Volition, Consciousness, Reflection

Spinoza attributes Consciousness to the exercise of Volition, without at the same time seeming to consider the converse--whether or not Consciousness is inherently Volitional.  But based on his justification of the former attribution, a denial of the converse seems to follow.  For, the justification seems based on a standard thesis that awareness of X is, at the same time, awareness of that awareness of X, i. e. Mind naturally doubles itself.  But, if so, Volition seems to not be involved.  However, that standard thesis seems antithetical to the concept of Mind that Spinoza otherwise develops, from Mind as actively producing Ideas, to the concept of Will and Understanding as coextensive, based on the concept of Mind as actively positing or affirming its Ideas, as has been previously discussed.  On that basis, an act of Reflection consists in Mind positing a previous act of Mind as its object, i. e. two volitional processes.  Thus, rigorously developed from the elements of his doctrine, Reflection is Volitional, and Volition is Reflection, whereas the concept of Consciousness that he introduces into the analysis is not well-grounded in them, a lapse of rigor in his development of the doctrine.