Emotion and Emotivism

According to Spinoza, an Emotion is an Idea of a change in the degree of strength of a Mode, the Object of which is the posited cause of the change.  Now, as one of staple topics of Psychoanalysis demonstrates--that Hate can be misdirected--an Emotion can be an inadequate Idea, the supplanting of which by an adequate Idea usually being the aim of therapy.  Likewise, any Emotion can be an inadequate Idea.  Now, according to Emotivism, Moral Judgment is not open to dispute, because the basis of Judgment, e. g. an Emotion such as Like or Dislike, is a simple, private, experiential datum.  But, just as Hate can be misdirected, so, too, can be a Moral Judgment based upon it.  Thus, a Moral Judgment can be an inadequate Idea, and, so, disputable, contrary to premises of Emotivism.  Spinoza's doctrine thus exposes the source of the error of Emotivism--the thesis that an Emotion is a simple, private, experiential datum.  Or, equivalently, that Emotivism is based on an inadequate Idea of Emotion.