Aristocracy, Democracy, and Phronetocracy

In the history of Political Philosophy, no term seems to have been more abused than 'Aristocracy'. These days, it is a derogatory term meaning, approximately, 'corrupt Oligarchy'. Hence, it is taken both as conflicting with Democracy, and as antithetical to any form of ideal government in general. But that meaning completely reverses its literal sense, as it was understood by the originators of the field. Literally, 'Aristocracy' means 'rule of the best', and, as Aristotle argues, Oligarchy is a degenerate form of it. However, even with that correction, Aristocracy and Democracy can still be taken to be mutually exclusive, primarily because, in an uncharacteristic lapse of analytical thoroughness, Aristotle never asks 'the best WHAT?', leaving the implication that he means 'the best Human', which contradicts the Equality entailed by Democracy. However, the contradiction can be easily dissolved, with the specification, 'the best qualified to lead', for, after all, Democracy is itself in part nothing but a means of determination of who the best-qualified leaders are. Furthermore, that specification is entirely indeterminate regarding quantity, i. e. it does not preclude a plurality, or even a universality of equally well-qualified leaders. Now, according to Evolvemental Phronetics, the criterion of leadership ability is comprehensiveness of perspective, or, to put it in more familiarly, wisdom. Hence, to avoid any terminalogical confusion, the best Political system for Evolvementalism can be called 'Phronetocracy'.

Phronetics and Equality

One main difference between Kantian and Humean Morality is widely recognized--Kant's is based on Reason, Hume's on the feeling of Sympathy. But another important difference has been treated only superficially. Kant's Principle is categorical, implying that everyone has at least the capacity to adhere to it. In contrast, Hume's is contingent, implying that not everyone has the capacity to be motivated by Sympathy. This implicit inequality has important political consequences, since Democracy presumes, like Kant does, at least an equality of capacity to participate in a process that requires recognition of one's kinship with others. So, if that capacity is lacking, Democracy reverts to at least Oligarchy, not merely in the actual governing institutions themselves, but in the processes of selecting who governs. The actual voting rates in the United States, as well as the contempt in which many Amercians are held by one political orientation or another, is strong evidence that the U. S., at least de facto, is today an Oligarchy. Now, the Evolvemental Phronetic Principle, 'Promote Evolvement as much as possible' defines 'as possible' not as Kant does, 'theoretically possible', but as Hume might, 'possible under the circumstances'. On the other hand, this allowance for an inequality of circumstance does not imply, as many of today's Oligarchs seem to have it, an immutability of any given incapacity to achieve a recognition of one's kinship with others, i. e. to participate effectively in a Democracy. Rather, it urges education in the direction of Idionomy, the factual falling short of which is no argument against its continuation.

Politics and Phronetics

Aristotle presents conflicting conceptions of the relation between Ethics and Politics. On the one hand, he has them as interrelated--the former is a preparation for the latter, and the latter is the actualization of the former. On the other hand, his highest Ethical Good, Contemplation, is explicitly apolitical activity. Christianity avoids any such confusion, with its distinction between 'rendering unto God' and 'rendering unto Caesar', which not only becomes ingrained in Euro-American culture, but implies that the basis of the distinction is a contrast between 'spiritual' and 'materialistic' Goods. But a more recent saying suggests an explanation of the distinction without invoking Metaphysical Dualism--'All politics is local'. For, Morality presumes to be Universal, which, in Political terms means that it represents an Internationalist perspective, which is usually far removed from Local concerns. Formulating the Politics vs. Ethics antagonism as Local vs. International demystifies their distinction, and suggests two ways to their reconciliation. First, the globalization of attitudes, which the Internet is effectively facilitating, can accelerate the Internationalization of Politics. Second, the cultivation of Individualism, as defined here, and as promoted by Evolvemental Phronetics, crosses borders without trivializing them. Particularity, i. e. defining someone as one of a type, is political partisanship, while Individualization transforms what one is part of to a part of what one is, i. e. transforms, for example, 'is American' from ='is a member of the set of Americans' to 'American is a member of the set of one's characteristics . Evolvementalism thus recovers the original Aristotelian conception of the complementary of Phronetics and Politics.

Phronetics and Economics

That Bentham's Moral System is a codification of Smith's Capitalism supports Dewey's contention that the Utilitarian 'calculus', including Mill's, is a reckoning that quantifies pleasures and pains as if they were monetary gains and losses. Dewey's criticism of Utilitarianism on Psychological grounds bypasses the more historically striking phenomenon of Morality becoming subordinate to Economics. In contrast, for Plato, Economic activity occurs at a lower part of the ideal Political entity, and for Aristotle, Economic well-being is a necessary condition of Happiness, but no more than that. Even Kant seems intimidated by the rise of Capitalism. While his Principle purports to transcend Economic motives, he misses an easy opportunity to explicitly subordinate the latter to the status of mere means, leaving his Theory vulnerable to Mill's interpretation of it as disguised Utilitarianism, and, hence, of disguised Economic Morality. In Evolvemental Phronetics, Economic activity is context-bound and receives no special consideration. The static possession of Economic goods, being no Action, has no Evolvemental Value. Saving or wisely investing money is likely to be more Evolving than squandering it. Turning a profit for two people is likely to be better than doing so for only one. An act that both generates a profit and is intellectually enriching is likely to be better than one that merely generates a profit, etc. In general, the pursuit of personal monetary gain is neither the best Conduct, as Bentham has it, nor 'the root of all Evil', as the saying goes, nor outside the sphere of Moral judgment, as some Systems seem to have it, but, rather, too narrow an Action to more than infrequently qualify as the choice in which one Evolves as much as possible.

Voting and Morality

There are two main theories regarding the nature of Democratic political processes. One, deriving from Locke, holds that one's vote is an expression of one's self-interest. The other, Rousseau's, holds that one's vote is an expression of one's opinion as to that is best for the collective as a whole. Considered as a Moral act, voting in the first sense is endorsed by Benthamism, while the second exemplifies Kantian and Millist Principles, i. e. Kant's Universalist paradigm, and Mill's 'greatest number' Consequentialism. There is perhaps no stronger evidence of the pervasiveness of Benthamism in American public life than the fact that few voters seem even aware of the possibility of the Rousseauian Principle. For Evolvemental Phronetics, Rousseauian voting is the more highly Evolved of the two types, because it entails a greater degree of Exposition. For sure, Lockeian Democracy is a significant Evolvement with respect to Monarchism, but the Rousseauian alternative proves that it is not the most highly Evolved Political System.

Benthamism

In scholarly circles, the Moral doctrine 'Utiliarianism' is usually associated with John Stuart Mill, but the Utilitarianism that is the more generally pervasive phenomenon may be that of the friend of Mill's father, Bentham. Bentham believed that the Highest Moral Good is the Greatest Happiness for the Greatest Number, and that the best means to that Good is everyone pursuing their own personal Happiness, so his Principle is 'Choose that act which best causes your own Happiness'. In contrast, Mill rejects the second of those beliefs, so his Principle is the more direct 'Choose that act which best causes the most Happiness for the most people. A simple example that bears out their differences is one in which person P has a choice between doing A, B, or C, in which A would benefit both P and another, Q; B would benefit P and have not effect on Q; and C would benefit P and harm Q. On Mill's evaluation, A is better than B, and B is better than C, but for Bentham, the effects on Q are irrelevant, so all three choices are of equal Moral Value. Now, while scrutiny bears up, for most analyists, the superiority of Mill's version, Bentham's codifies Adam Smith's Capitalism, and crystalizes the 'Liberty and Pursuit of Happiness' ethos of the U. S. Constitution, so his is the unofficial State Morality of the United States. But, Evolvemental Phronetics regards as especially inadequate both the Atomism and the Consequentialism of Benthamism: Atomism abstracts from the gregarious nature of the Individual, and Consequentialism places no value on the very performance of an Action. Hence, for example, the indifference to the drudgery of others that is codified in a Benthamist society, is a failure to promote Evolvement as much as possible, and, hence, is Phronetically unworthy.

Spinoza's Modes

A standard interpretation of Spinoza's Ethical program, which he does little to explicitly discourage, has it as a Rationalist Quietism that aims at the experience of an 'Adequate Idea', an epiphany which transforms the self-understanding of a human from one of an isolated creature governed by a self-preservative drive, to that of a particular 'Mode' of the Pantheistic God, who is identical to Nature, and who has both Mind and Body. However, this interpretation is difficult to reconcile with Spinoza's notion of God as fundamentally a creative process, 'nature naturing', and with his activistic Political Theory. Furthermore, he in places suggests that an 'Adequate Idea' is, in fact, genetic definition, e. g. the definition of a Circle instructs how to draw a circle, not a passive moment of realization, which is consistent with his notion of God as fundamentally a creative process. Spinoza may not have had the conceptual resources of Evolutionary Theory, or the innovations of Pragmatism, at his disposal. but this heterodox interpretation has him anticipating a transition from Quietist Ethics to Activist Phronetics, in which Modes are Individuals, not mere Particulars.

Appearance and Reality

'Appearances can be deceiving' is an uncontroversial common judgment, that entails a possibility--the 'can'-- that many prominent Philosophical doctrines have converted into a Principle. In them, 'Appearance', in general, is Ontologically inferior to, for example, 'The Thing-In-Itself', 'Reality', and 'Nothingness', and, in some cases, is treated as sub-real even without some superior correlate being posited. One problematic corollary of such doctrines is that processes such as manifesting, presenting evidence, exhibiting, and expressing, which are commonly regarded as valuable, must be dismissed as Ontologically degenerative. Now, Epistemological theories such as Coherentism and Constructivism have effectively shown how to accommodate the possible non-veridicality of an appearance without having to resort to Ontology, so they need not be repeated here. But they still fall short of accounting for the value of processes like manifesting, etc. In the Formaterial Individual, those processes are various modes of Exposition, one of the two main components of Evolvement, and, so, their value is accommodated by Evolvemental Phronetics.

Phenomenal Individuality

One version of the Humpty Dumpty doctrine has the cosmic fragmentation as a real event, with Morality as the program of actually trying to put the pieces back together. A more subtle, and powerfully influential version, might be called Phenomenal ('phenomenon'=the literally accurate 'appearance', not = the faddish 'extraordinary event') Humpty Dumpty-ism--Humpty has not actually fallen, but various parts of his body believe that he has. For example, the feeling in a particular finger might conclude not merely that this finger was absolutely severed from the others, but that the feeling itself is absolutely separate from other feelings. Analogously, many believe in the existence of a unitary collective 'Mind' or 'Soul' that is implanted in particular bodies, thereby losing sight of its own essential non-particularity. Morality in such doctrines thus consists in the Soul's or Mind's overcoming of the illusion of such particularity. Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, in places, and Heidegger, are among the more explicit advocates of such a doctrine, but it is also pervasively implicit. Correspondingly, Morality functions in them like a 'Wittgenstein's ladder', namely as a program that is rendered irrelevant by its successful completion. But, as is the case with all Humpty Dumpty doctrines, its soundness depends on its premise that Particularity lacks constructive meaning. Evolvementalism offers such a constructive meaning, so its Phronetics entails the cultivation of the Individuality of Particulars, not its repression.

Space, Time, and Phronetics

Humpty Dumpty Morality aims at the transcendence of 'Spatio-Temporality', because 'Space' and 'Time' are, according to that traditional doctrine, characteristics of the irreducible fragments that need to be re-assembled, in accordance with an original pre-condition. Even Heidegger's casting of 'Time' as that original entails the Ontological elimination of not merely particular 'Times' and 'Spaces', but of 'Space' in general. In contrast, Evolvement is an indefinite ascent into increasingly greater Complexity, and, as has been previously discussed, 'Spaces' and 'Times' are the generated structures of Individual Evolvement. Space and Time are thus intrinsic to Evolvemental Phronetics, for, the Principle 'Evolve as much as possible' is equivalent to 'Spatialize as much as can be Temporized'. In other words, in opposition to traditional Morality, Evolvemental Phronetics is essentially Spatio-Temporal.

Phronetics and Art

Aristotle's distinction between 'doing' and 'making' seems to suggest that he considers skilled productive activity, especially Art, as outside of the scope of Ethical evaluation. On the other hand, his Aesthetic theory focuses on Artistic products, rather than on the process of creating them, so the place of skilled activity, if any at all, in his Axiology remains uncertain. For Kant and Mill, Artistic activity merits no distinctive consideration, it being as subject to their respective evaluative processes as any other act, though Kant does hold up as an example the cultivation of one's talents as being Morally obliged. Formaterialism does not draw an essential distinction between doing and making, for every Action is at the same time an episode of self-cultivation by the Individual, a shaping of oneself in accordance with an Intention, as the common expressions 'making something of oneself' and 'inventing oneself' suggest. So, skilled activity is subject to the same Phronetic evaluation as any other Action, and furthermore, as controlled movement, often highly-developed, Artistic Action thus often entails a great degree of Evolvement. Worthy of special mention is the skilled use of implements and instruments. As Marx and McLuhan have noted, tools are extensions of the human body, and, so, their very use demands going outside oneself. Hence, the skilled use of implements and instruments in itself usually entails a great degree of Evolvement.

The Meaning of Life

Despite its brilliant cinematic skewering, the phrase 'the meaning of Life' remains a potentially serious matter. The question 'What is the meaning of Life?' has two main senses, depending on how 'meaning' is interpreted. A 'meaning' can be either a linguistic representation of some notion, or a purpose for current activity. That Life has a 'meaning' in the first sense is a central thesis for Philosophers such as Berkeley and Jaspers, who regard experiential phenomena as elements in a Divine language to be deciphered. That Life has a 'meaning' in the second sense is a central thesis of many teleological Systems, in which some ultimate goal is posited as that to which all activity must be oriented. Now, the idle entertainment of the question might deserve its skewering, but there are occasions in which its raising is indicative of a psychological crisis. Nietzsche diagnosis the crisis as a disillusionment that is the breeding-ground of Nihilism, so he proposes a new myth to replace the decline of the power of Religion in his era. Here, the crisis is interpreted as paralysis, i. e. that a loss of Faith is a loss of motivation, for which the cure is a redirecting of attention from 'beyond' Life to the Here and Now. Hence, the Phronetic Principle 'Evolve as much as possible' is also the Evolvemental answer to 'What is the meaning of Life?'

Reason and Instinct

According to the traditional conception, human behavior consists of two main components--Instinct and Reason. There is general agreement in the tradition that Instinct is fundamentally blind impulsive motion. But differences in conception of the nature of Reason, and how it relates to Instinct, are at the root of some significant Moral debates. 'Sentimentalists', such as Hume, believe Instinct chooses its own goal, and Reason serves only to calculate the best means to achieving the latter. 'Rationalists', such as Aristotle and Kant, insist, to the contrary, that Reason can constrain and override Instinct. One chronic shortcoming in the Rationalist analysis is the weakness of the explanations given as to how or why Instinct accedes to Reason. Aristotle goes no further than to simply state that it does, while Kant offers up a feeling of 'Respect' that Reason breeds, the unsatisfactoriness of which is underscored by his continuing to treat Reason as an uncomfortable yoke on Instinct. Nietzsche is more persuasive, because he challenges the presumed antagonism between Reason and Instinct, arguing, instead, that Reason is no more than an overpowering immanent harmonizing of Instincts. Still, all these positions share a common mis-analysis of the nature of Instinct, specifically that, in itself, it is pure unfettered impulsive motion. To the contrary, Instinct, in itself, is immobilized by the infinity of possible courses open to it. It seeks Form to release it, because Form selects and defines a channel for it. A sensory goal, as Dewey has shown, supplies such a Form, but so too does Reason. The advantage of Reason over Sense is that it offers wider scope to Impulse, in comparison with the mere immediate proximity of a sensory goal. Hence, Reason, far from being antagonistic to Instinct, is a facilitator of the latter, and as the Rationalistic argument should put it, one that is superior to Feeling. As the Formaterial conception of Individual Conduct has it, Instinct, i. e. the Material Principle finds an effective ambit-assessor in Reason, i. e. the Formal Principle, as they combine to Evolve to the greatest degree possible.

Imitation and Conduct

Imitation is the most slavish form of behavior. In human development, it is the most primitive, as children imitate those raising them. Likewise, in Philosophy's childhood, fidelity to a model, e. g. to a Platonic 'Form', is the criterion of behavioral evaluation. The Kantian revolution marks a maturation, insofar as linguistic expression becomes paradigmatic, freeing behavior from its dependence on the immediacy of imagistic or sensory exemplars. Correspondingly, the following of such a model is now discursive, an articulated rule-governed process. However, for Kant, the criterion for behavior is still fidelity to an exemplar, to his Fundamental Principle of Pure Practical Reason. Now, Deleuze's demonstration that Repetition is also Differentiation applies to Imitation. That is, just as Repetition can be conceived as a minimal degree of Differentiation, Imitation can be conceived as a minimal degree of behavioral Variation. Likewise, the following of a rule need no longer be construed as imitative, but can, rather, be conceived as, for example, expressive, and be evaluated in terms of, not its fidelity, but, rather, its scope and novelty. Conduct thus becomes truly Idionomic, as in the Evolvemental conception.

Bad Things, Good People

A common Moral question is 'Why do bad things happen to good people?'. The underlying premises of the question are that the cosmos is constituted such that 'Good' is rewarded and that 'Bad' is punished. The two most typical answers challenge the implied evidence of the question, namely, that a 'Good' person has been punished, specifically that what has transpired is a 'punishment'. Probably the more prevalent of the two insists that the ill that has befallen someone is not the expression of judgement, which, rather, might not become fully manifest until even an 'afterlife'. The other response challenges the observation that what has befallen one is actually 'Bad', arguing, instead, that it should be looked upon as a 'blessing in disguise'. Evolvementalism both rejects the Cosmological premises of the question and is critical of the Psychological premises of either response, especially the first. Except in cases of idle speculation, the question is raised when ill-fortune becomes too burdensome for one to proceed with their lives, so the response is necessary as a motivator. But continued psychological investment in promises that keep going unfulfilled only contributes to that burden, which the search for a 'silver lining' only eases modestly. In contrast, in Evolvemental Phronetics, the situation that Action modifies includes all givens, ill or otherwise, so misfortune is just one of the conditions that one might overcome or transform to a greater or lesser degree.

Moral Responsibility

'A bears Moral Responsibility for X' usually means one of two things. If X is a past event, it means 'A was the cause of X'. If X is a possible future act, it means 'A ought to do X'. In both cases, the attribution of Responsibility is typically grounds for Blame, i. e. in the former, to blame X for having done A, or for B which caused A, in the latter, to blame A if X does not get done. Even though an analogous analysis applies to Praise, it is rare that the question of Responsibility is raised in order to give credit. So, since Blameworthiness is usually grounds for punishment, the attribution of Responsibility is, generally, a justification for punishing somebody. But the most telling word in 'A bears Moral Responsibility for X' is the one that is seemingly the least significant--'for'. The import of the latter becomes evident in the comparison of 'responsible' with its synonym 'answerable', which is usually followed by a different preposition--'to'. This comparison makes conspicuous the absence of 'to' from a locution that literally connotes a process that is essentially a directed reaction. Without it, 'responsible' is as vacuous as 'answer' would be without a preceding question or address, exposing it, as Nietzsche charges, as a weapon. In the Formaterial Individual, one of the two fundamental processes, Propriation, is a making-one's-own of all one's acts. It thus suffices as an acknowledgement, to oneself, that one was 'the cause of X'. Such acknowledgement exhausts the concept of Phronetic Responsibility. Hence, responsivieness to others regarding what one has done is not to be confused with assuming Moral Responsibility for it, nor do the demands of others make one 'Morally Responsible' for what one might not do.

Happiness

'Eudaemonism' is the view that Happiness is the greatest Good, and its most prominent proponent has been Aristotle. It has been less successful in the Modern era, because the two most significant Moral theories of the past several centuries have found it insufficient--Kantianism, for which only deserved Happiness has Moral worth, and Utilitarianism, for which the greatest Good is Happiness for the greatest number. Perhaps the most notable defense of Eudaemonism in this era is one that is only implied. Emotivism is best known for its Axiological linguistic thesis that 'X is Good' means nothing more than 'I like X', which, it seems to be underappreciated, amounts to the normative equating Goodness and Happiness as well. However, none of these Modern theories of Happiness have reckoned with the full import of Aristotle's concept of Happiness, namely, that it is an "activity", not a passive state. Of the Moderns, it is perhaps Nietzsche who best appreciates Aristotle's Psychological insight that Happiness lies not in that having achieved or secured one thing or another, but in the development and exercise of one's abilities. There is nothing abstruse about that insight--the enjoyment of creative activity by anyone anywhere is ample testimony to its accuracy. The Evolvemental Phronetic emphasis on Action as the ultimate bearer of Value is likewise Eudaemonistic.

Tolerance, Sympathy, Respect

One common contemporary Moral Principle is 'Be tolerant', which requests non-interference in the activities of groups that one dislikes simply because they are different from one's own group. This is a very weak Principle, because it preserves both the attitudes that would generate interference, as well as the given social discord. A potentially more constructive Principle, promoted notably by Hume, as well as, and it cannot be repeated enough, Adam Smith, is 'Be sympathetic'. The shortcoming of this precept is that, as even Hume acknowledges, it depends on the existence of some cognized similarity between apparent strangers, which may not always obtain. Another problem with it, which is implied in Kant's 'Be respectful', is that kinship with another can be in terms of some ignoble characteristic. In contrast, Kant's insistence is that the object of Respect always be the Rational nature of another, which, is not only a 'higher' characteristic, but one that is a potential of all humans, meaning that the Principle can serve as the basis of a Universal social bond. But the problem with the notion 'we are all the same inside' which is common to both Humean and Kantian Morality, is that it is profoundly ungrounded. Rather, as Levinas, notably, has argued, the private experience of another is infinitely inaccessible to one, even if, as Kant argues, it entails structural similarities. Furthermore, it is, quite to the contrary, in public activites--conversation, collective projects--that people assimilate to one another. Levinas thus promotes the Principle, drawn from Buber, 'Treat another as a Thou.' But the limitation of this formula is that the only alternative in Buber's System to 'Thou' is 'It', meaning that the Ethical treatment of someone that one is not face-to-face with is impossible. In other words, it does not recognize as persons 'He', 'She', or even 'One'. Now, the concept of Individual that has been introduced here accommodates Others both present and absent, and plainly undercuts the stereotyping that is at the root of most intolerance. Hence, 'Treat someone else as an Individual' is a comprehensive potential antidote to the latter, and is entailed in 'Promote Evolvement' as a necessary condition.

Setting an Example

In Kant's Moral Principle, 'Act only on that maxim that you can at the same time will to be a Universal Law', the most indeterminate aspect is 'you can. . .will to be'. Kant's own discussion encourages the most common interpretation, one which minimizes the roles of 'you can' and 'will', leaving the essential meaning of the formula as 'Act only on that maxim that can at the same time be a Universal Law'. On that interpretation, the Principle serves as a test of the logical soundness of a maxim, a test that is conducted impersonally. In contrast, some of Nietzsche's writings suggest a stronger reading of 'will', namely, where he urges that Philosophers be legislators, not mere spectators. An example of a legislative application of the Principle is Rawls' interpretation of 'will to be a Universal Law' as a process of rule-writing at the inception of some collective activity. Rawls is explicitly targeting politico-economic institutions with this interpretation, so he abstracts from the role of personal maxims, and their Moral import, in the formula. A third, uncommon, interpretation both retains the maxim as the point of departure of the Principle, and construes 'you. . . can . . . will' as personally active. That reading is 'Act only in such a way that you can at the same time set an example'. An example has the same Universality as a Law, setting an example involves active willing, and 'can' indicates the personal effort required to set an example of one's projected course of Action. Now, Exposition is the process of Externalizing oneself, and Externalizing oneself to a Universal audience entails a great degree of Exposition, so, example-setting entails a great degree of Exposition. Thus, since Individual Evolvement is Exposition without loss of Propriation, the deliberate and controlled effort to set an example is highly Evolved Conduct. Hence, on the heterodox reading, Kant's Principle promotes highly Evolved Conduct.

Virtue

Aristotle's and Kant's theories of Virtue differ in two main respects. First, since they are informed by different Principles, their contents correspondingly differ. The second respect is structural. For Aristotle, Virtue is a species of acquired habit, which means that a Virtue can become an automatic character trait via the repetition of relevant behavior. For Kant, though, Virtue can never become permanently acquired, because adherence to Principle is constantly being newly challenged. While the Evolvemental Phronetic Principle differs in content from Kant's, because it evaluates the performance of Action, it agrees with him that adherence to it is always an ongoing challenge. Furthermore, to whatever extent Aristotle means 'habit' to be a conditioned tendency to respond to a situation in a certain way, what qualifies for him as 'Virtuous' behavior has no Evolvemental Value. On the other hand, the process of character-building does have Evolvemental Value, because the Individual's deliberate shaping of motion involved in the process appropriately coordinates Exposition and Propriation.

Utilitarianism

'Consequentialism' is the view that the Moral worth of an act lies in its consequences. The most important version of that doctrine is John Stuart Mill's 'Utilitarianism', which holds that the best act possible is the one that produces the greatest Happiness for the greatest number, with 'Happiness' calculated in terms of Pleasure and Pain. As simple as this formulation is, especially in comparison with Kant's Principle, what Mill had in mind for it is unclear. At times he seems to intend it as a description, as if it were presenting a Psychological or Anthropological account of a mode of behavior called 'Moral Evaluation'. Hence, his criticism of Kantian Morality is that it mischaracterizes relevant phenomena. On the other hand, his revision of Bentham's Utilitarianism entails some unequivocal normative elements, e. g. that the latter fails to consider the effect of one's act on others, and that its calculus fails to distinguish between 'higher' and 'lower' pleasures. But, in either case, description or prescription, Mill's Principle has its shortcomings. As a description, it might be valid for given phenomena, but it lacks the capacity to accommodate novel Moral activity, or to respond to the challenge that even if it is the criterion of Moral worth, Happiness ought not to be. As a prescription, the Principle recommends the calculation of consequences for the choosing and guiding Conduct. But such calculation, according to Mill's own theory of Induction, can only be a projection of what has previously transpired, and, hence, can only recommend a repetition of previous examples of pleasure- and Happiness-causing. Hence, it lacks the capacity to recommend innovation. Thus, according to the Evolvemental calculus, the Utilitarian Principle has minimal Phronetic Value, not to mention that Evolvemental Phronetics stands as a counter-example to descriptive Utilitarianism.

Virtue and Reward

It is sometimes said that 'Virtue is its own reward', but Kant is not an advocate of that Principle. His view is, instead, that, first, Virtue cannot be its own reward, and second, that Virtue ought to be rewarded. The former follows from his definition of 'Virtue' as the continuous attempt to adhere to impersonal Pure Practical Reason. But, because the latter emerges only as part of his further project of reconciling Reason and the popular Religion of his era, his defense of it noticeably flounders. His contention in one place that impersonal Reason has an interest in personal Happiness is question-begging, while his argument in another that personal suffering can weaken Moral resolve conflicts with his Principle that Moral motivation must be unselfish. The softness of the latter defense is perhaps best illustrated by its straw-man branding of Spinoza as an 'Atheist'. Spinoza, rather, is a 'Pantheist', a crucial point in the context, because his advocacy of 'Virtue is its own reward' is of a piece with his Religious position. In that System, 'Virtue' consists in one's joyful realization that one's action is itself a mode of Divine activity. So, in the process of misrepresenting Spinoza, Kant's challenge exposes how his own sundering of Virtue and Reward is a product of a Morality that, from the outset, separates Self and Other, Intention and Action. Furthermore, according to the Formaterial analysis of Action, Joy is not an extrinsic possible adjunct to the latter, but is itself the experience of the buoyant energy of nascent motion. Hence, in Evolvemental Phronetics, 'Virtuous' Action, i. e. best Conduct, needs no 'reward'. Also, as I have argued in a different context, Kant's failure to demonstrate that, according to Reason, Virtue deserves Happiness, fatally undermines his effort to reconcile Reason and Religion, an effort that is more a betrayal of Reason than a critique of it.

Phronetics and Rational Conduct

According to one contemporary popular image, a 'rational' person is someone who is cold, calculating, and controlling. A main part of this image has its roots in Hume's conception of 'Rationality'. For him, 'Reason' is distinct from the 'Passions', and serves them in a calculative capacity, i. e. to help determine the best means to the ends that they desire. But, in this model, only a Passion has motive power, to which Reason is subservient, so the notion of Reason as controlling cannot come from it. Rather, the latter is probably derived from the Kantian-Hegelian-Marxian conception of 'Reason' as the power of Totalization, which is often difficult to distinguish from Totalitarianist tendencies . One significant defense of Reason comes from someone hardly known as a Rationalist, namely Nietzsche, who characterizes it as a harmony of the Passions, not as an adversarial force. Here is perhaps a descendent of Aristotle's Theory of Moderation, except that in the latter, Reason is an independent external power, whereas for Nietzsche the harmonization is immanent. In Formaterialism, Reason is another name for the Formal Principle, so, in the Individual, it is another name for Propriation. It is thus essential to Individual Evolvement, as much so as is the Material Principle, Exposition, so it is neither the exclusive nor the predominant component in the Conduct that Evolvemental Phronetics promotes.

Phronetics and Justice

The Republic may be Plato's greatest work, because converging in it are his two main influences--Pythagorean Metaphysics and the fate of Socrates. But, while it stands as the seminal study of Political Philosophy, its central question, 'What is Justice?', has received relatively scant attention from a tradition that has been described as 'a series of footnotes to Plato'. It is thus somewhat surprising that the topic has recently had an increase in scrutiny in a place that has been typically indifferent to the Philosophical tradition, namely the American public. The occasion has been a debate between Nozick and Rawls over not so much the nature of Justice, but over which type of Justice is pre-eminent, Retributive or Distributive--for Nozick, Justice consists fundamentally in one's inalienable Right to what one has legitimately acquired, while for Rawls, it is in an equitable distribution of goods. Because this debate bears upon one of the central political conflicts of the time, namely Tax policy, it has drawn more than mere Academic interest. Now, because in Plato's description of Ideal Political organization, the Whole determines the Parts, he might be interpreted as according priority to Distributive Justice. But, his answer to his question is deeper than classificatory. For him, Justice is fundamentally an intra-personal condition--a well-ordered Soul, meaning that the Just treatment of others is, first and foremost, an expression of the Justness of character of the one conducting themselves towards them, with which Aristotle is in agreement. In the Formaterial Individual, a well-ordered 'Soul' consists in the balance between Propriation and Exposition. In other words, 'Justice' is another name for Individual Evolvement, and, so, is entailed in what the Phronetic Principle promotes.

Phronetics and Biblical Morality

Advocates of 'Biblical Morality' tend to gloss over the point that the Old Testament is not as monolithic on the topic as they usually represent it to be. Most notably, while one of the Ten Commandments forbids Killing, elsewhere God commands Abraham to do just that. That is, in one place Morality consists in the performance or non performance of certain acts, while in the other, the Principle is obedience to God, regardless of content. The death penalty for murder and faith-based war are two of the most common expressions of the equivocality of this Morality. Furthermore, these alternatives do not exhaust the Moral resources of the Old Testament. A little-appreciated third Principle can be easily inferred from Genesis. There, God is the Creator, and humans are created 'in his image'. Hence, humans are fundamentally creative, yielding the Principle 'Be creative!' The latter is equivalent to 'Evolve!', so Evolvemental Phronetics is no less consistent with Biblical Morality than is the more familiar version of the latter. Though, killing another will, except in immediately dire circumstances, always be among the less Evolved, less creative, courses of Action possible.

Phronetics and Language

Perhaps the most pervasive theme of contemporary Philosophy is Language, with Analytic Philosophy, Logical Postivism, Structuralism, and Deconstructionism among the most prominent treatments of the topic. These various theories seem to agree, in general, that the essential function of Language is to describe the world, even those which conceive of it as a 'game'. Accordingly, the primary influence of Kant on Philosophy of Language is usually taken to be Positivistic, namely the notion that what is linguistically undescribable is unknowable. So, Kant's explicit innovation in this Philosophical field has gone generally unappreciated. Language is central to his Moral Theory, which is based on Maxims and Imperatives, both linguistic constructions. His implicit thesis is that Rational behavior is essentially linguistic--the Maxim articulates a plan of possible personal action, and the Categorical Imperative formulates an evaluation of Maxims with respect to their transpersonal worth. Mead, most notably, though generally unbeknownst to the mainstream of Philosophy of Language, infers that Language is fundamentally Communication, and Communication is the medium of socialization, which explains the converse of the Kantian thesis, namely that Language is fundamentally a determinant of behavior. This view complements of the central theses of Pragmatism--that Epistemic description is fundamentally prescriptive, namely, not an account of what is, but a formula articulating how to go about discovering, testing, and confirming those proposed accounts. Evolvemental Phronetics is squarely in the Pragmatist tradition: Language functions Formatively in Conduct, i. e. as a guide, and the communication of an Individual with other Individuals always entails personal growth.

Phronetics and Politics

The existence today of such institutions as 'Ethics Commissions', that function to investigate political corruption, would seem to suggest an adversarial relation between Ethics and Politics. In contrast, Aristotle presents his Theory of the former as preparatory to that of the latter. For, in his System, Ethics is the cultivation of Reason in a person, and Politics is the arena for the practice of it. However, he compromises this systematization, when he also asserts that Contemplation, which is an entirely private experience, is the highest Rational activity achievable. Antagonism between Ethics and Politics in Western culture became ingrained over the centuries, especially when promoted by the influential Scriptural distinction drawn between 'rendering unto God' and 'rendering unto Caesar', and when codified by the Hobbesian notion of Politics as a necessary evil. One interpretation of Spinoza, namely that which has Political activity for him being the expression of Ethically enlightened individuals, and Kant's notion of a 'Kingdom of Ends', suggest, at least in principle, an overcoming of that antagonism. Now, since Idionomic interpersonal activity of any sort is an experience in which an Individual Evolves, Evolvemental Phronetics rejects the tradition that opposes Ethics and Politics.

Art and Phronetics

The most significant element of the Kantian revolution is his conception of Reason as being fundamentally Practical, not Theoretical, as tradition had previously had it. But, a subtler perhaps equally subversive component of his System is his analysis of the appreciation of Beauty, specifically his thesis that such contemplation entails a 'play' of the cognitive faculties. That such motions are intrinsic to the experience of Contemplation undermines the Platonist model that continues to influence Philosophical theories, of Contemplation as a closed static passive experience. One exception has been Dewey, who argues that the contemplation of Art is not merely passive but involves constructive cognitive processes as well. But probably the most ambitious overturning of Contemplationism comes from Nietzsche, with his 'Will to Power', which is oriented to the production of Creativity, not its reception. This overturning of Platonism is rooted in his continuation of Schopenhauer's prioritizing of Music over the visual arts. And, at one point he asserts that Music is fundamentally localized Dance, namely a Dance of the player's hands, fingers, breathing, etc., as well as of the listener's hearing. So, another challenge to Platonism can target the implicit prioritizing of visual Aesthetic experience in Contemplationism. Thus, if, in contrast, Dance is Philosophically paradigmatic, Value attaches to structured motion, not to passive viewing. Individual Evolvement is structured motion, so Evolvemental Phronetics promotes activities that may be contrary to Platonistic Value Systems.

The Phronetics of Religious Experience

The Evolvemental challenge to traditional Religious Cosmogony does not imply a denial in principle of any Phronetic value to practical Religious experience. For example, it does not necessarily endorse actions that Scriptures proscribe, but, rather, finds the Morality entailed by them to be, as a whole, incoherent and ungrounded--in one place killing a human is Divinely forbidden, while in another, it is Divinely commanded, with obedience to Divine power in either case being contrary to Idionomy. Furthermore, there is more to 'Religious experience' than subscribing to a Cosmogonic doctrine or adhering to a Scriptural formula. In fact, it seems to be rarely appreciated that there are two very different types of Religious experience--private and social, the grounds of which are suggested by Nietzsche's Apollinian/Dionysian, respectively, distinction, but never developed by him in his critique of conventional Religion. Private Religious experience, e. g. prayer, is an escape from environing society, an attempt to strengthen what is most personal. In contrast, public Religious experience, e. g. Dionysian frenzy, is an escape from one's particularity, an attempt to dissolve it into the collective. In the Individual, these are extreme instances of Propriation and of Exposition, which have Phronetic value when they are appropriately combined. Ecstasy is the harmonization and mutual enhancement of Internalization and Externalization, not the elimination of one, the other, or the difference between them. It is an Evolvemental episode.

Benefitting Others

If, as seems to be commonly thought, the Principle 'Benefit others' is the basis of Morality, it is a shaky foundation. Even 'Help those in need' often must be qualified by '. . . if they cannot help themselves', or by '. . . so long as doing so is not to the detriment of someone else, including oneself'. Furthermore, the centering of Morality on the benefitting of someone else is based on the Psychological premise that one will only act in one's self-interest unless otherwise prompted, a premise that has been previously challenged here. Finally, the formula 'Benefit others' leaves completely undetermined what constitutes 'benefit', meaning that some other Principle, namely one that defines the ultimate bearer of Value, would be the one that is at the heart of Morality. For example, in Evolvemental Phronetics, Evolvement is that bearer. So, the Phronetic Principle, with respect to others, is 'Promote Evolvement as much as possible'. Now, what constitutes Evolvement will vary from situation to situation. For example, if Need is overwhelming someone's capacity for self-motivation, then supplying them with food, clothing, shelter, etc. qualifies as promoting Evolvement. If someone lacks the education that will help them achieve Individual Reflection, then teaching them promotes Evolvement. If some collective project would give someone the opportunity to grow socially, then including them in the activity promotes Evolvement. Furthermore, the more who Evolve because of a course of Action, the greater the degree of Evolvement that has been promoted. And, promoting the Evolvement of others entails extending oneself beyond the sphere of self-interest. So, in promoting the Evolvement of others, one is oneself Evolving as well.

Ethics and Exteriority

For Levinas' Phenomenological Deontology, the sphere of Ethics is what he calls 'Exteriority'. Whereas 'Interiority' in his System characterizes the privacy of Consciousness, Exteriority is what is, in principle, beyond the reach of that Consciousness, namely the experience undergone by an Other, which one has access to only through the intrusion into one's own experience of the Face of the Other. In particular, Ethics begins, for Levinas, with one's being made aware of the expression of Need in the Face of the Other, which one experiences as inescapably deontological. Conscience is, thus, for Levinas, an external image, not an internal voice. In contrast, what is most fundamentally External to Consciousness in the Formaterial Individual is one's own Externalizing movements, processes which have typically been beyond the ken of the Phenomenalistic-Phenomenological tradition. Hence, one's experience of an Other as Exterior presupposes the extending of oneself towards them, e. g. a gesture of welcome, an invitation to share a problem, etc. In other words, it is the doing or not doing something about someone else's need, not the mere awareness of it, that opens up the sphere of Evolvemental Phronetic concern. More generally, the benefitting of another that Individual Evolvement entails is that which is not to the detriment of oneself. That is, the sphere of Phronesis is not exclusively Exteriority, but both Interiority and Exteriority, in combination.