Examplification, Empowerment, Education

Examplification is empowering insofar as it shows others that something can be done.  Furthermore, when the presentation of the example is articulated, what is shown is how something can be done, and when that articulation is represented as a formula, it is as a Method that something is being Examplified..  In each of these cases, Examplfication is, in other words, Education.  Thus, showing students how to conduct research is Education.  On the other hand, merely passing information on to them, despite the prevalence of that process in many classrooms, is not.

Potentism and Scope

The scope of the exercise of Power in an act of Self-Control is the individual performer, but that in an act that is also intended as setting an example is the target audience, as well.  Thus, 'Scope' is a significant variable in evaluation according to Potentism.  Furthermore, any factor of repeatability in Examplification can extend its Scope beyond its immediate audience.  So, the verbal representation of an act can increase its Potency, which is how the lives, and deaths, of Socrates and Christ continue as among the most powerful determinants of the course of Western history.

Potentism, Slave Morality, Master Morality, Morality of Self-Mastery

The representation, previously proposed here, of the Will to Power as the Moral doctrine 'Potentism', with the maximization of Potency its principle, facilitates evaluations of three types of doctrine that Nietzsche entertains, two of which it is sometimes identified with.  Slave Morality is deficient insofar as it stifles the creativity of exceptional types.  Master Morality is deficient, conversely, insofar as it exploits, abuses, or neglects the lower classes.  And, while the Morality of Self-Mastery might promote the maximum Potency of an individual, the scope of that exercise of Power is limited to that locus, e. g. a moment of Self-Control is deficient in comparison with a moment of Self-Control that is intended to, at the same time, serve as an example to others.  So, none of the three, despite apparent textual support to the contrary, especially in the cases of Master Morality and the Morality of Self-Mastery, is equivalent to Potentism.

Wil to Power, Morality, Potentism

Two of Nietzsche's innovative insights are: 1. A Moral doctrine is a product of the Will to Power, i. e. it is a model primarily designed to influence behavior, and 2. A Moral doctrine is the most potent expression of the Will to Power, i.e. the impact on human history of the deeds and words of Moses, Christ, Buddha, Socrates, Mohammed, etc. is unsurpassed by an other endeavor.  Together, the two imply the fundamental proposition of his later oeuvre--the Will to Power is a Moral doctrine, i. e. it formulates a model designed to invigorate the course of European civilization as hitherto constituted.  For want of a better terminology, that doctrine can be called 'Potentism', with the promotion of maximum Potency its fundamental principle.  Now, two tasks integral to any introduction of a new doctrine are a critique of rival doctrines, and a demonstration of its application.  Nietzsche's version of the former is his 'revaluation of all values', e. g. in the Anti-Christ, he exposes Christian Pity as a debilitating emotion.  However, an explicit systematic presentation of the application of Potentism is absent, thereby contributing to the general lack of recognition that the Will to Power is itself a Moral doctrine that is the underlying theme of his post-Zarathustra oeuvre.

Will to Power, Morality, Examplification

In 'Of the Bestowing Virtue', in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the image of the Will to Power is "gold", which "always bestows itself".  Now, the process of perpetual bestowal seems paradoxical, if not impossible, since it involves giving without subtraction.  However, there is a familiar experience that is constituted by that pattern--what has been called here 'Examplification', i. e. setting an example.  Now, to set an example is to establish a paradigm for some specific conduct, which, when generalized, is the act of creating a Moral doctrine.  Thus, the introduction of the Will to Power and the study of Morality are not two independent features of Nietzsche's later oeuvre--they are different facets of one and the same project, intersecting in the process of Examplification.

Empowerment and Overpowering

In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche introduces the Will to Power as a principle of Empowerment in 'Of the Bestowing Virtue', while later, in 'Of Self-Overcoming', it emerges as a principle of Overpowering.  Subsequently, he vacillates between the two, but with the heavy emphasis on the latter.  At the heart of the dichotomy is a structural problem that he seemingly neither recognizes nor addresses--that both a whole and each of its parts is governed by its own Will to Power, according to the formulation "Everything is the Will to Power" (from #1067 of the Will to Power collection).  Hence, a part of a whole is governed both by the Will to Power of the whole of which it is a part, and by its own Will to Power.  Accordingly, Empowerment is a promotion, by a part, of the Will to Power of the whole, while Overpowering is a promotion, by a part, of its own Will to Power, in conflict with that of other parts.  Now, the fundamental problem of both Morality and Political Philosophy is to systematize the relations between Whole and Parts, a problem which Nietzsche effectively avoids with his reductive opposition of Master Morality and Slave Morality.  In turn, the isolation of the former from a Wholistic Morality facilitates the abstraction of the process of Overpowering from the more comprehensive one of Empowerment, resulting in much of his post-Zarathustra oeuvre.

Beyond Good and Bad

In I, 17 of the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche asserts that 'beyond Good and Evil' "does not mean 'Beyond Good and Bad'".  Now, according to a narrow interpretation of the assertion, he is simply distinguishing Master Morality from Slave Morality, from which it easily follows that being an 'immoralist' according to the latter does not mean being one according to the former.  However, it is more problematic to more broadly infer from that inequality that Slave Morality being subject to revaluation by the Will to Power entails that Master Morality is exempt from it.  For, in general, as an original principle, all preceding doctrines are alike subject to reconsideration by a Will to Power order of rank, regardless of their established relations to one another.  And, specifically, as has been previously discussed, what is "healthy" according to the Master Morality in Beyond Good and Evil #258, i. e. aristocratic Morality in that passage, is exposed as self-destructive according to the Will to Power.  In others words, 'Good and Bad' are no more 'beyond' that principle than are 'Good and Evil'.

Will to Power and Etiology of Nihilism

The Genealogy of Morals implicitly outlines an etiology of Nihilism: 1. The internalization of the Will to Power qua principle of Aggression: 2. The infection of that introversion by the negativity of Ressentiment; and 3. The resultant formation of a Will to Nothingness.  However, that analysis is preceded by a more fundamental corruption in Nietzsche's doctrine--when what begins as a principle of Empowerment, i. e. the characterization of the Will to Power as a "bestowing virtue", in Zarathustra, degenerates into a principle of Aggression in Beyond Good and Evil, and continuing into the Genealogy.  Taking that origin into account, Nihilism can thus be diagnosed as a corruption of a process of Self-Enhancement into one of Self-Destructiveness.  So, the attendant hermeneutical question is whether or not Nietzsche's post-Zarathustra oeuvre itself exemplifies a succumbing to Nihilism, and, if #258 of BGE is any indication, it does.  For, there, as has been previously discussed, he characterizes as "healthy" a process that, upon closer examination, is revealed as self-defeating.

Critique of Power

In #258, Nietzsche offers the image of vines on a tree to illustrate how an aristocrat, i. e. a "more complete human being" (#257), is supported by the lower classes.  From the logic of the imagery, it follows that the taller the tree, the higher the reach of the vine, i. e. the 'more complete' the aristocrat.  On that basis, a critique of Power-relations can be developed, according to which systems in which the repression or neglect of lower classes by upper classes is exposed as self-defeating, e. g. Fascism, the Machiavellian Oligarchism of Strauss, the Libertarianism of Rand, predatory Capitalism, etc.  However, also vulnerable to that critique is Nietzsche's own assertion, in #258, that it is "good and healthy" for an "aristocracy" to "sacrifice . . . untold human beings, who, for its sake, must be reduced or lowered to incomplete human beings."  For, such sacrifice, reduction, and lowering, perhaps unwittingly, exemplifies the same pattern of the self-destructiveness of Power as do the other cases.

Aristocracy and Power

Since 'aristocracy' means literally 'rule of the best', the proposition 'aristocracy is the best type of government' is tautological.  Accordingly, Nietzsche's treatment of "aristocracy", in Beyond Good and Evil #258, is less informative than he seems to take it to be.  Nor does equating 'best' with 'most powerful' help him, since that merely converts the initial proposition into another tautology, i. e. 'the rule of the most powerful is the most powerful type of government'.  The latter emptiness is a symptom of another, in addition to the one previously discussed, methodological lapse in his presentation of the doctrine of the Will to Power--the lack of any precise definition of 'Power', accompanied by an exhaustive evaluation of alternative concepts of it.  Now, one plausible tack such a construction could take is a continuation of what is briefly proposed in #257--the synonymy of 'Power' and 'comprehensive', leading to the formulation that the 'best' ruler of a collective is the one with the most comprehensive vision of it.  On that basis, traditional alternatives, notably Theocracy, Plutocracy, Military Rule, can be evaluated, so that e. g. if suppression or neglect of part of the collective is involved, the structure is less than 'most comprehensive', and, hence, is an inferior type of government.

Political Philosophy of the Future

Since categories such as 'master', 'slave', 'noble', and 'oligarchy' all predate Nietzsche's introduction of the Will to Power, the construction of a 'Political Philosophy of the Future' based on that principle is can proceed independently of all of them.  Now, the obvious fundamental aim of such a doctrine is the maximization of collective Power, which entails the maximum empowerment of each member of the collective.  Hence, the value, according to the principle, of a specific type of system is a function, perhaps contingent on circumstances, of its efficacy in organizing the promotion of those maximums.  Thus, for example, Nietzsche, in Beyond Good and Evil #258, deviates from his own principle, not only by treating an "aristocracy" as an end-in-itself, but by ignoring that the strength of any such over-class is dependent on that of the under-class on which it is propped.  Likewise, systems purportedly following Nietzsche's example--notably National Socialism, Straussianism, Randism--by mistreating or neglecting its members, are too weak to qualify as a Political Philosophy of the Future based on the Will to Power.

Will to Power, Weakness, Abuse

It is difficult to determine whether Nietzsche's conflation, in II, 2, of the Genealogy of Morals, of incompetence and lying, is itself an expression of weakness, or one of abusiveness.  For, on the one hand, the reduction of all phenomena to the Will to Power seems to preclude from his system the possibility of a distinct concept of 'abuse of power'.  That is, if, as he proclaims in #1067 of the Will to Power collection, that everything is "the will to power--and nothing besides", the system lacks the capacity to recognize an 'abuse of power'.  On the other hand, insofar as the Will to Power is a principle of Growth, and to grow involves the "appropriation . . . of what is alien" (Beyond Good and Evil, #259), then the Will to Power is at least in part determined by alterior objects, just as healthfulness is contingent on the inner constitution of food.  Thus, the principle requires the enhancement of the objects of appropriation, with respect to which their "injury" (#259), for example, is an abuse of the power over them.  Accordingly, the classification of such mistreatment as a mere "consequence of the will to power" (#259) expresses an abuse of the principle, and not merely a weakness of it.

Autonomy and Anarchism

Nietzsche's characterizations of himself as 'immoral' or 'atheistic' may be merely rhetorical, since he does recognize an order of rank in conduct, and he is a disciple of the god Dionysus.  However, a third analogously negative classification may more substantively suit him--'anarchist'.  For, he would likely agree with R. P, Wolff that Autonomy is inconsistent with the legitimacy of any external authority, plus, as has been previously discussed, he fails to show that an autonomous being is necessarily suited to rule others, in which case it remains inconsistent with the Oligarchism that he seems to espouse.  However, his very few references to 'anarchists' are derogatory, though they have not discouraged the association with him of a watered-down version of Anarchism, i. e. 'Libertariansim', by Rand and her followers.  So, at minimum, what the very plausibility that he is an 'Anarchist', in the most rigorous sense of the term, perhaps most strongly indicates is that despite his reliance on Political categories, e. g. 'master', 'slave', 'noble', etc. a Political Philosophy remains underdeveloped in his oeuvre.

Epiphenomenalism, Artifactuality, Morality, Will to Power

Artifactuality defies Epiphenomenalism, which conceives all phenomena if not as illusory, at least as signs of some noumenal processes.  For, the meaning and value of, for example, a chess match is exhaustively defined by the invented rules of the game, independently of any covert, e. g. Psychological or Metaphysical, interaction involving the players.  Likewise, the meaning and value of the artifactual practice of Promising is exhaustively determined by its stipulated definition.  Thus, Nietzsche's esteem for Promising suggests a complete disavowal of the neo-Schopenhauerian interpretation of Morality as Epiphenomenal, which he espouses as late as The Gay Science, e. g. #1.  Accordingly, a Morality derived from the Will to Power, a doctrine which he invents, is a radical departure from all previous doctrines, to whatever extent they are conceived, ontologically or naturally, as given as 'true'.

Promising, Contract, Evaluation

In the opening sections of the Genealogy of Morals, II, Nietzsche expresses respect for Promising as a contractual arrangement.  However, the genealogy of that evaluation is uncertain.  It does not come from Master Morality, since, as he poses it in GM II, 17, "he who is by nature 'master' . . . what has he to do with contracts?"  Nor is it plausible that the respect is derived from an evaluation of Hobbesian' Contractualism, because the latter is embedded in the context of a 'war of all against all', a condition that, according to Human, All Too Human, #45, is "base".  A likelier precedent is Lockeian Contractualism, which Nietzsche evokes when characterizing the Active Forgetfulness that is the precondition of Promising as a "tabula rasa" in GM, II, 1.  However, that Contractualism constitutes a Democracy, which Nietzsche never advocates.  So, his evaluation of the practice of Promising seems to have no obvious ancestor in his doctrine.

Master-Slave, Noble-Base, Power

Though Nietzsche sometimes uses the pairs Master-Slave and Noble-Base interchangeably, at least one connotative difference between them is that the former is based on an interactive relation, while the latter merely compares.  Thus, for example, the mutually mistrustful "powerless people" (Human, All Too Human #45) are, according to the Genealogy of Morals II, 17, as such prior to being conquered, from which it follows that they are 'base' without being 'slaves'.  The distinction becomes more significant in Daybreak #199, which characterizes the unfettered "lust for power" of a Master, i. e. an "aristocrat", as "ignoble".  So, as is suggested by the previously discussed example of Nietzsche's contempt for liars, there seem to be inconsistencies in his doctrine between three orders of rank: Master-Slave, Noble-Base, and quantity of Power.

Promising, Will to Power, Lying

In the Genealogy of Morals II, 2, Nietzsche expresses equal contempt for one who is incompetent to keep a promise, and a deliberate false promiser, i. e. a "liar".  However, given his presentation of the Will to Power as his fundamental principle, following his noteworthy defense of the value of Lying, the conflation of the two types of Promise-breaking requires further explanation.  For, his contempt implies an evaluation that overrides the calculation that cheating another is justified if it involves an increase in Power.  An explication of that evaluation might have obviated the Machiavellian Oligarchism that continues to follow in his wake.  

Morality and Skill

Aristotle, Kant, and Utilitarianism each provides a formula for choosing well--the moderate option, the universalizable option, and the greatest happiness option, respectively.  Now, Magnus proposes that Nietzsche's contribution to that tradition determines whether or not one can will the eternal recurrence of an entertained possibility, though it is also arguable that his relevant formulation, rather, decides which is the more powerful option, i. e. the more comprehensive one.  In either case, doing anything well is Skill.  So, in these preeminent doctrines, a Moral principle defines a Skill, one distinguished from others skills not by kind, but by degree of generality.

Promising, Autonomy, Skill

As Kant's treatment of False Promising exemplifies, his concept of Autonomy is, in the Stoic tradition, a process of self-constraint, i. e. even his 'imperfect' duties, are derived as resistances to inclinations.  In contrast, Nietzsche's treatment of Promising suggests a positive concept of Autonomy, which, though he never characterizes it as such, can be recognized more familiarly as Skill.  For, Skill is Ability, and the sincere 'I promise to do X' = 'I have the ability to do X, and I will try to do X'.  Furthermore, Skill involves not only self-control, but "mastery over circumstances" (Genealogy of Morals, II, 2), as well.  Plus, Skill is an extended process, thereby requiring attention span, or, as Nietzsche characterizes it, "memory of the will" (GM, II, 1).  Also, an order of rank obtains between the skilled and the unskilled, not only when unrelated, but when in a teacher-learner context.  Finally, Skill is Power, so it is certainly implicated in Nietzsche's general doctrine.

Eternal Recurrence, Responsibility, Privilege

Among the events in one's past are one's actions, i. e. events which one initiated.  Hence, the affirmation of one's entire past entails that of one's past actions.  Now, to affirm the eternal recurrence of a past action is to affirm that 'one would do it again the same way'.  But, to affirm that one would do something again the same way is to take responsibility for it.  Thus, the affirmation of Eternal Recurrence entails the assumption of responsibility for each of one's past actions, which may be why Nietzsche characterizes Responsibility as a "privilege", in the Genealogy of Morals, II, 3.

Active Memory, Conscience, Proprioception

Corresponding, according to Nietzsche, in the Genealogy of Morals, II, 1, to Active Forgetfulness, is an "active" "memory of the Will", which, as he further argues, in GM, II, 2, is the origin of "conscience", not to be confused with "bad conscience".  However, the proposed correspondence does not hold, since, according to his own analysis, that Active Memory is the product of training, whereas Active Forgetfulness can be only internally generated, independent of all antecedents.  Likewise, as the product of learning from one's past mistakes, Conscience is not easily distinguishable from Bad Conscience, as the general argument of GM II requires.  In contrast, in the model that has been proposed here, Conscience originates as Proprioception, i. e. as the intra-organic homeostatic counterpart to Motility, with respect to which Nietzsche's 'active memory', 'conscience', and 'bad conscience', are all derivative processes.

The Evaluation of Promising

An interpretation of a sporting event in extrinsic terms, e. g. Psychological, Theological, etc., may be interesting, but it does not effect its result per se.  Like games, Promising is an artifactual activity the fundamental value of which is exhaustively a function of the performance of it itself, i. e. whether or not a promise is kept.  Thus, past performance determines the status of a new promise, and a promise is unfilled to only a creditor.  Accordingly, Nietzsche's concept of a "right" to make promises, and Kant's concept of an 'ought', i. e. an a priori obligation to an abstract entity, are, at minimum, interpretations of Promising that superimpose on it extrinsic evaluative criteria.  At maximum, by reducing it to either a Psychological phenomenon or a Logical proposition, they falsify its artifactuality.  In general, by imputing to Promising more than it actually involves, an interpretation detracts from how it might be Morally exemplary, i. e. as exemplifying that the primary locus of Moral evaluation is a performance itself.

Autonomy and Oligarchy

In the Genealogy of Morals II, 2, Nietzsche suggests that a hierarchy obtains between those who possess a "right to make promises" and those who do not, i. e. between those who are autonomous and those who are not.  However, that abstract distinction entails no necessary actual quantity of membership in either class.  Thus, it is not impossible that every member of a society is autonomous, in which case the society is not hierarchical.  In other words, the concept of Autonomy does not necessarily entail that of political Oligarchy, and could, in fact, be consistent with political Democracy.  Thus, Nietzsche's assertion that "our organism is an oligarchy" (GM, II, 1) is not as systematically significant as he seems to take it to be, not so much because that specific political classification is inaccurate, but because no political metaphor is appropriate to the internal structure of the human organism.  Thus, the venerable ancestor of that assertion, Plato's Individual-Polis analogy, similarly flounders on the contingency of how many Rational beings actually exist, i. e. if more than one, then neither a well-ordered Individual nor a well-ordered Polis is necessarily a Monarchy.

Promising and Autonomy

In the Genealogy of Morals, II, 2, Nietzsche classifies Promising as an 'autonomous' act, and then proceeds to classify Autonomy as 'supramoral', in apparent defiance of the Kantian doctrine that equates Morality and Autonomy.  However, this challenge to Kant is undermined by a vacillation in his own rhetoric.  For, in this passage, 'morality' clearly means 'morality of custom', an alternative to which he recognizes, in Daybreak 9, as a "morality of self-control".  In other words, if he is repudiating Kant in GM, then he is also repudiating his own earlier position, without explanation.  But, what likely amounts to no more than a terminological inconsistency distracts from the sharper distinction from Kant's doctrine that Nietzsche is at least implicitly drawing.  That is, for Kant, the involvement of Autonomy in Promising is only in the case in which the temptation to make a false promise is resisted, as a result of deliberate application of the principle of Pure Practical Reason to the maxim formulating the intention.  In other words, Promising is, itself, not an autonomous act, as it is for Nietzsche.  So, what Nietzsche is actually exposing in Kant's concept of Autonomy is its inherent and restrictive negativity, i. e. that it is a power of constraint, but not of creativity.

Nature, Super-Nature, Artifactuality

For Kant, Morality has a Super-Natural source, while for Nietzsche, a Natural one.  However, the practice of Promising, that is exemplary for each, seems peculiarly Human, and, hence, is not easily derivable from elsewhere.  Now, one alternative to Nature and Super-Nature is 'Second Nature', an everyday concept that has been occasionally used to characterize some aspects of Aristotelianism.  However, as primarily denoting acquired habits, that alternative is too restrictive to accommodate the creative processes that produce those habits, or any irregular human experiences.  In contrast, a more comprehensive characterization of the Human sphere is 'Artifactuality', the scope of which is the entire world of human construction, including not only the production of objects, but self- and collective-cultivation, as well.  Thus, the concept of Morality as a principle of Artifactuality is implicit in the status of Promising as exemplary in the doctrines of both Kant and Nietzsche.

Active Forgetfulness, Genealogy, Groundwork

The process of "active forgetfulness", that Nietzsche introduces in II, 1, of the Genealogy of Morals, suggests flaws in both his concept of a 'genealogy of Morals' and Kant's concept of a 'groundwork of a metaphysics of Morals'.  As a transition that cannot be reduced to antecedent conditions, the symbol that is appropriate to Active Forgetfulness, in Nietzsche's imagery of a succession of generations, is one that he does not entertain--Adoption.  Similarly, his image of "fruit" to characterize "the sovereign individual . . . liberated again from the morality of custom" (GM, II, 2), is inappropriate, because a fruit simply drops from a tree when ripe, whereas the "forgetfulness" that the image means to represent is an "active" process, in his own words.  In contrast, a 'groundwork' is, indeed, an active process.  But, if so, then so, too, is a 'groundwork of a metaphysics'.  In other words, the concept of Active Forgetfulness also helps expose 'Metaphysics' as a product of human construction in Kant's system, thereby debunking any reclamation of 'super-natural' privileges for it achieved by its relocation to the realm of Pure Practical Reason.

Active Forgetfulness and Eternal Recurrence

While Nietzsche only briefly alludes to "active forgetfulness" in the Genealogy of Morals, he significantly illustrates it in the 'Of the Vision and the Riddle' chapter of Thus Spoke Zarathustra--the image of the shepherd biting off the head of the snake that is choking him.  But, the latter symbolizes the liberating effect of the affirmation of Eternal Recurrence.  Thus, Active Forgetfulness and the incorporation of the past are two facets of one and the same Janus-faced "moment" produced by that act of affirmation, which is why he asserts, in GM II, 1, that there is "no present" without Active Forgetfulness.  In other words, the interpretations that the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence is an expression of Nietzsche's nostalgia for some bygone era neglect the relevance to the doctrine of Active Forgetfulness.

Active Forgetfulness and Naturalism

Among the most important concepts in Nietzsche's entire doctrine is what, in the Genealogy of Morals, II, 1, he calls "active forgetfulness", a process which creates a "tabula rasa of the consciousness, to make room for new things, above all for the nobler functions and functionaries, for regulation, foresight, premeditation".  This concept thus offers an alternative explanation to processes that can be generally classified as 'Detachment', and which are typically attributable to some deus ex machina, e. g. 'God', 'Reason', etc.  In other words, Active Forgetfulness is an essential principle in his Naturalism.

Ressentiment, Legislators, Commanders

In I, 13 of the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche argues that the concept of a subject that abstracts from its degree of strength is a product of Ressentiment.  Now, to legislate is to conceive a set of entities as independent of their differences in strength.  In contrast, a military organization is constituted by a hierarchy based on and codifying the relative strengths of its members.  Accordingly, that passage in GM seems to require a reconsideration of the conflation, in Beyond Good and Evil #211, of "legislators" and "commanders".

Genealogy and Groundwork

The Genealogy of Morals can be interpreted as a Naturalistic critique of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, with each of its three chapters a counterpart to each of those of the latter, respectively.  In his first chapter, Kant abstracts a principle from conventional Morality.  In the second, he derives that principle from the Reason within the individual.  In the third, he grounds that principle in the thesis that the individual inhabits two worlds.  In contrast, Nietzsche first exposes Kant's example of conventional Morality as contingent.  Second, he demonstrates how the 'Reason' of the individual consists in an internalization of conventional Morality.  Finally, he explains how the 'second world' is no more than a product of the imagination of members of the first, and only, world.  Aside from the parallel structures of the titles of the two works, the best textual evidence that such a contrast is at least part of Nietzsche's ambition is his highlighting, at the outset of his second part, of Promising, a seemingly trivial practice, except that it plays a pivotal role in Kant's second chapter.

Morality of Custom and Morality of Warfare

The career of George Washington suggests a flaw in the thesis, from Daybreak #9, that Morality begins as the "Morality of Custom".  For, his transition from leader of the revolutionary army to the first leader of the new country, illustrates that the military action that gives birth to a community can influence its settled condition.  Thus, it demonstrates that the Morality of Custom can be determined by a preceding Morality of Warfare.  A more methodical route to the same conclusion is to begin with the Will to Power, and then to derive from it a theory of 'History' as constituted by continual martial overcomings.  Whether or not Nietzsche later seemingly modified the Daybreak thesis on the basis of such a derivation, is unclear.