Will and Consciousness

In Spinoza's doctrine the Vital principle is the 'endeavor of something to persist in its being', with Will the Mental aspect of the endeavor.  Now, a significant feature of the endeavor is that it is "conscious". Thus, this Psychological dimension of his doctrine is apparently at odds with the long tradition, beginning with Leibniz, culminating with Freud, and thereafter popularized, according to which behavior is at least in part determined by subconscious or unconscious forces.  However, Spinoza would likely respond that such forces all have external sources, and, hence, are not ingredient in the Vital principle per se of the entity.  Likewise, an Emotion, contrary to some theories that glorify emotions, is not an expression of innermost character, but an effect of some external influence. Instead, it is only when behaving consciously, or, equivalently, when exercising Volition, or, equivalently, that one is self-activating, that, according to his doctrine, one is truly oneself.

Truth, Correspondence, Holist

Descartes' thesis that Will and Understanding are distinct is based on a traditional Correspondence concept of Truth.  For, the divergence of the two is exemplified for him by False Belief, in which Affirmation, a product of Will, does not correspond to its object, and, hence, is lacking Understanding.  In contrast, Spinoza's thesis that Will and Understanding are coextensive is based on a different concept of Truth, which can be called Holist.  According to that concept, a False Belief is, more precisely, one that is only partly True, but, in itself, is a product of an affirmation that combines both Will and Understanding.  For example, according to Descartes, a dream is False because it does not correspond to fact.  But, according to Spinoza, it is True as a datum, but False only insofar as it is a partly True representation of fact, potential complemented by another True datum, e. g. that one earlier fell asleep. The Holist concept is thus applicable to Berkeleyan Phenomenalism, which denies correspondence to any fact, and, so, serves Spinoza as the basis of a criticism of Empiricism. So, his Holist concept of Truth is another example of Spinoza's divergence from both main schools of Modern Philosophy.

Centripetal, Centrifugal, Mind

As has been previously discussed, the repudiation of Geocentrism and Anthopocentrism, entailed by the Copernican discoveries, is preparatory to a replacement of Centripetal Geocentrism and Centripetal Anthropocentrism, by Centrifugal Geocentrism and Centrifugal Anthropocentrism.  In other words, the concept of humans as protagonists on a cosmic stage in a drama determined by impregnable Heavens, is replaced by that of humans as centers of action, with the Heavens an accessible destination, as history has proven.  Now, one set of inhabitants of the Ancient Heavens is Platonic Ideas, which are thus passively experienced, e. g. contemplated.  But Spinoza inverts that relation, with a concept of Mind that anticipates Brentano's Intentionality.  According to this concept, Mind experiences an Idea only insofar as it posits it, i. e. affirms it, which Spinoza ascribes to Volition, rather than to Brentano's Intention.  On this basis, Volition and Understanding are one and the same, in opposition to Descartes' contrary concept of their relation. Kant later briefly similarly posits the unity of Will and Reason, but squanders the opportunity to further develop the insight, and to perhaps extend his rubric 'Copernican Revolution' to that unity.

Centrism, Centripetal, Centrifugal

It seems unarguable that one always finds oneself physically at the center of a world.  Hence, Physical Egocentrism seems to be an undeniable fact that is the basis of Epistemological Egocentrism, as well as of Psychological Egocentrism, and of Moral Egocentrism.  However, proponents of these rarely seem to consider that they all have a further foundation.  To begin with, none of them seems to recognize the ambiguity of any Centrism--Centripetal vs. Centrifugal--and the concepts are each varieties of the former.  So, typically ignored is Centrifugal Egocentrism, i. e. that one is a center of Action in one's world, and, hence, rarely considered is that this is the foundation of the Centripetal Egocentrisms, e. g. that Perception is a function of Action. Indeed, Modern Philosophy is primarily the product of the falsification of Centrifugal Egocentrism as Centripetal Egocentrism, e. g. Descartes, who is self-evidently at a desk writing the Meditations, presenting himself instead as gazing at a fire, and likewise for all the major works of the era.  But one possible exception is the Ethics--in which a Mode is an instance of a divine Emanation, i. e. a center of Action--an exception that is typically obscured by the inclusion of Spinoza as part of a sequence of Rationalists, in opposition to a sequence of Empiricists.  Nevertheless, Spinoza is distinctive among them as acknowledging and exploring the epochal change in human history that is a consequence of the Copernican discovery--a transition from Centripetal Geocentrism, i. e. in which the Earth is the arena of a cosmic drama of which humans are the protagonists, to Centrifugal Geocentrism, in which the Earth is the starting point of the human exploration of a previously impregnable cosmos.

Reason, Compassion, Happiness

In Kant's system, Happiness, defined as a totality of satisfactions, is an Empirical concept.  Hence, his inclusion of Happiness in the Highest Good of Pure Practical Reason, even conditionally, is problematic, at best.  Likewise, the ascription to Pure Practical Reason of the Duty to promote the Happiness of others is groundless, i. e. promoting their Rationality would be consistent with the principle.  Similarly, it would seem to follow on the basis of a principle of Self-Denial that one should promote the Self-Denial of others.  But, instead, Schopenhauer advocates Compassion, the exercise of which consists in the alleviation of the specific causes of the suffering of others, which as such, only reinforces their Selfishness.  In contrast, Spinoza has no such difficulty.  For, in his doctrine, Happiness is Health, Health consists in the active exercise of one's powers, and the active exercise of one's powers is grounded in Knowledge, either Reason or Intuition.  Thus, the promotion of the Happiness, no matter whose, is entailed in the Rationality of Spinoza's doctrine.  He does not share the problem with his peers because while their, and most other, concepts of Happiness is that of a passive condition, his is active.

Geocentrism, Perception, Action

As has been previously discussed, the repudiation of Geocentrism entails that of Anthropocentrism, and, hence, that of the Moral Absolutism that has been grounded by the latter.  And, while Berkeley and Kant, notably, endeavor to salvage the concept of the world as the arena of a Theological drama of which humans are the protagonists, Spinoza explores the consequences of the repudiation.  There is a further consequence, which he perhaps only implicitly recognizes, and that Kant verges upon, but because of his Theological commitments, cannot quite appreciate it for what it is.  The concept of Centrism is potentially ambiguous--it can signify motion towards the center, or motion away from the center, e. g. centripetal force, or centrifugal force.  Plainly, traditional Geocentrism and Anthropocentrism are of the former variety, i. e. the universe is conceived as oriented towards human existence.  But the repudiation of that Centrism does not entail that of the inverse Centrism, and, to the contrary, can liberate it.  Indeed, as subsequent history has proven, the Copernican discovery enables the recognition that humans are now centers of action, with the previously impregnable Heavens now an accessible destination.  Implicit in that recognition is the more radical revolution than the one that Kant acknowledges, the one that he verges upon, only to shy away from--the concept of humans as centers of Action, rather than of Perception.  In contrast, Spinoza does conceive Modes as essentially agents, not subjects, and as modifications of a divine emanation, perhaps as agents of a new Geocentrism.

Relativism and Subjectivism

The common association of 'relativism' with 'permissiveness' usually confuses Relativism and Subjectivism.  For unlike the latter, the former is not based on whim, e. g. a food being healthful on bio-chemical grounds, rather than attracting on the basis of aroma.  A similar, though more subtle, confusion underlies most complaints against 'cultural relativism'.  In some cases, the complaints are merely expressions of bigotry, e. g. Eurocentric, but, in others, e. g. ascriptions of objectivity to assertions of the superiority of Beethoven or Shakespeare, there is some basis.  However, as is well covered by Kant, at issue is a dialectic of Taste, namely, how Aesthetic evaluation is even possible, but, again, the conflict is between Objectivity and Subjectivity, not between Objectivity and Relativity.  Instead, the Moral Relativism of Spinoza is based on the factual repudiation of the basis of Moral Absolutism, sometimes aka Manicheanism--the discovery that the human species is not at the center of the universe, and, hence, that what is Good or Evil for it is not as such in itself.  Accordingly, what is beneficial or harmful to humans is still objectively so, but, outside of the Theology that refuses to accept the repudiation of the thesis that the Universe is the setting of a drama of which humans are the protagonists, such Goodness or Evil is not a characteristic that is independent of its effects on humans.

Geocentrism and Moral Relativism

• The repudiation of Geocentrism entails the repudiation of Anthropocentrism, and, while Kant tries to salvage the latter via his Reflective Judgment faculty, Spinoza considers the implication of the repudiation for Moral Values.  The result is a replacement of Absolutism with a variety of Relativism--'Good' and 'Evil' are no longer ingredient in the cosmos, but signify 'Healthful' and 'Unhealthful', respectively, relative to some subject.  Who the subject is varies--an individual person, a group of people with common characteristics, perhaps even the entire species.  Now, contrary to some common confusions, 'relative' in this case connotes Objectivity, not Subjectivity, i. e. whether or not some food is Healthful depends on e.g. its nutritional value.  In contrast, Utilitarianism is Subjectivist, i. e. with a private datum, Pleasure or Pain, the determining factor of the value of something.  So, in Spinoza's doctrine, Knowledge is an important factor in establishing whether or not something is Good, with Pleasure and Pain inadequate as sources of Knowledge. One seemingly unusual implication of this Axiology of the Ethics is that Virtue and Goodness are not necessarily related.  For, Virtue is an intra-personal characteristic, i. e. consisting in the achievement of Self-Control, whereas Goodness, as a characteristic of a person, is inter-personal, i. e. one is 'Good' insofar as one benefits another.  The two may coincide, e. g. when under the guidance of Reason, one helps another, but either can obtain in the absence of the other.  So, Spinoza's development of Moral Relativism is another feature of his drawing out the consequences of the repudiation of Geocentrism, again further than most of his peers of the era.

Geocentrism and Parallelism

The repudiation of Geocentrism destroys two hierarchical relations--that of ruler to ruled in Theocratic Monarchism, i. e. insofar as the relation represents the Heaven-Earth difference of kind, and that of Mind and Body, which is based on the Spirit-Matter distinction that separates Heaven from Earth.  Spinoza's response to the former has already been discussed--the replacement of a transcendent deity with an immanent one, corresponding to which is the replacement of Theocratic Monarchism with Technocratic Democracy.  Of course, the promotion of Democracy in the era is hardly unique.  However, his second response has had few peers--the attribution of Corporeality to his deity, resulting in Mind-Body Parallelism.  Indeed, the depreciation of Corporeality remains a common theme among Modern Secularists, e. g. the Empiricist disembodiment of Sense-Experience, Mill's 'higher vs. lower' distinction, etc.  So, Spinoza's doctrine expresses the most comprehensive appreciation in the era of the repudiation of Geocentrism.

Theocratic Monarchy andTechnocratic Democracy

In the Ethics, Spinoza presents no explicit Political doctrine, but the rudiments of one are implicit in it.  To begin with, the premises of Theocratic Monarchy are repudiated from the outset, by a concept of an immanent deity who is thus not in a transcendent hierarchical relation to human society.  Second, his concept of Reason as the adequate means to the solution of problems--as opposed to Theocratic ones such as prayer and ritual--is a basis for a Technocracy.  And third, his concept of a Rational society, as embodied by the Rule of Law as best promoting the common Good, amounts to an advocacy of Democracy.  So, in other words, the Ethics implies a repudiation of Theocratic Monarchism, in favor of Technocratic Democracy.  Thus, his introduction of an immanent deity collapses the distinction between the City of God and the City of Man, resulting in a post-Medieval Polis, for which the Ethics presents some of the main principles.  In contrast, Kant's Law-governing Kingdom of Ends includes a "head" that is "subject to the will of no other", and, hence, implicitly constitutes a Theocratic Monarchist reaction to Spinoza's Polis.  As is the case with his explicit criticism of Spinoza, he makes no attempt to either acknowledge or defend the underlying Theological point of dispute.

Suicide and Right

As has been previously discussed, Spinoza's doctrine entails that any self-destructive tendency must be an expression of only diminished capacity in some respect, a condition of 'emotional bondage'.  Hence, it seems to follow that he would dispute the contention of someone who believes that one has a right to commit suicide.  But, in fact, according to his concept of Natural Right, as developed in his Political writings, not in the Ethics, he does implicitly recognize such a Right.  For, in those passages, Natural Right is presented as transcending emotional incapacity, or, equivalently, intellectual capacity.  However, there is a discrepancy between those passages and the exposition in the Ethics, specifically regarding the concept of Power.  In the political writings, Natural Right and Natural Power are correlated, whereas in the Ethics, Power is correlated with Knowledge, and, hence, inversely with degree of bondage to Emotions.  Hence, from the latter, it would seem to follow that someone who is controlled by Emotion is someone whose Natural Right is correspondingly diminished.  Accordingly, there is no Right to commit suicide, at least on the basis of the Ethics.  It is unclear how Spinoza might reconcile the two apparently contradictory positions.

Will, Weakness, Suicide

Nietzsche's criticism of Schopenhauer's Asceticism is based on the innovative thesis that the true character of Volition is Will to Power, not the traditional Will to Live.  As such, its range of expression can vary in degree of Power, stronger or weaker.  Accordingly, the weakest expression of Will to Power is a Will to Nothingness, i. e. Asceticism.  Thus, Schopenhauer's promotion of Self-Denial, and, more generally, the concept of Will as essentially suffering, is a doctrine of a weak Will, and, hence, not universally valid, just as the ambitions of a sick person, e. g. the minimization of pain, are not those of a healthy person, who can, e. g. take the same pain in stride.  Now, an alternative criticism of Asceticism is implied in Spinoza's doctrine, according to which Self-Denial as a principle, rather than a temporary exercise of self-control, is impossible, since the fundamental principle of Self is persistence in its being.  On that basis, Self-Denial is, as Nietzsche diagnoses, a symptom of weakness, but not a weakness of a Will in itself.  Rather, it is a weakness with respect to stronger external forces, including those which are inimical to it, e. g. a parasite seeking to appropriate the blood of its host.  In those conditions, an apparent expression of Self-Denial is, in fact, an internalization of the stronger external inimical force, and an expression of weakness in that respect.  The more general significance of these rival criticisms of Asceticism is to the extreme case--Suicide--and, despite their differences, are similar as alternatives to the common contemporary approach that, influenced by Freud, respects suicidal tendencies as a psychologically sound expression of a Thanatos-like principle.

Will and Suffering

Schopenhauer's aim is the elimination of suffering.  The source of suffering, according to his diagnosis, is Individual Will, but because that concept is unsettled in his doctrine, he offers three different correctives.  First, he conceives suffering as inherent in Universal Will, of which Individual Will is an instance, so, Will per se is the problem, the corrective of which is the denial of Will, expressed in Ascetic behavior.  Second, he conceives suffering to arise specifically from the personal dissatisfactions of Individual Will, the corrective of which is, therefore, denial of Self, expressed in Compassionate behavior.  Third, he conceives suffering to arise in the combination of Will and Self, the corrective of which is Will-less, Self-less Subjectivity, expressed in the contemplation of Platonist Forms as presented in Art, especially in Music.  Now, he plainly seems most enthusiastic about the latter solution to suffering, but he recognizes that such experiences are short-lived, so he vacillates between promoting Asceticism and promoting Compassion, which are not necessarily consistent.  For, insofar as Compassion for the suffering of another entails Self-Denial in the alleviation of the suffering of another, it implicitly affirms the source of that suffering, i. e. some selfish desire of the other, and, hence, reinforces non-Ascetic behavior.  In any case, in his promotion of Asceticism, he is well aware that a Will to deny Will is a problematic concept, which is why ultimately the Contemplation of Will is the only sound basis for Asceticism.  Still, he does not seem aware that only Will can be at the source of the judgment that suffering per se is a problem that requires correction, rather than is simply an objective fact, i. e. a failure, requiring no further action.  So, Schopenhauer's own acts of writing and publishing doctrines that offer correctives to suffering seem themselves to not quite exemplify their contents.

Will and Individual

Individual is properly a quantifier that is pervasively, often misleadingly, used as a substantive.  For example, Schopenhauer does occasionally use it to quantify Will.  But for the most part, he treats it as a characterless entity, one of an indefinite number of such entities.  However, it may be that what is a logical error is not extrinsic to some of the content of his Moral doctrine.  For, the aim of the doctrine is to escape suffering, to which a diagnosis of and a specific corrective of are the means.  Now, he offers two diagnoses of suffering: caused by Will, or caused by Individuation, i. e. Selfhood.  Accordingly, a two-fold corrective for suffering consists in a denial of Will and a denial of Self.  That double denial is expressed in his abstraction of 'Individual' from 'Individual Will', i. e. in his abstraction of a characterless entity from a quantity, which, in the context, illustrates the Will-less, Self-less product of taking that corrective--a virtual nonentity, i. e. an anonymous subject of perception, a mere function, like Kant's 'I think'.  There are, thus, two logical errors that Schopenhauer commits--that a Will-less entity is alive, and that a Self-less being can still function as a subject.

Will, Representation, Individuation

According to Schopenhauer, Representation is the Principle of Individuation, i. e. by objectifying Will, it also fragments it, and then reconstructs the fragments in accordance with the Principle of Sufficient Reason, e. g. as Cause and Effect.  Now, one unclarity in the process is the status of the subject of Representation--itself an object of Representation, or Will?  One problem with latter is that it leaves unexplained the Individuality of an act of Representation, i. e. that it occurs in an Individual subject, at an Individual location.  But, the more general problem is that of the subject of the Principle of Individuation.  For, as a principle of a system, it has Universal scope, and the Universal principle in Schopenhauer's system is Will.  Accordingly, in his system,  Individuation can only be the Self-Individuation of Will, just as Representation can only be the Self-Representation of Will, which aligns him with Intuition as the ecstatic Self-Intuition of Substance in Spinoza's doctrine.  But, Schopenhauer cannot make that alignment because, while Volition and Cognition are systematically related in Spinoza's doctrine, they remain sundered in the theory that directly influences his own concepts of the two--Kant's.  They remain sundered in Kant's system because he neglects the exposition that would connect them--a theory of Action derived from his concept of a Rational Will, which would show how Cognition functions in a Volitional context.  But absent that exposition, Cognition has no systematic relation to Volition, which Schopenhauer inherits as an alienation of his Individual from its Universal, a source of misery that only Music can temporarily relieve.

Appearance, Phenomenon, Representation

Spinoza's Creating vs. Created contrast could correspond to Kant's In-Itself vs. Appearance contrast.  However, because Creating is a dynamic process, it is not a Thing-In-Itself, insofar as by 'Thing', Kant means a static entity.  Now, Kant further complicates the contrast with his Noumenon-Phenomenon distinction, which recasts the Thing-In-Itself as a product of thought, and, hence, as not in an inner-outer relation with Appearances.  By implication, therefore, the existence of an independent divine Creating is also denied, though Kant does not take the trouble to explicitly challenge Spinoza's claim to Intuit it.  Now, further complicating Kant's complication is Schopenhauer's Will vs. Representation contrast, which he attributes to Kant.  For, while his concept of Will is as an In-Itself that is not Noumenal, i. e. it exists independent of thought, Representation, unlike either Appearance or Phenomenon, is a product of thought, and, hence, strictly speaking, is Noumenal.  So, even if Will does correspond to Spinoza's Creating, Representation does not correspond to Spinoza's Created.  Accordingly, unlike Spinoza, he derives joy neither his version of the latter, nor from Will, which he thus experiences as a hostile affliction.  So, these variations of Spinoza's original contrast have significant implications for the doctrines that are developed from them.

Creating-Created and Will-Representation

Spinoza's Naturing Nature and Natured Nature can be conceived as a contrast of Creating and Created.  Creating and Created has more in common with Schopenhauer's Will-Representation duality than with Whitehead's Process-Reality.  For, like the former, but not the latter, the two terms are simultaneous, rather than consecutive, i. e. two aspects of one and the same development.  Now, Spinoza's Intuition of Creating is comparable to Schopenhauer's cognition of Will as expressed in Music--each achieves a liberation from suffering from the Emotions.  However, one significant distinction between the two ecstatic moments is that in Spinoza's, Individuation is revealed as itself a creative development, whereas for Schopenhauer, for whom Individuation is groundless, it remains the source of suffering.  Accordingly, Spinoza's doctrine affirms Creating, while Schopenhauer's seeks the denial of the Will.  Nietzsche can be conceived as abandoning the latter for the former as his career develops.  Meanwhile, Kant is not part of this tradition, even though Schopenhauer's Will-Representation contrast is derived from his Noumenon-Phenomenon one.  For, he is insistent that his Noumenal realm is Supernatural, thereby clearly distancing his system from any Naturalism, of which each of these other three pairs is a variety.

Intuition, Insight, Nature

Spinoza characterizes Intuition as the 'third kind' of Knowledge, but it is possible that there is a fourth, that can be called Insight.  The object of Insight is a briefly considered element of his doctrine, Naturing Nature, i. e. Nature as dynamic and creative.  Thus, the object of Insight is all Nature, both in oneself and everywhere else.  In other words, Insight is a rare, elevated experience.  Now, it is possible that by Intuition, Spinoza means Insight, for, Nature is God in his doctrine.  But too much of his exposition of Intuition seems devoted to matters not relevant to Insight, e. g. whether or not the Mind can survive the death of the Body, and too little to an exposition of Naturing Nature, e. g. the experiencing of oneself as a Mode of Natural creativity. Trying to make the doctrine as palatable as possible to hostile Christian and Judaic forces, i. e. by emphasizing elements that seem amenable to orthodox reading, might, under those hostile conditions, be justifiably prudent.  But three centuries later, the visionary aspects of the doctrine, that have more in common with 19th-century Vitalism than with the neo-Medieval Rationalism of Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant, need to be better developed.  Distinguishing Insight from his Intuition is a step in that direction.

Health and Morality

In Spinoza's doctrine, the highest value is Health, the interplay of the Parts of a dynamic active Whole. Thus, Health is implicitly Good-in-itself, while 'Good' and 'Evil' signify what is conducive or not, respectively, to Health. What is Healthful is relative to the specific constitution of a Mode, from which generalization, e. g. to all members of a species, is derivative.  Hence, in at least some cases, what is Healthful is relative to an individual Mode, as Aristotle recognizes, but, in others, it is common.  However, and it is unclear if Spinoza recognizes this, insofar as a collective constitutes a Mode, e. g. a species, then inter-Modal relations are themselves subject to Holist evaluation.  And, indeed, insofar as a Mode is a part of Nature, then Nature is the Whole, and Health is ultimately Ecological, i. e. a condition of the Ecosystem, of which an individual human is a part.  Regardless of these indeterminacies of his doctrine, his Philosophical insight is that the deliberate pursuit of Health is itself an activity, and, hence, is itself Healthful, from which it follows that the determination and application of Knowledge of what is Healthful, e. g. Physics, Chemistry, Physiology, etc., is itself Healthful.  Indeed, Philosophy itself can be Healthful, in two respects.  So, Spinoza's doctrine is well beyond the range of each of the two dominant Moral doctrines of the era--Kantianism, with its Supernatural concept of Good, and Utilitarianism, which privileges passive, phenomena.

Parallelism and the Limits of Knowledge

The awakening of him by Hume from "dogmatic slumber" begins with Kant's acceptance of having a sensory basis as a necessary condition of Knowledge.  It continues with his additional necessary condition of having an organization the only source of which is the mental structures that process sensory input.  Now, it is unclear if Spinoza is among those to whom "dogmatic" is a reference.  But if so, it would be an erroneous charge.  For, according to Spinoza, Mind and Body are correlating Parallels.  Hence, Knowledge is not only constrained by the limits of the senses, but of the sense-organs.  Furthermore, the correlation pertains to not only Knowledge, but to Action.  Hence, the functioning of the sense-organs is constrained by their role in organic action, e. g. eye-hand coordination, as is, therefore, sense-information, and, accordingly, Knowledge.  So, his criteria for Knowledge are perhaps even better grounded and more rigorous than those of Kant or Hume, neither of whom is therefore qualified to classify him as 'dogmatic', especially someone whose system depends on the existence of a supernatural realm.

Rationalism and Reason For Its Own Sake

The foundation of any Rationalist Psychology or Rationalist Ethics is the possibility of Reason for its own sake as a motive of behavior.  For, otherwise, Reason can be only Instrumental, and, hence, only at the service of non-Rational principles, e. g. the Passions.  So, the primary task of a Rationalist is to ground that possibility.  One prominent example of that effort is Aristotle, who ascribes to humans a natural Teleology, which motivates them to fulfill their Rational potential.  Another is Spinoza, according to whom Reason is an immanent force that is obscured by external forces.  Now, Kant, influenced by Leibniz, proposes a variation on these two--that the fundamental principle of Reason is a principle of Practical Sufficient Reason, which governs any use of Reason.  One expression of the principle is the requirement that use of Reason in Maxim-formation is subject to the criterion of Universality.  However, the concrete experience of the Rational principle is the moment when one chooses Reason for its own sake, when one chooses for its own sake to follow the prescribed use of Reason for Maxim-formation.  Accordingly, Sufficiency is the fundamental value of Reason.  However, as has been previously discussed, Kant's primary ambition for a Rationalist doctrine is its adaptability to Theologically-based Deontic Morality.  Entailed in that adaptability is a shift of emphasis to Totality as the fundamental value of Reason, e. g. when he attributes to Reason, on the basis of Totality, the thesis that Virtue is incomplete without Happiness, the completion of which requires a rewarding deity.  The historical consequences of this shift of emphasis have been plain--the ascendance in the Rationalist tradition of Totalitarian Reason, e. g. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and the marginalization of Sufficient Reason, e. g. the Pragmatists.  And, in the process, the motive of Reason for its own sake gets replaced by that of obedience to Duty for Duty's sake.

Reason and Freedom of Choice

Despite all the Deontic elements, the source of concrete motivation in Kant's system is what he calls Willkur, i. e. Freedom of Choice.  Now, he acknowledges that disobeying his Categorical Imperative is possible, which seems to entail that Reason and Freedom are not co-extensive.  On the other hand,  Choice requires an object, and, so, is in fact subject to further influence, and, hence, is as such not Free.  But, it can choose Reason, for its own sake, and Reason is independent of external influences.  Hence, concrete Freedom consists in action that is motivated by Reason for its own sake, and it is only by virtue of the absolute privacy of the choosing that it might be classified as a Noumenal Cause. But, Aristotle and Spinoza are among those who define Reason differently than Kant.  So, many of the features of his Moral doctrine are inessential to the concept of Rational Ethics--notably the content of his Categorical Imperative, the Deontic Quantity of his Categorical Imperative, and the Noumenon vs. Phenomenon qua Freedom vs. Nature duality. Instead, a Rational Ethics that is independent of such trappings can thus be developed on the basis of Freedom of Choice, a concept of Reason, and choosing Reason for its own sake, with the latter the focal point.

Noumenon and Reason

Probably the most important structural distinction in Kant's system is that of Noumenon vs. Phenomenon, which grounds the possibility of Freedom, i. e. of non-Empirical Causality.  However, the concept of Noumenon remains crucially underdeveloped in several respects.  For example, since he establishes that Quantity applies to only Phenomena, any quantification of Noumena is groundless.  Therefore the concept of Universal that he ascribes to the presumably Noumenal Pure Practical Reason is likewise groundless, i. e. if it were descriptive of the conduct of a Rational Automaton, it would entail no Quantification.  He also neglects to consider the significance of the equivalence of the concept of the totality of Phenomena and Spinoza's concept of Natured Nature.  He accordingly neglects to consider the potentially analogous relation between his Noumenal realm and Spinoza's Naturing Nature.  The potential relevance to Kant's doctrine of that relation is if it is similarly one of equivalence, then Pure Practical Reason is nothing but an expression of Spinoza's immanent deity, and, hence, the Noumenal realm is Natural, not Supernatural. Kant's negligence of the Noumenal characteristics of the Principle is graphically illustrated by the ratio of the amount of text in the trilogy and the Groundwork devoted to an exposition of it, versus the amount devoted to matters that are derivative or extrinsic.

Nature, Noumenon, Phenomenon

A cardinal feature of the conventional Morality and Theology that Kant attempts to protect from Spinoza's doctrine is its Super-Natural vs. Natural dualism.  A significant example of his commitment to the conventional doctrine is his adoption of that dualism to characterize one of the cardinal features of his Rational system--Noumenon vs. Phenomenon.  Stripped of that commitment, the similarities between the Noumenon-Phenomenon contrast and Spinoza's Naturing Nature-Natured Nature emerge.  For example, on that basis, it is easier to recognize Pure Practical Reason as an immanent, rather than transcendent, force.  Likewise, the force is thus not experienced in Deontic terms, i. e. as a command of Duty that must be obeyed.  Instead, the content of the Principle of Pure Practical Reason gives expression to the conflict between the internal force and outer influences, and, hence, functions as an instructive development of Spinoza's doctrine.  But he squanders the opportunity for a fuller exposition, instead adapting the analysis to a conventional drama of divine reward for obedience to duty, and, instead of acknowledging Spinoza's influence, turns on him.

Amor Fati and Faith

References to 'love of god' in his  exposition of the concept of Intuition suggest that Spinoza prescribes a doctrine of Amor Fati for averse circumstances in life.  If that is specifically what Kant is addressing by proposing Faith as an alternative, then the issue is rarefied Philosophy, transcending mere systematics.  Now, one of Spinoza's few peers on the topic would be Nietzsche, in his affirmation of Eternal Recurrence.  If so, then as the latter shows, the attitude is not one of permanent resignation.  Rather, as Nietzsche dramatizes, affirmation of what has come to pass is a precondition at any moment for subsequent creativity, which is why it is an empowering moment for both him and Spinoza.  In other words, Amor Fati is indeed a concrete systematically-developed concept.  In contrast, Kant cannot even prescribe to a virtuous person that they keep Faith, since Duty is their only motivation in his doctrine.  So, while Amor Fati has clear systematic practical value, Faith, on Kant's own account, has none, a plain deficiency in a presumed doctrine of Pure Practical Reason. Regardless, his response to Spinoza, on any grounds, is misguided from the outset.  For, a defense of a concept of Faith must begin at the source--a concept of deity.  Accordingly, the only possible rigorous argument against Spinoza's Amor Fati, in the name of Faith, is a Theological one, i. e. demonstrating the impossibility of a concept of an immanent, bi-attribute deity, which Kant seems unwilling, if not unable, to present.  Absent such an argument, not only is his criticism of Spinoza groundless, the whole premise of the second half of his Critical trilogy collapses--that Faith in the possible existence of a rewarding deity is necessitated by Rational principles--simply on the basis of the possibility of an alternative Rational concept of deity.

Virtue, Power, Faith

From the earliest times, religious ritual has been an attempt by humans to extend control over conditions, e. g. by appeasing a deity, perhaps via sacrifice.  In other words, such rituals have been attempts to extend the exercise of power over conditions.  Now, unacknowledged by Kant in Spinoza's doctrine is the identity of Virtue and Power.  Likewise, implicit in his charge that Spinoza's concept of Virtue is insufficient is that the criterion of measurement is Power.  For, his proposed correction can be conceived as a variety of extending Power over conditions, via religious ritual, perhaps via sacrifice.  In Kant's version of such ritual, sacrifice consists in the constraint of self-interest, that justifies faith in a deity delivering favorable conditions.  That the sequence is merely hoped-for does not alter its essential structure--a faith-based extension of Power beyond Virtue, even if justified as 'Rational completeness'.  But this 'Rational Faith' is merely a rationalization of the Faith component of conventional Deontic Morality, and its vicarious Power is not likely to impress Spinoza.

General Will, Practical Reason, Invisible Hand

Because of Kant's explicit attention to Hume, a contrast with a colleague of the latter has gone generally unnoticed, despite having become more significant over the centuries.  Kant's Moral principle can be summarized as--Act dutifully, and leave it to a supernatural deity to reward you with personal happiness.  In complete opposition--Act selfishly, and leave it to an invisible force to arrange for general happiness--is the principle of Hume's colleague, Smith.  The structural similarity is no accident--both Kant and Smith are influenced by Rousseau, with Pure Practical Reason and the Invisible Hand, respectively, varieties of his General Will.  However, each deviates significantly from the latter.  Though Rousseau does not develop the concept of General Will systematically, indications are that he conceives it as natural collective volition, anticipating the species instinct of Darwin, constituted by active and deliberate individual civic participation.  So, Smith most sharply diverges from the latter characteristic, i. e. in promoting laissez-faire selfishness.  On the other hand, Kant does adopt Rousseau's concept of active individual participation in general volition, but only heuristically, the result of which is an abstract generality the individual parts of which remain atomized, i. e. his Kingdom of Ends.  So, Kant and Smith could be conceived as initially neo-Rousseaian rivals, the antagonism between which has grown significantly since.  For, Kant's Moral doctrine can easily be conceived as condemning at least one of Smith's fundamental principles--the deliberate neglect of the well-being of others, regardless of the exploitation that later emerges as implicitly permitted in it.  But, as is commonly the case in the standard academic segregation of Philosophy, Political Science, and Economics, the interrelation of the concepts of General Will, Practical Reason, and Invisible Hand remains typically unconsidered, so, neo-Kantian criticism of Capitalism, e. g. Rawls', is typically unfocused, and the concept of a General Will remains obscure.

Reason and Hope

The specific point of Kant's dispute with Spinoza is the thesis of the latter that Virtue is its own reward.  Now, even though his counter-argument is on Utilitarian grounds, he justifies resort to those grounds with the thesis that it is according to Reason that a virtuous person be happy, with which Spinoza would likely not argue.  However, Spinoza would not accept a concept of Happiness that is subsequent to Virtue.  Now, the ground in Kant's system of that diachronic relation of Virtue and Happiness is his question "If I do what I ought to do, what may I then hope for?", which he attributes to Pure Reason.  So, implicit in this grounding is the thesis that Hope is Rational.  But, in passages of which Kant is well aware, Spinoza disputes that thesis, on the grounds that one of the constituents of Hope is Pain, and Reason does not promote Pain.  Nevertheless, Kant does not address this specific point that is perhaps the decisive one in the issue, which effectively undermines any ambition that his challenge to Spinoza is on Rationalist grounds.  This carelessness in responding to Spinoza contrasts sharply with the meticulousness of his response to Hume.  The potential casualty of this carelessness is a significant portion of his entire Critical system, from the second half of the 2nd Critique on, including the entire 3rd Critique.  For, without Hope, there is no ground in his Rational system for the concept of a Reward, and, thus, for the concept of a divine Rewarder, so, there is no necessity for a faculty such as Reflective Judgment to ground the concept of divine Empirical Rewarding.

Epistemology and Theology

In Spinoza's doctrine, the source of the Parts of experience is the Senses, and the source of the Whole of experience is Reason.  A third faculty is Intuition, the object of which is "God".  Now, in his doctrine, God and Nature are one and the same.  Furthermore, there are two aspects of Nature--'nature naturing', i. e. creating, and 'nature natured, i. e. created.  So, the Whole that is the object of Reason is Nature qua created, while Nature qua creating is the object of Intuition.  But, this divine force is immanent, not transcendent, so the Intuition of it by a Mode can only be the Mode's awareness of its own divine creating, or, equivalently, the self-awareness of Nature/God.  In the 19th-century, variations of this awareness begin to emerge in Philosophical systems, e. g. Schopenhauer's Will, Bergson's Elan Vital, etc.  But prior to that, such an Intuition of God has no analogue in the Epistemological theories of the era, primarily because in the dualistic Theology that predominates, the deity is transcendent, and, hence, is knowable, if at all, by inference.  In other words, Epistemology is not an autonomous field of study, but is determined by Theology, i. e. whether or not there is such a faculty as Spinoza's Intuition, is a function of whether or not there is such a thing as an immanent divine creative process.

Autonomy, Knowledge, Power

Kant well recognizes that outer experience being multifarious, it is essentially unorganized.  Accordingly, it is only via the Forms of Intuition that it first becomes successive, and then only via the Categories of the Understanding that Successiveness becomes further structured.  However, he does not seem to recognize the implications of the analysis for behavior--that any organization of external influences must be Autonomous.  In contrast, Spinoza does recognize that Adequate Knowledge and Autonomy are one and the same.  More specifically, Knowledge for him is not Knowing-That, but Knowing-How.  Thus Adequate Knowledge entails control of some event, either by entailing a means of neutralizing it, or by entailing a means of reproducing it.  In other words, according to Spinoza, Knowledge and Power are one and the same.  Thus, another example of the superficiality of the standard Rationalism vs. Empiricism classifications is that two founding proponents of the Knowledge = Power thesis are an 'Empiricist', Bacon, and a 'Rationalist', Spinoza.