Nature: Inanimate, Animate, Dynamic

As has been previously discussed, the Cartesian-Newtonian concept of Nature is as inanimate.  The emergence in recent times of the general acceptance of many parts of Nature as animate thus reflects the incapacity of that concept to ground a concept of animate Nature.  But Spinoza seems to have the converse problem--to derive a concept of inanimate Nature from one of animate Nature, e. g. how a stone can be conceived as endeavoring to persist in its being.  Now, he does not address the problem, but a potential solution comes, ironically, from Newton.  For, his First Law, according to which an object remains in motion unless acted upon from without, seems reducible to Spinoza's concept of persisting in being.  On the other hand, the concept of an endeavor seems difficult to ascribe to a stone.  However, there are passages in which Spinoza seems to equate persistence in being to the maintenance of the integrity of the parts of the body.  Now, that characteristic does seem easier to ascribe to an endeavor, especially in light of the more recent Physics, according to which the integrity of an object is achieved by internal cohesion produced by electro-magnetic forces.  On that basis, the characterization 'inanimate' can be replaced by 'dynamic', in which case the distinction between inanimate Nature and animate Nature can be revised as a distinction of degree between two parts of dynamic Nature.  Whether or not Spinoza would assent to such a projection of his doctrine can only be a matter of speculation, but the possibility does illustrate the greater versatility of his concept of Nature in comparison with that of the Cartesian/Newtonian concept.