Thursday, July 31, 2014

Government, Size, Proportion

The substantive, and codified, 'Small Government' vs. 'Big Government' contrast in the United States is not the economic one, but that of State vs. Federal.  Furthermore, as the struggle over the suppression of voting rights in Mississippi in the 1960s shows, Big Government can be accused of 'under-reach' rather than of 'overreach', thereby indicating that the more fundamental problem is not that of 'size', but of proportion.  Now, two of the decisive factors in the determination of Proportion in Government are geographical scope and technology, e. g. communication and transportation.  Thus, for example, while Athens is geographically smaller than the United States, surveillance capacities can facilitate more comprehensive governance in the latter.  Plus, evidence of the degree of centralization required in a near future Global entity is still lacking.  But, in any case, determinable in principle is that optimum Proportion in Political Philosophy is a function of effectiveness in promoting the strength of a Polity.

Wednesday, July 30, 2014

Small Government vs. Big Government

When not mere provocative rhetoric, the contemporary 'Small Government vs. Big Government' debate tends to suppress at least two significant premises.  One is that the context of the contention is a Government-Citizen contract, in which it is reducible to a negative services vs. positive services contrast, as has been previously discussed, the resolution of which seems under-determined by the United States Constitution.  The other is that a state-of-affairs determined by either a deity or market forces is better than that organized by human legislation.  But, typically lacking in the latter premise is both a definition of 'better', and, consequently, the presentation of a methodical procedure by which alternatives can be evaluated.  So, until both premises are rigorously addressed, the debate remains mere provocative rhetoric. 

Tuesday, July 29, 2014

Democracy, Contract, Government Size

Hobbes' pioneering insight is that the distinctive characteristic of Democracy is the consent of the ruled to be ruled, hitherto lacking in e. g. conquering or inherited regimes.  Grounding that consent, either implicitly or explicitly, is a contractual arrangement between ruler and ruled, in which the latter receive something in return.  So, one of the prominent debates in the subsequent tradition--'small government' vs. 'big government'--can be understood in the context of such a contract--negative service, e. g. enforcement of non-interference, vs. positive service , e. g. provision of subsistence.  However, both sides of that debate are typically presented dogmatically, i. e. as if each were an intrinsic good.  Both thus fail to address the underlying criterion--effectiveness in promoting the strength of a collective.

Monday, July 28, 2014

Democracy and Equality

A Democracy is egalitarian only insofar as every vote in an election is of equal value, and each voter agrees to accept the outcome of the process.  Otherwise, except in the case of unanimity rules, the result of an election reverts to an inequality between a majority and a minority.  Likewise, while a law applies equally to all, insofar as it formulates the interests of majority-elected legislators, it is a product of inegalitarian processes.  Thus, perhaps the least equivocal expression of Egalitarianism in the United States Constitution is the Bill of Rights, insofar as they are conceived as protecting any individual from majority abuse, not insofar as they are interpreted either as promoting the electoral interests of non-individuals, or as protecting an individual from other individuals, as is prevalently the case these days.

Sunday, July 27, 2014

Strength, Education, Affirmative Action

Since intellectual ones are among the powers of an Individual, the Education policy of the strongest society will involve all its members.  Accordingly, both sides of the contentious 'Affirmative Action' debate tend to accept the same unexamined premise.  For, at the highest-minded heart of the debate is whether or not an Inegalitarian solution to an Inegalitarian problem is itself just.  However, both sides, especially the con side of that proposition, tend to presuppose that Competition is the best Education principle.  Hence, each is vulnerable to the challenge that a policy that promotes the strengths of only half of its members is weaker than one that promotes the strengths of all.  In other words, the original Injustice is disadvantageous to not only those who are victimized, but to the society as a whole, a perspective that must inform the best solution.

Saturday, July 26, 2014

Equality of Opportunity and Equality of Outcome

Some American politicians distinguish between 'equality of opportunity' and 'equality of outcome'.  Now, that acomparison is derived from, and abstracts from, Smith's thesis that a Nation is stronger if outcomes are determined by an 'Invisible Hand' than by some entrenched Feudal arrangements.  The abstraction thus facilitates the avoidance of further comparisons, e. g. one according to which a system that implicitly neglects 50 per cent of its participants is weaker than one in which the strengthening of all is a fundamental goal.

Friday, July 25, 2014

Egalitarianism vs. Inegalitarianism

As has been previously discussed, the fundamental principle of Political Philosophy must be that a collective is better organized than not, i. e. because otherwise there is no reason for such a project.  Now, that principle can be more precisely expressed as : A collective is stronger organized than not.  Accordingly, a standard debate in Political Philosophy--Egalitarianism vs. Inegalitarianism--remains undecided, and is, perhaps, irresolvable. For, it follows from the principle that the best system is one in which the strength of each member is maximized.  So, the further derivation of either Egalitarianism or Inegalitarianism requires a necessary formulation of the relation of the maximum strengths of each member, a formulation for which some contingent thesis is inadequate.  But, hitherto, the prominent propositions on the topic that have been presented by both sides, e. g. Spinoza's and Rousseau's vs. Plato's and Nietzsche's, have all been contingent, whether statements of actuality, or of potentiality.  As a result, in an understandable eagerness to resolve the debate, each side has tended to settle for oversimplification that loses sight of the preliminary problem, which is the maximization of the strength of each member of a collective.

Thursday, July 24, 2014

Poltical Philosophy, Organization, Human Mutability

A Political Philosophy tends to propose a best system, typically presupposing some fixed, perhaps a priori, characteristic of Humanity.  However, the ample evidence is of conditions that have been varying over the centuries, not only insofar as the fundamental unit of organization has grown from City to Nation, and, perhaps, to Global Community, but also insofar as, especially more recently, technological advances have drastically altered the capacity for communication that is a factor in such organization.  Furthermore, not only do conditions vary, but if Marxism and Darwinism, for example, are correct, such variation is indicative of an inherent mutability of Humanity itself.  So, beyond the fundamental principle of Political Philosophy--that collective organization is better than its lack--further specification seems contingent.

Wednesday, July 23, 2014

Communication, Organization, Political Philosophy

One factor in social organization is communication, so developments in the latter can correlate with those in the former.  For example, most notably, it is likely no coincidence, that the ascendance of Democracy in Modern Political Philosophy is approximately contemporaneous with the decentralization of Medieval Knowledge repositories effected by the invention of the printing press.  The twentieth-century is characterized by the emergence of electric media, with radio benefiting FDR and Churchill, and TV serving the photogenic JFK and Reagan well, while the skyrocketing costs of advertising in them has impacted electoral processes.  Currently, human society is just entering the Digital Age, the implications of which are only beginning to appear.  Global decentralization, i. e. the Internet, is the most immediate development, facilitated by the actualization of one of Leibniz' visions, though possibility not as he anticipated--a universal language, i. e. the binary system underlying digitization.  Now, while decentralization correlates with Democracy, it is also proving to be a breeding ground of Plutocracy, as is evidenced by the efficiency of instantaneous international market processes, via the quasi-universal language compromised by Arabic numerals and various alphabetic abbreviations, enabled by the general digitization of wealth.  So, while the rise of Digital communication continues the Democratization of the past several centuries, it has not left Feudal Oligarchism completely behind.

Tuesday, July 22, 2014

Strength, Numbers, Organization

Strength is not 'in numbers', it is in numbers organized.  One of the virtues of Democracy is that it potentially maximizes the total strength of its members, but, as may have troubled Nietzsche, it tends to lack the infra-structure that can best harness the plural powers.  Thus, part of the appeal of military action is that it supplies order, as is that of nostalgia for Monarchism, especially of the Medieval variety.  Rare examples of non-militaristic Democratic organization are the Peace Corps, and post-arms race extra-terrestrial exploration.  So, as Nietzsche discerns, a post-Theological vision of Humanity has yet to be explicitly established, leaving the species fundamentally disorganized, though the obvious trend towards inclusive globalization suggests that such a vision is gradually being developed.

Monday, July 21, 2014

First Principle of Political Philosophy

The first principle of Political Philosophy must be--It is more advantageous for a collective to be organized than to not be.  Now, whether or not that principle, regardless of how it is implemented, is instinctive, seems difficult to ascertain, but some apparent objections to it do not suffice as counter-examples.  Anarchism presents no exception--in it is entailed the belief that a collective is best organized via the autonomy of each member.  Similarly, Randian Libertarianism relies primarily on the 'invisible hand of the market' for social structure.  Even Nietzsche's form-imposing conqueror believes that the multitude that he is shaping is better off under those conditions, with which the multitude agrees, a concordance which on both sides Nietzsche misunderstands as merely a Will to Power per se.  So, the principle is presupposed in all the main debates in the topic, begin with how organization is to be achieved, and which structure is best.

Sunday, July 20, 2014

Humanity, Manufacturing, Political Philosophy

There is familiar evidence in non-human species of instinctive, rudimentary political organization--power relations, class distinctions, collective regimentation, etc.  So, just as human manufacturing talents can be conceived as compensation for relative deficiencies of native characteristics, e. g. the production of clothing and shelter for lack of fur, Political Philosophy can be conceived as compensation for weakness in instinctive social organization.  Furthermore, just as the scope of human manufacturing has far exceeded that of correlative native characteristics, Political Philosophy has developed far beyond rudimentary instinctive structures.  In those terms, Democracy, bewailed by some as a symptom of degeneration, can be interpreted as a distinctive human advantage--e. g. the possibility of explicit self-determination exceeds those rigid structures as much as the possibility of mobility occasioned by the invention of the wheel far surpasses the correlative capacities of other species.

Saturday, July 19, 2014

Enlightened Self-Interest

The concept of 'Enlightened Self-Interest' is commonly understood to mean 'the promotion of social good that is also in one's own interest'.  Typically, the 'also' connotes a causal relation, e. g. 'Helping others makes one feel good about oneself', or 'Promotion of some public good can be profitable'.  Now, presupposed in those usages is an original Self-Society antithesis.  In contrast, Spinoza conceives that relation as Part-Whole, to which corresponds his Inadequate-Adequate distinction.  Furthermore, since Adequate Ideas empower, the contrast is one of Weaker-Stronger.  Accordingly, in his system, narrow Self-Interest is not merely unenlightened, it is a condition of relative weakness, a diagnosis to which a hyper-individualistic culture, such as that of contemporary America, is pervasively oblivious.

Friday, July 18, 2014

The Prince, Prudence, Reason

In V, 7 of the Political Treatise, Spinoza briefly, and with a touch of uncharacteristic irony, engages Machiavelli, by asserting that the cultivation of a "free multitude" is more prudent than ruling by Fear.  The challenge can be extended to rule by Deception--since Freedom is equivalent to Rationality, and Rationality is common, transparency is more conducive to the maintaining of political control.  Nevertheless, the broader historical context reveals a kinship between the two.  For, Machiavelli can be interpreted as initiating Modern Political Philosophy, by secularizing it, i. e. by liberating it from Medieval Theology, which Spinoza continues by re-establishing the systematic relation between Rational Ethics and Political Philosophy that characterizes the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle.  Similarly, Hobbes' 'war of all against all' can be better understood as a transition from Feudal Oligarchism, than as an ontological premise.  These more general patterns are difficult to appreciate if the Medieval Era is not recognized as transforming the Ancient doctrines, and as the pre-condition of the Modern Era, which the Straussians seemingly fail to do.

Thursday, July 17, 2014

Wholistic Self-Interest and Ecological Ethics

As Spinoza only occasionally emphasizes, the distinction between Adequate and Inadequate in his system is one of degree, not one of kind, i. e. 'Inadequate' is, more precisely, 'Semi-Adequate'.  Likewise, the distinction between the previously introduced  concept of 'Vital Self-Interest' and a non-vital variety is that of what might be called 'Wholistic Self-Interest' vs. partial self-interest.  One familiar example of the contrast is eating in order to survive or to remain healthy vs. eating in order to satisfy one's taste buds.  A less familiar, though prevalent, example, is the pursuit of superficial 'goods', often based on some contrived image, e. g. the 'American dream'.  Similarly, the criterion of Wholistic Self-Interest can be applied to Ecological Ethics, i. e. to distinguish catching a fish in order to stay alive, and cutting down a tree in order to build shelter, from killing a mink in order to supply status-symbol clothing, and cutting down a forest as a means to mere financial profit.

Wednesday, July 16, 2014

Ecology, Ethics, Vital Self-Interest

The distinction, within Spinoza's system, of the persistence in being as determined by adequate ideas, from that determined by inadequate ideas, can be characterized as that of 'vital self-interest'.  Thus, for example, the promotion of health can be distinguished from the pursuit of wealth.  So, since they are both determined by adequate ideas, conduct in one's vital self-interest is equivalent to Freedom in his system.  Furthermore, vital self-interest can provide a basis for an Ecological Ethics, e. g. can help distinguish kicking a dog, catching a fish out of starvation, killing minks, and using rats in the search for a cure to a disease, as well as chopping down a tree in order to build a shelter, from destroying a forest for profit.  It is also conforms to one of the methodological principles of Utilitarianism--people do in fact tend to draw such distinctions when judging these varying examples of the 'rights' of non-human Nature.  But, also, as a criterion of Ecological conduct, acting in one's vital self-interest is rooted in the fundamental locus of the term 'Ethical treatment'--the self-cultivation, in general, of the agent.

Tuesday, July 15, 2014

Dualism, Ecology, Environment

Traditional Soul-Body Dualism also entails the segregation of Soul from Nature in general, the influence of which continues even where the former principle is explicitly abandoned.  For example, it is implicit in Spinoza's characterization of a human as an "atom" in Nature, in II, 8 of the Political Treatise, since 'atom' connotes independent existence, whereas a human is essentially related to the Nature on which it depends for food, oxygen, water, etc.  Likewise, the contemporary use of the term 'the Environment' to indicate something over and against humans hypostasizes and abstracts from the concept of Ecology, in which the Human-Environment relation is one of essential interaction.  This vestigial Dualism undercuts a potential Ecological application of a fundamental principle of Spinoza's--that practices that damage 'the Environment' also threaten the continued existence of the species, an application the indifference to which by some is regularly in evidence.

Monday, July 14, 2014

Animals and Kingdom of Ends


The abandonment of Teleological Anthropocentrism does not alter the plain fact that many parts of Nature are life-supporting, with the apparent primary beneficiary still Humanity, but with little evidence of reciprocity.  Thus, though collapsing the traditional Human-Animal dualism, as a potential foundation for an Ecology, Spinoza's Naturalism remains limited.  In contrast, probably the greater influence on the concept of Animal Rights is Kant's Super-Natural model--his Kingdom of Ends, on the basis of which the treatment of animals as mere means is prohibited.  But, the model remains heuristic, in contrast with which a robust Ecology would explicate how Humanity natively serves a life-supporting function in a system of Nature.

Sunday, July 13, 2014

Animals and Rights

Probably the staunchest, and perhaps the only, defender of Animal Rights on Philosophical grounds is Peter Singer, who proposes that the Happiness of animals be included in any Utilitarian calculation.  However, the weakness in that proposal is that its pivotal factor--that animals be included in the concept of the 'Greatest Number'--is not itself determinable without circularity by the Utilitarian principle.  In contrast, Spinoza's system provides two potential rudiments for an extension of the set of Humans to other living beings--that they all possess Natural Rights, and that, as has been previously discussed, qua Rational to any degree, they all possess Political Rights, to at least some degree.  Accordingly, his Naturalism more strongly grounds than does Utilitarianism a counter-argument to the most formidable impediment to a concept of Animal Rights--to the deeply entrenched concept of the Human-Animal distinction as one of radical kind, not one of mere degree.

Saturday, July 12, 2014

Reason and Ecology

Likely responding to Descartes' thesis that non-human corporeal beings are soulless machines, Spinoza asserts, in II, xiii of the Ethics, that "the propositions we have advanced hitherto have been entirely general, applying not more to men than to other individual things, all of which, though in differing degrees, are animated."  Now, in those preceding passages, he establishes that any such individual possesses a Mind, i. e.  is constituted by an Idea in God/Substance/Nature.  It, thus, seems to follow, though he does not explore the consequences, that non-human Nature consists of living beings that are, to varying degrees, Rational, i. e. 'Metabiology' better characterizes the genre of his project than does 'Metaphysics'.  Accordingly, there is an undeveloped Rational basis in his system for a concept of Ecology that is in the purview of both Ethics and Political Philosophy--in which animals are, to some degree, fellow Rational beings, and the Environment possesses at least some Political Rights.  So, Spinoza's system has the resources to provide some current practices with a Rational ground that is perhaps impossible in the kind of Dualism that Cartesianism exemplifies.

Friday, July 11, 2014

Biology, Ecology, Metabiology

One standard definition of 'Ecology' is 'the study of the relations between an organism and its environment'.  However, since Ecology does not typically pertain to the relations between an organism and one component of its environment--other organisms of the same species--'the study of the relations between a species and its environment' seems to be a more accurate characterization.  Similarly, while 'Biology' is typically conceived as 'the study of the life-processes of an organism', some of those processes are reproductive, and, thus, pertain to its species, thereby suggesting an analogous modification of that definition to 'the study of the life-processes of a species'.  However, insofar as those internal processes are systematically related to external relations, e. g. chemical exchanges, there seems to be no sharp distinction between Biology and Ecology.  Instead, the interaction of the two fields suggests that they are branches of an overarching one, that can be called 'Metabiology'. 

Thursday, July 10, 2014

Reason and Universal Commonwealth

The political ideal implicit in Spinoza's concept of Reason is a Universal Commonwealth, with respect to which a City, a Nation, or even a Global Village, is contingently limited in spatial scope.  Often glossed as 'universal peace', this ideal does not preclude the possibility of discord, which, as internal, would be a violation of some law, not an outbreak of war.  Furthermore, while Humanity may be giving few indications of approaching a condition of universal peace, the long-term historical trend is plainly in the direction of an at least Global Commonwealth, i. e. from, as the basic unit of Political Philosophy, the City of the Ancients, to the Nation of the Moderns; the emergence of the United Nations; and the accelerating internationalization of Economics, Communications, and Transportation.  So, in a few more centuries, Nationalism may become as quaint as City rivalries are these days.  And, if, as Plato or Spinoza can never more than barely imagine, Humanity transcends terrestriality, an overarching Commonwealth will become more than Global.  Such a possibility, while familiar fodder for speculative fiction, is also implicit in Spinoza's concept of Reason.

Wednesday, July 9, 2014

Reason and Globalism

Political Philosophy is the study of the 'best' Polity, and, for Spinoza, Reason is the source of that idea.  Now, he characterizes the basic political unit as a 'Commonwealth', by which he seems to mean 'Nation', in contrast with the 'City' of the ancient version of the genre.  Furthermore, he proposes that the best mode of interaction between Commonwealths is that governed by a peace treaty.  However, he does not explain by what authority any such pact can be overseen, a shortcoming indicative of a more fundamental inadequacy in his presentation.  For, insofar as Reason is common to all humans, the best Polity according to it can be only single and global, the internal relations of which are mediated by laws, not by treaties.  Since terms such as 'international' and 'United Nations' presuppose the priority of the Nation as the basic political unit, for want of a better term, the Rational political ideal can be called 'Globalism'.

Tuesday, July 8, 2014

Human Reason and Natural Law

The contrast, in II, 8 of Political Treatise, between Human Reason and Natural Law, and the formulation, in II, 4, of Right and Power "over" Nature, suggest a potentially antithetical relation between Humanity and Nature that is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of Spinoza's system.  For, according to the latter, Thought is an attribute of everything that exists, i. e. of God/Substance/Nature.  Hence, natural laws are Ideas in that entity.  But, so too are the ideas of human reason, which, as, by definition, Adequate, are, likewise, ideas in God.  So, since Consistency is a characteristic of Rationality, there cannot be any antithesis between Human Reason and Natural Law.  Likewise, because human Power is equivalent to Rationality, its relation to Nature is not that of "over", but must be that of 'within'.  Accordingly, in Spinoza's system, any Idea of Humanity as possessing an unfettered Right to appropriate the rest of Nature to its purposes is Inadequate.

Monday, July 7, 2014

Natural Right and Animal Right

In Ethics, II, xiii, Spinoza recognizes the existence of non-human "animated" individuals.  It, thus, seems to follow from the opening sections of ch. II of Political Treatise that corresponding to the activity of such an individual is a Natural Right.  In other words, implicit in his system are Animal Rights, though, therein the term connotes something other than it currently does--it sanctions what an animal instinctively does, e. g. killing and consuming a weaker animal, rather than protects it from what a human can do to it.  But, while, for Spinoza, political organization mediates potential interpersonal violence, it leaves unaddressed the power of humans over weaker animals.  Thus, his system has the perhaps unpleasant consequence of sanctioning the abuse of other animals by humans, which some might consider a decisive refutation of his concept of Natural Right.

Sunday, July 6, 2014

Natural Right, Individual, Species

As has been previously discussed, a Political Philosophy based on the interests of the Species can be distinguished from one based on those of the Individual.  An application of the distinction to Spinoza's concept of Natural Right demonstrates how the two projects might diverge.  For, on the standard interpretation of the concept, strongly supported by the text, Spinoza, following Hobbes, attempts to adjudicate between pre-political and political Individual Right, with unclear results, as has been previously discussed.  In contrast, an attribution of Natural Right to the Species asserts the privilege of Power with respect to the rest of Nature, i. e. the Right to adapt the latter to its own interests where it can.  Theoretical establishment of such privilege is necessitated by the combination of his Pantheism and his rejection of Anthropocentrism, which leave Humanity without traditional Theological or Teleological sanction over the rest of Nature.  An example of where the two projects not merely diverge but potentially conflict is the use of manufacturing processes that might benefit each extant Individual, but which pose a long-term threat to the Species.

Saturday, July 5, 2014

Interest, Individual, Species

Since Hobbes' concept of a 'war of all against all' threatens both the human species and its individual members, his Leviathan conduces to the survival of each.  However, Individual and Species interests are not always co-extensive, e. g. reproductive sterility or barrenness is potentially fatal to the latter, but not to the former.  Likewise, short-sighted Economic or Environmental policy can be beneficial to an individual, at the expense of the species.  More generally, long-term structural sustainability can be a relevant factor in a Political Philosophy based on Species survival, though not in that of the Individual, thereby determining a preference of system, e. g. the Rule of Law offers greater potential stability than does a hierarchy dependent on personality, so, a Constitutional Democracy is superior to a Monarchy or an Oligarchy.  Likewise, a methodology that begins with the interests of the Individual is arbitrary, which the elevation to a Rational correlate does not necessarily correct, if Spinoza's and Kant's concepts of the Rational Individual are any indication, i. e. the scope of their principles is primarily that of extant individuals.  So, perhaps, the first decision that any Political Philosophy needs to make is one of orientation--the interests of the Individual, or those of the Species.     

Thursday, July 3, 2014

Species, Survival, Political Philosophy

Spinoza's brief allusion to "the interest and preservation of mankind" (Political Treatise, II, 8), is to a perspective that is rarely explored in Political Philosophy.  Typically, Hobbes' theme is paradigmatic in the genre--how a Polity can benefit an Individual.  In contrast, implicit in the passage is a consideration of the advantage of organization to the species as a unit.  On that basis, the fundamental scenario of Political Philosophy is Humanity vs. the rest of Nature, a context which transforms concepts such as Survival, Power, and Freedom.  Accordingly, for example, Freedom over Nature pertains to the causal patterns manifest in the latter, not to personal Emotions, i. e. is Technological.  Thus, the Survival of the species is best served by the maximal Power of each of its members, i. e. Democracy is the strongest Polity from this perspective, which, as common to all, is that of Reason.

Wednesday, July 2, 2014

Power, Tyranny, Reason

An important political application of Spinoza's doctrine is suggested by "Human power is to be reckoned less by physical vigor than by mental strength" (Political Treatise, II, 11).  For, more precisely, where Self-Control is lacking, then, so, too, is control over anything else.  Thus, in the calculation of Power, no amount of wealth or weaponry can compensate a tyrant for susceptibility to anger, fear, greed, etc. i. e. for a deficiency of Reason. 

Tuesday, July 1, 2014

Semi-Rationality and Right

In Definition 1 of Part III of the Ethics, Spinoza explains that 'inadequate' means 'partial', i. e. it connotes a degree of privation of Adequacy, not an absolute negations of it.  Accordingly, Passivity is never absolute, an Inadequate Idea is always partially adequate, and, likewise, a deficiency of Reason is, more precisely, a condition of Semi-Rationality, rather than one of Irrationality.  So, some of the previously discussed apparent inconsistencies in his concept of Right can perhaps be resolved with: 1. Every entity is at least semi-rational; 2. Hence, every entity possesses at least some degree of Power; and, therefore 3. Correspondingly, every entity possesses at least some Right.  Consequently, there can be non-political Natural Right, the extent of which can be increased in a Polity.  However, it also follows that desire is never completely "blind" (Political Treatise, II, 5), so Spinoza would need to jettison it and analogous antitheses, if he were to accept the modification.