Skill and Purpose

At the heart of Kant's concept of Cognition is the structuring of the sensory manifold that he calls Schematism.  However, he misses a correlate of Schematism in behavior--organized Motility, a common term for which is Skill.  Skill is the basis of behavior, evident in the learning of children from the earliest age, e. g. walking.  Skill is Know-How, and, hence, is the exercise of Technical Reason, i. e. the enactment of some explicit pattern, and, a special case of Technical Reason is Prescriptive Reason, in which the pattern is verbally formulated.  Now, Skill is autonomous and is enjoyed for its own sake.  So Skill that is heteronomously put to further Ends is derivative behavior, just as the pleasure from such Ends is extraneous to the enjoyability of Skill per se.  Hence, the common concept of such behavior that it is the basic unit of Psychology is erroneous, as is any Moral doctrine that takes such Psychology as its presupposition, e. g. Kant's doctrine.  The confusion bred by such superficial Psychology is aptly expressed by Kant's clumsy term 'purposeless purposiveness', that has no other way of characterizing a pre-purposeful phenomenon.  But the more fundamental problem for Kant is that the superficiality of his concept of 'Natural' behavior leaves the ground of his Moral doctrine unsteady, a problem that he might have avoided with a Groundwork that begins with his concept of Schematism, rather than with a popular concept of Duty.