Psyche and Ubiquity

As has been previously discussed, the arc of human history thus far is indicative of a guidance by a Will to Globalize.  Now, one plausible inference from the latter is to a Will to Ubiquity.  However, the relation to some other prominent volitions is less certain.  For example, the documented ongoing persistence of 'primitive' tribes at the same location evinces that a Will to Live is not necessarily a Will to Globalize.  Also, from the possibility that Technology is no more than a means to Globalization, it follows that the Will to Power is not the aim of Ubiquity, i. e. harmonization with, not control of, the environment could constitute the ubiquity of the race around the planet.  Finally, while Globalization might involve micro-evolutionary leaps, whether or not it is ultimately attributable to a Will to Evolve, in the Darwinian sense, depends on the emergence of a new species from this history of Globalization, which obviously remains to be seen.  So, likewise, theories that ascribe to the human Psyche a principle beyond a Will to Ubiquity are speculative and contingent.

Species and Globalization

To date, concrete evidence signifies a pattern of development of the human species that can be called 'Globalization', i. e. constituted by an arc that originates at a single location, and has arrived at a relative ubiquity around the planet.  That attribution is provisional, depending on further developments that can only be objects of speculation at this point, e. g. extra-terrestrial travel.  Accordingly, it can be inferred that insofar as there is a guiding principle of the species, it is concretely a Will to Globalize, from which any further characterization, e. g. a Will to Live, to Power, to Evolve, etc., is an abstraction.  Therefore, the fundamental principle of the Psyche of any member of the species is, likewise, the Will to Globalize, with respect to which, for example, the various Freudian structures are peripheral or subsidiary influences, at best.

Species, Life, Meaning

At least some of The Gay Science #1 seems to advocate a thesis often associated with 'Existentialism'--that Life is meaningless--on the basis of which, according to Nietzsche, the attempt by moralists to imbue it with meaning is comic.  However, those passages conflict with those in which he attributes a conatus to the species, which, at that stage of his career, is still the Will to Live.  So, if the latter is the case, then Life is  not meaningless, and the only thing comic about the moralists' efforts is that they mis-identify what is important about it, a conclusion that is not affected by the later replacement of the Will to Live with the Will to Power.  It is unclear whether or not any of Nietzsche's seriousness regarding either species-drive is ironic, but if so, it would be a posture that is inadequately grounded.

Species, Member, Reason

The activity of an infinite entity proceeds by Necessity, because there is nothing to resist what eventuates from issuing from some initial moment.  Likewise, insofar as the activity of an infinite entity is governed by Reason, Necessity is a characteristic of that Reason.  In contrast, the outcome of the activity of a finite entity is inherently uncertain, i. e. there is no certain connection between attempt and outcome, so any thinking involved in it is fundamentally Experimental Reason.  Now, the human species is as much a finite entity as is any of its members.  Thus, the Reason of the former is as much Experimental as is that of the latter, i. e. the activity in both cases consists in attempts the outcomes of which are always uncertain.  So, contrary to some traditional concepts of the relation, there is no difference of kind between the Reason of the species and that of a member.

Species, Member, Harm

If Nietzsche had lived another 100 years, he might have reconsidered two claims in The Gay Science #1--that individual lives are not to be taken seriously, and that individuals are incapable of harming the species.  For, those claims are challenged by the genocides, nuclear brinkmanship, and environmental crises, that have arisen since the 1880s.  But, his mistake is not merely factual--by conceiving the Species-Member relation as antithetical, and not as Whole-Part, he cannot recognize that any harm to any Member is also harm to the Species.

Individual and the Meaning of Life

Though Nietzsche does not explicitly characterize it as such, in The Gay Science #1 is a rare post-Birth of Tragedy application of the Apollonian principle--as Morality offering an illusion that imparts 'meaning' to the life of the Individual.  However, there is an alternative diagnosis of the search for Meaning in one's life.  In at least some cases, what is sought is integration into something larger, e. g. into the master-plan of a deity.  In other words, one wants to become a Part of a Whole, which a member of a species has been all along, but which is obscured by the Individual-Universal dichotomy that underlies the Apollonian-Dionysian contrast that is the implicit theme of GS #1.

Species and Atomism

In The Gay Science #1, Nietzsche proposes that "The species is everything, one is always none", evoking the influence of Schopenhauer and his Dionysian origins.  On that basis, he argues, Atomism, and the Moralities that promote it by given the 'Individual' a 'purpose', are actually no more than ruses by the species to motivate its members.  However, he stops short of considering the conditions under which such motivation arises.  Plainly, those conditions are constituted by an indistinction of members, which, according to the logic of his analysis, is also an expression, if not a ruse, of the species.  Thus revealed is that the species is determined by two principles--Diversification and Homogenization, and it is in periods in which the former corrects an excess of the latter that Atomism, and the Moralities that promote it, become prominent.  What ultimately prevents him from arriving at that concept of the species is his accepting inheritance from Schopenhauer of the concept of the Species-Member relation as one of Universal-Individual, rather than of Whole-Part, which admits of varieties of degrees of difference and of sameness between Members.

Species and Morality

The existence of 'Morality' presupposes 1. There are choices to be made in behavior, and 2. Some choices are better than others.  Thus, 3. There must be a criterion for determining the superiority of one course of action over another.  Now, given that an agent is part of the human species, the interest of the latter is the criterion for choosing.  However, typically lacking in practice are the awareness that one is actually functioning as a part, rather than as an isolated entity, and adequate knowledge of what course in fact is best.  Nietzsche, at the outset of The Gay Science, agrees that Morality is a means to the promotion of species interests.  But, because he conceives the individual member as antithetical to, not a part of, the species, and Representation as antithetical to Reality, rather than as consisting in degrees of adequacy to the latter, he conceives Morality to be a ruse of the species designed to lure members to promoting its interests.   He, thus, cannot recognize that Morality can be a transparent species-promoting program.

Species and Egoism

If the Species-Member relation is that of Whole-Part, then what is usually characterized as 'Psychological Egoism' is inadequate.  For, on that premise, it is a principle of Species-Diversification that distinguishes one Member from another.  Furthermore, just as Diversification is indefinite, i. e. A can vary from B slightly, drastically, etc., so, too, is the degree of distinction between two Members.  On that basis, Psychological Egoism abstracts both from the commonality of ground of two Members, as well as from the infinite varieties of difference between them.  Thus, even the standard simplification, namely, the Hobbesian concept of an absolute antithesis between all Members, is still only a superficial representation of a special, extreme, case of the internal Diversification of the Species, i. e. is an inadequate concept of that condition.

Alienation and Freedom

One insidious mode of Alienation is that which is conceived as 'freedom'.  This occurs in the context of an Individual-State antithesis, in which hostility by the former against the latter is actively expressed, for example, in violence directed towards "The Government".  However, that apparent 'liberty' is only superficial, and, instead, only reinforces the Alienation that is the ground of the conflict.  In contrast, effective liberation in such circumstances requires the elimination of the Alienation, which, in the common case in which the State is firmly entrenched, is expressed by detachment from the status quo as much as is possible.

Species and Dehumanization

In common parlance, to be 'human' usually means to be 'fallible'.  However, to 'dehumanize' does not mean to 'treat as infallible'.  Rather, it typically connotes to 'treat as an animal', or 'as an inanimate object'.  Thus, in those cases, 'human' means something like 'self-determining', a definition to which Marx, following Kant, subscribes.  Now, another sense of the term follows from what has been previously proposed here, i. e. that to be 'human' is to be 'a part of the human species'.  On that basis, the prevalent concept of a person as distinct from its species, e. g. when as consisting in a Soul that can transcend the fate of other humans, or when as represented as the unqualified substantive, 'the individual', also dehumanizes anyone that it denotes.

Species, Diversification, Individual Behavior

According to the best available, though by no means conclusive, evidence, the human species originates at a single location.  Thus, the pattern of development from that to the present-day unprecedented global dominance can be characterized as Diversification, which can, therefore, be attributed to the Species as a governing principle.  On that basis, every intermediary novelty, not only the birth of a new member, but every new action by a member, can, as a variation of the given, be ascribed to Species-Diversification.  Accordingly, the representation of any bit of behavior by a member, either as absolutely 'individual freedom', or as 'determined', is a short-sighted abstraction that expresses an alienation from Species-Being.

Diversification and Alienation

The Locomotility of a Member of a Species, i. e. the capacity to set itself in motion, is an expression of the principle of Diversification that governs the Species, i. e. a variation of the given.  Thus, each term of the traditional 'Free Will vs. Determination' debate entails alienation.  For, in the former, the Member is alienated from the Species, while in the latter, it is alienated from the capacity of self-activation.  In other words, separation from a Whole, and absorption into a Whole, are two ways that a Part can be alienated from its status as a Part.  Logically, each relation is formulated as an abstraction from Diversification.

Alienation, Society, Citizen

Marx diagnoses the Citizen-State antithesis that obtains in some societies, and that is codified in some theories, as a manifestation of Alienation, i. e. of the Citizen's loss of the natural power of self-determination, and its re-location in some general abstract entity, e. g. the 'Economy', the 'Sovereign', etc.  Now though he does not consider it, the same antithesis can also be discerned in the most general society of all--the Species, beginning with the traditional Universal-Individual representation of it.  In contrast, as has been previously discussed, the Whole-Part representation of the Species-Member relation overcomes the Alienation, and, hence, is applicable to less general collectives, as well.

Species, Member, Alienation

Since Aristotle, the Species-Member relation has almost always been interpreted as Universal-Particular.  One exception is Heidegger's Being-beings, though his alternative remains under-explained.  Now, Marx's concept is Aristotelian, as is entailed in his concept of 'alienation from species-essence, i. e. dehumanization, which consists is a repression of an individual's 'human' capacities to plan and enjoy the products of one's own labor, for example.  So, like the rest of the tradition, he does not consider that the Species-Member relation is one of Whole-Part, with respect to which, the Universal-Particular interpretation is already an alienation, and the Being-beings alternative is what Heidegger calls a 'forgetting'.

Labor and Alienation

The term "fruits" of Labor is actually from Psalms; Marx uses "product".  In any case, as has been previously discussed, if anything is one's ownmost, it is exertion, and, hence, any Locomotility that ensues.  Thus, one's Labor is one's property by nature, not by convention.  But, the product of one's Labor, which consists in a modification of some material, is not equivalently one's property; for, the material is not also one's own.  In other words, as Hegel better than Marx recognizes, the new form of a product is one's own, but not the matter of the product, e. g. the shape of a table that one has made is one's own, but not the wood that has been re-shaped.  But, if the product is not one's own, then it cannot be alienated from one.  Nor can one's Labor itself be alienated from one--at every moment that it is transpiring, one's exertion is singularly one's own.  However, what can be alienated is the profits from the sale of the product.  For, profit is created by surplus-value, which is created by the Labor that transforms some raw material, to which no wage is commensurate.  So, the fundamental alienation with respect to Labor is that between the wage for Labor and the sale of its product, an Ontological or Psychological difference, not a quantitative one.

Species and Property

The human species is only one of many inhabitants of the planet, so, absent a theological premise, a concept of Property that transcends it seems difficult to establish.  In other words, the scope of any concept of human Property is human society.  Now, as has been previously discussed, if there is any Property that is 'Natural', it is the Locomotility of a Member, e. g. the modification of some material via their exertion, i. e. their Labor, and, accordingly, also the product of that modification.  Otherwise, Property is only arbitrary, whether conventionally sanctioned, e. g. legally distributed, or not, e. g. stolen.  Thus, in the case of someone putting up a fence around some land, the fence is their Property, but without some social sanction, nothing within the fence is thereby 'theirs'.

Locomotilty, Private Property, Division of Labor

From the perspective of the Species, what is distinctive of a Member is the Locomotility that it initiates.  Thus, the fundamental concept of 'private property' is that process of Locomotility.  Now, Labor, qua the modification of external matter, is one expression of Locomotility.  Thus, Labor, and its fruits, is the fundamental element of Private Property.  So, as Marx, better than Smith, recognizes, a Division of Labor immediately alienates one's Labor, i. e. by appropriating into the production that is divided.  Thus, only by collectivizing the productive process is the distinctive contribution to it of one part of the work team recovered.

Species, Diversification, Private Property

Unification and Diversification of its Members are the two structural characteristics of a Species.  Accordingly, both distinguishing oneself from others, and associating with others, are among the basic drives of each Member.  Now, the most distinctive behavior is that which is creative, since it produces concrete novelty, i. e. a variation of the given.  So, 'individuality', i. e. being different from others, is not best exemplified by private property, as Capitalists tend to assert, since it is merely a distinction within the given.  In other words, the transition to Capitalism, say from Feudalism, can be interpreted as a process of Species-diversification, i. e. from relative social homogeneity.  But, Capitalism does not thereby achieve maximum differentiation, despite the contentions of many of its contemporary advocates.

Member-Psyche and Socialism

The concept Member-Psyche connotes that some Species-principle is the fundamental motivation of the behavior of any Member of the Species, a force that can be called the Superid.  Now, a basic problem for a corresponding Member-Psychology is to explain why the awareness that one is a member of the human species, seems to be pervasively lacking in ordinary experience.  One general response is that that absence is inherent in the development of a Member-Psyche, e. g. because of a natural falleness, or because it is a stage in a transition from implicitness to explicitness.  Another is that the absence is contingent, e. g. the product of a repression, such as when Smith prescribes the avoidance of the pursuit of any interest other than one's own.  The latter possibility is especially germane to a project like Marcuse's, since the liberation of Member-Psyches can conduce to the emergence of Socialism.

Superid and Member-Psyche

Freud subscribes to the proposition Ontogeny recapitulates Phylogeny, without considering that it implies that the development of a Member of the Species is a function of the development of the Species, and, therefore, that the behavior of the former is determined by the interests of the latter.  He, thus, does not consider that a Member-Psyche is a manifestation of some Species-principle, and can be called a Superid.  Now, two dimensions of any Species-principle are the variety and the cohesion of its Members.  Correspondingly, the function of the Ego that forms from the Superid is to both differentiate from others, and associate with them, a simultaneity that requires striking a balance.  In contrast, Freud's concept of Society is essentially one of hostility to an Ego that is capable of only reactive adaption.  Similarly, a Superid has no need of a Superego, i. e. since coordination with the social environment is part of the function of its Ego.  Accordingly, the terms of Marcuse's are significantly modified.  These contrasts are indications of how Psychology is transformed when its basic unit, the individual Psyche, is conceived not as a primitive given, but as a Member-Psyche that expresses some Species-principle.

Reproduction and Diversification

The concept of Reproduction connotes quantitative, though not necessarily qualitative, difference.  It, thus, implies that the function of the generation of a new entity is replacement of the old.  Now, such replacement might be apt in the context of the Will to Live, in which the aim is to merely continue on as before.  But, it is not adequate to the Darwinian process of Variation that he attributes to an Evolutionary principle, and especially not to the emergence of radical variations, i. e. mutations.  So, a more comprehensive, and, thus, more analytically accurate, characterization than Reproduction, of the generation of new life, is Diversification.

Communication and Psyche

Like most animals, apparently, humans communicate with one another, sometimes not for some ulterior personal purpose, but simply for the company.  So, there exists an impulse to communicate, but one that seems to elude easy classification in any of the established Psychic categories.  For example, it is not Vegetative, since it does not consist in the reproduction of Life; it is not Locomotive, since it does not require change of location; it does not necessarily involve Calculation; it transcends the Ego, and, hence, any of its Id, and the Superego presupposes the possibility of Communication.  Instead, it is a manifestation of a Species drive, and, hence, of a Superid.

Psyche, Will to Live, Will to Power

In one fundamental respect, Freud's concept of the Psyche is completely traditional--its acceptance of the thesis that human behavior is, at bottom, governed by the Will to Live.  Thus, despite the apparent influence of Nietzsche, that concept implicitly retreats from the perhaps most radical innovation of his predecessor--the thesis that human behavior is governed, rather, by the Will to Power.  The boldness of the latter is underscored by the ultimate subordination of its only peer, the Will to Evolve, to the Will to Live, i. e. 'survival', by Darwin.  Now, Nietzsche's focus on some of the degenerate modes of Power, and their horrible historical consequences, has obscured the richness of the concept.  For example, 'power' can mean simply 'ability', in which case the Will to Technical Reason is one mode of the Will to Power.  But, Technical Reason is know-how in the use of tools.  Thus, if Marcuse is seeking a Psychological grounding of a Marxist ideal, the Will to Power is sounder and potentially more fruitful than the Freudian version of the Will to Live that he does settle upon.

Locomotility and Will to Grow

According to the almost universally accepted concept of Psychology, Locomotility functions as a means to an end, in which the end is a representation of a correction of some problem in the given situation, e. g. the representation of drinking water, as a correction to thirst, that initiates motion towards water.  Implicit in that model is that Locomotility requires some representation to initiate it, and, hence, lacks autonomy.  Or, in other words, if need never arose, the organism would remain in one place.  Now, the fundamental flaw with this model is suggested by Nietzsche--it is a Psychology of Weakness, of behavior that is only ever a reaction to some deficiency, in contrast with which is the Psychology of Strength, which consists in a spontaneous surplus of energy.  Similarly, the Will to Live consists in the effort to remain alive in the face of threats, whereas the Will to Grow, often experienced as a feeling of restlessness, is constantly pushing beyond achieved levels.  So, Locomotility can be conceived as the fundamental manifestation of the Will to Grow, and, hence, as autonomous.  Thus, for example, Marcuse's model of Socialism, which, as derived from a gratification-seeking, i. e. end-orientated, impulse, Eros, is an expression of a Psychology of Weakness.

Locomotility and Will

It is Kant's initial ambition to develop a concept of Will as equivalent to Pure Practical Reason, i. e. in which the latter is the cause of Locomotility.  However, the plan runs aground when he discovers that even a Categorical Imperative can be resisted, with the source of resistance a second type of Will, one which has the capacity to choose between obedience and disobedience.  And, despite his own, and those of subsequent followers, efforts to somehow eliminate this surd from his system, they arguably do not succeed, which means that only it has the power to initiate Locomotility.  In other words, Will is actually Locomotility itself, i. e. the power of setting oneself in motion, which Kant attempts to suppress by absorbing it into Reason, in the same way that many, including Aristotle, Freud, and Marcuse, do when trying to absorb it into some representation of a Vegetative need.

Locomotility and Play

Exertion is proof of the autonomy of Locomotility.  Usually integrated into a behavioral sequence that begins with some representation, and ends in some course of action, in this moment, Locomotility is spontaneously initiated, and is independent of the activity that it is intended to enhance.  Concepts like impulse and drive, which connote motion, suppress this spontaneity, typically by absorbing it into a preceding representation that is equated with some necessary organic process.  For example, Hunger is usually conceived as Vegetative need that automatically sets in motion the search for food, a concept that obscures the distictions between an empty stomach, hunger pangs that signal a problem, and the locomotility that goes in search of a solution.  Now, Play can be conceived as Locomotility for its own sake, i. e.  as enjoyment of the capacity of spontaneous motion.  Accordingly, Marcuse's concept of a "play-impulse", which, in his terminology, connotes an origin that precedes the Locomotility that constitutes Play, is an example of the suppression of Locomotility that is entailed in the concept of the Psyche that he inherits from Freud.

Psyche and Locomotility

The 'ground' of Kant's Groundwork can be recognized as the traditional tri-partite concept of the Psyche--"Nature" as the Vegetative, "Will" as the Locomotive, and "Reason" as the Calculative part.  His primary aim is to demonstrate that the third can liberate the second from the influence of the first.  Now, one criticism of his effort, e. g. Schopenhauer's, is that Calculation is always at bottom in the service of Vegetative processes, as Hume claims.  Another is implicit in Freud's concept of the Psyche--that Calculation is actually determined by social forces.  However, regardless of their merits, neither of them addresses the internal problem that eventually emerges, with which Kant wrestles unsuccessfully.  For, as he discovers, the possibility of liberating the Will, via Reason, from organic need, presupposes the inherent independence of Locomotility from both of the other two divisions of the Psyche.  He, thus, shares with his critics, and with most other theorists of the Psyche, a neglect, if not a suppression, of that independence, without which a study of human motivation would be empty.

Cathexis and Field

Freud's image of Cathexis as a 'charged' interest implies a possible extension that neither he nor Marcuse considers.  As is the case in Electromagnetism, a multiplicity of charged items can, when in proximity, constitute a Field, in which their behaviors are interdependent.  The classical concept of Eros, as well as that of its popular Cupid incarnation, as mutual attraction, can be conceived as such a Field.  However, even as he ventures from Psychoanalysis into Social theory, Freud lacks the resouces to study individual behavior as determined by such collectives, which, as populated by Egos, is not to be confused with his concept of a Group, i. e. a mob, which is constituted by Ids.  Likewise, by accepting Freud's Social Atomism, Marcuse is hindered from even entertaining a concept that could enrich his model of an ideal society.

Psyche and Cathexis

The implicit heart of Freud's theory of the Psyche is the experience that, in translation, is termed 'Cathexis', meaning 'charged interest'.  In the experience, the object of Cathexis is perceived as charged, a reflection of the influence of Brentano's Intentionality on Freud, i. e. in which the appearing-charged of the object of perception is for the perceiver.  It is this electric-like characteristic of sexual desire that distinguishes it from other impulses, thereby explaining Freud's privileging of Eros over other drives, a focus that could be itself characterized as cathectic.

Greed and Psyche

It seems difficult to deny that Greed is a significant factor in the de-humanization of workers under Capitalism. Now, according to Aristotle, Greed is not only a Moral vice, but a Psychological disorder, as well.  For, not only does it consist in taking more than one's share, it is constituted by a disruption of Psychic harmony--an Intemperance of one drive, that can be harmful to other vital functions, e. g. overeating that disrupts sleep.  Thus, the Psychoanalysis of Greed requires the recognition of a multiplicity of organic processes.  But, Marcuse, following Freud, recognizes only one Vital principle--Eros.  So, not only does he lack the conceptual resources to recognize, diagnose, and remedy one of the fundamental discontents of civilization, that Psychic reduction might itself be interpreted as an expression of Intemperance, i. e. of a Self-Indulgence, which is intemperate even if the product of a liberation from its opposite, Abstinence.