Intellect and Homo Faber

In On the Improvement of the Understanding, Spinoza briefly entertains the notion of the Intellect as a manufacturer of tools, i. e. of means by which it methodically operates.  Though he leaves the notion itself undeveloped, it signals an epochal moment in Philosophical, if not Human, history.  For, the attribution of a tool-making capacity to even Mind in its own sphere, constitutes a shift in the concept of Humans from Homo Sapiens to Homo Faber.

Agency, Passivity, Labor, Profit

The underlying Psychological premise of Smith's system is Profit-Seeking, though the relation of that to the Survival instinct is unclear. Likewise, Spinoza's concept of Conatus does not distinguish increase in strength from mere maintenance of it. However, a decisive contrast in his model is between Agency and Passivity, which, when applied to Increase, is expressed as the sharp distinction of Creativity from mere Acquisition. So, insofar as Labor can be analyzed as a creative process, the cardinality of it in Marxism, in contrast with that of mere profiting in Capitalism, reflects an appreciation of Agency that is lacking in the latter.

Laissez-Faire, Freedom, Labor

The shortcoming in the standard Capitalist concept of 'laissez-faire' is that of the Empiricist concept of 'freedom' in general--it leaves undiscerned apparently internally generated behavior that is actually the product of external conditioning. In contrast, Spinoza's concept of Adequate Causality, i. e. conduct determined by an Adequate Idea, recognizes and excludes such latent heteronomy. Now, probably the best-known instance of Adequate Causality is Kant's concept of conduct determined by a universalizable maxim. Another, implicit in the Ethics, is behavior that adheres to scientific law, e. g. eating on the basis of dietary principles. A third is suggested by Spinoza's example elsewhere of drawing a circle according to a constructive definition--skilled activity. Hence, Labor, as Marx conceives it, i. e. as the deliberate and controlled modification of given material, is an instance of the Rationalist concept of Freedom. Accordingly, the cardinality of the Labor Theory of Value in his system expresses not only a difference between Rationalist and Empiricist Psychology, but, perhaps, the superiority of the former.

Realism, Nominalism, Economics

One of the oldest Philosophical debates is Realism vs. Nominalism, i. e. the priority of the Universal vs. the priority of the Individual. In extreme versions of each, the conflict is conceived as an antithesis, thereby relegating the inferior term to non-existence, e. g. in Buddhism and Atomism, respectively. Furthermore, in recent centuries, a Political instance of that mutual exclusivity, Collective vs. Individualism, has been the locus of the Marxism vs. Capitalism contrast, even though Marx and Smith each accommodates both Collective and Individual interests. However, even if the underlying logical antithesis is adequately conceived, which is questionable, the reduction of the relation of those systems to it is not. For, the larger context of Economic activity is Biological, i. e. survival, the primary polarity of which is species and member, each of which plainly exists concretely. Hence, while it might be arguable that one or the other pole has priority, the concept of their relation as antithetical, e. g. by Randists, is, at minimum, a simple-minded misapplication of Logic.

Capitalism, Individuation, Pluralization

If contemporary rhetoric is any indication, the emergence of Capitalism qua promotion of the profits of an individual, from Smith's concept of it as a means to collective wealth, is based on the premise of the irreconcilability of Individual and Collective interests. However, even without reversion to a Dialectical resolution, the inadequacy of such reasoning is easy to diagnose. For, the process of Individuation presupposed in it is typically abstracted from initial conditions, which, when taken into account, transform it into Diversification, Instantiation, Pluralization, etc., any one of which can be attributed to a collective as a positive development. So, anti-Collectivist versions of Smith's original system, e. g. monopolies, sweat shops, Randism, etc., can each be likened to a branch falling from a tree, i. e. as degenerative, if not devitalizing.

Selfishness and Capitalism

At least some apparently private personal experiences are, in fact, expressions of species drives, i. e. those associated with reproductive processes, e. g. sexual excitation. If so, then it is possible that, contrary to the evidence of immediate perception, all such experiences are ultimately governed by species principles. In that case, mere Selfishness, i. e. a drive that would exist in an entity even if no other entity existed, is a semi-adequate idea, as Spinoza proposes, not an illusory one, as Schopenhauer holds. On that basis, for example, Smith's concept of Self-Interest is, thus, not inconsistent with either the promotion of the wealth of a nation, or the Sympathy that he advocates in his earlier work. In sharp contrast, the advocacy of Selfishness for its own sake by contemporary Capitalists, e. g. Rand, is exposed as short-sighted.

Capitalism, Slavery, Monopoly, Plutocracy

Capitalism has demonstrated a tendency to generate monopolies and slavery, thereby indicating that, at minimum, neither of those formations is precluded in the system. Hence, in other words, Capitalism has evinced a propensity to revert to the Feudalism that it was conceived by Smith to supersede. So, subsequent U. S. government intervention in those developments suggests that the system has more in common with Plutocracy than with Democracy, regardless of the posturing of contemporary advocates of laissez-faire Economics.

Geocentrism, Capitalism, Free Will

Copernicus' discovery not only refutes Geocentrism, but calls into question Egocentrism, and the reliability of Egocentric perception. For, it challenges the natural assumption that one is a fixed center of the universe, as well as that ordinary perception e. g. that the sun transits across the sky, can be taken at face-value. Now, while perhaps Spinoza best understands the implications of that unreliability for the perception of one's own 'free will', the otherwise usually acute Hume fails to consider that the passions that are the objects of such perception might themselves have unsensed external causes. Accordingly, Capitalist Economists who uncritically inherit, via Smith, Hume's Empiricism, likewise fallaciously attribute 'freedom' to much of the behavior that they study, even as advertisers who profit from the manipulability of consumers have keener insight.

Atomism, Atoms, Molecules

According to Atomism, relations between Atoms are 'external', i. e. are inessential to what they conjoin, which remain unaltered by such association.  That concept is expressed in Social Atomism by the ideal of the 'self-sufficient individual', and by Thatcher's denial of the existence of 'society'.  However, even Physics and Chemistry no longer accept that concept of the Atom, instead conceiving it as constituted by electromagnetic forces.  Accordingly, depending on the type of charges that are involved, any Atom is inherently disposed to entrance into molecular association, resulting in a loss, a gain, or a sharing of what begins as an internal component.  Now, market relations, e. g. exchanges, co-ownership, etc. can be interpreted according to that model, but the dogmatism that the parties involved remain unchanged by such associations cannot be.

Atomism, Association, Dissociation, Capitalism

According to Atomism, Atoms are immediately given, with respect to which relations between them are products of extrinsic association.  Thus, in Social Atomism, e. g. Smith's model, the members of a society precede, and are independent of, modes of association, such as contracts, and his Invisible Hand.  Now, the primary vulnerability of Atomism is that its presumed immediate givens are, in fact, the products of prior processes of disassociation, e. g. in Atomistic Empiricism, the datum 'red' and the datum 'circle', are abstracted from a red circle encountered in the original experiential flux.  Accordingly, likewise, Smith's Capitalistic social model, including its laws and its psychological presuppositions, is the product of dissociation.  Hence, as descriptive, it falsely represents human relations, and, as prescriptive or normative, its standards are not only groundlessly arbitrary, but are significantly low, e. g. idle shopping qualifies in it as 'rational' behavior.

Empiricism, Atomism, Capitalism

As Kant reminds, Reason is more than, as Hume conceives it, a source of abstraction--it is a power of Synthesizing.  Thus, Hume's relegation of it to calculation in the service of Passion presupposes not only the Epistemological primacy of the Senses, but the Logical one of Atomism, as well.  Accordingly, insofar as Smith's Capitalist model is derived from Hume's system, it is implicitly Individualistic, with respect to which his Invisible Hand is anomalous.  So, conceived as governed by a Synthesizing principle, i. e. Dialectical Materialism, a fundamental distinction of Marxism from Capitalism is that of Rationalism to Atomism.

Capitalism, Freedom, Passion

First devised by Smith, Capitalism is a special case of Empiricism, and, in particular, the concept of Freedom that it entails is inherited from Hume's.  Now, according to latter, 'Freedom' is not uncaused, but is internally determined behavior, as opposed to externally conditioned.  However, that concept is open to the Spinozist challenge that because Empiricism accepts sense-data at face-value, it lacks a criterion for distinguishing 'free' from conditioned behavior.  Indeed, Hume's own terminology implicitly acknowledges the soundness of that challenge.  For, on his analysis, Passion, not Reason, as Spinoza asserts, is the ground of self-determination.  But, 'passion' plainly connotes 'passivity', thereby reinforcing the charge that presumed Humean 'freedom' is actually a moment in a conditioned behavioral sequence.  Thus, the concept of 'Freedom' that is assumed in Capitalist theory is similarly nugatory, i. e. no behavior that it denotes can be accepted as 'free' at face-value.

Shopping and Semi-Rationality

Since, on his own analysis, Spinoza's concept of Inadequate Causality combines autonomous and heteronomous factors, it might be more accurately termed 'partially adequate causality'.  Likewise, since Adequate Causality in his system is equivalent to Sufficient Reason, the corresponding deficiency can be characterized as 'Semi-Rationality', rather than as 'Irrationality'.  Thus, on that basis, Hume's concept of Reason as a "slave of the passions", is semi-rational.  Similarly, any purchase of a non-vital good, i. e. of neither Essential nor Surplus Utility, as previously defined here, can be classified as Semi-Rational, insofar as it combines impulse and calculation, e. g. most of what usually constitutes Shopping.  Hence, most contemporary variations of a Capitalist model conflate Rational conduct and Semi-Rational behavior, a shortcoming in either a Descriptive theory or a Normative/Prescriptive doctrine.

Capitalism and Rationality

Four prominent concepts of Practical Reason are: 1. Aristotelian--a Mean; 2. Spinozist--Adequate Causality; 3. Kantian--Universal Law; and, 4. Humean--calculation at the service of Passion.  Plainly, the weakest of them is #4, even when qualified as the calculation of the most efficient means to passionate ends.  Now, since Smith, Capitalists have rarely seemed to define their concept of 'Rationality', but the predominant use suggests acceptance of either #4 or its qualified version.  So, the behavior represented in their models is less than optimal, no shortcoming if their aim is merely Descriptive, but a profound flaw in an even implicitly Normative or Prescriptive theory.

Ersatz Utility, Shopping Utility, Novelty Value

Many people, especially present-day Americans, enjoy shopping per se, in which they often engage without any specifically intended item.  Thus, the fundamental value of a purchase during such a trip is determined by a species of Ersatz Utility that can be called Shopping Utility.  Now, a significant, if not exclusive, factor in Shopping Utility is Novelty, i. e. the newness of not necessarily the product itself, but of it for the consumer, even to the skimpiest degree.  So, often escaping the analyses of Economists is Novelty Value of a purchase.

Pet Rocks, Utility, Shopping

Instead of the continuing attention to accounting for the high market price of a relatively useless item like diamonds, Economists might try to explain why anyone would pay a penny, let alone $3.95, for a 'Pet Rock'.  The example cannot be dismissed as frivolous, since the product netted millions for its originator, a phenomenon that can just as easily be interpreted as manifesting the fundamental utter randomness of Market activity, as instantiating a Labor Theory or a Use Theory of Value.  But, it can also be analyzed as exemplifying what can be called the 'Shopping Theory Value', which recognizes Shopping per se as a pleasurable activity.  Indeed, that one of Bush's first addresses to the U. S. following the 9/11 attacks includes an exhortation to 'Go shopping!' suggests the status of it as a national pastime, if not duty or religion.  Nevertheless, the Utility of Shopping seems rarely to be considered as a fact with either Economic or Moral meaning.

Ersatz Utility, Popular Demand, Herd Instinct

Herd instinct often stimulates someone to assimilate themselves to the crowd, simply for the sake of blending in.  In Economic activity, that instinct is frequently manifest in a consumer's wish to conform in response to a perceived 'popular demand' for an otherwise useless product, thereby generating apparently freely calculated Ersatz Utility.  But consumers are not the only ones susceptible to such deception.  Just as mystified by Ersatz Utility are Economists who conflate it with real usefulness, or who associate what is unarguably a powerful marketing ploy with the Demand side of exchanges.

Ersatz Utility and Rationality

Ersatz Utility diverges from Marginal Utility by denoting the values of not only useless items, but harmful ones, as well.  For, it cannot be denied that people regularly purchase e. g. cigarettes and junk food, regardless of warnings of their unhealthfulness.  Now, while there are various theories of such behavior, e. g. weakness of the will, inadequate ideas, etc., what they have in common is that such conduct is less than fully rational.  Hence, those examples expose a significant flaw in not only Marginalism, but in many Economic models--the premise of Rational behavior, i. e. that people always act in their best self-interest.  For, the inattention of those  models to self-destructive behavior, betrays not merely an inattention to empirical detail, but a moral indifference to the distinction between Wealth and Well-Being that is only amplified by Mill's feeble attempt to contrast 'high' from 'low' pleasures.  Indeed, the regular incitement to shopping frenzy, e. g. 'Black Friday' in America, illustrates the significant contribution to the wealth of a nation that Ersatz Utility can offer.

Ersatz Utility, Conspicuous Consumption, Herd Instinct

Veblen's phrase 'conspicuous consumption' instructively characterizes some cases of Ersatz Utility.  For, 'conspicuous' highlights the source of the presumed usefulness of e. g. the purchase of a Rolls-Royce, not for reliability or comfort, but for presumed prestige.  In other words, in such instances, the value of the item is as a status symbol.  But, the flimsiness of that Utility is evident from the absence of any actual consequences beyond the imagined admiration of others.  So, the irony of Conspicuous Consumption is that underlying its aim of achieving distinctiveness is a herd instinct, i. e. it is entirely dependent on the opinion of others.

Economics, Description, Prescription

When Mill attempts to contrast 'higher' from 'lower' pleasures, he betrays one of his most important insights--the distinction between Description and Prescription.  Still, even with that lapse, he is more conscientious in that respect than either Capitalists or Marxists have tended to be.  For, the various representations from the former of Economic behavior do not even address the question of whether such conduct should be amended.  Likewise, while the criticism from the latter of Capitalist exploitation is plainly normative, the complementary assertion that the rectification of it will necessarily transpire according to the laws of History is descriptive.  To avoid such conflations, an Economic Theory that includes both types of proposition must begin with some Normative principle derived from a more general Moral doctrine; then, develop a model of Economic behavior based on that principle; and, finally, apply that model to assess and, if warranted, to suggest corrections for, described extant practices.  In such a project, ideological orientation is transparent from the outset, and debates like that over theory of Market Value are, from, the outset, subordinated to a more general context.

Surplus Utility and Ersatz Utility

Three types of Utility can be called 'Essential', 'Surplus', and 'Ersatz'.  Examples of the three are, respectively, clothing, tailor-made clothing, and clothing with a celebrity logo.  For, clothing is an organic necessity; well-fitting clothing, while not an organic necessity, still has real value as comfortable; but, a celebrity logo, regardless of a price increment, adds nothing to the purpose served by clothes.  Now, a telling weakness in Marginalism is that it does not distinguish the Surplus and Ersatz varieties, thereby potentially establishing delusional spending as paradigmatic Economic behavior, while, at the same time, marginalizing actual organic need.

Scarcity, Marginalism, Ersatz Utility

To some proponents of the Use Theory of Value, the high price of useless--relative to inexpensive water--diamonds, is a "paradox" explainable by Marginal Utility.  To others, the example suffices as a refutation of that theory, in favor of what might be called the 'Scarcity Theory of Value'.  Now, since the latter is based on the peculiar desirability of Scarcity per se, the Utility that it breeds can be more accurately characterized as 'Ersatz', rather than 'Marginal', symptomatic, thus, of psychological confusion requiring either education or therapy, rather than of a defective theory to be tweaked by an ad hoc manoeuvre.  Thus, Marginalism reinforces one of the weaknesses of Capitalism--an indifference to the traditional moral distinctions between apparent and real worth, which even the Utilitarian Mill recognizes, i. e. in his 'higher'-'lower' distinction, and, between Wealth and Well-Being.

Utility and Marginalism

In order to account for the high market price of a relatively useless, i. e. in comparison with water, item, such as diamonds, some advocates of the Use Theory of Value, 'Marginalists', have developed the category of 'Marginal Utility' to accommodate non-vital usefulness, thereby, according to some of them, reinforcing a Capitalist response to Marxism, insofar as the latter relies on the Labor Theory of Value.  However, typically lacking in Marginalism is a justification for the stretching of the concept of Utility to include the objects of mere wishes with those of real need.  That absence is perhaps fatal to the doctrine, since it leaves the term 'Marginal Utility' question-beggingly equivocal, and, hence, a ripe target for the Marxist who interprets the high market price of diamonds as a symptom of Capitalist mystification.

Use-Value, Quantification, User-Value

As has been previously discussed, there are three problems with the quantification of Use-Value or Utility.  First, since Pleasure is a private experience, the common unit required by trans-personal quantification, e. g. the Utilitarian Calculus, is lacking.  Second, even when considered merely peersonally, Pleasure expresses a modification in a user, the quantification of which is, hence, comparative, not positive, from which, e. g. the 'Util' of Neoclassical Economics abstracts.  Therefore, third, the value to a user of a comparative quantity is contingent on specific circumstances, e. g. the +5 of a bowl of chicken soup to a sick person at -3 means a lot more than the +100 of a sumptuous chicken dinner to that person at +200.  Underlying the three problems is that Use-Value is essentially User-Value, relativized to each moment of experience, rather than uniformly possessed by a product.

Use-Value, Economics, Morality

As decisive in Demand, Use-Value is a significant factor in the determination of Exchange-Value.  But, Use-Evaluation presupposes some End to which its object is a means.  In turn, the value of an End is in the purview, exclusively, perhaps of Morality.  So, even sophisticated quantitative, i. e. monetary, representation of Use-Value cannot completely immunize an Economic system from Moral scrutiny.

Exchange-Value and Use-Value

The contrast of a $500 meal for a well-fed person and a $3 meal for someone who is chronically starving illustrates the utter incommensurability of Exchange-Value and Use-Value.  It also, by implication, illustrates the profound confusion entailed in the prevalent classification, e. g. in American Economic analysis, of a person in urgent need of medicine as a 'consumer' no different from someone seeking to purchase their third Rolls Royce.  More generally, because the primary function of Money is to facilitate exchange, Economic theory, at any level, a fundamental term of which is money, inherently abstracts from, or, perhaps, suppresses, vital interests.  Hence, any coincidence of the wealth of a nation and the well-being of a nation is accidental.

Use-Value, Quantification, Utilitarianism

That $10 usually means more to a poor person than to a rich one illustrates a significant internal flaw in Utilitarianism.  As mediating exchange, monetary price expresses Exchange-Value, the efficiency of which is derived from the capacity of the quantification of a common unit to both standardize and differentiate the otherwise incommensurate terms of a transaction.  In contrast, the meaning to one person of a quantity of money is its Use-Value, and that the same quantity has a different meaning to another reflects the absence of a common unit between them.  In other words, Use-Value in an interpersonal context cannot be quantified.  But, as the name plainly expresses, the basic unit of Utilitarianism is Use-Value, i. e. Pleasure.  Hence, the interpersonal quantification, i. e. the Utilitarian Calculus, via which the doctrine determines the general 'good', is completely inappropriate to its fundamental terms.

Demand, Need, Morality

As has been previously discussed, the standard concept of Demand does not distinguish between Wish and Need.  But, that contrast is not only that between frivolity and vital necessity.  It also expresses the depersonalization implicit in the terms of any generalized Economic model, Micro- or Macro-, especially qua quantified.  Thus, the Socialist formulation, 'each according to his need', restores such models to a Moral context.

Utilitarianism, Capitalism, History

As has been previously discussed, the Empiricist concepts of Pleasure and Pain are a-temporal.  Accordingly, the positive and negative modifications of them in the standard versions of the Utilitarian Calculus express neither increase nor decrease, but, rather, merely differences in degrees of intensity with respect to non-feeling.  In contrast, Spinoza's concepts of the two, represent an increase and a decrease, respectively, in strength, and, hence, are inherently temporal, as are, analogously, Economic Profit and Loss.  So, if the ambition of Bentham and Mill is to model Ethics on Capitalism, Utilitarianism should adopt Spinoza's concepts, on the basis of which the 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' would be the temporally accumulated, optimally coordinated, strengths of the members of a society.  On such a model, History would be revealed as an essential dimension of both Utilitarianism and Capitalism. 

Invisible Hand and History

As has been previously discussed, Utilitarianism is inadequate to Capitalism insofar as its concepts of Pleasure and Pain abstract from prior conditions, while those of Profit and Loss do not.  Temporality is at least implicit elsewhere, as well, in Smith's system, e. g. in productive processes, in the occasioning of demand, etc.  So, if, as he proposes, Market Price is the resultant of an adjustment effected by a tendency inherent in the system, i. e. the Law of Supply and Demand, aka the Invisible Hand, implicit in it is an entire past, e. g. if climate events prompt a 10 cent increase in the price of a loaf of bread, it is with respect to a previous price, which itself reflects a change in conditions, etc.  So, another way that the Invisible Hand can be recognized as an expression of Dialectical Logic is as a motor of History.

Invisible Hand and Revolution

As has been previously discussed, if, as Smith proposes, there is inherent in Economic activity a tendency towards equilibrium, the scope of its influence can be generalized from specific negotiations, to a society as a whole.  Now, as representing a resolution of antagonistic interests, the representation of that tendency, his Law of Supply and Demand, aka the Invisible Hand, can be recognized as governed by Dialectical Logic.  But, the latter, according to Marxism, resolves social contradictions by revolution.  Thus, the Invisible Hand can be recognized as the motor of the transformation from Capitalism into Socialism, as conceived in Marxism.

Invisible Hand and Wealth Redistribution

If there were, as Smith supposes, inherent in Economic activity, a tendency towards equilibrium, its scope would be general, not localized, i. e. not merely specific to Supply-Demand contexts.  Rather, it would also correct widespread imbalances, such as disparities in wealth.  Accordingly, the redistribution of wealth could be interpreted as a manifestation of such a general tendency.  Thus, for example, taxation that funds government benefits to the needy could be appreciated as an expression of Smith's Invisible Hand, not as in conflict with it, contrary to the protests of many contemporary Capitalists.

Profit and Pleasure

The modeling of Utilitarianism on Smith's system is based on the correlations of Pleasure with Profit, and Pain with Loss.  Now, the latter of each pair connotes a net quantity, i. e. an increase or decrease with respect to a prior condition.  But, beginning with Locke, a sense-datum, such as Pleasure or Pain, is a presupposition-less event.  Therefore, because Utilitarianism is an Empiricist doctrine, Bentham's and Mill's attempts to apply Empiricism to Smith's system are structurally flawed, at minimum. 

Invisible Hand, Individual, Collective

In the contemporary popular imagination, the Invisible Hand is a principle governed by an Individualistic ethos, insofar as income is conceived as reflecting the worthiness of its recipient.  However, as, as Smith conceives it, its primary role is to achieve equilibrium between Supply and Demand, it is independent of the conflicting self-interests that require resolution in order for an exchange to take place.  In other words, income is an expression of the subordination of the interests of the involved parties to compromise.  Thus, according to Smith, the principle is governed by the well-being of the collective, which requires the smooth interactions that it facilitates, contrary to the presumption of contemporary Capitalists.

Invisible Hand, Self-Interest, Hate

In Smith's Economic system, the Invisible Hand functions as a corrective to self-interested motives.  Hence, it is possible that he conceives it as a substitute for Sympathy, which serves the same role in his earlier work.  But, if, so, he now leaves unmodified other expressions of selfishness, e. g. emotions, such as hate.

Greatest Happiness and Optimal Happiness

The complete satisfaction of each of one's wishes can be called one's 'greatest happiness'.  Likewise, the achievement of the greatest happiness of each party can be called the 'total' greatest happiness.  Thus, the total greatest happiness entails the compossibility of each of the individual greatest happinesses.  However, as the Law of Supply and Demand reflects, that compossibility cannot be presumed to obtain, therefore, requiring compromise, typically via negotiation, the optimal result of which is the point of equilibrium.  So, the best-case scenario under such conditions, for either individual party or collective, can be called the 'optimal' happiness, which is likely what Mill intends by the formulation 'greatest happiness for the greatest number', if the standard application of the Utilitarian Calculus is any indication.  Now, Utilitarianism vacillates between description and prescription, i. e. between a characterization of how people actually conduct themselves, and a formula for determining the best course of action.  But, the problem with the latter is that, as has been previously discussed, there can be a discrepancy between real equilibrium and apparent equilibrium, with the latter the product of expressed terms, rather than of what is privately willed, and, hence, the product of guesswork.  In other words, the utility of the Utilitarian Calculus is itself limited by the unavailability of requisite knowledge, i. e. the real will of others.

Supply, Demand, Conflicting Interests

According to the Egoist Psychology to which Capitalists subscribe, the fundamental elements of the situation to which the 'Law of Supply and Demand' is usually applied are inherently conflicting interests--the seeking of each party to maximize gain and minimize costs, the achievement of which can come only at the expense of the other.  Thus, in a simple sale, the ideal for the buyer is to pay nothing, while that for the seller is to receive an infinitely large amount.  Of course, in practice, each party typically enters into a negotiation with a specific limit in mind--the maximum that the buyer is willing to spend, and the minimum that the seller is willing to receive. Accordingly, the equilibrium point is halfway between those two amounts.  However, in usual actuality, neither side is aware of the limit of the other, so, the terms of the ensuing negotiating may bear little resemblance to the privately willed ones, with the result an equilibrium that likewise bears little resemblance to the potential of the situation.  So, any assumption that the 'Law' is functioning in the service of achievement of optimal results is groundless.

Supply-Side Interests

In any Economic exchange, each party has a supply and a demand, with money often one of each.  Thus, the term 'Supply-Side' does not, in itself, distinguish one party from another.  Likewise, the term 'Supply-Side Economics' is, in itself, trivial.  Rather, what it typically denotes is the interests of the owners of the means of production, as opposed to those of consumers, and to the needs of those too poor to enter into any exchange.  Accordingly, for example, where that system prevails, profitability justifies the production and sale of junk, rather than that of useful or of vital goods.

Demand-Demand Equilibrium

The basic unit of Economic activity is the Exchange, and not the mere transfer, e. g. a donation.  Now, while in a simple Exchange, each party has both a Supply and a Demand, the Psychological motors, according to Smith, of the negotiation that precedes it, are the Demands involved, e. g. the seeking by each party of Profit.  Hence, the Equilibrium reached by the negotiation is Demand-Demand. not Supply-Demand, as Smith and his followers commonly conceive it.  Likewise, the distinction usually represented as 'Supply-Side' vs. 'Demand-Side', is actually that between two different Demand-Sides.

Equilibrium, Excess-Deficiency, Supply-Demand

A simple and clear example of an arrival at an Economic Equilibrium is when one person, in possession of some object for which they have no need, and the keeping of which is burdensome, gives it to a person who is lacking it.  Likewise, an exchange in which such balance is achieved involves reciprocal excess-deficiency transfers.  Accordingly, the best evidence of Equilibrium is the absence of both Excess and Deficiency.  In contrast, Smith and his followers conceive 'equilibrium' as the termination of a process of negotiation between a party that can supply an item to someone for whom it is the object of a wish, the immediate evidence of which is merely an actual exchange.  Thus, since, on that basis, 'equilibrium' can be attributed to any transaction, it can be conceived as inhering in all Economic activity, and attributed to a 'Law of Supply and Demand', or to an 'Invisible Hand'.  The discrepancy between the two concepts of Equilibrium is manifest where grotesque excess and deficiency are validated as the products of an immutable Law, or, equivalently, of a sacrosanct Hand.

Utility, Price, Pleasure

Bentham's Utilitarianism is often recognized to be isomorphic to Smith's system, perhaps as a generalization of the latter, perhaps as representing its essential structure.  In either case, according to his doctrine, the Utility of a market exchange is expressed in the price paid.  But, according to Smith, the price paid expresses an equilibrium between Supply and Demand.  Thus, the degrees of pleasures to the participants in an exchange are perhaps tempered in the achievement of equilibrium.  Therefore, the presumed correlation between Utilitarianism and Capitalism exposes a flaw in the former--its Atomistic Hedonism, which entails that the quantification of Pleasure in one person is independent of that in another. 

Demand, Wish, Need

While a Wish is conscious, and is for an object that may not satisfy an organic lack, a Need is an organic necessity, even if not consciously entertained.  Now, those differences are morally significant to both Aristotle and Mill, i. e. expressed in the former's distinction between apparent and actual Good, and in the latter's between lower and higher pleasures.  In contrast, the standard Economic concept of Demand does not distinguish them, and is usually taken as equivalent to Wish.  Accordingly, any Economic system that takes that concept at face value is, at minimum, amoral, and insofar as a program takes it as sacrosanct, e. g. as a factor in the promotion of Wealth, or in dogmatic laissez-faire Capitalism, it is arguably immoral.

Slavery, Supply, Demand

One of Marx's sharpest insights only touches upon a problem for any Political or Economic system.  According to his analysis, it follows from the principle of Self-Interest that the Capitalist seeks to pay a laborer only enough to ensure a return  to work the next day, which they will do if the labor supply far exceeds its demand.  Thus, since the 'freedom' of a laborer to refuse such work is nominal, the condition is equivalent to Slavery.  However, Marx seems to stop short of a further of examination of that relation, which predates any Political or Economic theory.  Likewise, what Plato misses in his account of social 'necessity', is the need for drudgery tasks, including, notably waste disposal, e. g. mopping, sweeping, etc.  Now, in itself, the demand for such labor is perhaps both high and perpetual, but, the supply, i. e. those willing to perform it, is minimal, at best.  Hence, enter Slavery to generate that supply.  But, since those tasks usually require little special skill, even Marx's formulation of 'to each according to his ability', does not define who in a division of labor subsequent to the socializing of the means of production is to clean the toilets in a factory at the end of the day.  Even the speculation that one day, robots will perform such drudgery, does not address who cleans the toilets in the factory that builds them.  So, rather than a peripheral problem in Political or Economic theory, the conditions to which Slavery, in its various guises, has been the traditional solution, is an essential one.

Competition and Scarcity

Competition entails relative scarcity, which is essential to some contexts, e. g. to games in which there can be only one winner.  But, even if widespread, scarcity is a contingent fact in a society, and, obviously, is a deficiency, i. e. with respect to conditions of abundance.  Now, a Philosophy of Economics must be based on Necessity and Ideality, from which Contingency and Imperfection are methodically derived.  Thus, as important a topic Scarcity is, Competition is not, contrary to some popular opinions, an unconditional virtue of an Economic system.

Supply-Side Economics and Competition

A primary aim of Supply-Side Economics is the creation of Demand where it does not otherwise exist.  Thus, the perhaps most effective means to that creation, i. e. advertising, is a significant factor in such a system.  Accordingly, economic competition is often most visible in advertising, especially when the goods represented are of approximately equal value.  Thus, for example, the promotions during the Super Bowl often draw as much attention as the game itself.  But, the most influential Supply-Side Competition in contemporary American life is probably that between political ads, in which substantial investment goes into swaying an otherwise indifferent public into choosing between two products for neither of which there is an inherent Demand.  That the usual massiveness of such investment has been classified as 'free speech' by the U. S. Supreme Court underscores how deeply ingrained in American life Supply-Side Competition is. 

Capitalism and Competition

Perhaps inspired by the apparent superiority, in the mid-20th-Century, of the goods in the American market, as opposed to the those in that of the Soviet Union, advocates have sometimes promoted Capitalism with the following argument: 1. The production of superior goods is an indication of a superior Economic system; 2.  Competition improves the quality of goods produced; 3. Competition is an inherent factor in Capitalism; 4. Socialism eliminates Competition; 5. Therefore, Capitalism is inherently superior to Socialism.  However, the perhaps weakest link in the argument is the premise that some seem to take as its strongest--#3.  For, the fundamental motor of Capitalism is Self-Interest, with which Competition can conflict, and, thus, be suppressed, e. g. a monopoly, and to which the improvement of the quality of goods is only contingently related.  So, the status of goods on the shelf of a store may just as likely reflect that of environmental conditions, e. g. climate, richness of natural resources, etc., as the relative values of Capitalism and Socialism. 

Capitalism and the 13th Amendment

That, as has been previously discussed, "We the people", in the preamble to the U. S. Constitution, rigorously analyzed, refers to only the authors of the document, and not to all the citizenry, is a merely semantic quibble.  However, that it precludes the inhabitants of the territories that are not full 'citizens', i. e. are slaves, is a much more substantive problem.  Now, the ugly history of racism tends to obscure the fact that as an Economic relation, Slavery long precedes both Capitalism and Marxism, both of which have proven susceptible to it.  But, while Marxism, de jure precludes Slavery, i. e. in its concept of the collectivization of property, Capitalism does not.  So, the 13th Amendment of the Constitution implicitly distances it from the latter system, even as de facto neglect of or resistance to that repudiation continues.

We The People and General Welfare

Since the main verbs of the Preamble to the U. S. Constitution are "ordain and establish", their subject, "we", is, more precisely, those constructing the document, rather than "the people", in general.  However, that generality is explicit in one of the stated aims of the passage, "promote the general Welfare", and is implicit in another, "form a more perfect union".  Now, since the term used is 'welfare', rather than 'wealth', it seems likely that the connotation is 'well-being', rather than 'abundance of goods'.  Furthermore, at the time of that construction, Wealth of Nations exists, but relatively obscurely, and Marxism is decades in the future.  So, according to the unequivocally expressed words of the Founding Fathers, contrary to many contemporary interpretations, including those of some of the members of the Supreme Court, their intention entails neither some specific Economic system, nor the promotion of Self-Interest.  Likewise, a rigorous determination of the 'Constitutionality' of some process would include an assessment of the extent to which it promotes the "general Welfare".

We, Homo Sapiens, Homo Faber

Though he does not systematically develop it as such, Marx's concept of Class Consciousness may be the first substantive Philosophical consideration of the concept of We.  Hitherto, and still usually, the concept of trans-personal Subjectivity is either a mere aggregate of Is, or a universal I.  In contrast, Marx's I is not the subject of cognition, but the agent of production.  Accordingly, it can be conceived as conjoined with other such Is while maintaining its distinctiveness.  In other words, corresponding to the historical emergence of Class Consciousness is the theoretical innovation of the possibility of We, facilitated by the transformation of Homo Sapiens into Homo Faber.

Marxism, I, We

Contrary to common reputation, Marxism is not based on the premise of a prehistorical property-less Eden.  Instead, whether or not Marx recognizes it as such, it is 'Each is entitled to the fruits of their labor', that he implicitly treats as an a-historical principle, though one with actual exemplifications, e. g. the nomadic craftsperson who directly barters self-produced wares to acquire other goods.  But, what is historical about the principle is that, according to the doctrine, it catalyzes, under conditions of Capitalist industrial mass production, the unprecedented emergence of Class Consciousness.  The historical novelty of the latter is that it consists in a 'We', the awareness of which is impossible in any preceding social organization, e. g. Capitalism can never be conceived as more than an aggregate of 'I's.  So, perhaps the fundamental Moral significance of Marxism is its promotion of the development from I to We.

Sowing and Reaping

The Biblical correlation between Sowing and Reaping is usually interpreted as it is likely intended--as the Moral principle that one will bear the consequences of one's actions.  But, in Economic terms, the correspondence can also help distinguish Marxism from Capitalism.  For, Marx's concept of the fruits of one's labor can be formulated as 'The one who reaps should be the one who sows'.  In contrast, 'What one sows is the minimum that a landowner can pay one' represents the relation in a Capitalist system.

Ability, Need, Distributive Justice

The formula, 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his need', adopted, not coined, by Marx, can be classified as a principle of Distributive Justice.  Now, since Capitalists rarely engage Marxism on an intellectual level, their objections to that principle can only be a topic of speculation.  One might be that what one receives should be determined by the work that one does, not by what one needs.  However, that argument ignores the first clause of the formula, and, furthermore, is clearly arbitrarily directed, since no Capitalist seems to apply it to the alienation of the fruits of one's labor that is inherent in their own system.  Another objection might be that what one receives should be determined by the Invisible Hand of the Market, a counter the effectiveness of which is plainly dependent on the essentially indemonstrable existence of such an entity.  Indeed, that that version of a Capitalist principle of Distributive Justice is equivalent to a prohibition of third-party interference in commercial exchanges, highlights what is distinctive about its Marxist counterpart--that Distributive Justice is an artefactual process.

Capitalism and the Dehumanized Exploiter

It follows from Marxist analysis, that in a Capitalist system, the condition of the exploiter is just as much one of deprivation and dehumanization as is that of the exploited, but for different reasons.  For, the exploiter is essentially idle, and, hence, as non-productive, is deprived of the enjoyment of the fruits of one's labor.  Furthermore, because implicit in Marxism is the definition of 'human' as 'homo faber', non-productiveness is equivalent to non-humanness. 

Capitalism, Exploitation, Behaviorism

One flaw in the 'Cave' scenario in the Republic is Plato's inattention to the status of the puppet-masters, who are neither chained to their desires nor liberated by Reason, according to the logic of the image.  A similar indeterminacy in the Marxist model of a Capitalist society is the status of the exploiter.  Now, the Psychological theory underpinning Smith's system suggests a resolution to both uncertainties.  For, that theory is essentially what has come to be called 'Behavioristic', according to which Self-Interest is mechanistic, as becomes salient in its Greed mode.  Accordingly, the exploiter is as psychologically unfree as is the exploited cog in the profit-producing machinery, from which it follows that Plato's puppet-masters are as enslaved as are the members of their captive audience.

Socialism and Vitalism

Kant's characterization, in the 3rd Critique, of an Organism as a body each of the parts of which are both Means and Ends, is also a social model, i .e. it applies to his Kingdom of Ends.  Now, according to Marx, as a mere commodity, a worker is a mere cog in the means of production of profit to the owner of that means.  Accordingly, on that concept, a worker that is also the owner of the means of production is both a Means and an End.  Thus, Marx has at his disposal a Kantian argument that a Socialist collective is an Organism, whereas a Capitalist aggregate is, as has been previously discussed, no more than a mechanistic association, i. e. he has at his disposal a Vitalistic defense of Socialism.

Mechanization, Capitalism, Socialism

The charge that Capitalism is inherently exploitative, and, hence, is essentially unjust, constitutes one facet of Marx's Moral justification of Socialism.  Another is that, by classifying workers as commodities, Capitalism dehumanizes them.  Now, while that judgment can be associated with Kant's prohibition of treating others as mere means, it originates in Marx's most fundamental Philosophical orientation.  For, while Dialectical Materialism is often recognized as a counter to Hegelian Dialectical Idealism, it is also an alternative to Mechanistic Materialism, which, in turn, presupposes Atomism, the target of his earliest project, concerning Democritus.  In other words, his most fundamental Philosophical objection to Capitalism is that it is a species of Mechanistic Materialism, a system that is perhaps best exemplified by its treatment of a worker as a piece of machinery.  But, the mechanization of society is pervasive, since the system also entails a general Mechanistic Psychology, in which even the exploiters of the Proletariat are conceived as mere machines.  So, one defense of Socialism is that it is more vital than is Capitalism, entailing that the beneficiaries of the latter would, as much as their victims, benefit from a transition to the former.

Socialism, Education, Revolution

Education as part or all of a means to a Socialist collective has two main obstacles.  One is that the Proletariat must overcome deeply ingrained indoctrination, i. e. institutional obfuscation of the truth of their condition, e. g. via Religion, to become aware of being victims of exploitation.  The other, probably more challenging, is that the beneficiaries of that exploitation have to be be convinced to relinquish those benefits.  To that end, the appeal to Justice has been partly successful over the decades, but, as is especially the case in the U. S., recalcitrance has ossified to the degree that has led Lovestone, as has been previously discussed, to declare American society an 'exception' to Marxist analysis.  At the heart of that recalcitrance is a problem that is as old as Plato and Aristotle--the chasm between believing what is best, and knowing what is best, even for oneself--which makes any effort to convince an exploiter that a Socialist collective is in their best interests, too, futile.  But, if education is thus doomed to failure, then the advocacy of Revolution as a means to a correction of Injustice may be justified.

Socialism, Capitalism, Invisible Hand

As an a priori proposition, 'Revolution is the only means to Socialism' is meaningless, since the concept of 'means' is inapplicable to a process that is either inevitable or seamless.  As an empirical proposition, it is false, since alternative means are conceivable.  One is a voluntary transition, which could include a process of education.  Now, that 'Revolution is a better means to Socialism than is non-violent education' is a true empirical proposition is questionable, given the failures of the Soviet Union, as well as the peaceful adaptation of some Socialist measures in places like Scandinavia.  Another voluntary transition is one, suggested by recent events, that seems to defy theories both favorable and unfavorable to Socialism.  For, the ongoing acquisition of American property by China, and the indebtedness of the U. S. to the latter, constitutes a triumph of a Socialist country over a Capitalist one, on Capitalist terms.  Accordingly, another possible means to Socialism is via the Invisible Hand of the Market, a transition that cannot be easily subsumed under either Marxist or Capitalist dogma.

Justification and Best Means

The substantive question to a Marxist regarding the Justification of Means is: Is revolution the best means to a Socialist state?  Implicit in that formulation is the possibility of alternative means.  Hence, the question is inapplicable when Revolution is conceived as a transition in a Necessary process.  Likewise remaining implicit in the Marxist answer is that one alternative--a universally voluntary collectivization of the Means of Production--may be extremely unlikely.  But, even if so, it is not logically impossible, which is why a Philosophical examination of Marxism requires that that alternative, and any others, be explicitly addressed, before being dismissed. 

End, Justification, Socialism

The concept of an 'unjustified end', the possibility of which is alluded to by both Marx and Trotsky, as has been previously discussed, is problematic, since an End can be only self-justifying.  Now, available to a Marxist is the following justification of Socialism:  'Justice is self-justifying.  Socialism is a Just condition.  Therefore, Socialism is a justified End.'  But, while that argument is apparently no more than implicit in Marxist writings, it is sometimes rivaled by the more explicit:  'Socialism is the End of History.  Therefore it needs no further justification.'  However, this argument is unsound, since it confuses 'end', meaning 'stopping point', with 'end', meaning 'deliberate goal'.  So, the Marxist concept of History is unhelpful to a defense of its Socialist aims.

Ends, Means, Justification

The familiar accusation that Marxists subscribe to the proposition 'The ends justify the means' is inaccurate, perhaps disingenuous, and, ultimately, specious.  The charge is inaccurate insofar as it is difficult to reconcile with either of two quotes:  "An end which requires unjustified means is no justifiable end", (Marx, 'On the Freedom of the Press'), and, "A means can be justified only by its end.  But the end in its turn needs to be justified", (Trotsky, unpublished).  It is disingenuous insofar as its speaker does not advocate Marxists ends.  Now, the actual origin of the expression is uncertain, e. g. while it is sometimes associated with Machiavelli, it does not appear as such in his writings.  In any case, finally, the accusation is specious, because the proposition is tautological.  For, by definition, a 'Means' is subordinated to an 'End', a relation that can be interpreted as 'is justified by', independent of any of its instances.

History and Teleology

Because Kant classifies Teleology as 'Reflective', his concept of a Telos of History is no more than heuristic.  However, Hegel is less cautious, conceiving History as the primary determinant of the course of events, combining Teleological Rationality and Christian Messianism.  So, though Marx inverts Hegel's concept, with a Materialist version of Dialectics, he still inherits its subordination of all humans to its Necessity.  Likewise, Heidegger's 'History of Being', even if it reverses the progressive pattern of such Teleology, is just as determinative.  In contrast, because Nietzsche conceives all 'Theory', even that of History, as 'Interpretation', he, more than these other German pioneers of the Philosophy of History, recovers Kant's respect for the Humean skepticism that is the prelude to the tradition.  Indeed, by conceiving History as an object of either "use" or "abuse", Nietzsche anticipates the kind of Pragmatist concept of it with which Dewey confronts Trotsky in 1939.

Self, Time, History

As has been previously discussed, Marx's concept of  Laborer is derived from Kant's concept of Self.  Now, entailed in the latter is the concept of Time as a Form of Experience, with respect to which Objective Time is abstracted.  But, History is a species of Time.  Thus, any concept of Objective History abstracts from personal experience.  Hence, a proper Marxist concept of Object History conceives it as a mystification that perpetuates the powerlessness of the Proletariat, not as a process immanent in Matter.  Likewise, a decisive moment in the awakening of Class Consciousness is the awareness that workers can make History, and not merely endure it.

Self, Capitalism, Marxism

Hume's dissolution of the 'Self' into a 'bundle of perceptions', leaves, without further modification, any concept of 'Self-Interest', or of Private Property, groundless.  Now, while Smith does not address the problem posed by his associate, Kant, Hegel, and Marx do.  First, Kant, in general, posits the concept of a 'Self' that functions as a bundler of the bundle, and, more specifically, according to one interpretation of his Refutation of Idealism, shows that 'Self-Consciousness' consists in an awareness of one's effects on phenomena.  Hegel then develops that interpretation into a concept of Self-Recognition, which is also a moment of Self-Reliance that liberates a 'Slave' from a 'Master'.  Plainly, therefore, Marx's concept of one's relation to the fruits of one's labor continues that response to Hume.  Thus, the Psychological premises of Marxism are sounder than those of Capitalism, though the advantage has rarely been recognized by subsequent advocates of either system, so serious discussion of it has been lacking.

Property, Abolition, Pluralization

We is a pluralization of I, not an abolition of it, e. g. not a reversion to some pre-Individuation condition.  Likewise, Our is a pluralization of My, not an abolition of it, e. g. not a reversion to some pre-privatization condition.  Now, the Collectivization promoted by Marxism is often represented, by both advocates and opponents, as an abolition of private property, especially of that of the means of production.  But, the pivotal concept of the doctrine, the 'alienation of the fruits of one's labor, presupposes an exclusive, perhaps 'natural', Right to what one produces through one's Labor.  So, Marxism is not internally contradictory only if Collectivization is Pluralization, a thesis which, if better recognized by all concerned parties, would advance the mode of conflict between them.

Justice and History

At its root, the Marxist critique of Capitalism is Moral--that system is inherently unjust.  The injustice, usually glossed as 'exploitation', is, more commonly, 'stealing'.  For, on Marx's analysis, Labor produces Profit, so, the Laborer is the primary owner of any Profit, to which an exchange for Wages with the owners of the Means of Production, whether or not under constrained conditions, is essentially incommensurate, i. e. is stealing.  His solution to the injustice is ownership of the means of production, beginning with land, by laborers, i. e. which would eliminate the exploitation of them.  So, the consequent practical problem is effecting the collectivization of the means of production, his solution to which is Revolution, the inevitability of which is entailed in Dialectical Materialism.  Thus, in Marxism, the end is Moral, to which his theory of History is subordinated as providing a means.

Capitalism vs. Marxism

In the contemporary popular imagination, Capitalism promotes Individualism, while the priority of Socialism is the Collective.  But, in their inceptions, the orientations are to the contrary.  For, as the phrase 'wealth of nations' connotes, Smith conceives his system as a rival to Feudalism with respect to an entire society, whereas, at the heart of Marxism is an argument against the exploitation of the individual worker.  Thus, the two are also incommensurate, since the former argues on technical grounds, i. e. that Capitalism is a more effective means to general well-being than is Feudalism,  while Marx's charge against Capitalism is normative, i. e. that Socialism is the more just of the two systems.  One reason why these contrasts are not better recognized is that the associated inessential and ungrounded theses, the Invisible Hand and Dialectical Materialism, are commonly mistaken for them.  Also, that Smith's system is directed specifically against the Feudalist status quo explains why no subsequent Capitalism has managed an intellectually responsible rejoinder to Marxism, a doctrine that has little in common with its original target.

Experimental Reason and Investment

The concept of Labor cannot be derived from that of Dialectical Materialism, since the latter connotes a Necessary process, whereas the outcome of any instance of the former, like that of any human exertion, is never guaranteed in advance.  Likewise, insofar as the concept of an Invisible Hand entails a correlation with a degree of exertion, e. g. with 'hard work', it suppresses the essential uncertainty of the results of an endeavor.  Thus, if any practice exemplifies the Experimental Reason that informs all Economic activity, it is Investment.

Labor and History

According the Marx, Labor is the source of all Economic Value.  Now, Labor, as he conceives it, can be most generally defined as 'the deliberate effort to modify some given material'.  Furthermore, modification spans degrees of differentiation, from mechanical repetition, to radical transformation.  Accordingly, History can be interpreted as the production of Labor, e. g. the bare repetition of stable hereditary rule, the complete destruction and reconstruction effected by an invader, etc.  Thus, what is distinctive about a Socialist revolution is not that it is a product of Labor, but that it is the perhaps unique case of the Working Class being the agent of modification, rather than its sufferer.  So, a Labor Theory of History does not under-appreciate the rise of Socialism, while it escapes some of the problems that beset Dialectical Materialism, e. g., notably, reconciling the concept of an immanent necessary force with that of the self-determination of the insurgent class.  Likewise, a Labor Theory of History has the systematic advantage over Dialectical Materialism of deriving both an Economic Theory and a Theory of History from one principle--Labor.  

Capitalism, Cycle, Freedom

From its inception, Capitalism has been beset with rarely scrutinized systematic problems.  To begin  with, Smith never explains the relation between the promotion of Self-Interest that he promotes in Wealth of Nations, and the Universal Sympathy that he advocates, without any later retraction, in his earlier work. He also offers no derivation from his Humean premises of his cardinal concepts of 'Self' and 'Invisible Hand'.  Furthermore, the subsequent Capitalist concept of Cycle is problematic in two respects.  First, as is the case with the Invisible Hand, according to those Empiricist premises, it can never be more than an observed past conjunction, and, hence, contrary to common presumption, cannot be an immanent law.  Second, as a purported transcendent pattern, to which all Economic activity is naturally subject, a Cycle is Deterministic, and, hence, is antithetical to the concept of  'free' enterprise.  So, until rigorously addressed, these problems indicate that Capitalism is less a system than an arbitrary, no more than loosely coherent, set of practices, the beneficiality of which is, therefore, no more than contingent.

Economic Cycle, Invisible Hand, Growth

One objection to any Government intervention, including the regulation of Interest Rates, in Economic activity, is that it tampers with patterns conceived as 'cyclical', and characterized as 'natural'.  Now, two properties of a Cycle are that it returns to its starting point, and that any transition from one of its segments to another is determined by the whole, with, in some cases, a third, that the pattern is self-caused.  Thus, daily and yearly cycles include the first two, but, since those patterns are expressions of celestial rotations, they are not self-caused.  So, implicit in the standard concept of the 'Economic Cycle' is that it is as transcendent to the activity that are its phases as is the 'Invisible Hand', and that Growth is never more than a temporary episode.

The Value of Interest Rates

The variability of Interest Rates, and of Usury laws, indicate that there is no Rate that is inherently either beneficial or harmful.  Thus, it is not impossible that the optimal rate is 0%, in which case any charge for a loan should be banned.  But, given how deeply entrenched in and interwoven into Macroeconomics the practice pervasively is, an empirical evaluation of it is nearly impossible.  Still, it cannot be denied that the influence of Interest extends beyond merely Economic activity, which even the staunchest of advocates of laissez-faire policies cannot deny is a species of social activity in general.  Hence, an evaluation of the former can be derived from one of the latter, e. g. if hysterical behavior is deemed to be both personally and collectively unhealthy, than so, too, is it malignant qua Economic activity.  Thus, for example, the Christmas shopping rush can be evaluated as socially 'harmful' even if it is calculated to 'boost the Economy'.  Accordingly, the value of Interest as a social practice is a topic for Political Philosophy, even if some Economists insist that a governing body should not be interfering in such a practice.

The Interests of Money-Lenders

A lowering of the Interest Rate by the U. S. Fed is usually designed to stimulate Economic activity by lowering the price of Money, with the possible beneficial general consequences of an increased investment in productivity, which would involve increased hiring, leading to more employee income, and, hence, to more spending on products, etc.  But, regardless of which set of consequences becomes actualized, one constant is the pivotal role of money-lenders, and of their interests, in the course of events, regardless of whether or not they are in the private sector, and regardless of their involvement in practices that tend to lead to a need for such stimulation.  So, an objection to that Fed action, either on the ground that the Government should not interfere in the 'Free Market', or because it only encourages past malfeasance, tends to accept that the centrality of that role.

Interest, Rate, Value

Economic Interest per se is of no interest--it is the Rate of Interest that is decisive in motivating the sale and purchase of money.  Now, as the manipulations of the U. S. Fed in the latter regard illustrate, Interest Rate functions as a stimulus to Economic activity.  However, its Value is not intrinsic, because it depends on the values of not only the purposes to which borrowed money is put, e. g. to that of a produced or purchased good, but also on those of the consequences of stimulation itself, e. g. the hectic, if not hysterical behavior during the Christmas season that is enabled by the extending of Credit.  So, to conflate Interest-Value with Labor-, Use-, or Exchange-Value in a Macroeconomic model is as short-sighted as to assume, from the discovery, in a medical examination, of both adrenaline and an amphetamine, that the latter is as organically generated as is the former.

Interest and Conflation

The labor on, the use of, and the exchange of products is each a human activity.  Thus, the Economic patterns imputed  to the determinations of Labor-Value, Use-Value, and Exchange-Value are derived from Psychological and/or Moral ones.  In contrast, Interest entails a relation between Money and calendar Time, and, hence, is an inherently inhuman determinant of Economic Value.  Thus, the absence of a real, i. e. a not merely nominal distinction between what can be characterized as Value and Meta-Value, can be termed 'Conflation', an analytical failure, even if, like Inflation, the concrete conditions to which it corresponds are not necessarily malign.

Interest and Meta-Economy

If B returns to a satisfied A a dollar bill loaned a month previously, the interaction is equivalent to the earlier one.  However, if A has charged interest, then the value of even the selfsame bill is less than it had been, indicating both a depreciation of it over that period, as well as an inflating of the value of A's satisfaction, even if elsewhere, its purchasing power remains the same.  So, Interest can create an opaque Meta-Economy, that, nevertheless, usually influences the first-order Economy, e. g. determining a graduate to take a career path that can specifically accommodate the repayment of the interest portion of an education loan.  Nor do non-Marxist Economists seem to respect the distinction that the example illustrates, i. e. Marxists isolate what they could call a 'surplus-Economy', of which Interest is one factor.

Interest and Meta-Language

Money can be conceived as a Language of Economic relations--a commonly accepted symbolic system serving to communicate purchasing power.  Likewise, Money has its meta-Language--Interest, i. e. of which it itself becomes an object of representation, and, just as a meta-Language can, in turn, become the object of a meta-meta-Language, Interest can be recursively compounded.  However, while Logicians endeavor to maintain a distinction between strata, that of Principle and Interest is usually merely nominal, the actual conflation of which is perhaps best exemplified by the 'underwater mortgage'.  Thus, the Macroeconomic collapse set in motion by a proliferation of cases of the latter can be conceived as an expression of Illogic.

Language and Money

While Communication binds the members of a Society together, in contemporary Economic systems, Money is the medium of common meaning.  Now, in the past decade, the U. S. Supreme Court has decided that spending on a political campaign is a species of 'free speech', thereby complementing a previous establishment of a corporation as a 'person'.  So, America now has a de jure, and not merely a de facto, national Language--not English, as some advocate, but Money.

Vitality and Property

One difficulty in interpreting a collection as an organic unity is that while the latter is typically spatially contiguous, the former might not be.  However, since the territory that a collection inhabits is continuous, in the absence of privacy, it can be the medium of an expression of unity.  Hence, because Vitality is a characteristic of an Organism, Socialism is inherently potentially more vital than is Capitalism, at least when the latter entails private property 'Right' to be 'Natural'.

Vitality and Political Philosophy

Vitality is a characteristic of an organism, which, as a unity of more or less essential parts, is distinguished from a mere contingently co-existing aggregate.  Now, Plato's concept of a Republic is unified by a Soul, and includes parts the "mother" of each of which is "necessity'.  Thus, even though Vitalism is a system usually associated with the 19th Century, notably with Bergson, the first Vitalist Political Philosophy precedes it by more than two millennia.

The Economy and Growth

An increase in the height of a plant, but not that of a building can be characterized as 'growth'.  Similarly, 'X is growing' is meaningful only if the referent of 'X' is an organism.  However, insofar as it is unclear what the subject in the common phrase 'The Economy is growing' could denote, the proposition could be meaningless.  Thus, for example, if it mediately represents some increase in the Society to which 'The Economy' is implicitly attributed, then it is meaningful, but only if the 'Society' is an organized unity, not some mere aggregate.  But, Capitalism is Atomistic, and, hence, the collective of which it is the system is never more than an aggregate.  Thus, an utterance in contemporary America of "The Economy is growing" is usually either inaptly metaphorical, or unwitting propaganda.

Vitality, Self-Interest, Capitalism

Vitality entails Growth, which, in turn, entails Increase.  Thus, Profit can be an indication of Vitality.  However, Self-Interest is too vague to be understood as grounding a Profit-motive, and, its most common interpretation, Self-Preservation, connotes maintaining, not increasing.  So, Capitalism, as conceived by Smith and most of his successors, is not inherently vital.  In contrast, a drive to Self-Increase could motivate the seeking of profit, but only as an episode of personal growth, to which an increase in possession of inanimate objects is not in itself equivalent.  So, the theoretical justification for the proposition that Capitalism is more vital than Communism, a staple of American Political rhetoric in recent decades, seems lacking.

Vitality, Self-Interest, Profit

What distinguishes organic Vitality from mere Motion is Growth.  Thus, while, Elan Vital qua principle of flux, Will to Live qua principle of maintaining existence, and Will to Power qua principle of discharging strength are not Vitalistic, qua increased mobility, qua multiplying species members, and qua increase of power, correspondingly, are.  Likewise, Self-Interest qua Self-Preservation does not suffice as a Profit-motive.  Thus, any presumption by Smith that it is interchangeable with the latter is groundless, and, perhaps, constitutes a significant flaw in his concept of Capitalism.

Freedom and Vitality

Freedom can be taken to immediately indicate Vitality, not as a fundamental principle of Ethics, Political Philosophy, Psychology, or Metaphysics, but simply physiologically, i. e. as unconstrained movement.  However, unconstrained movement can also be a symptom of de-vitalization, i. e. as an expression of dissociation, e. g. the motion of a limb due to a neurological disorder.  Likewise, the rogue behavior of a member of a society can be interpreted in either way, thus demonstrating that the value of Freedom is not absolute, but, rather, is subordinate to that of Vitality.

Capitalism and Vitality

Probably the most familiar contemporary image of a de-vitalized society is totalitarian Communism, in which individual initiative is suppressed, thus stifling growth.  However, the absence of that suppression does not suffice for vitalization.  For, Vitality is a characteristic of an Organism, whereas, Capitalism is fundamentally an Atomistic system, in which collectivity can never be more than an aggregation, into which the integration of individual initiative is inherently problematic.  Furthermore, it is also susceptible to the same stagnation as any other system--degeneration into symbolic ritual, which is a mode of mechanical repetition.  As a unit, Capitalism is a Frankenstein robot, awaiting animation from elsewhere, to which an aggregate of individual initiatives is inadequate.

Philosophy of History, Political Philosophy, Vitality

One of Marx' important, albeit subsidiary, innovations is to recast Capitalism, a system, as a moment in History.  The possibility of that dual interpretation reflects that its object is both somewhat stable and somewhat unstable, and, so can be extended to the typically fixed objects of Political Philosophy, in general, thereby suggesting that the latter and Philosophy of History are two perspectives of one and the same phenomenon.  Thus, for example, one characteristic, and, not merely an accidental circumstance, of Hobbes' Leviathan is that it stabilizes the preceding 'war of all against all', the concept of which is inspired by the actual English Civil War.  Accordingly, thereby exposed as just as much a threat to Political organization as is instability, is, as has been previously discussed, stagnation as well, i. e. the possibility of rigidification, e. g. Totalitarianism, to which any system is susceptible.  Thus, insofar as Vitality constitutes a mean between instability and inertia in Historical development, it can also serve as a Political ideal.

Instability, Inertia, Vitality

Implicit in the concept of Socialism as merely the resolution of the internal incoherence of Capitalism is the judgment of it as superior on the grounds of stability, not of Justice.  But, instability is not the only deficient mode of stability--inertia is another.  Thus, as events subsequent to Marx have tended to demonstrate, Socialism is no less susceptible to stagnation, e. g. Totalitarianism, than are other varieties of social organization.  Accordingly, instructive in those apparent limitations is that an optimum condition, as a mean between instability and inertia, is what can be called Vitality. 

Logic and History

Like Analytical Logic, Dialectical Logic distinguishes between terms and operations, while unlike the former, it does not conceive terms as atomistic, and, hence, it does not conceive that distinction as absolute, i. e. Dialectical operations are immanent in its terms.  However, a Teleological principle undermines that contrast, since it entails a permanent end state, and, hence, the possibility of a term that inherently precludes any further operations.  Thus, the positing of Socialism as the Telos of History undermines the thesis of Dialectical Materialism that e. g. Feudalism and Capitalism are inherently unstable conditions.  Conversely, proposed corrections to that problem, 'permanent revolution' and 'Negative Dialects', cannot account for any fixed conditions.  So, a more flexible concept of History is one consisting in moments that are more or less stable, requiring a Logic in which differentiation and integration are not mutually exclusive, as are Negation and Conjunction in Analytical Logic, and Negation and Synthesis in Dialectical Logic.

Individual, Dissociation, Hermit

Literally, 'individual' means 'undivided', and in Logic, it functions as a Quantifier of some given type.  In contrast, in common political parlance, it usually connotes 'dissociated'.  Now, dissociation can be absolute only in the case of a unique entity, e. g. a deity.  Furthermore, one, and perhaps, the only, case of dissociation from a species is the process of Mutation, as a phase in the origination of a new species.  Otherwise, within the human species, the closest approximation to absolute dissociation is the hermit, though the sometimes presumed 'self-sufficiency' of the latter tends to abstract from dependency on non-human Nature for survival, e. g. for food, shelter, etc.  Still, as appealing as that image might be under some circumstances, the promotion of it as a Political ideal is often a symptom of social decay, regarding which 'Individualists' tend to be unreflective.

History and Experiment

Suppressed in any expectation is essential uncertainty, e. g. ALS is a reminder of what is taken for granted in even the simplest physiological effort.  Likewise, as unprecedented as is the extent of control that Humankind currently exercises over the rest of Nature, it is hardly infinite, and, so, neither the continuation nor the increase of that control is inevitable, even if likely.  Now, while that suppression may be vital to efficiency of functioning, it is inappropriate in either a Psychological doctrine or a theory of History.  So, instead, given that uncertainty, every new active experiential moment is experimental, i. e. is an attempt at something, with the outcome not guaranteed, regardless of precedence.  In other words, even when all previous efforts have been successful, the fundamental repetition is not of the successful result, but of the underlying experiment.  Likewise, as Washington, Nietzsche, and Dewey appreciate better than does Hegel and Marx, History is essentially a product of such experiments.

Dialectical Materialism and Omnipotence

A necessary condition of pre-determination of a course of events is the omnipotence of the determining force, i. e. to which all antecedent factors must be subject.  Such omnipotence is a premise of Theological doctrines such as Calvinism, and, arguably, is implicit in Hegel's concept of History insofar as it entails eventuation of the return of Jesus Christ.  Likewise, the transition from Capitalism to Socialism is inevitable only if the scope of Dialectical Materialism is Universal, i. e. applies not only to economic arrangements, but to, for example, microorganisms, as well.  In other words, if microorganisms are not included in the sweep of Dialectical Materialism, a Capitalist society can be destroyed before it arrives at Socialism.  Whether or not Dialectical Materialism is an omnipotent deity in Marxism is not clear.

Necessity, Universality, Fate

Spinoza and Schopenhauer agree that the common concept of 'individual' is erroneous, but for subtly different reasons.  For the former, the error is intellectual, i. e. a mistaking a part for a whole, while for the latter, it is Ontological, i. e. mistaking an illusion for a reality.  But, regardless of that difference, in each case, the Individual is conceived as subject to a 'necessity', i. e. to the inescapability of the operation of some Universal.  Now, this 'necessity' is distinct from another, often characterized as 'fate', i. e. as inevitable outcome, and, yet, with which it is sometimes entwined, if not conflated, e. g. in Birth of Tragedy.  However, that one might act spontaneously, shows that an outcome can be not predetermined, even if, in the process, one is still functioning as a member of the species.  In other words, independence from given circumstances is distinguishable from independence from some Universal.  Now, while Nietzsche's study is not compromised by inattention to that distinction, Marx' concept of History arguably is--by conflating the 'necessity' of one's membership in a society, i. e. Class and Species, with 'necessity' of outcome, i. e. of Socialism from the weaknesses of Capitalism.

History, Dialectics, Totalization

Dialectical Reason is essential a principle of Totalization--the contradictions that are its motor are internal, and are expressions of insufficiency and partiality, e. g. Class Conflict.  On its basis, therefore, History is a process of Totalization.  However, any such concept of History ignores and fails to accommodate evidence of alternative processes, e. g. population growth expresses Diversification, which, formally, is the inverse of Totalization.  Furthermore, while subsequent to Marx himself, but at the disposal of his successors, are concepts of Humankind as exceeding Totalization, e. g. as preceding a higher evolutionary stage, or as becoming extra-terrestrial.  So, yoking Socialism to Dialectical Materialism arguably compromises the former, as History after Marx has tended to demonstrate.

Dialectical Materialism and Socialism

Marx derives Dialectical Materialism as follows.  First, according to Hegel, Mental processes necessarily tend towards Totalization, via a synthesis of opposites.  Second, Mind is Material.  Therefore, the internal dynamic of Matter is Dialectical.  So, applied to Society, the elimination of Classes is inevitable, with Socialism the result.  Now, the main weakness in the derivation is the dogmatic reduction of Mind to Matter, not only because the thesis is only one of several familiar varieties of their relation, but also because it accepts the traditional concepts of each.  Furthermore, evidence of Dialectical Materialism is lacking, e. g. the concept of sexual activity as a 'synthesis of opposites' is inadequate, since in combination with the resultant, the sequence better evinces a pattern of Diversification, rather than one of Totalization.  So, the imposition of Dialectical Materialism on History is not only questionable, but obscures the most compelling argument for Socialism--that it corrects the injustice in Capitalism that profit is stealing.

Progressive History, Experimental Reason, Teleology

Hume's concept of past conjunction, a-temporal as is, can be extended to constituents of  a diachronic development.  So, from the latter, a projection of a pattern into the future is also a continuation of it.  Now, such a projection can, further, involve a value judgment of it, as well as, an assessment of how to implement it.  Thus, for example, Globalization is a thesis that includes: 1. Observation of increasing Human integration and control over the planet; 2. A projection that continued increase will eventuate in the establishment of a Cosmopolis; 3. An evaluation of that consequence; and 4. A determination of a course of action based on that evaluation, e. g. whether or not to promote it.  Such a concept of History can be called 'Progressive', and, since nothing beyond #1 is certain, can be analyzed as entailing Experimental Reason. In contrast, according to orthodox Dialectical History, the transition from an observation of past events to eventual totalization is unitary and Necessary, i. e. is Teleological.  To date, the accuracy of Dialectical History is questionable.

Dialectical Necessity as Amphetamine for the Masses

Marx, of course, conceives History as human-made, but, apparently, not in the same way that they manufacture goods.  For the former, but not clearly the latter, is governed by Dialectical Necessity, according to his concept.  Thus, for example, given inclement conditions, someone could build shelter, possibly a log cabin, possibly a tent, with the success of the result uncertain, e. g. the edifice might leak.  Similarly, given an oppressive, unjust, decadent society, a rebellion might ensue, with uncertain consequences, e. g. France in the late 18th-century.  In contrast, according to the Marxist concept of History, transitions from Class Conflict, to Class Consciousness, to Revolution, to Socialism, are each expressions of Dialectical Necessity.  But, that the immanence of that pattern in the course of events distinguishes it from traditional mystification, e. g. from the unfolding of a divine plan, does not suffice to prove that it is essential to the establishment of Socialism.  Accordingly, his thesis of Dialectical Necessity seems to function for him as an amphetamine for the masses.

Making History

Hume's analysis of Causality exposes the latter's traditionally entailed concept of 'Necessity' as habitual expectation.  But, within his own doctrine, while a sense-datum, e. g. a color, might be passively experienced, as his term 'Impression' subtly connotes, neither Habit nor Expectation merely befalls one.  So, perhaps unwittingly, he exposes the error in the traditional implication that Causality is merely a passively observed happening.  Now, Determinist theories of History also entail Necessity.  Thus, from Hume can be derived the challenge to those theories--that History does not happen, but is made.  Furthermore, absent Necessity, the outcome of such making is not guaranteed in advance.

Expectation, Empiricism, Habit

According to Hume, the pivotal component of his concept of Causality--the expectation that the Future will resemble the Past--is a 'habit'.  Now, the ostensible function for him of that derivation is to counter the Rationalist premise that the source of Causal judgments is Reason.  However, he seems unaware that it also suggests a fundamental shortcoming in his methodology.  For, according to his Empiricism, all non-Analytical Knowledge originates in Sense Impressions.  Now, a Sense Impression occurs in the Present.  But, Expectation connotes the Future.  Thus, Expectation cannot be explained by a Sense Impression alone.  Now, Habit is a species of Practice, independent of any mode of Cognition.  Thus, if 'Expectation' is meaningful in Hume's formulation, it can only be as derived from the Practical dimension of Experience, not, as his Empiricism entails, from the Cognitive one.

History and the Future

As has been previously discussed, the 'American exception' to Marxist analysis constitutes a counter-example to the theory of History entailed in the latter.  Now, underlying that disproof is a simple premise that has been typically obscured in even the most prominent of its articulations.  For, the standard representation of Hume's concept of Causality--"'A causes B' = 'A and B' are perceived as constantly conjoined'"-glosses over its precise formulation--"'A causes B' = 'A and B have in the past been perceived as constantly conjoined, and the constant conjunction is expected to continue in the future'".  In turn, presupposed by the weaker 'expectation' is the stronger premise that the future is inherently uncertain.  So, at the heart of Marxism is not merely a denial of that premise, but an evasion of it shared by even non-Marxist Philosophies.

Cosmopolis and War

In a Cosmopolis, intra-species war will likely be a thing of the past, but not necessarily because humans have become perpetually peaceable.  Rather, since the group identifications, e. g. national, religious, that have usually determined the pre-conditions of hostilities, may become as quaint as a war between cities has become.  But, more important, any Cosmopolitical conflict will be internal, and, hence, a jurisprudential problem, either civil or criminal, as is foreshadowed by the concept of International Law, and by tribunals such as those at Nuremberg.  Thus, for example, the classification of the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks as 'criminals', rather than as 'enemies', expresses a Cosmopolitical orientation, rather than a Nationalistic one.

Individual and Cosmocitizen

As is clear in Logic, 'Individual' is a Quantifier, and, hence, grammatically, it is a modifier that presupposes a type that it quantifies.  Accordingly, any concept of 'the individual' qua independent of any collective category is fictional.  So, for example, the concept of an inherent antithesis between Individual Right and General Good is inadequate insofar as it abstracts from an Individual's membership in some other Genus.  Now, Hume and Kant each implicitly expresses recognition of such superficiality.  The former's concept of Self, usually overshadowed by his image of 'bundle', is based on identification with some more or less localized collective with whom one sympathizes, while for the latter, the only constitutive concept of the 'I' is an instantiation of the Universal 'Practical Rational Being'.  Accordingly, a primary challenge to the cultivation of Cosmocitizenship, which, as has been previously discussed, is a significant dimension of ongoing Globalization, is not to reconcile 'the individual' with an incipient world order--it is to loosen entrenched identification with less comprehensive groups, e. g. Race, Nation, Religion, etc.  To that end, for example, stoking nationalistic fervor is counter-productive, and is inconsistent with Pluralistic foreign policy.

Cosmopolitics and Political Philosophy of the Future

While in current parlance, 'cosmopolitan' usually connotes 'worldly', suggesting a local familiarity with culture elsewhere, for Kant, it has more in common with the image of a 'global village', i. e. with the concept of a world-wide social organization.  Accordingly, as Globalization continues, the principles of Cosmopolitics as a Political Philosophy of the Future are beginning to more concretely emerge.  Thus, for example, the ruling body is likely to resemble a United Nations with universal jurisdictional powers, a primary aim of which is the overcoming of decades, centuries, and even millennia of divisions. A significant dimension of such a goal is likely to be the cultivation of Cosmocitizens, via Geopolitical programs, in which even Nietzsche's projection of experimental Miscegenation, not to breed a 'superior race', but to neutralize chronic racial and ethnic hate, might find a place.

American Exceptionalism, Counter-Example, Experiment

Put more strongly and more precisely, what Lovestone characterizes as the American 'exception' to traditional Marxist analysis amounts to a counter-example to the entailed concept of History, and, hence, a disproof of it.  Furthermore, in America's past is the potential basis for an alternative concept of History--Washington's description of it as an "experiment", which could apply to both the revolt against the British, and the choice of the new construction as a Democracy, rather than as a Monarchy.  Experimental Reason recognizes and incorporates what is suppressed in Dialectal Reason as inevitable--the uncertainty of any transition from one set of conditions to another.  But, Reactionary-ism is not exclusive to Marxism, as the continued American Capitalist insistence on the 'intentions of the Founding Fathers', that conveniently ignores their Experimentalism, demonstrates.

Ethics and Cosmopolitanism

While Aristotle conceives Ethics and Political Philosophy as complementary doctrines, in Medieval thought, the former has priority.  For, in that era, the former is conceived as governing the Soul, the latter as governing the Body, and the Soul as superior to the Body.  Now, that order of rank is not necessarily determined by explicit Theological premises, e. g. it is also a consequence of Kant's priority of Noumenon over Phenomenon.  But, Kant's system also entails another priority--Universal over Individual, which does not necessarily presuppose Soul-Body dualism.  Thus, in his writings on History, as well in the Moral writings of Hume and Hegel, a different, concrete contrast begins to emerge--that of Universal social organization to Particular ones.  On that basis, the Ethics-Politics distinction is that of Cosmopolitanism to Tribalism, Civicism, and Nationalism, as is, therefore, the traditional priority.  In other words, concrete Ethics and Cosmopolitanism are one and the same. 

Globalization and Transcendence

It is from the perspective of the species that Globalization is conceived as a process of Integration.  But, from the perspective of the parts of the species, e. g. nations, and their members, it is experienced as Transcendence.  For, to 'transcend', stripped of its usual Ontological or Theological exaggeration, is to surpass some given, and the transitions from Tribe to City to Nation to Cosmopolis each surpasses some status quo.  Now, the concept of Human Universality has been impelling these transitions for centuries, to greater and lesser degrees of abstraction.  So, what is distinctive about the most recent phases of History is that Globalization has been becoming more and more concrete, e. g. the Internet, the United Nations, rapidity of transportation, etc.

American Leadership

The concept of American Exceptionalism, most recently often used to validate military aggression in support of some Economic interests, is a short-sighted version of what can be called 'American Leadership'.  According to the latter, because of its original rootlessness, America is in a unique position to usher the rest of the world in the Globalization that has emerged as the primary theme of human History.  On that basis, its challenge is to promote the ideal both elsewhere and at home, e. g. to intervene in sectarian violence abroad, as well as to set an example by resolving domestic discord.  Plainly, in the fulfillment of that role, the U. S. is a work-in-progress, the rate of which is contingent on the scope of the visions of its own rulers.

American Exceptionalism

In contemporary parlance, 'American Exceptionalism' usually connotes a superiority that validates unilateral action.  Now, the concept originates with de Tocqueville, in reference to the nation's birth in revolution and its Democratic construction.  However, the popularity of the phrase itself can be traced to its use by the Marxist Lovestone, in the 1920s, to argue that America is immune to the doctrinaire Communist projection of an inevitable internal dissolution, thereby drawing the enmity of Stalinists.  Thus, implicit in the revival of the expression in the 1980s is that the more recent American distinctiveness is the result of the 'defeat' of the Soviet Union due to massive increases in Defense spending,  Hence, as subsequent Foreign policy has often been demonstrating, the phrase now represents shifts in the concept of America--from Liberation to Aggression, and from Democracy to Capitalism.

General Will and History

Rousseau's 'General Will' is often interpreted Atomistically, i. e. as an expression of a consensus of Individuals, analogous to a Hobbesian Sovereign.  Now, one under-appreciated alternative is suggested by the decidedly non-political Schopenhauer--that the General Will is fundamentally a species drive, independent of its members, which Kant, Hegel, and Marx gloss as 'Reason', of one variety or another.  On that basis, the Democratization that Rousseau inspires constitutes a moment in the development of the species, whether as part of a Will to Live, or even of a Will to Grow.  Accordingly, even if it is not codified until the works of his successors, the modern concept of a human History that is more than a mere narrative first emerges with Rousseau's General Will.

Trickle-Down Economics

"Trickle-down Economics", a term popularized by Will Rogers, and, subsequently, often used by commentators to characterize Capitalism, is rarely employed by theorists of the latter.  Nevertheless, it is applicable to a set of propositions often appearing in their theories, designed to explain the political benefit of Capitalism, i. e. how the wealth acquired by a few can reach the many.  Now, such an explanation is susceptible to two main types of challenge: first, that the success of the New Deal in America demonstrates that Capitalism is not the most effective means to a general Economic Good; and, second, that the wealth bestowed upon the many is, in fact, theirs, as the source of the labor that first created, to begin with, for which it is very inadequate as compensation.  So, lost in the contemporary usage of "Trickle-down Economics" is Rogers' sarcasm, the target of which, i. e. the ungrounded thesis that the wealth of individuals is therein extended to that of a nation, has rarely been conscientiously addressed by recent Capitalists.

The Purpose of Supply-Side Economics

Demand-side Economics can easily be conceived as a means to the provision of sustenance goods to all members of a society, and, hence, to the strength of the latter.  In contrast, the Good of Supply-side seems less concrete.  For, for example, its recent advocates tout it as an effective counter-measure to Inflation, which, while superficially seeming beneficial to somebody, is typically further justified only by its systematic relation to other abstract formulations.  Now, most of those advocates also both conceive Full Employment as promoting Inflation, and oppose Government subsidies of the needy.  Hence, whatever the purpose of Supply-side Economics might be, it is difficult to identify it with that of Demand-side Economics, and, so, the standard representation of the two as rivals to one and the same end is misleading, at minimum.

Supply-side and Demand-side

The strongest collectivity entails the maximum well-being of each of its members.  Hence, an 'Economy' is the organized effort to satisfy fundamental needs, e. g. food, shelter, etc.  So, since the production of goods in an Economy, as defined, is determined by physiological necessity, the system can be classified as 'Demand-side', which does not preclude competition as an effective means to that end.  On that basis, 'Supply-side' Economics, i. e. in which Supply determines Demand, pertains to an inessential sphere of social activity, regardless of how refined arguments promoting it are, e. g. the Lafler Curve.  Thus, Supply-side categories should not be conflated with Demand-side ones, e. g. subsuming someone seeking life-saving medicine under the same 'Consumer' rubric as someone shopping for a Rolls-Royce.  Such confusion, rampant in contemporary United States, and is a symptom of Political weakness. 

Revolution, History, Leadership

Comparisons of Rousseau and Marx usually focus on topics such as Equality and Property.  Less examined is the bearing of the former on the latter's concept of History.  Now, even though Rousseau does not explicitly incite rebellion, his writings unarguably inspire the French Revolution.  Hence, they are a part of the history of the latter.  Likewise, explicitly provocative, Marx' writings are part of the history of Communism.  But, even as moments of an individual's arrival at a collective consciousness, they still precede similar awakenings in his readers. In other words, within that revolutionary Egalitarian movement is a temporal ordering between writer and audience, i. e. between Leader and Followers, from which Marx' concept of History abstracts.

Invisible Hand and General Will

Some have proposed that as an organizing principle of a society, Smith's 'Invisible Hand' is influenced by an analogous concept introduced by another Hume ally--Rousseau's 'General Will'.  If so, then, while each may be trans-personal, it is Rousseau's idea that is better grounded in Humean methodology.  For, as has been previously discussed, even when stripped of its metaphorical features, Smith's image transgresses Empiricism, i. e. it presumes to express a 'law' that is inherent in social interaction.  In contrast, General Will can be derived from Universal Sympathy, which Hume accepts as a sense-datum.  So, a Smith-Rousseau comparison is perhaps disadvantageous to the former, highlighting the essential passivity entailed in his famous image.

Empiricism and the Invisible Hand

The Capitalist concept of an 'invisible hand of the market' violates Empiricist methodology in three ways.  First, Invisibility is precluded from a system in which the knowledge of any entity is rooted in sense experience.  Second, granting that the Smith's image mis-connotes the 'Law of Supply and Demand', it still abstracts from the Empiricist concept of a 'law' as no more than a past perceived regularity.  Finally, according to the methodology, perceived regularity is a product of an association of independent elements, a connection which, writ large, is actively effected, e. g. via a contract.  So, the intervention of Government in the determination of Market Value is more consistent with Empiricism than is passive submission to the vicissitudes of an impersonal 'law', even conceived as perceived regularity. 

Skepticism and Capitalism

Insofar as Smith is influenced by Hume, Wealth of Nations is open to interpretation as a writ large expression of Skepticism.  Now, while the latter is often presented as a self-subsistent Epistemological theory, its internal incoherence, i. e. it is destabilized by its entailed Skepticism of Skepticism, is an indication of a transitional phase.  Thus, for example, for Kant, it offers a transition from Dogmatic Rationalism to Critical Rationalism, while, more radically, for Pragmatists, it constitutes part of a maturation from Knowledge qua given, to Knowledge qua artefactual, e. g. the results of experimentation.  Likewise, absent the recourse to the groundless 'invisible hand' premise, Smith's invention effects no more than a dissolution of Feudal society, with a concrete still alternative lacking.  For Marx, Socialism is that alternative, but his interpretation of Capitalism as the pivotal negative moment en route to it is complicated, if not compromised, by Dialecticism, through which he is convinced of the inevitability of that outcome.  In any case, the corrosive influence on American society of Capitalists such as Libertarians and the Tea Party can be interpreted as skepticism writ large.