Friday, November 30, 2012

Reason, Examplification, Pluralism

'Distributive Reason' can be defined as a process in which a singular entity becomes a universal by virtue of inspiring imitations, e. g. an archetype.  It is, thus, a pluralizing process.  Now, the concept of Examplification, i. e. the concept of the process of setting an example, entails that of inspiring imitations.  Thus, Examplification is a process in which Reason pluralizes.  In contrast, Kant's concept of Reason, which can merely constrain individual behavior, on the grounds of inconsistency, lacks any inherently Pluralistic factor.

Thursday, November 29, 2012

Reason, Examplification, Causality

The concept of 'examplification', i. e. setting an example, entails that of the universalization of a singular moment, and, hence, is a product of Reason.  Furthermore, it also equivalent to the concept of setting a precedent, and, therefore, of that of causal efficacy, i. e. Spinoza's concept of Adequate Causality and Kant's Schema of Causality each entail the following of one event upon the performance of another.  Thus, 'Examplify!' can be at least as suitably characterized as a 'principle of Pure Practical Reason' as is Kant's formula, i. e. its source is constitutive Reason.

Wednesday, November 28, 2012

Reason and Moral Genius

One of the few passages in which Kant devotes attention to Action per se is in his examination, in the 3rd Critique, of Genius, one characteristic of which is its exemplariness.  Now, if he had proceeded to analyze the latter, he might have recognized that to set an example is to universalize, from which he might have concluded that Taste is entailed in Genius.  Likewise, since his Moral Law entails the universalization of a maxim, it can be understood as a formula of Moral Genius, in which Reason functions as the form of Exemplification.  So, Whitehead's observation, that the history of Philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato, abstracts from Plato's role as a propagator of the example set by the Moral Genius of Philosophy, namely Socrates.

Tuesday, November 27, 2012

Reason and Action

According to Kant, the imperatival form of his principle of Pure Practical Reason expresses the discrepancy between a hypothetical perfectly rational entity and an imperfectly so one.  Hence, the "Act" of the formula is extrinsic to the concept of perfectly rational performance, therefore, leaving unexplained the motivation, and, thus, the self-motivation of that rational ideal.  In contrast, Spinoza can ascribe activation to the attribute of Extension, a structural component of a rational entity that has no obvious analogue in Kant's system, leaving Action as an empirical concept in it.

Monday, November 26, 2012

Reason and Causality

Without causal efficacy, the ideas of Reason remain Theoretical and regulative, not Practical and constitutive.  Now, while Kant demonstrates that it is not impossible that Reason can be a cause, and asserts that it is a cause, he not only does not explain how it is a cause, but insists that the impossibility of such an explanation is a virtue.  However, that immunization against the demand for an explanation is based on two premises--that Reason is supernatural, and that its causality is of the Efficient category.  In contrast, if, as previously proposed here, Reason is fundamentally proprioceptive, and its causality is of the Formal variety, then its efficacy is not only a plain fact of experience, but one that can be explained.

Sunday, November 25, 2012

Practical Reason and Proprioception

Kant's effort to demonstrate the applicability of Reason to Action is much less conscientious than that of the applicability of the Understanding to concrete Cognition.  In particular, in comparison with the focal point of the latter, i. e. the Schematism, his variously proposed focal points of the former--a feeling of 'respect', a power of choice--seem no less ad hoc devices than a pineal gland might.  In contrast, a more substantive tertium quid has been previously proposed here--Proprioception.  That is, if Reason is conceived as a highly developed homeostatic system of guiding motility, then it is conceived as truly practical, thereby satisfying Kant's ambition for it.

Saturday, November 24, 2012

Reason, Consistency, Sufficiency

Kant's concept of 'imperfect duty' is a challenge to his thesis that 'rational' conduct is governed primarily by Consistency, since it requires him to explain how something that does not exist, i. e. a non-performed act, entails a contradiction.  Accordingly, he concocts maxims of impulsive negligence to serve as the bearers of inconsistency.  He thereby circumvents examination of the possibility that conduct can be 'rational' by virtue of maxims that are derived not from impulse, but from Reason itself.  In such cases, Reason is governed by what has here been previously termed a 'Principle of Practical Sufficient Reason', in which Reason is itself creative.  On that basis, Consistency is only a necessary condition of the Rationality of conduct.

Friday, November 23, 2012

Reason and End

If Pure Reason is, fundamentally, the process of unifying a multiplicity, then it entails no concept of 'end', which is, as Spinoza argues, the product of a concept of Reason as fundamentally teleological.  Likewise, it entails no concept of 'end in itself'.  Now, in a variety of places, Kant espouses, either implicitly or explicitly, a concept of Pure Reason as a principle of unification.  On that basis, contrary to what he frequently asserts elsewhere, Reason does not have or set ends, and neither Reason nor a rational being is an end in itself. Rather, as admirable as is his declaration that humans should never be treated as mere means, it is an empirical principle. 

Wednesday, November 21, 2012

Standpoint and End

To 'transfer' oneself, as Kant characterizes the process, at #40 of the Critique of Judgment, as part of his development of his Aesthetic Theory, to the standpoint of some other, entails, at least heuristically, a relocation in space, to the experience of a radically, because private, different set of empirical objects.  In contrast, to transfer oneself to a "universal" standpoint simply entails the abstraction from the empirical components of experience, to its a priori components.  In that process, not only is no spatial relocation involved, but the otherness of the other is abstracted from, as well.  Likewise, according to the Groundwork, as part of the development of his Moral doctrine, to treat an other as an 'end in itself' is to respect and promote a set of empirical interests, that are radically, because private, different from one's own.  In contrast, his thesis, "Rational nature exists as an end in itself", abstracts from all empirical differences, and, hence, from not only the contingent private interests of others, but from the very otherness of others, as well.  In other words, his concepts 'standpoint of others' and 'end in itself' are similarly ambiguous, i. e. each admits of both a universalistic and an particularistic interpretation.  One perhaps surprising distinction between the two is that it is the Aesthetic concept that receives from Kant a universalistic emphasis, while it is the particularistic sense of 'end in itself' that predominates in his Moral doctrine.

Tuesday, November 20, 2012

Standpoint, Universality, Plurality

At #40 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant discusses thinking from a "universal standpoint", i. e. "from the standpoint of everybody else", achievable only by "transferring" oneself to the "standpoint of others".  Now, given that 'standpoint' essentially connotes 'particularity', the concept of 'universal standpoint' is, at best, problematic.  Furthermore, the distinction between Appearances and Things-in-Themselves, which is fundamental to his system, entails that the object of a 'universal standpoint' can only be a thing-in-itself, a classification which seems unhelpful to a theory concerning aesthetic judgments about appearances. In any case, in the notion of transferring oneself to the standpoint of some other, there is brief evidence of a process of Pluralization, a process that gets suppressed by Kant's eventual effort to universalize the standpoint.

Monday, November 19, 2012

Reason and Communication

Kant introduces the concept of 'communicability' in the 3rd Critique, primarily to explain Aesthetic Judgment.  However, it is clear from his exposition that it is not only aesthetic feeling that he regards as 'communicable'.  For example, at #40, he asserts that a "moral feeling , , , can be communicated universally , , , by means of reason."  What is significant in this passage is that it implies that Reason is not a content of communication, but is, itself, a medium of communication.  In other words, Kant is here evinced as conceiving Reason to be a specific linguistic pattern, rather than a pre-linguistic process that contingently gets verbally expressed.  The passage is, thus, evidence that Kant conceives Reason to be essentially linguistic, from which it follows that Cognition is essentially linguistic, and that Language is an a priori capacity, which Cassirer and Chomsky seem to appreciate better than many other neo-Kantians.

Sunday, November 18, 2012

Reason, Judgment, Duty

In the Groundwork, Kant distinguishes between a maxim that is inconceivable as a universal law, and a maxim the universalization of which is, while internally conceivable, is inconsistent with the internally conceivable universalization of some other maxim.  The significance of that distinction to his system is that it is the basis of the difference between the concepts of 'perfect' and 'imperfect' duty, and, subsequently, of that between those of 'Justice' and 'Virtue'.  Now, as has been previously discussed here, at #40 of the 3rd Critique, he draws a distinction between "judgment", which is thinking from a "universal standpoint", and "reason", which is "consistent" thinking.  On that basis, it is Judgment, specifically, that is the source of the universalizability of a maxim, and Reason, specifically, that is the source of the consistency between universalizations.  Accordingly, in Kant's system, it is Judgment, specifically, that is the source of the concepts of Perfect Duty and Justice, while it is Reason, specifically, that is the source of the concepts of  Imperfect Duty and Virtue.

Saturday, November 17, 2012

Reason, Consistency, Pluralism

In #40 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant, digressing from the main exposition, distinguishes: 1. thinking for oneself; 2. thinking from the standpoint of everyone else; and 3. thinking always consistently.  He characterizes these, as, respectively, "unprejudiced", "broadened", and "consistent", thinking.  He also classifies their sources as, respectively, "understanding", "judgment", and "reason",  Now, practical correlates of these three can be discerned in his fundamental principle of Pure Practical Reason, respectively: acting on a maxim, the universalization of a maxim, and the non-contradictoriness of a universal law.  Hence, these distinctions confirm what has been previously proposed here--that the Pluralism of his doctrine does not derive from Reason, specifically, i. e. the criterion of non-contradiction that governs Reason does not entail a multiplicity of thinkers.  In fact, if, as Leibniz argues, the principle of Contradiction is derived from the principle of Identity, Pluralism is antithetical to Reason

Friday, November 16, 2012

Reason, Objectivity, Universality, Pluralism

The concept of Subjective Universality, that Kant introduces in the 3rd Critique to characterize the interpersonal communicability of judgments of Taste, bears out that the Object-Subject distinction is not equivalent in his system to the Universal-Individual one.  The priority of the former contrast to his Moral theory is evinced at the outset of his exposition, in the Groundwork, of the concept of Imperative, which he there introduces as a relation between a perfectly rational entity and an imperfectly so one, i. e. between objective necessity and subjective contingency.  Now, no multiplicity of rational entities is entailed in that relation, nor is it entailed in the fundamental formulation of the principle of Pure Practical Reason, in which the only multiplicity entailed is that of maxims.  In other words, the concept of Subjective Universality bears out that the Pluralism of Kant's doctrine is not derived from Pure Practical Reason, or, at least, not from how he fundamentally conceives it.

Thursday, November 15, 2012

Legislative Reason and Deontic Logic

The emergence of neo-Kantian Deontic Logic tends to obscure the insufficiency, for Kant, to his Moral Law, of the universalization of maxims.  For, as he makes clear in the 3rd Critique, mere subjective universality suffices as a criterion for judgments of Taste.  In contrast, his Moral Law requires the elevation of a maxim to objectivity, i. e. requires conceiving it not only as universal, but as a law, as well.  Furthermore, it is only as explicitly legislative that Reason is causal, i. e. that it is constitutive.  So, Deontic Logic, the focus of which is the practical syllogism, the major premise of which is a proposition that is universally quantified in some respect, e. g. subjects or worlds, remains no more than an exercise in formal calculation, that abstracts from the decisive innovations of Kant's Moral doctrine.

Wednesday, November 14, 2012

Judgment and Experimental Reason

If Kant had conceived 'Judgment' as he does his 'Transcendental Deduction', i. e. as legalistic, he might have anticipated Dewey in locating it as the termination of a process of examination.  As such, 'pronouncement', more precisely than 'utterance', characterizes the expression of a judgment.  For, 'utterance' also classifies the initiation of that process, which, likewise more precisely, can be termed a 'proposal', thereby avoiding, as well, the further ambiguities of the notion 'proposition', that figures prominently in many Epistemological and Logical theories.  Now, a proposal is implicitly questionable, and, hence, can be classified as an interrogative expression, i. e. it expresses 'What if?', with respect to which the pronouncement of a judgment is the settlement.  But, as has been previously discussed here, the source of such questions, is Experimental Reason.  Thus, the 'Theoretical' Reason that is the main topic of Kant's 1st Critique is a subtopic of Experimental Reason, i. e. it examines Knowledge in abstraction from the quest for it.  The preface to the 2nd edition, introduced by a quote from Bacon, suggests, at least briefly, his acknowledgment of the primacy of Experimental Reason.

Tuesday, November 13, 2012

Judgments and A Priori Knowledge

The possibility, previously proposed here, that, for Kant, judgments are utterances, would seem to conflict with his affirmation of the existence of a priori Knowledge.  For, if judgments are both utterances and the fundamental mode of expression of Knowledge, it would seem to follow that all knowledge is a posteriori, i. e. because utterances are a posteriori.  However, that conclusion depends on what Kant means by 'a priori Knowledge'--1. 'knowledge of truths that are independent of empirical experience', or 2. 'knowledge possessed pre-natally'.  Now, there is little evidence that he joins Plato in subscribing to #2, and even if his position is that humans are pre-programmed with certain 'pure' concepts, the latter are not to be confused with the knowledge that is the product of a process involving them.  On the other hand, there is no incompatibility between a truth and the utterance of it, which is the distinction entailed in the contrast between interpretation #1 and the thesis that all judgments are utterances.  So, that Kant asserts the existence of a priori Knowledge is not necessarily an argument against the possibility that he affirms the latter, as well.

Monday, November 12, 2012

Judgment, Language, Private Knowledge

At B 97 of the 1st Critique, Kant uses the word "say" to introduce an expression that he classifies as a 'judgment', the significance of which is that it is evidence, in an otherwise indeterminate exposition, that he conceives judgments to be utterances, in which case, they serve a fundamentally social function.  It follows that insofar as judgments are the modes of expression of Knowledge, Knowledge is fundamentally social, which accords with the concept of the essential sociality of Rational beings that becomes explicit in the 2nd Critique.  But, it is implicit in the 1st Critique, as well.  For, the a priori transcends the a posteriori, e. g. personal differences.  Accordingly, the 'I think' is not only the ground of the unity of Knowledge, but, as anonymous, it is the ground of its sociality, as well.  So, the linguistic character of judgment underscores that for Kant, there is no private Knowledge, as there is in systems that recognize the possibility of intuitive Knowledge.

Sunday, November 11, 2012

Moral Pluralism, Heliocentrism, Solipsism

Kant's Moral doctrine is Pluralistic, populated by a multiplicity of rational beings, each of which, as an end-in-itself, is a noumenal entity.  Now, according to the standard interpretation of his 'Copernican revolution', the subject of Experience is analogous to a heliocentric system, with Reason as its 'Sun'.  However, as stated, in Kant's doctrine there are a multiplicity of such subjects.  Hence, granting the standard interpretation of his 'Copernican revolution', it follows that the astronomical metaphor that is appropriate to Kant's doctrine is a galaxy, not a solar system, which, as literally 'solipsistic', is antithetical to the doctrine's Pluralism.

Saturday, November 10, 2012

Other Minds, Reason, Morality

Some philosophers have been challenged by the problem of the existence of other minds, primarily because immediate evidence of such an existence seems lacking.  Now, according to Kant, entailed by his principle of Pure Practical Reason is the principle to treat an other, because rational, as an end-in-itself.  In other words, he implicitly classifies the question of the existence of other minds as a Moral, not a Cognitive, problem, and solves it accordingly.

Friday, November 9, 2012

Reason, Morality, Lying

Kant's four examples of 'duty' are often regarded as more interesting than rigorously convincing, primarily because of the difficulty in corresponding a logical contradiction with a concrete event.  Still, the example of false promising has been appreciated as more instructive than the others, since it entails both the construction and the breaking of a social convention.  But, that example is distinctive in another respect--it is fundamentally linguistic.  Hence, on that interpretation, false promising is a special case of lying, which is fundamentally immoral, because it undermines the effectiveness of language, the medium of communication, and, hence, it undermines the very basis of social harmony.

Thursday, November 8, 2012

Reason, Morality, Constructivism

While 'Constructivist' is often used to characterize Kant's Cognitive theory, it is rarely applied to his Moral doctrine.  Since autonomous Reason, qua legislative faculty, can ground the cultivation individuals, and the building of their society, the rubric seems appropriate.  However, Kant, instead, emphasizes the 'supernatural' facets of the doctrine, beginning with the abstraction of maxims from their actualization, thereby rendering the products of Reason extrinsic to the evaluation of its exercise.  Furthermore, his inclusion of an eternally existing deity as a member of a rational society makes it difficult to conceive that collective as 'constructed'.  But, with the integration of maxim and action, that concept becomes clearer, as do that of the autonomy of self-cultivation, and of society-building, with respect to which it is the existence of a deity that becomes extrinsic, if not irrelevant.

Wednesday, November 7, 2012

Reason and Atomism

Perhaps Kant's primary contribution to the Rationalist tradition is his concept of Reason as intrinsically Universal, likely based on the equivalence of 'impersonal' and 'universal'.  Thus, the role of Reason in conduct becomes inherently social, e. g. the coordination of maxims with laws, whereas, for Aristotle and Spinoza it is only extrinsically interpersonal, while for Plato, Descartes, and Leibniz it remains an essentially private process.  In other words, the Kantian concept of Reason is anti-Atomistic, and anticipates the nascent Dialectical tradition of  Hegel, Marx, Fichte, etc.

Tuesday, November 6, 2012

Reason and Ersatz Freedom

The paradox of heteronomous behavior is that is not experienced as such.  For, such behavior is preceded by a feeling, which is a private event, so that what ensues seems to have a private origin, and, thus, appears to be 'free'.  Hence, as Spinoza argues, liberation from heteronomous influence can begin with the recognition of it as such.  Now, insofar as Reason, for Kant, prompts one to conceive oneself as a member of a macroscopic society, it transports one out of the vulnerability of unwitting privacy, and, hence, from heteronomy.  However, he does not join Spinoza in appreciating the liberating effect of directly recognizing heteronomy for what it is, which may be why he misses that the apparent 'choice' to disobey Reason constitutes a relapse into ersatz 'freedom'.

Monday, November 5, 2012

Reason, Morality, Philosophy of Language

While the attention to Kant's 'Categorical Imperative' tends to focus on its classification as 'categorical', its more significant component is that it is an imperative.  For, as an imperative, it is verbal, thereby evincing that Reason, specifically the Principle of Pure Practical Reason, is, essentially, linguistic.  That is, the essential moment of the Principle--its role in determining a course of action--is as a linguistic formulation, evaluating other linguistic constructions, i. e. maxims.  In other words, Kant's doctrine is constituted by a perhaps unprecedented convergence of Reason, Morality, and Language, in which Language emerges crystallized as Reason, representing itself as the a priori autonomous basis of social cohesion.  As such, the doctrine can be characterized as a 'Philosophy of Language', meaning: not 'a theory about Language', but: a 'doctrine, the source of which is Language'.

Sunday, November 4, 2012

Heliocentrism, Reason, Empowerment

The Sun is central to human experience not only insofar as it enables visibility, but also insofar as it is source of physiological energy, i. e. via photosynthesis.  Thus, the Sun not only enlightens, but it empowers, as well.  Now, many of the Heliocentric interpretations of Kant's system, e. g. Silber's, recognize only the first as analogous to the influence of Reason on human experience.  But, that Reason is causal, which Kant labors at great length to establish, suggests that the second solar property is the more fundamental analogy in his doctrine.  So, the empowerment by Reason is the focal point of the Copernican transformation of a passive Subject to a dynamic Agent.

Saturday, November 3, 2012

Reason, Choice, Bi-Heliocentrism

Silber interprets Kant as effecting a Moral 'Copernican revolution', i. e. as inverting the traditional concept of Reason as conforming to independently set 'goods'.  His analogy, thus, abstracts from the "motions" that Kant ascribes to the source of Reason, thereby falling short of the 'Copernican revolution' that has been proposed here--from passive Subject to dynamic Agent.  Accordingly, Silber settles for Heliocentric imagery, with Pure Practical Reason as the 'Sun'.  Now, as has been previously argued, Silber fails to make the case that Freedom of Choice is derived from Pure Practical Reason.  Hence, a more accurate characterization of that imagery is 'Bi-Heliocentric', because that failure leaves the model with two 'Suns'--Pure Practical Reason and Freedom of Choice.  In that respect, Silber's representation of the outcome of Kant's effort to reconcile rational morality and popular morality, is accurate.

Friday, November 2, 2012

Reason, God, Freedom of Choice

Having undermined, in the 1st Critique, all traditional proofs of the existence of God, it is historically significant that Kant's alternative effort, in the 2nd Critique, be sound.  Now, that proof entails the proposition that Virtue is the worthiness to be happy, which, in turn, entails the thesis that humans possess a power of freedom of choice.  However, that that power includes the possibility of choosing to disobey Reason, which Kant does not dispute, seems to present a serious challenge to his ambition, i. e. because that thesis seems to be a premise that is independent of the resources of Reason.  While Kant himself seemingly remains oblivious to this potentially conclusive lacuna in his procedure, Silber, in his introduction to Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, in his attempt to bridge that gap, agrees that freedom of choice is irrational, proposing that "the irrational is a mode of the rational".  However, given the absence of any further elaboration, that seemingly contradictory proposition achieves the opposite of what Silber intends--it reinforces the suspicion that Kant's proof of the existence of God is as unsound as the others that he refutes.

Thursday, November 1, 2012

Retributive Justice, Karma, Property

The concept of Retributive Justice--entailing reward as well as punishment--presupposes a concept of Property, i. e. the concept of an action as 'one's own.'  Hence, it is a variation on the popular notion of 'Karma'--a contrivance that effects what occurs naturally in the latter, namely, a return of an action to its source.  Thus, Retributive Justice can be conceived as a special case of respect for property rights--the process of returning something to its owner.