Mind, Automaton, Mechanism, Autonomy

In Improvement of the Understanding, Spinoza briefly uses the term "automaton" to characterize Mind.  The term has thus suggested to a least one recent scholar that his concept of Mind is mechanistic, which, because Mind, according to Spinoza, is part of Nature, seems to conform to the Cartesian/Newtonian concept of Nature.  However, according to Deleuze, 'automaton' connotes something different than its standard contemporary English meaning.  He, instead, interprets it as 'autonomous being', which is certainly well-grounded etymologically.  But stronger support for that interpretation can be found elsewhere in Improvement, in a passage in which Spinoza characterizes Mind as creating its own "tools", i. e. operations that facilitate its work.  He gives no instances, but the formation of algorithms seems exemplary.  Indeed, he even uses the term "mechanisms" to characterize its simpler operations.  So, to that extent, "automaton" does connote 'mechanical'.  But, the capacity of Mind to far transcend such mechanisms with more complex inventions, tends to confirm the interpretation of "automaton" as 'autonomous being'.

Nature: Inanimate, Animate, Dynamic

As has been previously discussed, the Cartesian-Newtonian concept of Nature is as inanimate.  The emergence in recent times of the general acceptance of many parts of Nature as animate thus reflects the incapacity of that concept to ground a concept of animate Nature.  But Spinoza seems to have the converse problem--to derive a concept of inanimate Nature from one of animate Nature, e. g. how a stone can be conceived as endeavoring to persist in its being.  Now, he does not address the problem, but a potential solution comes, ironically, from Newton.  For, his First Law, according to which an object remains in motion unless acted upon from without, seems reducible to Spinoza's concept of persisting in being.  On the other hand, the concept of an endeavor seems difficult to ascribe to a stone.  However, there are passages in which Spinoza seems to equate persistence in being to the maintenance of the integrity of the parts of the body.  Now, that characteristic does seem easier to ascribe to an endeavor, especially in light of the more recent Physics, according to which the integrity of an object is achieved by internal cohesion produced by electro-magnetic forces.  On that basis, the characterization 'inanimate' can be replaced by 'dynamic', in which case the distinction between inanimate Nature and animate Nature can be revised as a distinction of degree between two parts of dynamic Nature.  Whether or not Spinoza would assent to such a projection of his doctrine can only be a matter of speculation, but the possibility does illustrate the greater versatility of his concept of Nature in comparison with that of the Cartesian/Newtonian concept.

Nature, Thought, Soul

Spinoza's attribution of Thought and Extension to one and the same substance, God/Nature, is a direct response to Descartes' attribution of them to two distinct substances, Mind and Body, with Nature restricted to the latter.  Descartes, reflecting his Theological orientation, also diverges significantly from Plato and Aristotle by identifying Mind and Soul, thereby eliminating the animal and vegetative divisions of the Soul.  The result is a concept of Nature and its parts as inanimate machines, a thesis that soon gains great influence via Newton's adoption of it.  In sharp contrast, Spinoza attributes both Mind and Body to all parts of Nature, distinguished by degree of complexity, and, thus, by implication, animation to all those parts, thereby repudiating the Cartesian/Newtonian concept of Nature and its parts as mere machines.  Now, Spinoza's attribution of Thought to Nature has hardly gained wide currency over the centuries.  But that e. g. dogs and trees are now generally accepted to be intelligent living beings is an example of the general assimilation of at least some of his doctrine.

Nature and Proof of the Existence of God

The Argument From Design is one of four prominent 'proofs of the existence of God'.  The Cosmological Proof tries to prove that God exists as a necessary First Cause; the Teleological Proof tries to prove that God exists as a necessary Final Cause; and the Ontological Proof tries to prove that the existence of God is entailed in its essence.  Now, Kant is widely recognized as presenting the most formidable refutations of them.  However, Spinoza's counter to the other three is just as decisive as that to the Argument From Design, as has been previously discussed--even if they do soundly prove the existence of a deity, they fail to prove that that deity transcends Nature, i. e. is incorporeal.  Similarly failing is Kant's Practical Proof that he proposes as the replacement for the four that he has repudiated--that Pure Practical Reason requires the existence of God as a rewarder of Virtue.  For, the concept of Karma is an example of a principle of just deserts that can be conceived as immanent in Nature.  So, even granting the necessity of the existence of a rewarding deity, that it transcends Nature remains unestablished.  Thus, Spinoza's doctrine undermines all the proofs simply and decisively--by denying from the outset any Super-Natural existence.  At the same time, it exposes the limits of the scope of their relevance--dualistic Theology--whether in the Medieval Era, or in the so-called Enlightenment.

Transcendent Designer and Immanent Designer

As has been previously discussed, implicit in Spinoza's attribution of Thought to Nature is an exposure of the fallacy of the various versions of the standard Theological Argument From Design.  According to that argument: 1. Nature evinces Design; 2. Evidence of Design indicates the existence of a Designer; 3. Therefore, a Designer exists; 4. Therefore, the transcendent Abrahamic deity exists.  Usually, counter-arguments have targeted 1 or 2, e. g. Hume and Kant, respectively.  But, the counter that is possible only on the basis of an intelligent Monist Naturalism targets 4, by implicitly exposing the inference to a Designer that transcends Nature--an inference that is the essence of the argument--as begging the question.  Furthermore, Spinoza's doctrine does not merely neutralize the argument by presenting an alternative inference at 4--its alternative is better grounded.  For, there is ample evidence of Designing that is immanent in Nature--that of humans, who routinely make plans and execute them, with e. g. products of their manufacturing as evidence of Design, which advocates of Theological argument freely acknowledge.  So, there is unarguable evidence of the existence of immanent Self-Designing in Nature.  In contrast, there is no such evidence of the existence of a transcendent Designer that is independent of the argument devised to prove that existence.  Nevertheless, Spinoza's doctrine has remained an untapped resource as the Argument From Design persists in its recent Creationist guise, e. g. Darwinists who seem satisfied with the thesis that Evolution is a random process.

Intelligent Design and Intelligent Self-Designer

These days, the phrase 'intelligent design' is best-known as a Creationist counter-argument to Darwinism, the fundamental premise of which is that the patterns evinced by Nature are better ascribed to a deity than to a random process.  The argument is also similarly applicable to Big-Bang Theory, though it seems to appear less in that context.  But while it is now associated with Creationism, a version of it has a long history, preceding its emergence in Medieval Theology as one of the 'proofs of the existence of God', advanced by Aquinas, in particular.  Newton, too, subscribes to the argument, but because his Physics overshadows his Theological writings, his continuation of that tradition has been relatively less recognized.  Now, Kant's critique would seem conclusive.  Nevertheless, the argument has survived its apparently more formidable peers that are included in Kant's critique--the Ontological Argument and the Cosmological Argument.  In any case, Spinoza's doctrine implicitly refutes its Medieval version and its descendants.  As has been previously discussed, his attribution of Thought to Nature is equivalent to the attribution to Nature of Intelligent Design.  But implicit in his doctrine is that the inference from Intelligent Design to transcendent Intelligent Designer is fallacious, i. e. begs the question.  For, an inference to immanent Intelligent Designer is also possible.  In other words, his affirmation of the principle that Nature is an Intelligent Self-Designer is another example of his Pantheism/Monist Naturalism undercutting the Dualism that continues to prevail in both Theology and Philosophy.

Nature, Thought, Intelligent Design

Spinoza's concept of Nature is of a dynamic, creative Substance.  Hence, more accurate than 'Thought' and 'Extension' as terms for its attributes, likely references to Descartes' static substances, are 'Thinking' and 'Extending'.  Now, one way to understand what he means by the attribution of Thinking to Nature is to examine an exemplification, i. e. the Thinking of a Mode as it creates.  So, his description of the guiding of the drawing of a circle by following the definition of a Circle is one such example.  On that basis, more generally, any production, guided by a model, whether of a sequence of behavior, or of the manufacture of some thing, exemplifies the Thinking of Nature.  Accordingly, his attribution of Thought to Nature is equivalent to the attribution of what might be called  'intelligent design' to Nature, though, quite contrary to the usual use of that phrase, the design is a product of immanent designing, i. e. is the self-designing of Nature.

Naturalism and Human Artifice

Whether or not Spinoza conceives Thought to be inherently Mathematical, his attribution of it to Nature is a direct contrast with Descartes' concept of Thought as Super-Natural.  More generally, the attribution is a cardinal premise of the aspect of his doctrine that has been overshadowed by his Pantheism--what can be classified as Monistic Naturalism.  The under-emphasis of the latter is due to Spinoza's own focus on the God aspect of his principle, to the relative neglect of its Nature and Substance aspects, which together constitute Monistic Naturalism.  Now, as his counter to Descartes signifies, the immediate aim of Monistic Naturalism is the denial of any Super-Nature.  But, over the subsequent centuries, perhaps unanticipated by Spinoza, a second non-Natural realm has emerged--the world of Human artifice and its products, often characterized as 'unnatural', or 'artificial'.  Such characterizations perhaps reflect a Theological legacy--a distinction between God-made Nature and the disobedient Human appropriation of it.  Nevertheless, in a Monistic Naturalism, regardless of their value, all such activity and its products is Natural.  So, one way to forfend such developments from within Spinoza's doctrine is to emphasize that Modes are intra-Natural, as is all their creative activity.

Nature, Thought, Mathematics

Both Empiricists and Kant argue that Mathematical relations are part of the perception of Nature, not in Nature itself.  Thus, if Spinoza's attribution of Thought to Nature is based on the thesis, perhaps derived from Descartes, as has been previously discussed, that it has an inherent Mathematical structure, then it is vulnerable to formidable challenge.  However, the stronger textual evidence suggests that for Spinoza, it is the "order" of events in Nature that evinces the inherence of Thought.  Indeed, Hume might be skeptical about the positing of a law that connects the striking of a ball by a stick with the subsequent movement of the ball.  But he does not deny that in the concrete case, one precedes the other.  So, it is most likely that Spinoza's attribution of Thought to Nature is based on the Ordinality of events, which obtains even in the case of a mechanistic sequence, i. e. the order of events in Newton's clockwork Nature expresses the Thought its divine clockmaker.  Furthermore, if Mathematics is defined in terms of terms of Ordinal Numbers, rather than Cardinal Numbers, the inherent Ordinality of events entails the possibility of an inherent Mathematical structure.  So, the Empiricist potential  criticism of the the attribution of Thought to Nature is, at best, only conditionally sound.

Nature and Thought

The complement in Spinoza's doctrine of his attribution of Extension to God is that of Thought to Nature.  This is two decades prior to the appearance of Newton's concept of Nature as mechanical, and, hence, as lacking Thought, so perhaps Spinoza recognizes no urgency in explaining the role of Thought in mechanical relations.  Still, he is familiar with the discoveries of Galileo, so he is aware of such relations constituting gravitational events. He is also, of course, familiar with the work of Descartes, and, hence, of the latter's innovations in and applications of Analytic Geometry.  Furthermore, he is aware of the status of Mathematical relations as objects of Thought, according to Descartes, and, hence, as products of Thought in his doctrine. Thus, if Spinoza's concept of Nature is influenced by Descartes, then insofar as the laws of Nature are fundamentally Mathematical, Thought is an attribute of Nature.  Accordingly, a potential response by Spinoza to Newton is that qua mechanical, Nature might lack Thought, but qua Mathematical, it is constituted by Thought.

Intuition and Creativity

In the context of the Ethics, the Intuition of God might seem to be a rarified mystical experience.  But in a different context, the general significance of the moment may be easier to recognize.  From the beginning of recorded history, creativity has been an attribute of humans.  But in almost the same span, human creativity has been interpreted as an object of divine wrath, with epochal consequences. Less dramatically, but similarly, the source of that creativity, Techne, is relegated by Aristotle to inferior, non-divine status.  Thus, when Spinoza's Intuition of God is combined with familiar creative experience, it not only enriches the experience, and even explains Kant's concept of Genius, but repudiates any cultural tradition in which human creativity is conceived as disobedience, e. g. the entire drama of Fall and Salvation that has had a powerful influence on some societies for centuries.  Likewise, the relegation of Techne, common to Philosophy since Aristotle, is nullified.

Creativity and Creator

As has been previously discussed, the object of Spinoza's Intuition poses an unchallenged counter-example to the standard concept of an incorporeal, transcendent deity.  Now, Spinoza seems to imply that that concept is an Inadequate Idea, but he does not present a detailed derivation of it from his concept of an immanent deity.  One possible approach to such a derivation begins with a distinction that Spinoza only briefly entertains--between Naturing Nature and Natured Nature--which, as has been previously proposed, can conceived as Creating vs. Created.  On that basis, the concept of a Creator that transcends its Creations is an expression of a Created-perspective that is alienated from its Creating correlate.  Now, the recovery of an ever-present but latent perspective is one of the most venerable of Philosophical projects, e. g. from the 'forgetting' of Plato, to the 'forgetting' of Heidegger.  But in all these cases, what has been lost is an Epistemological, perhaps inert, standpoint, whereas in the case of Spinoza, it is a source of Creativity.  Consequently, while the goal of those projects is Enlightenment, that of Spinoza's doctrine is Empowerment.  Thus, the 'forgetting' that has given rise to the standard concept of a transcendent deity is actually a weakening that is expressed by the powerlessness of its corresponding creations in the standard associated Theology.

God and Fact

The peak moment of Spinoza's doctrine is an Intuition of God/Nature/Substance, constituted by an immediate awareness of oneself as as an active part of the creative force of reality.  Now, it can only be speculated about, but it seems likely that this a first-hand description of an experience, and not a projection of an abstract possibility.  If so, then Spinoza is reporting, as a fact, that God and Nature are one and the same, and, hence, that God has a corporeal aspect, and that it is immanent in all its Modes.  As such, it refutes all alternative concepts of deity, not as a counter-argument, but as a factual counter-example.  Nevertheless, this momentous discovery has generally been ignored by those to whom it is relevant.  For example, while Dualists Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel each offer a criticism of Spinoza, in each case the topic is a peripheral matter which is taken as sufficing to therefore dismiss Spinoza.  Later, a purported follower of Spinoza, Alexander, reduces Spinoza's doctrine to an Empiricist system culminating in a concept of deity in which all vitality is drained.  In contrast, Spinoza's insight likely inspires the two most influential Philosophers of the 19th-century, Marx and Nietzsche, though only implicitly, but because those two have generally been marginalized by subsequent academic Philosophy, the significance of Spinoza's discovery has remained generally ignored.  This neglect shows that not only has the alleged Love of Wisdom become nominal in Philosophers, they can no longer even be considered champions of intellectual integrity.

Wisdom and Ecologism

As has been previously discussed, insofar as Spinoza's Wisdom includes the Intuition of one as a Mode of a dynamic immanent deity, it surpasses that of King Solomon, and Biblical Wisdom, in general, according to which the deity is transcendent.  But this new Wisdom is more than merely post-Theological, in the traditional sense of that term.  God in Spinoza's doctrine is also Nature, so Wisdom is, equivalently, that one is also an integral part of Nature, not a visitor to it, as is entailed in traditional Super-Naturalist Theology.  In other words, Spinoza's new Wisdom is incipient Ecologism, the fuller development of which is centuries away.  Ecologism is another implication of the Copernican destruction of Heaven-Earth dualism, and Spinoza's nascent awareness of it is another indication that he is the most radical of the early waves of post-Copernican Lovers of Wisdom.

Wisdom and Intuition of God

In common parlance, usually entailed by the Wisdom vs. Foolishness contrast is a Knowledge vs. Ignorance contrast, often expressed in terms of age and experience vs. youth and inexperience.  So, in one of the two predominant modern Moral doctrines, Kantianism, Wisdom is no factor, i. e. the Kantian principle is independent of any such conditions.  In the other, Utilitarianism, such conditions are irrelevant to the calculation, which it merely describes, regardless of how wise or foolish the choices involved, even though Mill sometimes struggles to refrain from normative judgment, e. g. his 'higher' vs. 'lower' distinction.  In contrast, degree of Knowledge is a factor in Spinoza's doctrine, in which Knowledge is more rigorous defined than it is in common parlance.  So, that doctrine can be conceived as promoting Wisdom, and, if so, as surpassing that of even King Solomon.  For, according to the doctrine, maximum Wisdom is achieved in the Intuition of oneself as a Mode of an immanent God.  But Solomon's Wisdom must fall short of that degree--for his God is transcendent, and, so, his Wisdom could never include such knowledge, regardless of how much else of his God that he knows.

Wise vs. Foolish: Beyond Good and Evil

The concept of Good and Evil as ontological, i. e. as ingredient in objective reality, is often characterized as 'Manichean' or 'Zoroastrian'.  Thus, Spinoza's repudiation of that concept likely inspires Nietzsche's 'Beyond Good and Evil' theme.  But Nietzsche goes further in his development of the theme, notably showing how value terms have been used as weapons.  However, perhaps because of the premature end of his career, Nietzsche never fully develops that 'Beyond', going only so far as to imply that Evaluation be comparative, i. e. presented as an "order of rank", but offering no replacement for the terms 'Good' and 'Evil', other then an inverse 'Good' and 'Bad'.  In contrast, a more substantive alternative for Philosophical Ethics has been proposed here--'Wise' vs. 'Foolish', one which might revive the literal meaning of 'Philosophy'.

Wisdom and Strength

Spinoza defines Good and Evil as Healthful and Unhealthful, respectively.  Accordingly, the characterization of a person in those terms can be, as is the case in Utilitarianism, Consequentialist, i. e. how they effect others.  Thus, the terms are unavailable to him as an evaluation of a person as signifiers of their own internal condition.  So, it is as a possible alternative that he uses the Aristotelian term 'Virtue' as such in some contexts, i. e. as connoting the possession of Power.  However, unlike Aristotle, he does not go further to develop the use of the term systematically, and offers no indication of how he might use, correspondingly, 'Vice'.  Furthermore, in the time since Aristotle, those terms have acquired semantic baggage well in excess of their original precise definitions.  So, one suitable alternative available to Spinoza, and to Philosophical Ethics, in general, is, as has been previously discussed, 'Wise' vs. 'Foolish', defined in terms of maximizing the exercise of strength.  In that context, in which the exercise of strength can be to a greater or lesser degree, evaluation is correspondingly comparative, so the fundamental evaluative terms are, more precisely, 'Wiser' and 'Foolisher'.  Those terms are well-suited to his doctrine because, as is the case in their common usages, degree of knowledge of circumstances is a factor in degree of strength.  So, though Spinoza himself does not develop it as such, his doctrine does lack a replacement for traditional 'Good' vs. 'Evil' Axiology, and one based on the concept of Wisdom is both available and suitable.  The concept also has potential value to him in his attempts at a Philosophical critique of Biblical scriptures.

Wisdom, Prophecy, Prescription

King Solomon is well-known as a source of Wisdom.  But insofar as Philosophy is methodical or systematic, he is thus not also a Philosopher.  Regardless, he is also classified as a Prophet, a characterization that seemingly is not applicable to Philosophers.  However, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche each project the future, so, in that respect, each is indeed a Prophet. Furthermore, like the Biblical Prophets, Marx and Nietzsche warn about the urgency of behavior-change.  Now, Prediction is not the only discourse about the future; Prescription is, too.  And, indeed, both the advice that Solomon offers in the Psalms, etc., and dire warnings about the need to change, are modes of Prescriptive expression.  So, Prescription is both wise and prophetic, and, further, is Philosophical insofar as it is methodically or systematically developed.  Conversely, it is because of the preponderance these days of Philosophers who insistently restrict themselves to Analysis that Philosophy has become commonly conceived as not concerned with Wisdom, i. e. is a misnomer.

Wisdom and Foolishness

'Philosophy' means 'love of wisdom', but Wisdom seems a rare topic among 'Philosophers'.  Indeed, the closest to a popular image of a 'Philosopher' is not Plato, Kant, etc., but King Solomon, and very little of the output of these Philosophers has seemed classifiable as 'Wisdom'.  Instead, the primary interest of most Modern Philosophy has been Knowledge, the main objects of which have been Truth and Goodness, the studies of which are typically segregated on the basis of the traditional Theory-Practice duality.  In contrast, Wisdom combines both, and its privative correlate is neither Falsity nor Evil, but Foolishness.  A little more precisely, Wisdom consists in doing what is best on the basis of the most comprehensive grasp of circumstances as is possible.  Likewise, Foolishness is informed by a minimal grasp of circumstances, so, the Wisdom-Foolishness contrast is one of degree, not of kind.  Now, Spinoza does not characterize his doctrine in those terms.  But his Inadequate-Adequate contrast is one of degree, and maximum Adequacy is constituted by the 'Intuition of God', which, in his doctrine is equivalent to a comprehension of the Whole.  Thus, behavior on that basis can be classified as 'Wise', the progressive privation of which approaches 'Foolish'.  Now, one general distinction between Spinoza and Solomon as sources of Wisdom is that the former is systematic while the latter is not, a distinction which, by itself, might distinguish the 'Philosopher' from the 'Wise Person', e. g. Psalms seems to have no unifying theme.  But one implicit specific point of contrast is that Spinoza does not regard Monarchy as the wisest Political structure.

Techne and Reason

Traditionally, 'Techne' connotes artistic skill, and, hence, entails no obvious involvement with Reason.  But, Spinoza, not necessarily intentionally, reveals that involvement in the course of explaining his concept of Definition.  His specific example in that explanation is Circle, his definition of which is an instruction for the production of a Circle, i. e. how to draw one.  So, the execution of the definition consists in the instantiation of a general formulation, which is a traditional concept of Reason.  Such instantiation is not specific to verbal formulation--it obtains in the case of an artisan attempting, even instinctually, to actualize some idea.  But its involvement in the application of mathematically formulated knowledge, instructions for the use of implements, and of prescriptions for recommended behavior, is an essential factor in human development, especially in the accelerated development of the past several centuries. Now, such Reason coordinates Mind and Body, without subordinating one to the other.  So, Spinoza's doctrine is one of the few in which Technical Reason can be grounded, and recognized for the role that it plays in human development.

Homo Techne and Dualism

The developments of the past 500 years, culminating in the most extraordinary event in not only Human history, but in terrestrial history, strongly suggest that Homo Sapiens has become Homo Techne.  Nevertheless, many prominent Philosophers of the era adhere to the former concept.  Now, there is at least one pervasively held systematic reason for maintaining that concept of Human.  For, Technical Reason involves a coordination of Mind and Body, and, hence, their parity as factors in it.  But, for the most part, beginning with Parmenides, Philosophers have subscribed to a variety of pseudo-Dualism, in which Mind and Body are severed, with Mind conceived as superior to Body in some respect.  As a result, Homo Sapiens has been the predominant concept of Human, with Homo Techne, a derivative, inferior mode of being.   One notable exception to this tradition is Spinoza, according to whom Mind and Body are equally vital coordinated aspects of human behavior, and, hence, are hospitable to Technical Reason. Of course, Spinoza does not anticipate the rapid technical developments, culminating in extraterrestrial exploration, of the next several centuries.  But, his doctrine, perhaps uniquely, provides a ground for them.

Proactive, Reactive, Passive, Autonomous

• As has been previously discussed, Spinoza's fundamental behavioral principle can be characterized as Proactive.  Now, insofar as it applies to a Mode, which is a finite being affected by other finite beings, the principle determines a response to an external influence, in which case its Proactive function is specifically Reactive.  Thus, Proactive is not antithetical to Reactive, while Reactive is distinct from Passive, which signifies a modification the cause of which is external, e. g. an Emotion.   In other words, a Reaction is a Proactive response to a Passive condition.  On that basis, Hume conflates Reactivity and Passivity when he ascribes motive power to a Passion.  Furthermore, Kant's concept of Autonomy entails independence from external influence, but, as is expressed in the formulation of his Rational principle, it is occasioned by the formulation of a Maxim, and, hence, by some Passion.  Hence, it is not equivalent to Proactivity, though a concept of Autonomy other than Kant's might be.  So both sides of the prominent debate between Hume and Kant fail to consider a factor that underlies each.

Active and Proactive

In contemporary common parlance, 'active' usually connotes the opposite of 'inactive' or 'inert'.  Hence, it inadequately represents what Spinoza means by it--the opposite of 'passive' or 'reactive'.  Instead, a contemporary term that is closer to what Spinoza means by 'active' is 'proactive', signifying not only 'active', but also 'self-activating'.   Now, 'proactive' is instructive in distinguishing between Spinoza's concept of "persisting in being", and a prominent apparent synonym, 'self-preservation'.  For, as is exemplified by Hobbes' influential use of it, the latter typically connotes a reaction to a threat, whereas Spinoza conceives the endeavor to persist in one's being as proactive, i. e. as operative independent of external circumstances, hostile or otherwise.  Now, the previously discussed proposed revision of Spinoza's principle as the endeavor to maximize the exercise of strength introduces a further point of distinction between it and the concept of Self-Preservation.  For, to 'preserve' means to 'maintain', whereas to 'increase' means to not merely 'maintain', but to 'extend', as well.  Thus, the revision entails a proactive endeavor to increase strength even in the circumstance of no threat of a decrease.

Persisting in Being and Exercising Strength

A significant lacuna in Spinoza's doctrine seems to be between the endeavor to persist in one's being, and the differentiation in one's being in terms of varying degrees of strength, which can become a factor in determining the endeavor, e. g. choosing the greater of two goods. One solution is to follow Nietzsche, and to redefine the object of the endeavor as the maximization of the exercise of strength.  The alternative is not a change of principle, merely an explication of a version of the vital principle that is standard prior to the 19th-century.  It seems consistent with his analyses of various structures, and it captures the connotation of the original as an active principle, i. e. being active consists in the exercise of strength.  It is also potentially grounded in his concept of God/Nature/Substance, insofar as that concept has the structure of Emanation.  For, Emanation connotes increase, and a Mode is an instance of that deity, so, increase, and not merely maintaining, is inherently part of the object of one's endeavor.  Thus, it is unclear why Spinoza might reject the explication.

Reason and Power

Spinoza does not formally define Reason, but in one of its functions, it is the source of Ideas of objective Causal connections.  Such a function is valuable to finite being, for whom experiential connections are immediately random and merely subjectively concatenated, and, hence, are not necessarily effective in promoting strength and neutralizing weakness.  The power of Reason in this capacity seems merely Instrumental, as Hume insists.  However, Reason has another function: introducing objective Causal connectivity into the endeavor to persist in one's being.  In this function, it is the source of not Knowing-That, but of Knowing-How, i. e. Reason is Technical therein.  Furthermore, though such Causal connectivity is objective, it is not independent of the endeavor.  For, in many such cases, the connections are created, not discovered, as much of human society illustrates.  Likewise, the value of such Reason is more than Instrumental, i. e. more than the value of the products of Know-How.  For, in the exercise of Know-How itself, one's power, i. e. over oneself, and over external materials, is increased, and, hence, is of value in itself in the endeavor to persist in one's being.  Thus, Reason is Power not merely qua Instrumental, but, more so, qua Technical.

Passion and Motivation

According to Spinoza, the active principle that determines all behavior is the endeavor to persist in one's being.  Entailed in the principle is the endeavor to maintain or increase one's strength, and to correct any decrease in strength.  Now, whether an Emotion consists in an increase in strength, a decrease in strength, or a maintaining of strength, it is a passive condition.  Hence, the motive power to modify an Emotion can not come from an Emotion, but from only the active principle.  On that basis, Hume's error is to attribute motive power to a Passion, despite the plain connotation of passivity in the term itself.  The root of his error is to reduce a complex, derivative, passive experience to a simple, irreducible, dynamic experiential datum.  Or, in other words, his concept of Passion is inadequate, one significant implication of which is that his concept of Reason as the slave of the Passions is likewise inadequate, which, regardless, does not help Kant's rejoinder, which accepts the same concept of the Passions.

Emotion and Emotivism

According to Spinoza, an Emotion is an Idea of a change in the degree of strength of a Mode, the Object of which is the posited cause of the change.  Now, as one of staple topics of Psychoanalysis demonstrates--that Hate can be misdirected--an Emotion can be an inadequate Idea, the supplanting of which by an adequate Idea usually being the aim of therapy.  Likewise, any Emotion can be an inadequate Idea.  Now, according to Emotivism, Moral Judgment is not open to dispute, because the basis of Judgment, e. g. an Emotion such as Like or Dislike, is a simple, private, experiential datum.  But, just as Hate can be misdirected, so, too, can be a Moral Judgment based upon it.  Thus, a Moral Judgment can be an inadequate Idea, and, so, disputable, contrary to premises of Emotivism.  Spinoza's doctrine thus exposes the source of the error of Emotivism--the thesis that an Emotion is a simple, private, experiential datum.  Or, equivalently, that Emotivism is based on an inadequate Idea of Emotion.

Experience and Emotion

According to Spinoza, human experience consists in the endeavor to persist in one's being.  So, Knowledge is part of that endeavor, determining what promotes it and what hinders it, in order to harness the former and to eliminate the latter.  Thus, Sense-Experience, the focus of prominent Philosophers of the era and beyond, is of only derivate interest to Spinoza.  More relevant to his project are the increases and the decreases of one's strength in the endeavor, which, on the basis of his Parallelism, have Mental and Bodily aspects.  Thus, unlike most Dualist Philosophers, he can conceive Pleasure and Pain as Ideas of Bodily conditions, i. e. of increases in strength and decreases of strength, respectively.  Furthermore, because he defines Emotions as derived from Pleasure and Pain, he can conceive them as not irreducible experiential data, as is common to most systems of Psychology and Morality, but as fluctuations in strength, to be either reinforced or resisted, via Knowledge of their causes.  Two notable applications of this concept of Emotion are to Sympathy and to Hope, each of which, containing a Pain component, can be weakening experiences.  The concept thus entails significant objections to the advocacy of one or the other Emotion, e. g. by Hume and Kant, respectively, which, even if recognized, are difficult to counter on the basis of a concept of Emotion as an irreducible experiential component.

Sense-Experience and Sense-Organ Experience

It is not an explicit theme for Spinoza, but implicit in his doctrine is a repudiation of most standard concepts of Sense-Experience.  To begin with, Mind is the Idea of the Body, and of its parts, so Sense-Experience is, more properly, Sense-Organ Experience.  Thus, for example, the awareness of a color is, more properly, the awareness of an optical process. Second, Experience, in general, is the endeavor to persist in being, so the fundamental context of Sense-Organ Experience is this endeavor, in which the Sense-Organs are coordinated with other parts of the Body.  Thus, for example, the standard Empiricist account of visual experience has no way of explaining hand-eye coordination. Finally, the data of the Sense-Organ Experience are modifications of the Sense-Organs.  Thus, contrary to most concepts of Sense-Experience, Sense-Data are not discrete atoms, but are constituted in part by the previous condition that has been modified.  In other words, most of these concepts of Sense-Experience repeat Locke's profound error--generalizing what might be an initial Tabula Rasa to all subsequent experience.  The general unfamiliarity of this repudiation of most concepts of Sense-Experience is an indication of the marginalization of Spinoza in subsequent Philosophy.

Volition, Consciousness, Reflection

Spinoza attributes Consciousness to the exercise of Volition, without at the same time seeming to consider the converse--whether or not Consciousness is inherently Volitional.  But based on his justification of the former attribution, a denial of the converse seems to follow.  For, the justification seems based on a standard thesis that awareness of X is, at the same time, awareness of that awareness of X, i. e. Mind naturally doubles itself.  But, if so, Volition seems to not be involved.  However, that standard thesis seems antithetical to the concept of Mind that Spinoza otherwise develops, from Mind as actively producing Ideas, to the concept of Will and Understanding as coextensive, based on the concept of Mind as actively positing or affirming its Ideas, as has been previously discussed.  On that basis, an act of Reflection consists in Mind positing a previous act of Mind as its object, i. e. two volitional processes.  Thus, rigorously developed from the elements of his doctrine, Reflection is Volitional, and Volition is Reflection, whereas the concept of Consciousness that he introduces into the analysis is not well-grounded in them, a lapse of rigor in his development of the doctrine.

Will, Consciousness, Modification

Spinoza attributes Consciousness to Will on the basis of the premise that the attribution to Mind of a capacity to double itself, i. e. Reflection, is self-explanatory.  A more elaborate explanation of the first attribution begins with a concept of Causality as a Modification, i. e. in which the act of Causality spans a transition from a previous condition to a subsequent condition.  Now, there can be a Consciousness of that Causality by virtue of Mind monitoring the entire process.  But that Causality is Will.  Hence, according to the more elaborate explanation, the Consciousness attributed to an act of Will is Mind taking as its object the process that the act spans, i. e. is not an act of Reflection qua a simple doubling of itself.  On that basis, the latter, a common Philosophical concept, is inadequate.