Pleasure, Quality, Organism

If, as Bergson and Heidegger propose, Experience is fundamentally Utilitarian, then the fundamental Sensations are not colors, sounds, etc., but Pleasure and Pain.  The abstraction of Perceptual Experience from Utilitarian Experience is thus evident from the outset of Modern Philosophy, when Descartes ignores that fire is a Utility-Object, and an occasion of Pleasure or Pain, e. g. of warmth or burning.  Likewise, Pleasure and Pain are among neither the Primary nor Secondary Qualities of the Empiricists, classifiable instead as Tertiary Qualities, by virtue of Utilitarian Experience being associated with Perceptual Experience as an inessential super-stratum.  That distinction continues in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, as Kant studies the enjoyment of Secondary Qualities occasioned by the perception of either natural or artificial objects.  However, in his establishment of a criterion of Aesthetic Judgment, the object of Pleasure shifts from the Senses themselves to their "play".  However, Kant does not recognize that such Pleasure is thus an example of not enjoyment of Secondary Qualities, but of what might be called a 'joy of movement', of which the interplay of the Senses is a special case.  He thus does not recognize that his criterion of Aesthetic Judgment is nothing other than the judge's Pleasure at dancing, i. e. skilled activity unifying multiple parts of the judge.  In that context, Beauty is not the 'symbol of the Good', but a stimulus to the creative activity of an Organism that is more than merely a subject of Utility and Perception.