Tuesday, April 30, 2013

Architecture, Will to Power, Art

The Architecture that Nietzsche classifies as an effect of Will to Power, in #11 of the 'Expeditions' section of Twilight of the Idols, is "conscious of no witness around it".  In contrast, the exalted Architecture to which he refers in #218 of Human, All Too Human, "signified something", which entails the existence of a witness to it, and, hence, that it serves as a symbol.  So, perhaps, the two examples illustrate the distinction of Architecture as a purposeful construction, e. g. for a dwelling, from Architecture as an Art, e. g. as an expression of exaltation.  At minimum, the contrast suggests that Will to Power does not suffice as a principle of Art.  Accordingly, the phrase 'Will to Power as Art', chosen by someone else as the title of a chapter in the posthumous Will to Power collection, is premature, despite Heidegger's treatment of it as a fait accompli in Nietzsche oeuvre.

Monday, April 29, 2013

Architecture, Will to Power, Dionysian

Nietzsche's classification of Architecture, in #11 of the Expeditions section of Twilight of the Idols, as an expression of Will to Power, but of neither Dionysian nor Apollinian, has the merit of explaining the Sublimity of that Art, i. e. as a "victory over weight and gravity".  Furthermore, because, as he contends in #218 of Human, All to Human, Beauty is extrinsic to Architecture, its non-Apollinian status follows.  However, its non-Dionysian status leaves unexplained how Architecture, like every other Art, communicates.  For, Communication unites separate individuals, and one of the main theses of Birth of Tragedy is that the Dionysian is the principle of the unification of separate individuals, i. e. is the principle of Communication in any Art.  Since Twilight appears just prior to Nietzsche's permanent incapacitation, and to a conclusive articulation of his concept of Will to Power, the relation between the Dionysian and Will to Power that it presents can be conceived as provisional, subject to a revision that gets preempted.

Sunday, April 28, 2013

Absolute Music, Architecture, Dionysian

Two indications in Human, All Too Human of Nietzsche's liberation from the influence of Schopenhauer are in # 215 and #218.  In the first, he introduces 'Absolute Music', which is not, contrary to Schopenhauer's concept of Music, a representation of Will.  In the second, he characterizes some examples of exalted Architecture as only extrinsically beautiful, thereby rejecting Schopenhauer's formulation that Sublimity entails Beauty, that has been previously discussed.  These passages suggest, furthermore, a break with the Aesthetic Theory of his own Birth of Tragedy, as well.  For, he explains that Absolute Music also precedes its incorporation into Dionysian activity, while, in #11 of the 'Expeditions of an Untimely Man' section of Twilight of the Idols, he asserts that Architecture is neither Dionysian nor Apollinian.  However, one difference between the two developments is that while his liberation from Schopenhauer sharpens into opposition, he never waivers in his allegiance to the Dionysian principle, leaving as apparently unaddressed the problem that Absolute Music and Architecture thereby become ungrounded phenomena.

Saturday, April 27, 2013

Sublimation and Repression

The concept of Sublimation is crucial to Nietzsche's system, since his cardinal thesis--that humans create their deities--requires that the Sublime be generated, not given as such.  Accordingly, his introduction of the term, in #189 Beyond Good and Evil, seems ironic.  There, in the context of ruminating how the constraint of a drive serves to intensify it, he observes that "under the pressure of Christian value judgments, the sex drive sublimated itself into love."  In other words, that apparent instance of Sublimation is, rather, one of Repression.  Furthermore, the observation itself involves its own act of Repression.  For, insofar as Sublimation connotes deification, idealization, exaltation, purification, ennoblement, etc. it is an Apollinian effect, at least according to Birth of Tragedy at its outset.  In contrast, "the sex drive sublimated itself" plainly evinces a Dionysian effect, thereby indicating that with it Nietzsche is continuing the repression of the Apollinian principle that begins towards the end of Birth of Tragedy--questionably, as has been previously discussed--and informs his thinking thereafter, and perhaps, Freud's, as well.

Friday, April 26, 2013

Dionysus, Apollo, Deification

In Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche first introduces Dionysus and Apollo as independent deities; later, in #21, characterizes them as "fraternal"; while eventually, in "22, he seems to settle on the suggestion that the former is, if not more fundamental, at least the dominant of the two brothers.  However, regardless of these vacillations, a relation that he does not seem to entertain underlies them all.  Simply, Dionysus is a deity, a deity is a personified individuation of some experiences, and Apollo is the god of personified individuation.  Hence, Dionysus presupposes Apollo, even if the experiences that he personifies, e. g. intoxication, sexual activity, etc. do not.  This relation precedes even what he describes in #8--the vision of his god by the Dionysian reveler qua satyr, since, Dionysus, as merely posited, is presupposed by such revelry.  Likewise, the interpretation of Apollo as a 'mask' of Dionysus overlooks that the concept of 'mask' is itself Apollinian.  Thus, in general, any reduction of Apollo to Dionysus, which would explain the disappearance of the former in Nietzsche's post-Birth works, is problematic.

Thursday, April 25, 2013

Sublimity, Sublimation, Dionysian, Sexuality

In #39 of WWR, Schopenhauer characterizes the feeling of the Sublime as that of "the beautiful only by the addition, namely the exaltation beyond the known hostile relation of the contemplated object to the will in general."  So, in the few, and brief, allusions to Sublimity in Birth of Tragedy, e. g. section 4, Nietzsche seems to agree with Schopenhauer, i. e. that it is the production of Beauty via the overcoming of suffering, and, hence, is an Apollinian effect.  However, in what subsequently becomes the more significant characterization of it, because it seems to anticipate Freud, in #189 of Beyond Good and Evil, he observes how "the sex drive sublimated itself into love", which, in that context, is clearly an intimation that 'love' is a ruse of the sex drive.  In other words, in that passage, Sublimation is a Dionysian effect masquerading as an Apollinian device, or, as he puts it in #22 of BT, a "symbolization of Dionysian wisdom through Apollinian artifices."  While it is unclear if Freud analogously attributes Sublimation to the Id, the relevance of Nietzsche's analysis to contemporary notions of 'romantic love' is more obvious.

Wednesday, April 24, 2013

Dissonance and Egoism

The interpretation, e. g. perhaps Rand's, of Nietzsche as a proponent of Selfishness is plainly refuted by #33 in the 'Expeditions of an Untimely Man' section of Twilight of the Idols.  There, he applies two of his cardinal theses--that the 'individual' is an "error", and that Egoism, as, like any Moral doctrine, a contingently useful fiction, is of value to only 'strong' types.  Now, what primarily distinguishes 'strong' from 'weak' for him is the mindfulness of the fundamental Dissonance of human existence, i. e. as expressed by the affirmation of Eternal Recurrence.  Accordingly, each of the following exemplifies weakness--the abstraction of Nietzsche's writings from their Dionysian context; the advocacy of Egoism as universally valid; and, conceiving the 'individual' as a factual atom.

Tuesday, April 23, 2013

Dissonance and Sexuality

The logical principle that an 'Individual' is always an individual of some universal corresponds to Nietzsche's thesis that the Apollinian principle always correlates to the Dionysian.  But, as his derivation of the artistic Dionysian from the Dionysian festivals is a reminder that underlying both Logic and Aesthetics is the Biology of the Individual--that the embodiment of these dualities is the reproductive organs of every apparently discrete member of a species.  In other words, when Nietzsche observes, in #25 of Birth of Tragedy, "dissonance become man--and what else is man?", the tension underlying that Dissonance is that between certain processes qua privately pleasurable and/or painful, and those same processes qua phases of the reproductive drive of the species, a tension over which the currently popular term 'sexuality', tends to gloss, i. e. as what Schopenhauer and Nietzsche would likely agree is a mere appearance.

Monday, April 22, 2013

Dissonance and Paradox

Perhaps the Philosophical version of Dissonance is Paradox, but not so much a Russellian intellectual puzzle as a Zen koan.  For example, the affirmation of Eternal Recurrence is paradoxical, because the act of affirmation simultaneously effects a denial of Eternal Recurrence, i. e. every repetition is a new repetition, and, thus, a non-recurrence.  Furthermore, in contrast with Russell's exercises, the act involves personal 'self'- reference, i. e. one's own act becomes a moment in the Recurrence, and, hence, therein one becomes an object to oneself.  Thus, the affirmation generates the same ironic self-awareness that the tragic hero achieves, according to Nietzsche's concept of Tragedy.  However, this concomitance of the Universal and the Individual is not dialectical--in that moment, the paradox is preserved, not negated, in the same way that, according to Nietzsche, Dissonance is expressed, not resolved, by the tragic artist.

Sunday, April 21, 2013

Dissonance and Eternal Recurrence

Nietzsche first introduces Zarathustra in #342 of The Gay Science, under the rubric, "The tragedy begins", thereby plainly signaling that he conceives Thus Spoke Zarathustra as a Tragedy.  Now, as has been previously discussed, essential to his concept of Tragedy, as presented in Birth of Tragedy, is the phenomenon of Dissonance.  Accordingly, the central event of Thus Spoke Zarathustra--the presentation of Eternal Recurrence--must be interpreted as exemplifying Dissonance.  However, the concept of Eternal Recurrence qua theory of Time, is regular and orderly, if not beautiful.  In contrast, the act of affirming of Eternal Recurrence, which requires countenancing all joy and all suffering equally, combines Pleasure and Pain in the way that Dissonance, according to Nietzsche, does.  So, contrary to many interpretations of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the centerpiece of the work is not the theory of Eternal Recurrence, but the affirmation of it, by the tragic hero of the drama.

Saturday, April 20, 2013

Dissonance as Symbol

Birth of Tragedy is the resultant of three main influences on Nietzsche--Wagner's innovative use of Dissonance, Philology, and Schopenhauer's Metaphysical theory.  Accordingly, he casts his concept of Dissonance in terms of that theory, i. e. as symbolizing that Life is essentially suffering.  Later in his career, he recognizes that that Pessimism is as much an interpretation as is the Rational-Theological Optimism that it challenges, but without similarly revising his concept of Dissonance, at least not explicitly.  One possible revision conceives the admixture of pleasurable and painful effects of Dissonance as symbolizing plainly evident variability--Nature is sometimes calm, sometimes tempestuous, with neither fundamental, just as human affairs are sometimes fortunate, sometimes tragically strifeful, with neither fundamental.  Thus, Dissonance can remain a symbol of human existence, but also of the one-sidedness of prominent Metaphysical theories.

Friday, April 19, 2013

Harmony and Dissonance

In section 2 of Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche includes in the "essence" of Dionysian music, "the utterly incomparable world of harmony".  But that characterization leaves the relation between Music and Tragedy unclear, until, in section 24, he introduces "dissonance" as the musical expression of the "ugly and disharmonic", and as the musical ground of Tragedy, though without further explaining the apparent contradiction between Harmony and Dissonance.  One, and perhaps the only, way to reconcile those two is to conceive Harmony as not a precise condition, but as comprising a range of degrees of togetherness among a multiplicity of components.  On that basis, Dissonance consists in maximum degrees of disassociation within that range.  Similarly, the condition of Nature that it expresses is not absolute separation, but relative disassociation.

Thursday, April 18, 2013

Dancing, Music, Creativity

The medium of Dancing is not one's 'body', which is an abstraction, but one's Motility.  Thus, Dancing, like Music, as has been previously discussed, involves not only the organization of its medium, but the very production of it as well.  Now, since any artistic process involves physiological coordination, e. g.the guitarist's hand-to-hand-to-ears, the painter's brush hand-to-eyes, every Art, even Music, can be conceived as a special case of Dancing.  However, Nietzsche seems ambivalent about which of Music and Dancing is prior--in section 2 of Birth of Tragedy, on the one hand, he characterizes Dancing as "incited" by dithyrambic Music, while, on the other, it is from Dancing that "other symbolic powers suddenly press forward, particularly those of music."  Still, the uncertainty reinforces the thesis that Dancing can be as self-sufficiently creative as Music, as has been previously discussed, can be.

Wednesday, April 17, 2013

Music, Medium, Creativity

Every Art has its medium--paint, ink, bronze, etc.--and according to Dewey, the basic medium of Music is a "tone".  However, a tone is part of given tonal system, in the same way that a word in a poem is part of a given language, in which case the medium of Music is the entire pre-established system.  However, as experimental improvisational Music shows, any 'noise' can be spontaneously integrated into a performance.  Hence, the basic medium of Music is, more accurately, a sound.  Furthermore, as that Music illustrates, a performer can be the source of not only the organization of the medium, but of the medium itself, unlike e. g. a painter, for whom the paint pre-exists the the artistic production.  Thus, a musical performance can distinctively exemplify pure Creativity, i. e. it is constituted by the production of both its matter and its form.  However, Nietzsche's allegiance, at least at an early stage, to Schopenhauer's concept of Will prevents him from appreciating the Dionysian as a principle of Creativity--for, according to that concept, Will is the perpetuation of the same, with respect to which any novelty is merely phenomenal.

Tuesday, April 16, 2013

Music and Expression

Pantomime is not merely imitative, it is expressive, as well.  So. Nietzsche's characterization of Dancing, in section 2 of Birth of Tragedy, as a "pantomime", and as the occasion of the "release off all the symbolic powers", suggests a significant departure from the long tradition, stretching from Aristotle to Schopenhauer, that conceives Art as essentially Mimetic.  Now, to 'express', literally to 'press out', most immediately means to 'transmit empirical content to a percipient'.  Thus, 'Expression' is not to be confused with a relation between an artist and a completed work of Art, e. g. Dewey's use, or the basis for the usual classification of Pollock's pieces.  Furthermore, it is not be confused with to 'transmit the meaning of an empirical content to an audience', which is one of its special and derivative cases.  That is, it is special, because not every Artwork, e. g. 'Abstract Art', has some ulterior idea, feeling, or object that it 'means', plus the transmission of such meanings is indirect, if not problematic, e. g. as Nietzsche puts it, in #809 of Will to Power, "one never communicates thoughts: one communicates movements".  Now, what is unique about Music among the Arts is its capacity to transmit its content to a percipient directly and immediately, i. e. the physical propagation of sonic vibrations is fundamental to musical performance.  Thus, insofar as Art is essentially expressive, and Expression is grounded in the transmission of content, Music is the exemplary Art.

Monday, April 15, 2013

Dionysian, Experimentation, Music

Insofar as Dionysian Art effects the smashing of Form, one Art that is intrinsically Dionysian is Experimental Art.  Now, experimentation is not exclusive to Music, but what distinguishes it from other Arts is its capacity to express experimentation.  For, experimentation consists in a digression from some given, and Music has always demonstrated that it has the resources to express Digression-from-a-Given, e. g. its Theme-Variation structure.  But, Digression is more than a contingent compositional pattern.  Rather, it is at the heart of Music--any silence digresses from a given sound, and Rhythm is essentially constituted by such Digression.  So, because of its unique capacity to express Digression, i. e. with respect to which Poetry is derivative, Music is the preeminent Dionysian Art qua Experimental Art, as Jazz, with which Nietzsche would likely have a little acquaintance, perhaps best exemplifies.

Sunday, April 14, 2013

Music and Dionysian

There are at least three ways that Music can be classified as a "Dionysian art", as Nietzsche characterizes it at the outset of Birth of Tragedy.  First, it can sonically represent the ecstatic emotions of the Dionysian festivals, just as the tragic chorus symbolizes Dionysian revelers, in his concept of Tragedy.  Second, it can be an actual part of those celebrations, an example which he briefly cites.  But, third, and more radically, Music can itself be the cause of Dionysian activities, not only of the St. Vitus dance, but of the orgies that literally unite separate individuals.  However, to function in this manner, Music does not require some eternal set of characteristics.  Rather, a "change to a new type of music" can unsettle "the most fundamental political and social conventions . . .till it finally overthrows all things public and private", as Plato warns in the Republic, IV 424.  In other words, it suffices for Music to change in some fundamental way to effect the kind of dissolution of individuality that Nietzsche recognizes in sections 1 and 21.  Hence, the Dionysian power of Music is historically conditioned, and does not consists in some eternal set of metaphysical characteristics, as Schopenhauer's legacy requires, i. e. Dithyramb is no more 'Dionysian' sub specie aeternitas than is Wagnerian opera.  Conversely, Music can also serve to reinforce a status quo, as both Plato and Nietzsche recognize, and, so, is not inherently Dionysian for that reason, as well.

Saturday, April 13, 2013

Music and Apollinian

Nietzsche's 'Apollinian' is the principle of both Form and Illusion, perhaps reflecting more its derivation from Schopenhauer's concept of Representation, than from classical sources.  However, there is no clear systematic connection between Form and Illusion, e. g. a drawn geometrical figure and a sculpture both possess form, but are not so obviously illusory.  Likewise, Form is what distinguishes Music from random noise, Dithyramb from incoherent shouting, and Dancing from spasmodic lurching.  Furthermore, research of Synaesthesia includes well-documented cases of the 'seeing' of Music.  So, Nietzsche's exclusion of Apollinian influence from Music is equivocal, if not erroneous.

Friday, April 12, 2013

Music and Sculpture

With the introduction, in recent decades, of amplification into Music, there has been the emergence of specialized interest in the shaping of sounds.  This development is not radically unprecedented, just a magnification of and focus upon a process that musical performance has always incorporated, only less attentively so.  This rise has thus brought into greater relief an intimate relation between Music and Sculpture that is typically ignored in traditional Aesthetic Theory classifications, e. g. Nietzsche sharply distinguishes them as 'Dionysian' and 'Apollinian', respectively.  So, since it seems difficult to deny that Sculpture is Apollinian, it seems difficult to maintain, despite Nietzsche's effort, the thesis that Music is an exclusively Dionysian Art.

Thursday, April 11, 2013

Dionysian, Art, Communication

In Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche shows that all Art is genetically Dionysian, i. e. that dithyrambic Music inspires Dancing, which releases all the symbolic powers, including the Apollinian ones.  At the same, that demonstration implies that all Art is categorially Dionysian, as well.  For, to characterize anything as 'symbolic' is to classify it as a 'language', and, hence, as a medium of Communication.  Now, Communication unites discrete individuals, and, so, is a Dionysian activity in Nietzsche's system.  Thus, if all the Arts are symbolic, they are all media of Communication, and, hence, are all species of Dionysian activity.

Wednesday, April 10, 2013

Space, Time, Individuation

According to Schopenhauer, Space and Time are each a "Principle of Individuation', because each effects a separation in representations, i. e. 'there' from 'here', and 'then' from 'now', respectively.  However, his claim of Kantian heritage for these concepts is questionable, since for Kant, they are 'Forms of Intuition', and, in his system, a 'Form' unifies a manifold, not generates one.  Furthermore, Schopenhauer takes  no account of Kant's distinction between 'Outer' and 'Inner', to which Space and Time, respectively, correspond.  Now, as has been previously discussed here, 'individuation' is equivocal, failing to distinguish Outer Individuation, i. e. separation, from Inner Individuation, i. e. integration.  Thus, 'space' clearly connotes 'separation', and, hence, its Individuation is Outer.  In contrast, Time is essentially 'inner' because, as has been detailed here earlier, it is the product of the process of Temporalization, in which every new moment is integrated with experience that has already occurred, as its culmination.  In other words, the entire past of every moment is already part of the moment prior to any subsequent analysis into the separate moments 'now' and 'then'.  So, Time can be classified as a Principle of Individuation, but not in Schopenhauer's sense of the term.

Tuesday, April 9, 2013

Individuation, Apollinian, Proprioception

'Individual' has two non-equivalent meanings: the literal one, 'undivided', and the common one, 'separated'.  Correspondingly, two varieties of 'individuation' are inner and outer, respectively.  Now, Schopenhauer's Principle of Individuation is of the latter type, as is much Nietzsche's version of it, his Apollinan principle.  However, Nietzsche diverges from his predecessor by discerning a Dionysian process of outer individuation as well, i. e. Rupture, dismemberment, birth, etc., which the outer Apollinian principle serves to refine.  But, he also recognizes an inner Apollinain principle, the source of the "beautiful illusion of the inner world", "measured restraint", and the "calm of the sculptor" (BT, #1).  What he does not recognize is that the ground of these inner characteristics is Proprioception, which, as the organic independent complement of Motility, produces the original body image from which all illusion is derived, and as fundamentally homeostatic, is the basis of all measured restraint and calm.  Proprioception functions thus to unify Motility, i.e . to 'individuate' it, in the inner sense, even during dancing, so, therein, the Apollinain principle is coeval with the Dionysian principle, and is not subsequent to, and derived from, the latter, as Nietzsche proposes.

Monday, April 8, 2013

Tragedy and Philosophy

Nietzsche's ambition in Birth of Tragedy is more than to propose a new theory of Tragedy, or an innovative general Aesthetic Theory.  Rather, his introduction of 'Socrates' as a detached observer of Tragedy implies a definition of 'Reason' as a species of Apollinian Art, and, hence, as born out of Music.  Furthermore, it casts the entire Socratic tradition as originating in Tragedy, a thesis sometimes misinterpreted as a nostalgia for the pre-Socratic era, rather than as a constructive element in any current philosophical self-understanding.  However, by accepting the fictionalized Platonist character as his 'Socrates', he misses an opportunity to cast the trial of the historical man as a 'tragedy', with the actual Socrates as its 'tragic hero'.  With Philosophy born from Tragedy in this way, the 'Philosopher' is established as a person of action, of which the Rational Arts--Thinking, Arguing, etc.--are special cases.

Sunday, April 7, 2013

Tragedy and Dancing

According to Nietzsche, Tragedy combines the Dionysian Art, Music, and an Apollonian Art, Drama, with his main innovation the thesis that the former gives rise to the latter.  In section 2 of Birth of Tragedy, he describes the precise moment of transition, a reaction to dithyrambic Music: "The essence of nature is now to be expressed symbolically; we need a new world of symbols; and the entire symbolism of the body is called into play, not the mere symbolism of the lips, face, and speech, but the whole pantomime of dancing, forcing every member into rhythmic movement.  Then the other symbolic powers suddenly press forward . . ."  In other words, Dancing, qua pantomimetic, functions as a transition to dramatic action, which is the former, now fully articulated, under the auspices of the Apollonian principle.  Thus, for example, dialogue is derived from song lyrics, which are refinements of pantomimetic vocalizations.  His innovative thesis is that the Apollonian principle does not supervene on the process from without, but, as a source of symbolization, is itself generated out of the Dionysian Art.

Saturday, April 6, 2013

Birth and Tragedy

As has been previously discussed, Nietzsche finds in the Dionysian experience that is a phase of Tragedy, both Rapture and Rupture, which are seemingly incompatible, since in the former, two people can become "fused" (BT, sect. 1), while in the latter, they suffer, inversely, "dismemberment into individuals" (BT, sect. 2), a process of Individuation not to be confused with that governing Schopenhauer's concept of Representation.  However, allowing that the two events do not occur simultaneously, but sequentially, they are easily recognizable in the examples of sexual congress, followed by reproduction.  In other words, insofar as Rapture and Rupture are two stages of Tragedy--the third being Apollonian Vision--not only is Tragedy an Art-form that has a birth, but Birth is the central event of what Tragedy portrays.  Thus, his 'Birth of Tragedy' is also 'Birth as Tragedy'.

Friday, April 5, 2013

Rapture and Rupture

As has been previously discussed, in the first section of Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche diverges from Schopenhauer's concept of the noumenal realm, by characterizing the Dionysian experience as one of "ecstasy".  However, starting in section 3, he suddenly reverts to agreement with Schopenhauer, by describing that experience as "suffering and contradictory".  Now, he does not explain the apparent inconsistency between the two characterizations, but one way that they would be compatible is if they refer to two distinct, inverse, moments in the experience, that can be termed 'Rapture' and 'Rupture'.  For example, as applied to Schopenhauer's system, Sympathy and Contemplation are rapturous, while Rupture is the source of the various noumenal differentiations--Reproduction, Character, 'I Will', etc.--that, as has been previously discussed, is not adequately explained.  It is unclear if either Schopenhauer or Nietzsche would accept that analysis of the noumenon, but if not caused by such a Rupture, suffering is as irreal as is the individual that bears it.

Thursday, April 4, 2013

Harmony and Unity

While Nietzsche's Dionysian principle is explicitly derived from Schopenhauer's concept of Will, it departs significantly from it.  Whereas that Will, according to Schopenhauer, is the source of universal suffering, the Dionysian realm, as Nietzsche describes it in the first section of Birth of Tragedy, is one of "universal harmony", in which each "feels himself not only united, reconciled, and fused, with his neighbor, but as one with him, . . . in ecstasy."  However, Harmony and Unity are not equivalent--the former entails a multiplicity, while the latter does not.  Hence, Nietzsche also inherits from his predecessor the problem of the existence of noumenal plurality, a problem which remains unaddressed in that section.

Wednesday, April 3, 2013

Harmony and Collectivity

Harmony entails a balance between Unity and Multiplicity, i. e. the differentiation of its components is as essential as is their integration.  Thus, to whatever extent Schopenhauer regards Harmony as intrinsic to Music--he does not to agree with Rousseau that it is a gimmick--he is committed to recognizing that Music is an inherently collective Art.  Now, in his system, Will is the principle of Unity, and Individuation is the principle of Multiplicity.  Thus, a musical performance qua collective, does not "copy" Will, as Schopenhauer proposes, but effects a combination of Will and Individuation.  However, the inferior status in his system of Individuation prevents him from appreciating that capacity of Music, and from recognizing that Music might be an inherently collective Art.

Tuesday, April 2, 2013

Will and Polyphony

Schopenhauer's pioneering appreciation of Music does not seem to extend to Polyphony.  For, when he does examine a plurality of synchronic sounds, e. g. his analysis of Harmony, he subordinates their diversity to their unity.  Furthermore, that privileging is inadequate to multi-melodic music, e. g. the 'free jazz' of recent decades.  Now, proper appreciation of Polyphony, in conjunction with his thesis that Music is a direct copy of Will, yields the insight that Will is inherently Pluralistic.  On that basis, a doctrine, such as his, that promotes the dissolution of individual differences, is not one derived from Will as its fundamental principle.

Monday, April 1, 2013

Courage and Complacency

At the beginning of Schopenhauer as Educator, Nietzsche offers what might be construed as an explanation for the previously discussed absence of  Courage in Schopenhauer's doctrine: "Men are even lazier than they are timid, and fear most of all the inconveniences with which unconditional honesty and nakedness would burden them".  By implication, 'Courage' is, at bottom, Effort, according to Nietzsche in the statement.  However, that classification mistakes Effort as the genus of Courage for Effort as a necessary condition of Courage.  Furthermore, even granting the mistake, the formulation does not apply to Schopenhauer's system, which, as has been previously discussed, does not accommodate individual Effort in any way.  However, a bigger problem with Nietzsche's analysis is one that a later Nietzsche might detect--what Bruno, for example, likely fears and resists is not an 'inconvenience', but a lethal threat.  In other words, this younger Nietzsche trivializes Courage by reducing mortal danger to an 'inconvenience', a reduction which is itself an expression of the culture of Complacency that he casts Schopenhauer as overcoming.  Still, that is not to dismiss that reduction as unworthy of Schopenhauer.  For, the Asceticism of the latter is a luxury that similarly trivializes involuntary hardship and deprivation, as does his reduction of courageous self-sacrifice to the penetration into an illusion.  Thus, Nietzsche's own apparent complacency at this stage of his development bespeaks an accurate insight into a Complacency to which Schopenhauer's doctrine is no exception, the full implications of which he only later better understands.