Saturday, August 31, 2019

Certainty and Autonomy

Disembodiment in Modern Philosophy begins when Descartes, who, at the beginning of the Meditations, is surely sitting at a desk writing, represents himself as gazing at a fire.  Likewise, Locke, who is similarly situated, represents a blank page as a blank mind, and his filling it with words as receiving impressions. Now, searching for Certainty from Descartes' actual immediate situation can lead to the seemingly patent falsehood of "I am not writing this", and, hence to the indubitable "I write, therefore I am".  Still, one might be dreaming, or one's hand might be under the control of some external force, e. g. in the case of so-called 'automatic writing'.  But such doubt can be thwarted by an attempt to stop writing.  Now, the attempt may fail, but in itself, success or failure, it certainly occurs.  Hence, regardless of whether success or failure is dependent on external intervention or a healthy Motor system, the attempt itself remains in one's control.  Thus, in a re-embodied context, Certainty. supreme value of Modern Philosophy, is revealed to be Autonomy, as emerges in Kant's system, and as is clear to Nietzsche.

Friday, August 30, 2019

Sense-Experience and Dualism

In ordinary experience, sense-information is acquired by the functioning of the sense-organs, in coordination with other parts of the body, e. g. the sighting of a puddle to be side-stepped.  Now, Sense-Experience can be distinguished from Motor-Experience, but only analytically, just as inhalation from exhalation.  For, concretely, they are combined in the behavior of an organism.  In contrast, for many Philosophers, Sense-Experience is the foundation of Experience, and what it is distinguished from, if not antithetical to, is Reason.  In many of these cases, Sense-Experience is conceived as inferior to Reason, but, in others, to the contrary, and in at least one case, i. e. Berkeley, it is the source of divine communication.  In all of them, the distinction is the fundamental Philosophical topic, i. e. Empiricism vs. Rationalism.  But, regardless of which is privileged, Sense-Experience is implicitly conceived as absolutely independent of Motor-Experience, which is usually not even recognized in either system. In other words, this debate that dominates Modern Philosophy presupposes the disembodiment of Sense-Experience, as a continuation of the long tradition of Mind-Body quasi-Dualism.  It thus perpetuates the fracturing of the Human Organism that has its origins at least as far back as Parmenides, and is profoundly reinforced by Medieval Theology, i. e. the doctrine of the Salvation of the Soul.

Thursday, August 29, 2019

Perception and Body

For Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, Experience is fundamentally Perception, so the Forms of Experience are those of Cognition.  In particular, Space and Time are the Forms of Intuition.  But, unclear in his system is the Spatiality of the body of perceiver, not as an object of perception, rather as lived, e. g. whether or not the hand that is feeling something is at the same location as the hand that the perceiver can see is to the side of their torso.  In contrast, there is not such unclarity insofar as Experience is conceived as fundamentally Action.  For, in that concept, the body of the Agent is the ground of Space--the Spatiality of the body is the basis of the Spatiality of potential objects of action, e. g. to the left, to the right, ahead, behind, above, below, etc.  Accordingly, Space is a Form of Action insofar as it is the Form of the Body of the Agent.  But, parts of the Body include the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, and the skin, and factors of Action include looking, listening, smelling, tasting, and touching.  Accordingly, insofar as Experience is Action, Space is an a priori Form of Intuition because it is first a Form of the Body.  From that perspective, the status of Perception in the Critique of Pure Reason is the same as it is in most of Modern Epistemology, especially as it is for Berkeley--disembodied.

Wednesday, August 28, 2019

Heteronomy, Autonomy, Sense-Experience, Motor-Experience

More significant in Kant's system than the Theory-Practice distinction, and perhaps underlying it, is that of Heteronomy and Autonomy.  Insofar as Theoretical Reason consists in the processing of received Sense-Data, it is fundamentally Heteronomous.  So, with the establishment of the primacy of Autonomy in the Critique of Practical Reason, a revision of what is essentially a Heteronomous concept of Experience that the Critique of Pure Reason presents is called for, but not offered by Kant.  Now, as has been previously discussed, the Utilitarian concept of Experience, i. e. in which a Perception-Object is conceived as primarily a Use-Object, proposed by Bergson and Heidegger, presents a concept of Experience as fundamentally Practical.  However, it is not necessarily that of an Autonomous Experience.  Instead, a concept of Autonomous Experience must include a revision of one of the staples of Modern Epistemology--a revision of the acceptance of Sensation as the foundation of Sense-Experience, an apparently irreducibly Heteronomous moment.  But, Sensation is itself the product of an abstraction--from a possibly Autonomous process, i. e. from an act of Sensing.  For, Sight, Sound, Odor, Flavor, and Texture, are each abstractions--from Looking, Listening, Smelling, Tasting, and Touching, all, in fact, motor activities.  So, the more thorough revision implied by the Critique of Practical Reason of the concept of Experience presented in the preceding Critique is one that includes a replacement of Sense-Experience by the Motor-Experience which is its ground.

Tuesday, August 27, 2019

Schematism, Techne, Reflective Judgment

Techne plays a crucial role in the Critique of Pure Reason, though Kant does not recognize it as such.  Instead, he calls it Schematism--"an art concealed in the depths of the human soul"--which not only unifies Thought and Sense, but, as Heidegger observes, is the original ground of the apparent Duality.  So, a Third Critique could, similarly, reveal Technical Reason as the original Organic ground of the apparent Duality of Practical Reason and Pure Reason, i. e. by showing how a rule guides conduct.  However, Judgment, instead, is the topic of his Third Critique, but not as an expression of architectonic elegance, rather, as a solution to a problem that emerges at the end of the Critique of Practical Reason. In the latter, he arrives at the concept of Happiness proportionate to Virtue, on the basis of a Rational development, thus still needing an Empirical grounding, i. e. an explanation of how Happiness, an Empirical event, can be interpreted as the effect of a divine reward, a non-Empirical cause.  The solution is the same as how Beauty, a private Pleasure, can be attributed to an external object--via Reflective Judgment, or, in other words, heuristic Judgment.  Thus, as a consequence of a Theological commitment, instead of discovering the original Organic unity of the Theoretical Reason-Practical Reason Duality, Kant settles for what is essentially an imaginary ad hoc conjoining of the two.  The contrast of these two possible syntheses illustrates how the influence of Medieval Theology has reinforced the quasi-Dualism introduced into Philosophy by Parmenides, previously discussed, or conversely, why Ancient Philosophy has been so useful to that Theology.  Even Heidegger seems to miss another possible application of his insight into the unity of Kant's Schematism--to his own Being-Beings quasi-Dualism.

Monday, August 26, 2019

Pleasure, Quality, Organism

If, as Bergson and Heidegger propose, Experience is fundamentally Utilitarian, then the fundamental Sensations are not colors, sounds, etc., but Pleasure and Pain.  The abstraction of Perceptual Experience from Utilitarian Experience is thus evident from the outset of Modern Philosophy, when Descartes ignores that fire is a Utility-Object, and an occasion of Pleasure or Pain, e. g. of warmth or burning.  Likewise, Pleasure and Pain are among neither the Primary nor Secondary Qualities of the Empiricists, classifiable instead as Tertiary Qualities, by virtue of Utilitarian Experience being associated with Perceptual Experience as an inessential super-stratum.  That distinction continues in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, as Kant studies the enjoyment of Secondary Qualities occasioned by the perception of either natural or artificial objects.  However, in his establishment of a criterion of Aesthetic Judgment, the object of Pleasure shifts from the Senses themselves to their "play".  However, Kant does not recognize that such Pleasure is thus an example of not enjoyment of Secondary Qualities, but of what might be called a 'joy of movement', of which the interplay of the Senses is a special case.  He thus does not recognize that his criterion of Aesthetic Judgment is nothing other than the judge's Pleasure at dancing, i. e. skilled activity unifying multiple parts of the judge.  In that context, Beauty is not the 'symbol of the Good', but a stimulus to the creative activity of an Organism that is more than merely a subject of Utility and Perception.

Sunday, August 25, 2019

Theory, Practice, Techne

Kant himself betrays his subordination of Theoretical Reason to Practical Reason.  For, in his Third Critique, presumably designed to synthesize the first two, Theory regains the ascendancy.  This status is plainly expressed in general by the focus on Judgment, and, specifically, when he subordinates Genius to Taste.  If, instead, the synthesis retained the primacy of Practice, then the resultant combination would be Technical Reason, i. e. how Theory guides Action.  Likewise, if Taste were incorporated into Artistic Creativity, then the resultant combination would be Technical Reason.  From there, Kant might later have recognized the role of Technical Reason in his brief consideration of the concept of Organism, rather than merely analyzing the cognitive grounds of the concept.  And, it might not be until nearly the end of Dewey's career that the Pragmatism that is inspired by Kant's Practical concern even considers Art as a mode of active Experience.

Saturday, August 24, 2019

Techne and Ecology

As has been previously discussed, the subject of Techne is an Organism, i. e. because Know-How is animated behavior that unifies parts.  So, the attribution of Know-How to non-Human Organisms that is common in contemporary Biology is Anthropomorphic, based on the concept of a Human as a subject of Techne.  Likewise, the consequent general replacement of the Newtonian concept of the World by an Ecological concept, i. e. consisting in the interplay of Organisms, is grounded in the concept of a Human as a subject of Techne.  Now, literally, 'technology' means the 'study of techne', and, hence, of how Technical Knowledge determines behavior, e. g. following a set of instructions.  So, 'Technology', properly speaking, could apply to the process of building tools and instruments, and of operating them.  But, the operation of them in which what they are applied to is conceived as inert Matter is antithetical to the concept of Techne that is systematically related to an Ecological concept of the World.  In other words, the common association with 'technology' and environmental destruction is based on a misuse of that term.  Rather, implicit in that destructiveness is a regression to the Newtonian concept of the World as constituted by inert Matter, an Anthropomorphic concept based on the quasi-Dualistic concept of the Human subject as a Body essentially severed from a Mind/Soul.

Friday, August 23, 2019

Techne and Organism

The experience of Techne--know-how, skilled activity, behavior in accordance with some formula--is familiar in everyday life.  It combines Theory and Practice, and Mind and Body, and consists in a combination of Unity and Multiplicity.  It thus presents an example of an Organism that is easily accessible to Reflection.  Now, one proponent in the history of Philosophy of the primacy of Techne has been Protagoras.  But for the most part, Philosophical Reflection has been at the service of detachment from Corporeality, a result of which has been the predominance of quasi-Dualism and the separation of Unity and Multiplicity.  Accordingly, the rare attention to the concept of Organism, e. g. from Kant and Whitehead has been in terms of a transcendent Duality, e. g. Theory and Practice, Efficient Causality and Teleological Causality, etc.  In contrast, Reflection on skilled behavior easily reveals a concept of Organism that seems to be familiar to everybody but most Philosophers.

Thursday, August 22, 2019

The World, Anthropocentrism, Anthropomorphism

Bergson develops a post-Kantian concept of Experience as Practical, combining both Anthropocentrism and Anthropomorphism.  In the concept of Experience as Practical, an Object is fundamentally that of Use, rather than of Perception, a concept further developed by Heidegger.  So, this concept of the World as at the disposal of a Human for usage is Anthropocentric.  Furthermore, Bergson conceives a Use-Object as constituted by inert Matter.  This concept is Anthropomorphic--it derives the concept of the Object as inert from the concept of one's Body as in itself inanimate, a concept that has its Modern roots in Descartes' severing of Mind from Body in his quest for Certainty, and identifying Mind and Soul.  In other words, Bergson's concept of a Use-Object as inert is the product of an Anthropomorphic interpretation of it on the basis of the concept of the Human Body as essentially inanimate.  In contrast, for example, Anthropomorphizing the World on the basis of a concept of a Human as an Organism yields a concept of an Ecosystem.  On that basis, the concept of a Use-Object can be conditioned by an Ecological principle, e. g. when cutting down a tree for lumber can have adverse environmental consequences.  Likewise, more generally, Anthropocentrism can thus be conditioned by Anthropomorphism.

Wednesday, August 21, 2019

Knowledge, Anthropomorphism, Principle of Sufficient Reason

Parmenides can be excused more easily than Bergson for not considering Kant's Anthropomorphic thesis that Knowledge of Being is mediated by the conditions of Knowledge, a thesis that could explain why the Monism of each begins in Reflection, previously discussed.  Now, according to Kant, those conditions are the Forms of Intuition, and the Temporalized Categories of Understanding.  But, despite his eventual establishment of the primacy of Practice over Theory, he does not revise his concept of Experience accordingly, so he does not recognize that the Form of the Objects of Knowledge are, instead, that of Action determined by a Rational principle.  Such Anthropomorphization is plain in ordinary experience whenever, for example, Intention is attributed to a barking dog.  So, if the Knowledge of Being is structured in terms of the conditions of Human Experience, and the primary Form of Human Experience is Rational agency, then Being is Known in terms of a Principle of Sufficient Reason.  But, Parmenides and Bergson alike abstract from the Corporeal expressions of such Rational agency, thereby each arriving at a quasi-Dualist Monism, differing in respect of Rest vs. Motion, but not in respect of Unity vs. Multiplicity.  Implicit in such Monism is a severing of the Principle of Sufficient Reason from what it grounds.  Much of the subsequent history of Philosophy continues that abstraction effected by Parmenides.

Tuesday, August 20, 2019

Monism, Multiplicity, Corporeality

Though Socrates is often considered to introduce Reflection into Philosophy, Parmenides' formulation that Thought and its Object are one and the same suggests that reflection on his own Mental processes is a factor in his Monism.  Now, details of his concept of Mind, other than an allusion to the Logos are sparse, but from his The One principle, it can be inferred that Thought, too, is, for him, absolutely simple.  Hence, he has abstracted it from its organic functions, including directing and coordinating motor activities, and organizing sensory data.  Accordingly, the abstraction by which Unity and Multiplicity are severed in his Monism perhaps originates in Reflection.  Likewise, Bergson's Monism develops from an examination of a flux of inner states that are primarily feelings, and then decisively distinguishes Pure Memory from Motor Memory.  The underlying aim of the traditional severing of Multiplicity from Unity thereby becomes explicit--escape from Corporeality, a Philosophical motive that has been so pervasive that even Spinoza briefly betrays his Parallelism to accommodate the possibility.

Monday, August 19, 2019

The One, Multiplicity, Motion

Perhaps because of the rivalry with Heraclitus, and Zeno's arrow and Achilles paradoxes, Parmenides' The One is probably best known as opposed to Motion.  However, the term itself, as opposed to, say, Eternity, connotes Number and Quantity primarily, on the basis of which its character of Changelessness is an attribute, not a constituent.  Regardless, a problem for Parmenides is his use of "continuous" to characterize Changelessness.  For, Continuity connotes Temporal diversity, and, hence, Multiplicity, without which, Changelessness signifies nothing other than Death.  But a perhaps bigger problem for him is that there is a readily available example of Continuity--Motion--which consists in both Unity and Multiplicity.  Hence, Parmenides' own words betray his derivation of The One from a more fundamental One-Many combination, a criticism seemingly overlooked by his staunchest opponents over the centuries--Heraclitus and Bergson.  Bergson overlooks it because his system is ultimately only a variety of Monism, with dynamic Spirit as its unitary principle.  He thus shares with Parmenides a depreciation of Multiplicity--in his case consigning it to the realm of Matter, which he conceives to be degenerated Spirit.  This agreement with Parmenides thus confirms that the primary opposition of The One is to Multiplicity, not to Motion.

Sunday, August 18, 2019

Monism, Pluralism, Atomism, Capitalism

As has been previously discussed, Monism and Pluralism are inverse varieties of quasi-Dualism.  For, each is a Transcendent Dualism regarding the relation between One and Many, and each privileges one of them.  Now, Atomism seems to be a variety of Pluralism, primarily insofar as it conceives Unity as merely nominal.  However, insofar as Atomism entails the concept of the Externality of Relations, it is Monist.  For, from the perspective of an Atom, all alteriority is inferior to it, an inegalitarianism that is expressed concretely in contemporary Capitalist Selfishness.  Pluralism can avoid dissipation into such Atomism only by recognizing a common unifying factor.  To Smith, the Invisible Hand might function as such a unifying factor in the otherwise Atomist Free Market.  But history has shown that it is as nominal as any other General concept so relegated by Atomists.

Saturday, August 17, 2019

Immanent Dualism and Transcendent Dualism

A rarely recognized distinction is that between Immanent Dualism and Transcendent Dualism.  In the former, a pair is conceived as essentially compresent, in the latter, a pair is conceived as essentially separated.  One example of the former is Form and Matter, i. e. complements, while one example of the latter is Descartes' Mind and Body.  Now, one reason why the distinction is not generally recognized is that Philosophy has usually been quasi-Dualistic, previously discussed, thus entailing an essential separation of some kind between the two terms.  But another is that advocacy of Immanent Dualism, where putative, has typically been half-hearted.  One example is Aristotle, who after presenting Form and Matter as complementary, seems to argue for a divine isolation of the former from the latter.  Likewise, after presenting Mind and Body as parallel, Spinoza struggles to explain that a Mind might survive the death of its corresponding Body.  Now, it seems difficult to deny that One and Many, or, equivalently, Unity and Multiplicity, constitute an Immanent Duality.  For, all the entities in the world are both One and Many, and even if the Universe itself is infinite, that it does not immediately dissipate indicates the presence of an internal integrity that holds its many parts together.  Hence, the predominance of the concept of One and Many as a Transcendent Duality in the history of Philosophy, begins just as Neoplatonism unwittingly represents it--by a severing of an original Immanent Duality.

Friday, August 16, 2019

Monism, Pluralism, Quasi-Dualism

According to Monism, there is one Substance, and according to Dualism, there are two Substances.  But many systems that are classified as one or the other are, in fact, neither. Instead, they are typically constituted by a Substance and a quasi-Substance, in which the latter is partly dependent on, or inferior to, the former, but also partly independent of it, e. g. Spirit and Matter, and, so, the classification quasi-Dualism is apt.  Now, an apparent alternative to both Monism and Dualism is Pluralism, according to which there are multiple Substances.  Because of the focus on Epistemology, it is rarely recognized that modern Empiricism is Pluralistic, as the occasional characterization of it as Atomist signifies.  But, often underlying the apparent Pluralism of these systems is a quasi-Dualism that is merely the inverse of Rationalist quasi-Dualism.  For, in them, there is Unity, but typically only as nominal, and, furthermore, Multiplicity is presented as given, without any consideration as to a genesis of it.  In other words, such Pluralism is a quasi-Dualism that is derived from the same severing as Monism of an original One-and-Many concatenation, e. g. Emanation, as has been previously discussed.

Thursday, August 15, 2019

One, Many, Dualism

Perhaps unwittingly, Neoplatonism illustrates how Parmenides arrives at his The One.  Beginning with the process of Emanation, in which the development of multiple rays from a single source is a continuum, the Neoplatonists isolate the source, and characterize it as The One, thereby severing Unity from Multiplicity.  Likewise, Parmenides' ostensible Monism is actually a suppressed Dualism.  Now, while much of the subsequent tradition does not recognize so radical a suppression, it still inherits a One-Many Dualism that includes an account of the One influencing the Many.  Typically, though, the account is merely nominal, e. g. 'individuation', 'instantiation', even the 'ingression' of the avowed non-Dualist Whitehead, lacking any coherent explanation of how the divide is bridged.  But, once the full genealogy of the One-Many relation is considered, it is clear that the reason why such an explanation continues to be lacking is that the problem that it would solve is itself just as merely nominal as the various solutions.  Similarly, what Zeno ultimately demonstrates is the non-existence of not Multiplicity, but of the severing that separates Multiplicity from The One to begin with.

Wednesday, August 14, 2019

Reality and Dualism

A disciple of Parmenides, Zeno uses Dialectic to demonstrate the non-Reality of each of the antithesis of the The One--Motion and Multiplicity.  Now, Motion and Multiplicity are united in the process of Emanation, which, beyond the unitary source, is a becoming multiple. Accordingly, the Neoplatonists, who are, hence, neo-Parmenideans, distinguish The One from subsequent phases, one characterization of which is the Logos, thereby creating a Dualism that is less the Parmenidean Real vs. non-Real, more the standard Dualism of Real vs. inferior, with the Logos in the latter realm.  But, as is evident in any consideration of a plain example of Emanation, e. g. light from a light-source, what is Real is a continuum of light-source and light-ray.  Accordingly, what is non-Real, i. e. a product of mere analysis, is the severing of source and its expression.  Thus, the irreality of Dualism is not one of its terms, but the Duality itself.  Telling in the Neoplatonist Dualism is the severing of the 'Logos' from The One, which is equivalent to the severing within the pre-Parmenidean Logos of consequences from the Principle of Sufficient Reason.  The doctrine thus illustrates how Platonism, not Socratism, which adheres to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, is the decisive development in Ancient Philosophy, i. e. Dualism.

Tuesday, August 13, 2019

Logos, Dualism, Dialogic

As has been previously discussed, Irony is a method employed by Plato to bridge the chasm between Thought and Language.  But his more prominent method to that end is Dialogic, or, as it is often rendered, Dialectic.  The method functions as a means to a non-verbal cognition of a Form via the negation of attempts to verbally formulate it.  Hence, Platonist Dialectic is not to be confused with Hegelian Dialectic, the aim of which is a more comprehensive formulation.  Now, Plato's use of Dialogic is likely inspired by Zeno, who uses it to promote the Parmenidean The One.  But, as has been previously discussed, that principle is a product of a Dualist modification of the Logos, i. e. a severing of the Principle of Sufficient Reason from what it grounds.  Furthermore, the Agnostic professions of the actual Socrates can easily be conceived as based on sincere adherence to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, rather than as instances of Irony.  Hence, more informative than the standard Socrates vs. Pre-Socratic division in the History of Philosophy, is that of Plato vs. Pre-Platonism.  For, as the maturation of Philosophical expression, Platonist Dialogic establishes a triumph of Dualism over the Logos that has prevailed in most Philosophy ever since.

Monday, August 12, 2019

Irony, Socrates, Plato

Perhaps the most significant of the mis-attributions of a feature of Platonism to Socrates is Irony.  As is implied by the charge of Impiety, Socrates' primary application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason is against superstition, involving professions of Ignorance that can be, in principle, sincere, e. g. Agnosticism. In contrast, as is expressed in the Protagoras, Plato applies the Principle less against superstition than against Sophistry.  But, to make the case that Philosophy is distinct from Sophistry, Plato needs to invoke the Theory of Forms, i. e. that the expression of Philosophy signifies non-verbal entities and relations, whereas Sophistry is never more than merely verbal.  So, Irony becomes central to Plato's dialogues--i. e. its use of language to explain the fundamental emptiness of language.  Plato thereby tackles a problem ignored by previous Dualists, e. g. Parmenides, whose dismissal of Multiplicity as non-real is itself part of that Multiplicity.  So, to attribute Irony to Socrates is to miss both the principled sincerity of the professions of the actual Socrates, but how vital it is to Plato.

Sunday, August 11, 2019

Dionysian and Mob Mentality

Nietzsche characterizes Socrates as "the opponent of Dionysus".  But that characterization may be based on a nuance that Nietzsche overlooks, possibly because of his casting of Socrates as a "spectator".  Instead, beginning with the unarguable fact that Socrates was no mere spectator at his trial, why he is, instead, not the hero of a Tragedy that is more than a mere Aesthetic event, culminating in a death that is no mere Aesthetic event, is not considered by Nietzsche.  For sure, in the context, Socrates does attempt to promote detachment, but detachment from superstition and sophistry that constitute what can be summarized as Mob Mentality.  So, what is lacking in Nietzsche's study is a distinction between the Dionysian principle and Mob Mentality, if there is one, without which an inference from opposition to the latter, to opposition to the former, may be faulty, i. e. based on an equivocation.  Nietzsche's own later struggle with Mob Mentality suggests a possible revision of his earlier characterization of Socrates, but not one that he makes explicit.

Saturday, August 10, 2019

Socrates and Logos

Birth of Tragedy is primarily a study of comparative Aesthetics--Ancient Greek Tragedy with Wagnerian Opera--that becomes Philosophically relevant because of the role of 'Socrates' in it.  But this 'Socrates' is not as conscientiously presented as much of the rest of the work.  For, as signifying 'detached observation', this 'Socrates' is based on the character in Plato's dialogues, rather than on the historical Socrates, who could easily be cast as a Tragic hero, i. e. with his accusers as the Chorus.  Furthermore, Nietzsche does not consider that Detached Observation might be subject to its own genealogy.  For example, it can be analyzed as the product of a fracturing of the Logos, as has been previously discussed here.  On that basis, Socrates can be conceived as internalizing the Principle of Sufficient Reason, i. e. as a criterion for evaluating knowledge claims, rather than as internalizing the Dualism that is expressed in Detached Observation.  In later years, Nietzsche seems to repudiate his Schopenhauer-influenced Dualism of this period.  But it is unclear if he ever recovers the pre-Platonist Socrates.

Friday, August 9, 2019

Logos, Dionysus, Apollo

Nietzsche's Dionysian and Apollonian principles are derived from the Ancient deities Dionysus and Apollo, and their relation is modeled on Schopenhauer's Will-Representation version of Kant's Noumenon-Phenomenon duality.  Another Ancient deity of Philosophical significance is the Logos, the principle of which is the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and which is constituted as a continuum between the Principle and what it grounds, illustrated by Emanation, as has been previously discussed.  So, the demise of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, corresponding to the "death", according to Nietzsche, of the Dionysian-Apollonian combination, i. e. Tragedy, is the severing of the Principle of Sufficient Reason from what it grounds, perhaps most effectively by Parmenides, resulting in the long Dualist tradition in Philosophy.  But part of that tradition is Schopenhauer's Will-Representation pair.  Hence, so, too, is Nietzsche's Dionysian-Apollonian pair part of that Dualist tradition.  Thus, his effort to recover some long-repressed Philosophical Principles does not go far enough.

Thursday, August 8, 2019

Principle of Sufficient Reason and Reflection

As has been previously discussed, the object of the earliest Philosophy is a Principle of Sufficient Reason, which soon gets transformed into a transcendent Principle of Self-Sufficiency, the privileged term of a Dualism.  So, when Socrates introduces Reflection as a factor in Philosophizing, the most prominent and influential of interpreters of Socrates, Plato, incorporates that factor primarily by internalizing the Dualism.  It is not until Spinoza, inspired by Emanationism, rejects the Dualist transformation, and combines Reflection directly with a Principle of Sufficient Reason.  The combination consists in his conceiving the production of his own doctrine as itself grounded in the Principle of Sufficient Reason, his Insight into which is rendered as the Intuition of God in his doctrine.  Subsequently, the combination of Reflection and Principle of Sufficient Reason is most patently expressed by Marx and Nietzsche, who recognize their works as further consequences of a Principle of Sufficient Reason.  Otherwise, for the most part, Philosophical Reflection has remained as detached from its object as a transcendent Principle from some inferior realm. 

Wednesday, August 7, 2019

Insight and Principle of Sufficient Reason

As has been previously discussed, Insight is cognitive access to a substratum, and to how the stratum is generated out of the substratum.  In other words, it is the basis of an explanation of the Causality of the substratum.  Often, the object of Philosophical Insight is a Principle, e. g. the Water of Thales, the account of which includes an explanation of how what is apparently not Water is derived from Water.  Now, such explanations have not always stood up to scrutiny, prompting the new Insights and new Principles that have constituted the history of Philosophy.  Thus, the object of Philosophical Insight can be generalized from these efforts as a Principle of Sufficient Reason, i. e. a Principle that explains both itself and everything else.  But, with Parmenides, the Philosophical project becomes truncated.  For, he exempts his Principle, The One, from having to either recognize or explain Multiplicity.  The subsequent tradition is not as extreme, generally recognizing Multiplicity, as an inferior realm, but  offering no explanation of why the superior realm generates it.  Notable in this tradition is Schopenhauer, who resuscitates the Principle of Sufficient Reason, only to consign it to the world of Representation, without recognizing that he needs to apply it to his Principle, Will, in order to explain how Representation comes about, regardless of whether or not Representation is real, irreal, or unreal.  As a result, Philosophical Insight is reduced to functioning as a vehicle to presumed Otherworldliness, rather than as determining the nature of the given, as a prelude to modifying it.

Tuesday, August 6, 2019

Insight and Causality

With considerable baggage having accrued to the term 'Intuition' over the centuries, a fresher alternative is available in common parlance--'Insight'.  Insight can be the means of access to any of the substrata of Philosophy--Form, Essence, Noumenon, Reality, etc., but without the specifications that have rendered them incompatible, undermining the usefulness of the term.  But the object of Insight is more than such a substratum--also cognized is how the stratum is generated from the substratum, an account that is often lacking in Philosophical systems, e. g. how a Phenomenon develops from a Noumenon.  Hence, the proper object of Insight is Causality.  Thus, Insight qualifies as what Spinoza calls Adequate Knowledge, but it does not reduce to either Intuition or Reason.  For Causality that is the object of Insight is primarily a singular but complex concrete event, e. g. how a murder occurred in a mystery, fiction or non-fiction, i. e. neither homogeneous nor a pattern.

Monday, August 5, 2019

Intuition and Geometry

Intuition is usually distinguished from Reason as non-discursive, and from Sensation as non-Empirical.  Usually, its Object is conceived as simple, and contact with it as immediate.  But, there have been a wide variety of concepts of that Object--for Platonists, a Form; for Spinoza, God; for Bergson, Motion; and, in ordinary parlance, an ulterior motive of another.  So, Euclidean Geometry, as a Deductive system, is clearly non-Intuitive.  And Pythagorean Numerology is likely Intuitive.  But, the classification of the Cognition of Pythagorean Geometry is less clear.  On the one hand, as a Form, a geometrical figure might be Intuited.  But, once an Angle is involved, the object becomes more complex.  For, as has been previously discussed, an Angle cannot be reduced to a mere Vertex, and, instead, must be derived from a concept of Circulinearity, to which mere Rectilinearity is inadequate, and, indeed, with which it is incommensurable.  So, plainly, the Pythagorean Theorem, which entails the measures of both Lines and Angles, is not simple, and, hence, cannot be Intuited, even at a moment of nascent inception.  Thus, even if not as formalized as Euclidean Geometry, Pythagorean Geometry is too complex for Intuition, and, so, must incorporate Reason at some moment.

Sunday, August 4, 2019

Triangle, Trilateral, Measurement

If Triangle and Trilateral are equivalent, it is only by virtue of Angle being conceived as an intersection of two sides.  But once measurement becomes a factor, there is no interchangeability, e. g. in the famous Pythagorean theorem, which relates the measurements of three sides, there can be no linear substitution for the concept of Right Angle that qualifies it.  Now, Trigonometry establishes a correspondence between linear measurement and angular measurement, but the correspondence is not grounded in a mathematically systematic translation.  Furthermore, there can be no such ground.  For, linear measurement is extensive, i. e. the counting of units that are progressively appended, while angular measurement is intensive, i. e. a subdivision of a whole, usually 360 degrees, an arbitrary quantity.  But that whole is a rotation.  Hence, the angle between any two sides of a Triangle is that between two radii of a Circle, abstracted from the context of the latter.  So, if an Angle is something more that a mere intersection of Lines, Triangle and Trilateral are not equivalent.

Saturday, August 3, 2019

Geometry, Intuition, Angle

As has been previously discussed, the lack of any Empirical evidence of geometrical figures in the non-Human world supports the Empiricist thesis that Geometry is the product of abstraction from the cognition of that world.  One standard response to the Empiricist is that the elements of Geometry compose the noumenal substratum of that world, accessible via a type of Intuition.  However, challenging for that response is to explain how perhaps the most fundamental of the elements, the Line, is at all even intuited without some phenomenal content.  So, less challenging in that regard is for another element--the Angle--an in-between that has no phenomenal content.  Of course, the Empiricist can argue that an Angle is nothing but an abstraction from two Lines, but the Intuitionist can respond that the Empiricist reduction fails to account for how the two Lines are arranged.  Still, another shortcoming of the thesis that the Angle is a noumenal existent is that as existing where there are two Lines, it is restricted to two-dimensionality, and, hence, is inadequate as a substratum of the three-dimensions of the empirical world.

Friday, August 2, 2019

Circle, Point, Sphere

It might be argued that Circular motion, whether that of a celestial body, thought-thinking-itself, or entailed in Spinoza's definition of Circle, is still only an approximation to the idea of a Circle, so its imperfections, e. g. the directionality of the motion, are not that of the idea.  However, the definition that Spinoza rejects--a set of points equidistant from a point--has its own shortcomings, even if it does not entail directionality.  For one, the set of such points is infinite, which compromises clarity, and for another, the concept is dependent on a point that is not part of the set--the center point.  So, this definition comes no closer to an illuminating cognition of a self-sufficient perfection.  But, it does suggest a problem from a different direction.  For, plainly, this formulation is hindered by the attempt to define a Circle in terms of Points.  But, once a difference, and a possible incommensurability, in dimensionality is introduced, so, too, is, implicitly, another one--between Circle and Sphere.  Then, the challenge becomes to establish the independence of the former from the latter, which seems daunting, given that the Sphere, even if itself not in immediate evidence in Reality, is at least closer to it than a Circle is in terms of dimensionality.  Likewise, in general, for the Pythagorean-Euclidean tradition of Geometry--its elements diminish concrete Reality, a strong indication that it is abstract Knowledge, and not an object of esoteric cognition, rather the basis of useful human Technical Knowledge.

Thursday, August 1, 2019

Geometry, Theory, Techne

On the one hand, Kant's treatment of Geometry in the context of Human Intuition continues Spinoza's anthropomorphizing of the topic.  But, on the other, by classifying it as an object of Cognition, not as a product of Construction, he seems to regress to the Pythagorean tradition.  However, that apparent regression is actually due to an underdevelopment of his own system.  For, entailed in his eventual subordination of Theory to Practice is a revision of the role of Intuition in Experience--from mere observation, to integration into Action.  Accordingly, Space and Time, revised, are Forms of Action.  Similarly, Geometry and Mathematics, revised, are Forms of Construction, i. e. grounds of the creation of human artifacts, just as is implied by Spinoza's operational definition of a Circle. Tending to confirm this status is the plain fact that while there are no apparent regular Geometrical figures in the non-Human world, they are in abundant evidence in the products of Human creativity--wheels, buildings, etc.  So, the status in Human history of Geometry as a Theoretical Knowledge is provisional and anticipatory--a first stage of its development as a Technical Knowledge.