Saturday, June 30, 2012

A Copernican Revision

As modern Astronomy has established, the familiar phenomenon of the daily east-to-west transit of the Sun across the sky is actually caused by the rotation of the Earth on its axis, with respect to which the Sun is immobile.  It is this re-attribution of motion, i. e. from the Sun to the Earth, that is the methodological innovation that Kant ascribes to Copernicus.  In other words, contrary to what has been asserted here previously, and elsewhere, Kant's 'Copernican revolution' is independent of Copernicus' Heliocentrism, i. e. which pertains to annual, not daily cycles.  Thus, Kant's interest in the Geocentricism of the Earth spinning on its axis is not tantamount to a 'counter-Copernican revolution', as has been previously argued here.  In other words, his 'revolution' pertains to a motion-rest relation, not to a center-orbit one.

Friday, June 29, 2012

Mind, Theater, Cave

Perhaps the most formidable challenge to Hume's metaphor of Mind as a theater consisting in no more than a sequence of images, is implicit in its best-known predecessor--Plato's 'Cave'.  In order to counter that challenge, Hume needs to explain how the sequence of events presented in the Republic, including the cave itself, is itself no more than part of an internal mental drama, i. e. how that sequence is not derivative.   Analogously, he needs to explain how his own 'theater' is part of the scenes that transpire within a theater.  Hence, entailed in his metaphor is either an infinite regress of theaters, or else an existence outside the theater, which would seem to contradict the fundamental premise of his theory of Mind.

Thursday, June 28, 2012

Mind as Operating Theater

Hume, like Locke before him, believes that Experience is constituted by irreducible fundamental elements, a view implicitly opposed to Leibniz' thesis that such elements can themselves be comprised of subliminal 'petites' perceptions.  A recent descendant of Hume's Atomism is Analytic Philosophy, which, while asserting that the isolation of such elements is the sole effective means of resolving philosophical problems, seems to remain oblivious to the tendentiousness of such an assertion.  Probably the most distinctive feature of this variation of Atomism is its focus on language, with words as its fundaments.  So, with its attention to linguistic surgery, the variety of 'theater' that is an image of the Analytic Philosophy concept of Mind, is that of medical operation, rather than of drama audience, as it is for Hume.

Wednesday, June 27, 2012

Mind as Laboratory

One alternative to Hume's image of Mind as a theater is that of a laboratory.  The latter is implicit in Dewey's Experimentalism, and is explicit in the use of 'thought experiments' in contemporary Philosophy.  But, more important, everyday experience is frequently constituted by episodes occurring in a mental laboratory.  These transpire whenever one entertains possible courses of action, from casual, e. g. fantasizing, to rigorous, e. g. careful deliberation.  In the process, one is trying something out, to see how it might feel or whether it is feasible.  So, one clear distinction between the image of Mind as a laboratory, and that of a theater, is that in the former, it is active, while in the latter, passive.

Tuesday, June 26, 2012

The Performing Mind

It seems difficult to deny that at least one of the functions of Mind is the observation of phenomena, though the genesis and analysis of that process is open to wide debate.  So, what, more precisely, is problematic about Hume's image of Mind as a theater spectator is that it is one-sided, i. e. that it neglects the possibility of Mind as itself an appearing performer.  Hegel explores that possibility, when he proposes that Mind, in one of its phases, objectifies itself by appearing to itself, though, ultimately, Mind is a spectator in his system. In contrast, the concept of Mind as an appearing performer has been previously developed here, as the independent principle 'Will', a process also variously characterized as 'Motility', 'Externalization', etc.  On the basis of that model, any of these can be classified as a 'mental' act--writing, Socratic defense, educating, and legislating--each a performance that can also become the object of a further, distinct, mental act, i. e. observation.  Thus, Sloterdijk's study of Nietzsche, 'Thinker on Stage', can be understood as an implicit application of that model.

Monday, June 25, 2012

Philosopher as Performer

Nietzsche early conceives 'Socrates' as a detached spectator of Greek tragedy.  Thus, part of his subsequent anti-Platonist project is to re-cast the Philosopher as a performer--variously, e. g. as a tragic hero, an educator, or as a legislator.  However, as attempts to overturn Platonism, these alternatives are uncharacteristically misdirected.  For, Socrates, is, arguably, a tragic hero in the Apology, and a legislator in the Republic, while his Academy showcases Plato as an educator.  So, a more appropriate target of Nietzsche's heterodox project might be any advocate of 'Philosophy' as grounded in passive detachment, e. g. Hume, with his image of Mind as a theater spectator.

Sunday, June 24, 2012

Philosopher, Spectator, Writer

Hume's image of Mind as a theater spectator is only a minor variation on Descartes' of it as an armchair observer.  It, thus, likewise, self-evidently falsifies Mind in the same manner that the latter does.  For, the immediate experience, of which each account is purportedly a faithful rendering, is not a passive private entertainment of some phenomena, but a social act of writing, i. e. what is immediately occurring when Descartes is describing the fire in front of him is that he is writing a book for others to read.  So, if either of these influential thinkers had recognized their functioning fundamentally as performers, it might not have been necessary later for Marx and Nietzsche to exhort philosophers to, if not change the world, at least legislate it.

Saturday, June 23, 2012

Appearance and Appearing

When Hume likens the Mind to a 'theater', it is, more precisely, as a member of the audience.  Thus, when Kant, somewhat belatedly in his career, discusses the processes of 'appearing to oneself', and 'affecting oneself', the image of a 'theater' is Shakespearean, not Humean, i. e. in which one is a performer.  Hence, a sharp distinction can be drawn between passive 'Appearance', and active 'Appearing'.  That distinction is implicit in Spinoza's Active-Passive contrast, and the interaction of Appearing and Appearance informs, notably, Hegel's concept of Self-Recognition, which profoundly influences Marx.  But, aside from Nietzsche's appreciation of the significance of the Appearing, most of post-Kantian philosophy reverts, like Hegel, to the one-sided effort of equating Wisdom with spectating.

Friday, June 22, 2012

Microcosmos, Macrocosmos, Self

In establishing Certainty as the criterion of Knowledge, Descartes implicitly recognizes that only subject-object unity can satisfy that condition, and that Selfhood is essentially an Epistemological relation.  Thus, the decisive anti-Cartesian thesis is Kant's proposition that one can know oneself only as one appears to oneself, not as one is in oneself, because it rejects the possibility of subject-object coincidence in even the most intimate Epistemological case.  Nevertheless, not to be deterred, various successors continue to conceive the subject-object abyss as at least, in principle, surmountable--via e. g. Hegelian Dialectic, Pragmatist probabilistic approximation, Bergsonian Intuition, etc.  However, the microcosmos-macrocosmos model of Experience, that has been presented here, shows that such neo-Cartesian ambition is not merely futile, but misguided.  For, on that model, Selfhood is essentially not an Epistemological relation, but consists in a coordination of two heterogeneous dimensions--the subject of perception and the agent of motility.  Hence, any correspondence between them is a practical problem of experiential coordination, not an ideal given or discoverable Epistemological condition.

Thursday, June 21, 2012

Macrocosmic Stimulation, Microcosmic Simulation

Just as the telescope has helped refute the commonsense thesis that the Sun revolves around the Earth, the microscope has helped refute the commonsense thesis that the macrocosmos, i. e. the environment that encompasses one, is immediately perceived.  For, as neurological science reveals, the initial impulse of a neural path occurs prior to perception, and as optical science shows, impulses are transformed in the interval.  In other words, microcosmic simulation occurs after macrocosmic stimulation.  So, even without taking into account how the antecedent condition of a specific neural path, or eyes, further influences the processing of the stimulus, microscopic analysis helps demonstrate that the two events are not identical, contrary to the commonsense thesis.

Wednesday, June 20, 2012

Macrocosmos and Action

By distinguishing the perceptual world from an 'in-itself', Kant prompts some of his successors to conceive the latter as a mysterious realm penetrable only by some supernatural mode of cognition.  But, ordinary experience offers a better guide to the nature of what lies beyond perception.  For, the most intimate of objects of perception is one's own body, and it is plain that one's own body is a representation of oneself qua motile agent.  Thus, Kant's description of the in-itself as a world of 'freedom', and Schopenhauer's, as 'volitional', accurately formulate what can be easily inferred from ordinary experience.  Likewise, a macrocosmos of experience is primarily an arena of action that encompasses an agent, a world that is represented in a corresponding microcosmos that includes the objectified body of the agent.

Tuesday, June 19, 2012

Microcosmos and Temporality

In the Cartesian tradition, perception is conceived as fundamentally a private event, usually subject to subsequent epistemological study, by Rationalists and Empiricists, alike.  One exception is Spinoza, for whom the significance of perception is primarily conative, e. g. as a stimulus, that constitutes a modification of the subject of perception.  Now, for Kant, such a process of modification suggests a temporalization of experience, i. e. as consisting in a 'before' and an 'after', while for Pragmatism, as well as for Bergson, the conative character of perception suggests that the perceptual world is primarily a field of action.  So, in the Phenomenological Ontology of, notably, Heidegger and Sartre, in which these developments converge, the psychological microcosmos, i. e. the perceptual world, is the immediate past of a subject.

Monday, June 18, 2012

Microcosmos--Psychological and Physical

Insofar as the perceptual world is encompassed by consciousness, it can be characterized as a 'psychological microcosmos', following the use of 'psychological' by Plato and Aristotle.  Furthermore, insofar as a physical object is an object of perception--e. g. the human body, the Sun, without or without the aid of a telescope, minute particles, without or without the aid of a microscope--the physical sciences are all part of a psychological microcosmos, a central thesis of Kantianism that is neglected by even the contemporary Nobel Physicist Weinberg, in his attempt to defend his field against Kant's critique of it.  Thus, the standard physical microcosmos, e. g. sub-atomic and sub-nuclear particles, strings, etc., is derived from a more fundamental psychological microcosmos, on this model of Consciousness.

Sunday, June 17, 2012

Microcosmos, Macrocosmos, Counter-Copernican Revolution

Copernicus' Heliocentrism entails that the Earth, and, hence, the humans that inhabit it, revolve around the Sun.  Thus, Kant's 'Copernican revolution', which results in the location of the human subject at the center of its universe, seems, in at least one respect, better characterized as a 'counter-Copernican revolution', i. e. because it undoes the Heliocentric displacement of humans from its Ptolemaic focal point.  Now, as Kant shows, the human subject inhabits two realms, which he variously characterizes as 'phenomena'-'noumena', 'nature'-'freedom', etc.  Here, as has been previously proposed, following Lebiniz' model of a Monad, that pair is also conceivable as 'microcosmos'-'macrocosmos'.  On that basis, Kant's 'Copernican revolution' actually consists in a deconstruction--a 'critique', in the most literal sense of the term--of the conflation of the two realms that is usually accepted as ordinary experience.

Saturday, June 16, 2012

Microcosmos, Macrocosmos, Experience

Since Plato's 'writ small'-'writ large' contrast, many philosophers have recognized that both a world is within a subject, and a subject is within a world.  This contrast has been variously characterized as 'subjective'-'objective', 'appearance'-'reality', 'ontological'-'ontic', etc., with, in at least most cases, one or the other of the pair accorded priority.  Now, as has been previously proposed here, another characterization of the contrast is 'microcosmos'-'macrocosmos', in which neither is a privileged dimension of human experience.  Accordingly, on this model, experience is constituted by the coordination of the realms, not by a reduction of either to the other.

Friday, June 15, 2012

Monad, Microcosmos. Macrocosmos

Leibniz' model of a 'Monad'--on opaque entity reflecting its environing universe--thus conceives it in a dependent microscosmic-macrocosmic relation with the latter.  In contrast, in probably the best-known alternative microcosmos-macrocosmos relation--Plato's 'wirt small'-'writ-large'--the two realms are merely isomorphic, with neither prior to the other, as is also the case when they are inversely related, or are not related at all.  One advantage that these alternatives have over Leibniz' concept is that they doe not share with it the burden, apparently undischarged, of explaining how a microcosmos can be opaque with respect to a macrocosmos, and, yet, exist as dependent on it, i. e. it suffices for them to posit the two realms as heterogeneous with respect to one another.  At minimum, merely as conceivable alternatives, they expose the arbitrariness of Leibniz' privileging of the macrocosmos, a priority that precludes the possibility of an independent genesis of the microcosmos, e. g. an ascent from the infinitely small, from which a Monad first emerges.

Thursday, June 14, 2012

Monad and Microcosmos

Leibniz' distinction between petites and conscious perception implies the existence of a threshold, one which Deleuze attempts to explain in terms of an application of one of Leibniz' other main innovations, i. e. as a differential.  However, the distinction between unclear and clear in the use of a microscope is one of degree, i. e. degree of magnification, not of kind.  So, if there is any actual threshold in perception, on Leibniz' model, it is the subject of perception itself, i. e. petites and conscious perceptions are all equally 'in' the Monad, or as Jaspers terms it, are encompassed by the Monad.  Now, what is in the Monad is, according to Leibniz, nothing but a reflection of the entire environing universe.  Thus, the Monad can be conceived as constituted by a microcosmos of progressively, and indefinitely, smaller events, including petites and conscious perceptions, alike.

Wednesday, June 13, 2012

Petite Perceptions

Of Leibniz' many innovations, one that does not necessarily promote Rationalism is his recognition of what is sometimes called 'petite perceptions'--subliminal elements of experience, precursors of the 'subconscious'  By venturing into hidden dimensions of awareness, he contributes to the undermining of traditional Psychological Atomism, just as the invention of the microscope reveals the existence of a potentially infinitely divisible microcosmic realm.  The 'soul' is, thus, no longer a simple given, but, as Hume and Kant assert, may be a molecular 'bundle' or 'synthesis', respectively.  Or, it may even be only a fragile fiction, often unequal to its underlying unstable infinite manifold, as Nietzsche and Freud propose.

Tuesday, June 12, 2012

Sublime and Subliminal

Though virtually identical in appearance, 'sublime' and 'subliminal' have almost diametrically opposed meanings--'exalted' vs. 'below a threshold'.  Now, as deriving from 'sub' and 'limit', the latter seems etymologically correct.  In contrast, as Kant's uncontroversial characterization of the former--'exceeding the capacity of the imagination'--suggests, 'super-lime' would be more accurate.  Furthermore, standard use of 'sublime' precedes Kant's, not only in English, e. g. Burke's, but in the original Latin itself.  So, regardless of the context--casual, rigorous, Latin, German, English, ancient, modern--that use seems completely, and inexplicably, at odds with its literal meaning.

Monday, June 11, 2012

Conscientiousness and Science

If 'God is in the details', it is only, according to traditional theology, because of his omnipresence, not because of anything divine about detail per se.  In contrast, interest in detail qua detail, facilitated by the microscope, has been remarkably fruitful for Science, as advances in Chemistry, Subatomic Physics, and digital technology continue to prove.  So, Conscientiousness--attention to, and respect for, detail--is perhaps epitomized by the ongoing discovery of progressively, and indefinitely, smaller particles and their interactions, an enterprise which expresses it as a Piety specific to scientific research.

Sunday, June 10, 2012

Conscientiousness and Sublimity

One main distinction conventionally drawn between Conscience and Conscientiousness is that in the former, but not in the latter, content is decisive.  That is, Conscience is a call to perform a specific action, whereas, Conscientiousness is a call to thoroughness, independent of which action is called for.  Thus, the latter more clearly exemplifies 'duty for duty's sake' than does the former, a mundane exemplification that seems to defy Kant's exaltation of Duty as "sublime".  However, any such defiance is constrained by his, and the common, definition of 'sublime' as "absolutely large", which neglects Kant's own attribution of infinitude to smallness, as well.  Accordingly, it is 'attention to detail' that constitutes the Piety that is specific to Conscientiousness, and, so, a detail can be the decisive content in a 'conscientious' performance.

Saturday, June 9, 2012

Conscience, Conscientious, Totality

Despite their divergent ordinary usages, the equivalence of 'conscience' and 'conscientious' is exhibited in the expression 'conscientious objector'.  Furthermore, Kant shows 'conscience' as consisting in a totalizing process, in which distinct subjects are revealed as equal before a universal law.  Likewise, 'conscientious' is usually taken as synonymous with 'thorough', which connotes 'totality', i. e. all the details involved in some activity.  Thus, despite their denotative differences, 'conscience' and 'conscientious' are structurally essentially equivalent.

Friday, June 8, 2012

Practical Piety and Conscientiousness

Though etymologically similar, 'conscience' and 'conscientious' are rarely taken as interchangeable.  The former usually connotes a motivation, often interpreted as supernatural, to pursue one course of action, in opposition to another.  In contrast, the latter means, while also a motivation, one directed to a manner of conducting oneself.  Now, though 'conscientious' might generally not entail an origin that is supernatural, it can still involve respect for its object, as is often exhibited in skilled activity.  Thus, as more specific to Praxis than is Conscience, Conscientiousness is perhaps an even better example of Practical Piety 

Thursday, June 7, 2012

Practical Piety and Conscience

Piety is problematic for Pragmatism, for, as traditionally conceived as a private attitude, it is independent of Action, and, hence, is a phenomenon that the doctrine does not recognize.  Attempts to extrinsically attach Piety to Action--as a qualifier of the latter, e. g. Dewey's project, or as expressible by, or as inferable from it, do not resolve the fundamental antithesis.  In contrast, Conscience is intrinsically related to Action, and, of course, has religious connotations, thought Kant, Nietzsche, and Heidegger have concepts of it that are independent of traditional theology.  So, if Dewey had sought to establish a concept of practical Piety, rather than one of naturalistic Piety, he might have arrived at one, such as Conscience, that is more proper to Pragmatism.

Wednesday, June 6, 2012

Piety and Idolatry

By arguing that Piety can be natural as well as supernatural, Dewey, perhaps inadvertently, illuminates its fundamentally subjective character.  For, what he shows is that that an object is revered suffices to elevate it, regardless of its ontological status.  Thus, Piety is indistinguishable from Idolatry, i. e. devotion to a supernatural deity is structurally no different than awe of Nature, celebrity worship, and unconditional obedience to an institution.  Conversely, the existence of a supernatural deity does not necessarily suffice to command reverence for it, for, e. g. it might provoke defiance.  So, even Dewey's heterodox treatment of Piety suggests that perhaps the most common object of Piety is Piety itself.

Tuesday, June 5, 2012

Piety: Active and Passive

While drawing a distinction between supernatural and natural piety, Dewey characterizes each as voluntary "passive" behavior, i. e. as self-motivated, self-modifying adjustment to given conditions, with a supernatural deity presumed to exist in the former variety.  Now, also among the pre-conditions of any experience are one's prior experiences.  Hence, any voluntary self-modification is fundamentally an active adaptation of a least some given conditions, independent of any subsequent adjustment to other given conditions.  Furthermore, as Spinoza shows, self-modification can be conceived as an instance of divine creativity.  Thus, Dewey overlooks the possibility of 'active' piety, as well as the consideration that because Praxis, is, in itself, an active process, any piety entailed by Pragmatism is fundamentally active, not passive.  So, Dewey's advocacy of passive natural piety suggests an abandonment of Pragmatism, in favor of  behavior that he himself recognizes as a promoted by traditional Theology.

Monday, June 4, 2012

Piety and Pragmatism

Dewey presents his study of 'religiosity' without explicitly attending to a significant methodological problem.  According to his Pragmatism, the meaning of any proposition is operational.  But, Piety, traditionally, at least, is a kind of attitude, and, hence, is, as such, meaningless for a Pragmatist such as Dewey.  Thus, to derive, as he does, 'religious' from given instances of 'religion', is question-begging for that orientation.  On the other hand, on the basis of his subsequent exposition of that representation, his operational definition of 'piety' seems to amount to 'continuous promotion of agrarian communal goals'.  However, such a definition is the product, not of a generalization of observed practices, but, of an a priori deduction from the wholistic characteristics that he attributes to the attitude governing 'religious' experience, a procedure which seems contrary to Pragmatist principles.

Sunday, June 3, 2012

Ecology and Piety

Dewey's concept of 'religiosity' can be understood as 'ecological piety'--an entity's awareness of itself as inherently implicated in a system of Nature.  It, thus, challenges traditional 'piety', which is conceived as consisting in a supernatural relation between Soul and God, plus, it stands as a critique of the profiteering exploitation, theologically sanctioned, or not, of Nature.  However, his Functionalism hampers Dewey from attributing piety to the intra-natural process of the self-cultivation of an entity, which seems difficult to interpret as an instance of adjustment to, or of, and environment.  In contrast, Spinoza's concept of ecological piety, as consisting in the awareness of an entity as an instance of natural creativity, does accommodate such a process.  Now, while, for the most part, Dewey seems to treat Spinozist Modality as an abstraction from a Functionalist context, his own concept of purposeless Artistry, of which self-cultivation can be conceived as a special case, eludes Functionalist interpretation, thereby implying that Spinoza's concept of ecological piety is the more fundamental one.

Saturday, June 2, 2012

Religion and Ecology

Dewey's Functionalist treatments of Religion reveal that the Science that is the primary rival of the latter is neither Physics nor Astronomy, but Ecology.  For, according to those treatments, Religion is a means of adjustment of an entity to an environment, e. g. praying for rain, or expressing thanks for a bountiful harvest.  But, the study of organism-environment interaction is Ecology, which, therefore, defines the context of the application of all scientific knowledge, including Physics and Astronomy.  Its challenge to Religion is perhaps most clearly expressed when the latter presumes to bypass it, with the positing of the existence of an entity that transcends it, i. e. the 'Soul'.  Accordingly, the doctrine that accepts no such premise, Pantheism, is the convergence of Religion and Ecology, i. e. further evidence of Spinoza's far-sightedness, which neither Dewey, nor most contemporary 'environmentalists', seems to appreciate.

Friday, June 1, 2012

Religion and Play

Nietzsche's occasional entertaining of an image of a dice-throwing deity is not an advocacy of the Probabilism of Pascal, Mill, Peirce, and Dewey.  Rather, it is an attempt to advance the notion of the divinity of Play, in a culture dominated by a God of punishment and/or forgiveness., i. e. a God conceived sub specie gravitas.  The extent and depth of that 'spirit of gravity', as Nietzsche sometimes characterizes it, is also expressed by the groundless vehemence of Einstein's insistence that 'God does not play dice with the universe'.  Scientific Probability is, thus, no different than the Necessity that Einstein cherishes in one respect--they both suppress the playfulness of Chance, i. e. what Nietzsche appreciates, thereby allying themselves with the Religion to which they are often opposed.