Psyche, Individual, Universal

The early chapters of Human, All Too Human seem to suggest a replacement of Metaphysics by Psychology as the study of the Noumenal dimension of human experience.  However, it is, more precisely, a naturalization of the concept of Psyche = Soul = animating principle that has traditionally been conceived to be supernatural in some respect, e. g. incorporeal.  Now, while that traditional concept has been predominantly conceived to be Individual, in some cases it is conceived to be Universal, i. e. one Soul for all Bodies.  So, Schopenhauer's Will to Live, and Nietzsche's Dionysian, can be recognized as continuing the latter variety.  Furthermore, Nietzsche affirms his allegiance to the Dionysian principle to the very end of his career.  Hence, despite his reputation as an 'individualist', his concept of Psychology entails that of a Universal Psyche, that, by The Gay Science, is specified as the Psyche of the Species, as has been previously discussed.  Accordingly, to whatever extent Freudian Psychology is influenced by Nietzschean Psychology, the concept of Psyche that it entails, e. g. the personalized Libido, is Individual, and, so, diverges from the latter in that respect.  In contrast, the Collective Unconscious of Jungian Psychology is closer to the Nietzschean Species Psyche.

Will to Power and Evolution

In the Prologue, Zarathustra asserts, "Man is something that should be overcome", and proceeds to liken the relation of Overman to Man to that of Man to Ape.  Later, when he introduces Will to Power as the life-force to replace Will to Live, he characterizes it as "Self-Overcoming".  So, even if Nietzsche does not explicitly describe it as such, and it has not be classified by scholars as such, Will to Power is plainly an Evolutionary principle.  Accordingly, entailed in these passages is a rejection of the Darwinian subordination of Evolution to Survival.  Furthermore, unlike orthodox Darwinism, Nietzsche extends the concept of the origin of the Human species, to that of a Super-Human species, a process that has yet to be completed.  Thus entailed is also a repudiation of so-called Social Darwinism, the apex of which is merely a concept of a type of individual Human.

Noumenon, Will to Power, Evolution

In #16 of Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche seems to repudiate use of the Noumenon-Phenomenon contrast.  However, what he is more precisely rejecting is the Metaphysical status of the former, as part of the more general project of the book to re-conceive the contrast as Sub-Conscious vs. Conscious, thereby pioneering what becomes the Freudian tradition in Psychology.  The dichotomy is also a factor at the outset of The Gay Science, where he proposes that Morality is itself only a doctrine of Phenomena, designed to reinforce the illusion of Individual Selfhood.  But, there, he introduces a significant variation on the connotation of Universality in the Noumenal realm--it is now that of the Species specifically.  Likewise, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 'Man' and 'Overman' are general, not individual concepts.  Thus, when he defines Will to Power--his replacement of Schopenhauer's Noumenal Will to Live--as Self-Overcoming, he is implicitly conceiving the Noumenal realm as the Evolutionary drive of the Species, even if he expresses disdain for Darwinism elsewhere.

Noumenon-Phenomenon, Volition-Cognition

Nietzsche, at least at the outset, adopts the Noumenon-Phenomenon dichotomy of Kant and Schopenhauer, joining the latter in applying it to the undermining of Modern Atomism.  In Birth of Tragedy, the Universal Will vs. Individual tension is interpreted as that of Dionysian vs. Apollinian, resolved in the Ego-shattering of ancient Tragedy.  Later, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche replaces Will to Live with Will to Power, but his introduction of Zarathustra in Gay Science with "The tragedy begins" suggests that he has not also abandoned the Noumenon-Phenomenon distinction.  Still, that variability of type of Will suggests that a different underlying dichotomy might be at issue--Volition vs. Cognition--with Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche privileging various versions of the former, i. e. Rational Will, Will to Live, or Will to Power, respectively.  But, regardless of which of the pair is conceived as superior, the dichotomy is not unanimously recognized.  For Spinoza, notably, they are two facets of the same life-force, on the basis of which the otherwise generally accepted dualism is derivative--abstracted from actual experience.  Similarly, therefore, Noumenon and Phenomenon are originally two dimensions of one and the same ordinary experience, the sundering of which becoming a Philosophical issue that is thus only contingent.

Particular, Individual, Variation

Modern Atomism has its roots in the the Theological concept of Individual Soul.  It is formally expressed in the replacement of the Aristotelian Quantifier Particular by Individual, which transforms the commensurable Universal-Particular pair into the antithesis of Universal vs. Individual.  Now, despite the potential repudiation of Atomism inherent in his fundamental Universal Will to Live principle, Schopenhauer perpetuates it by preserving Individual as the corresponding Quantifier.  Furthermore, despite relegating Individuality to ontological inferiority, he still dignifies it qua Principle of Individuation, seemingly unaware that a Principle connotes Universality.  Now one relaxation of this logical rigidity comes from outside Philosophy--Darwin's concept of Variation, which is more sharply contrasted with that of Universal than is Particular, but less than the polarization that Individual signifies.  The advantage to Schopenhauer of replacing Individual by Variation, would be that it grounds the concept of a Personal Will that his combination of Compassion and Self-Denial requires, but, which is groundless in his doctrine as is, as has been previously discussed.  However, that replacement would sacrifice the relegation of Personhood to the status of Maya that reflects the influence of Buddhism, but that only stunts his Moral doctrine.

Compassion, Noumenon, Self-Denial

Schopenhauer's Morality of Compassion combines neutralizing one's own desires and alleviating the suffering of others.  However, as straightforward as this complementarity may seem, it involves a significant incoherence.  For, the systematic basis of the priority of Compassion in Schopenhauer's system is the superiority of the unitary Noumenal Will to Live over Phenomenal multiplicity.  But the latter entails that any Individuality, and, hence, any Individual Selfhood, is a mere Phenomenon.  If so, then any proposed combination of such a Phenomenon and Noumenal Will--Self-Interest, Individual Will, etc., is ungrounded in his system.  Accordingly, the only meaning that 'self-denial' could have is 'recognition that the Self is a mere Phenomenon', not 'negation of selfish desire'.  Furthermore, the problem is not easily rectified, since any introduction of a middle term between Will and Self would violate the rigid antitheses--Noumenon vs. Phenomenon, Universal vs. Individual--that are the grounds of the doctrine.  So, Schopenhauer has in his discovery of a Universal Will to Live a basis for a repudiation of the Atomism that dominates both the Rationalism and Empiricism of the era, but the conceptual resources at his disposal, themselves products of that Atomism, hinder a coherent development of it.

Sympathy, Noumenon, Phenomenon

Schopenhauer adopts Kant's Phenomenon-Noumenon distinction, and agrees that the latter is the superior realm.  In other words, he shares with Kant a Noumenal Morality.  However, he diverges from his predecessor by positing that the Noumenon is the Will to Live, while Reason functions no more than to totalize Phenomena.  Now, the experience of that Noumenon, which is one and the same in all cases, constitutes Sympathy, according to Schopenhauer.  But this Morality of Universal Sympathy is profoundly different from Hume's.  For, the latter is merely Phenomenal, based on one's perception of similarity with others, as opposed to one's realization, despite appearances, of being at bottom one and the same as them.  So, Schopenhauer's Morality of Universal Sympathy also implies a criticism of the Atomism of the doctrine of Sympathy of Hume, and of many others.

Morality, Rationality, Will to Live

Schopenhauer presents a Humean response to Kant's Rationalist Morality: 1. Morality is based on Sympathy, which is grounded on a universal Will to Live; and 2. Kant's attempt to link Virtue to an external reward exposes his concept of Reason as Instrumental.  Now, the insufficiency of #2 is that it does not apply to the dimensions of Kant's doctrine, previously discussed, which are independent of what is arguably an overreaching by Kant, or, to, equivalently, Spinoza's more rigorous concept of Rational Ethics.  But #1 is based on a significant systematic confusion that squanders a deeper insight.  For Schopenhauer, only the universal Will to Live is real, with respect to which Individuation is sub-real in some respect that Schopenhauer does not fully explain.  But if Individuation is sub-real--mere appearance? epiphenomenon? illusion?--then so, too, is Egoism, from which it follows that Instrumental Reason is at the service of a Passion that can only be Universal, not Selfish.  What Schopenhauer briefly glimpses is the concept of an Individual Human whose behavior is a manifestation of a Species drive, localized in that member, just as blinking, while localized at an eye, is still part of the neurological system of an entire organism.  But, he instead directs this potential Evolutionist insight to Kant's regression--from a Rationalist Morality to one oriented towards traditional Theology.

Versatility, Virtue, Reward

Perhaps the least studied of Kant's four Duties is the 'imperfect Duty to oneself'. However, this one might be the most significant of them.  His example is 'one should not let one's talents rust', or, conversely, 'one should cultivate one's powers'.  But, a power is Know-How, so, this Duty promotes Technical Reason, the same faculty that devises the Means-End relation that constitutes a Maxim.  Furthermore, the principle that requires it is Universal, and, so, is applicable to all Humans, but questionably to any incorporeal of the inhabitants of his Rational Kingdom.  Hence, the Duty is equivalent to the promotion of the Versatility of the Human Species, i. e. equivalent to its Evolvement, as has been previously discussed.  Now, many find satisfaction in the cultivation of their talents, and the fulfillment of a Duty in Kant's doctrine is a Virtue.  Thus, at the heart of the doctrine is an example of a self-rewarding Rational Virtue that obviates the purported Necessity of a deity that rewards Virtue, and, hence, a moment therein that anticipates the threat of Evolutionism to traditional Theology.

Writing, Morality, Adaptation

'Scribere' is Latin for 'to write'.  A description with respect to an Environment is writing that aims at fidelity to it.  A prescription with respect to an Environment is writing that tries to articulate how to use it.  Now, two dimensions of Kant's response to Hume are that of a contrast of Morality as autonomous and prescriptive vs. Morality as heteronomous and descriptive.  The contrast is, thus, likewise, that of Writing as part of a Human Adaptation-Of an Environment vs. Writing as part of a Human Adaptation-To an Environment.

Morality and Writing

Communication is a significant factor in social organization.  So, a significant factor in the versatility of Human social organization is the peerless versatility of one of its primary modes of communication--writing.  Thus, likewise, insofar as Morality consists in an internal organization of a Species, as has previously discussed, the versatility of Human Morality derives at least in part from that of the Writing by which it is transmitted amongst its members.  Thus, the Ten Commandments are distinctive because they are the purported product of a divine writer, as is the book in which it appears.  In other words, in one of the most venerable of Human behavioral codes, the combination of Morality and Writing is deified, as is the versatility that characterizes them.

Morality and Versatility

As has been previously discussed, one definition of 'to evolve' is 'to increase versatility'.  Such increase in versatility is evident throughout the course of Human history thus far: from the distinctive thumb, to the multifarious use of tools, to travel where no terrestrial species ever has before.  A further example is, as has been previously discussed, the versatility of internal organization of the Human species--from rigidly homogenized, to loosely dissipated--including varieties of Moral codes.  So, if Morality is a distinctively Human characteristic, it is not, as Darwinists propose, insofar as its members have a greater propensity for cooperation than do members of other species, it is insofar as it is capable of much greater versatility of internal organization.

Egoism, Species, Adaptation

The contemporary association of 'morality' with collective values, in both specialist and casual contexts, tends to obscure that Egoism is one of the oldest and still commonest, e. g. Capitalism, of Moral doctrines.  Now, Egoism does not refute the thesis that Morality is an internal organization of a Species for adaptive purposes.  For, it can arise when a social homogeneity, itself of adaptive value, becomes stagnant, and stifles vitality.  In European history, such stagnation afflicts the late Medieval era, characterized by a Morality of submission to Theological authority.  A transition to Egoism is thus signalled by Descartes' Cognito, and Locke's Tabula Rasa Sense-Experience.  Furthermore, just as the concept of Individual both distinguishes and is generic, such Egoism both dissolves localized social homogeneity, and prepares for a more general assimilation, i. e. every Human is an Individual Human.  So, there is nothing paradoxical about the concept of Egoism as an adaptive strategy of the Species, which entails that Universalism is not an eternal normative principle.  Accordingly, contemporary political rhetoric in which routine Capitalist behavior is classified as 'immoral' only devalues Morality, thereby neutralizing what might be legitimate criticism.

Adaptation and Varieties of Morality

Evolutionists since Darwin have conceived Human 'Morality' to be a manifestation of 'superiority', based on the observations of more cooperative behavior than that among chimps.  So, presupposed in such a conception is that 'Morality' consists in a corrective to selfish behavior, and it ignores the plain evidence of regimented instinctual mass behavior in many 'lower' species.  An alternative concept begins with Marx's insight that tool-use is the distinctive Human characteristic, and the premise that internal organization is an adaptive strategy of the Human species.  On those bases, the scope of 'Morality' is indeed the entire species, but with no fixed structure.  In other words, the Universality of the scope of Morality is not to be confused with the Universality as a normative criterion, an error that Kant seems to make.  Accordingly, the diaspora by which the species spreads around the planet from a single location at an early phase of its history, the Individualism of the post-Medieval era, and the subsequent tendencies towards Cosmopolitanism, are each examples of 'Morality'.  So, if the standard Evolutionist concepts of the relation between 'Evolution' and 'Morality' are any indication, ideologies are as slow to assimilate the full implications of Darwin's discoveries as they have been with those of Copernicus, Galileo, etc.

Art, Morality, Adaptation

Kant's formulation that 'Beauty is a Symbol of Morality' would seem to entail that the production of Beauty and the production of Morality are analogous in some respect.  Or, in other words, it entails that Genius and Pure Practical Reason correspond in some respect.  Now, each has a super-personal source.  Furthermore, that a product of Genius, be, according to Kant, "exemplary", is logically equivalent to the condition that a Maxim be Universalizable.  However, where Morality diverges in the analogy is from the condition that the product of Genius, according to Kant, be "original".  At the root of the divergence is the implicit premise that Morality is eternal, while Art is historically-conditioned. On the other hand, if, as has been previously discussed, Morality prescribes an internal re-organization of the Species, as an adaptive strategy, then the premise that Morality presents an eternal remedy, e. g. Universality, for an eternal flaw, e. g. Selfishness, is undermined.  On that basis, the analogy between Genius and Pure Practical Reason entails, the contrary, that the latter, like the former, has Transformal Causality, i. e. it serves to modify a previous internal organization of the Species, for some new adaptive purpose.  Accordingly, the divergence of Morality from Art is due to an abstraction by Kant of the former from its historical context, i. e. from having as its antecedent an era in which Individuation is an adaptive strategy of the Species, expressed as a Morality of Self-Interest.

Morality, Universality, Species

Hume and Kant share a general structure of the content of Morality--a Universalist principle correcting Selfish behavior.  The main difference between the two is the source of the principle in individual experience--Sympathy vs. Reason.  In this specific contrast, Kant seems to have the advantage, since Reason is itself the origin of the concept of Universality, whereas, Hume has at his disposal only a concept of interpersonal Similarity that must be generalized from the base case of one and one other.  But the mysteriousness of the source of Universality in Kant's system--Noumenal impersonal Reason--signifies more than Universalist content.  The allusion to a 'Technic of Nature' suggests the possibility of a transcendent source of Morality, which, in the context of the Critique of Teleological Judgment might be a deity that is analogous to an artist in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment.  But, it is not until Darwinism, with the focus on a Species, that it becomes conceivable that that source of Human Morality is the Species itself, in which case Universality signifies a genesis and a scope of Morality, above and beyond its content.  On that basis, the content of Morality might be Individualistic, e. g. Egoism, while its scope is still Universal, i. e. its scope is the entire Species, serving a function of the latter, e. g. an adaptive strategy. So, nascent in Kantian Morality is a more radical shift than one of content--one of function.

Species, Adaptation, Morality

A Species can be conceived as an Organism, and its members as constituent sub-Organisms.  The internal organization of a Species can be an adaptive strategy, either an Adaptation-To or an Adaptation-Of its Environment.  Hence, any such strategy is an expression of Technical Reason.  Furthermore, organization is a product of Formal Causality, and, accordingly, re-organization is the product of Transformal Causality, previously introduced here.  So, as has been previously discussed, Transformal Causality and Technical Reason can be Noumenal in Kant's system.  Therefore, his Pure Practical Reason can be a manifestation of an effort of the Species to re-organize its members, interpreted by Kant as a counter to the Selfishness that is characteristic of the adaptive individualizing strategy of the Species in the previous era.  In other words, Kant's Universalist Morality is an interpretation of the Technical Reason of the Species, but the concept of Morality as an Ecological strategy is difficult to recognize so long as it is conceived as Theologically determined.

Noumenon, Formal Causality, Organism

A cardinal principle of Kant's system is the possibility of a Noumenal Cause of a Phenomenal Effect.  In the Critique of Judgment, such Causality is Teleological, e. g. Purposive behavior, since a Purpose is non-sensible.  Now, probably the most important Noumenal Causality in the system is that of Pure Practical Reason.  However, that Causality is not Teleological, so, since the only other Causality that Kant recognizes is Efficient, i. e. Mechanical, by default, the Causality of Pure Practical Reason must be Efficient.  However, there is a third possibility, a Causality that is implicit throughout his system, the source of Synthesis--Formal Causality.  Thus, the imposition of the criterion of Universality on individual behavior, by Pure Practical Reason, can easily be classified as Formal Causality.  Furthermore, instead of the awkward definition of Organism in terms of Teleological Causality, i. e. a system of reciprocal Purposes, it can instead be more elegantly defined as a manifold of functions unified by a Formal Cause.  Plus, since that definition leaves the scope of its application indeterminate, both a Species, and each of its members alike, can be conceived as an Organism.  On that basis, the source of Pure Practical Reason can be the Formal Causality of the Species, i. e.  influencing the behavior of one of its members.  So, at Kant's disposal is an Organicism that would be visionary for its time, but he is more concerned to devote his innovations to undoing the damage done to traditional Theology by the Copernican Revolution.

Action and Copernican Revolution

At the beginning of Matter and Memory, Bergson describes the fundamental immediate scenario of Human individual experience--one as the origin of possible action on the surrounding world, into which cognition and other mental processes are incorporated.  But subsequently , like most of the Philosophical tradition, Bergson, subordinates Action to Cognition, in his case, Action qua Material to Memory qua Spiritual. Kant, too, briefly potentially incorporates Cognition into Action, under the rubric of subordinating Theory to Practice.  But it is only at the end of his trilogy that the meaning of that subordination becomes clear.  He begins the trilogy with a 'Copernican Revolution' in Cognition, and closes it with a concept of Human Moral experience as the Telos of Nature.  But that concept is nothing other than Anthropocentrism, a concept the repudiation of which is entailed by the repudiation of Geocentrism, which is a consequence of Copernican Astronomy.  In other words, Kant begins with a Copernican Revolution in Theory, and ends with a counter-Copernican Revolution in Practice, with the latter as ultimately prior in his system.  So, Kant does briefly restore Action to the center of the Human world, but only as constrained by a hope for the beneficence of a deity that inhabits an inaccessible encompassing realm.  As subsequent events have shown, that constraint has not prevented a sequence of Human actions that have led them into a celestial realm the presumed inaccessibility of which is debunked by the Copernican Revolution in Astronomy.

Theory, Practice, Techne

Kant relies on Techne in the Critique of Judgment, in two ways.  First, and most prominent, he attributes to a 'Technic'  an Organic concept of Nature, the ultimate purpose of which is to serve as a medium for the Moral and Theological experience of individual Humans--by means of which the occurrence of Happiness can be judged to be a divine reward for Virtue.  Second, and only as a footnote, he classifies the Hypothetical Imperative, i. e. 'Do A as a means to B', as 'Technical', overriding his earlier classification of it as 'Practical', and diverging from Aristotle's traditional criterion for distinguishing between Techne and Praxis.  Accordingly, insofar as this concept of Technic combines Theory and Practice, the Third Critique systematically unifies the first two.  Now, alternatively possible on the basis of these same conceptual resources, is a concept of the Human species as an Organism that organizes its members, and their individual exercises of Technical Reason, by means of a general Technic, which they personally experience as what Kant calls 'Pure Practical Reason'.  But, this alternative unification of Theory and Practice, one that foreshadows Organicism and Ecologism, is preempted by his Theological commitments.

Religion and Adaptation

From its earliest days, Human society has involved appeals to assistance from a deity in the promotion of vital processes.  In other words, Religion has always been part of how it has adapted to its environment, and the deity addressed is implicitly conceived as subsisting in that environment.  Theological systematization, no matter how elaborately developed, does not change that Ecological status.  For example, the Geocentrist Heaven that encompasses the Human world, from which a Fall, and to which an Ascension, constitute the primary content of appeals to a deity for help, is thus part of the Human environment.  Nor does the post-Geocentrist Spirit vs. Matter transformation of the Heaven-Earth contrast alter the Ecological status of both realms, and of the deity that rules both of them, i. e. as constituting the Human Environment, to which Religion is an Adaptation strategy.  Likewise, as Theologically radical as Kant's proof of the existence of a deity on the basis of Pure Practical Reason might be, the role in his system of mundane Happiness that is a divine reward for Rational conduct is still part of an Adaptation-To an Environment.   His concept of Autonomy connotes a moment of liberation from a dependence on an Environment, but by hoping that such independence be rewarded, he surrenders it.

Causality and Noumenon

The most important distinction in Kant's system is that between Phenomenon and Noumenon, the most important thesis regarding which is that the latter has causal efficacy with respect to the former, but not vice versa.  On that basis, he posits that Reason is a Noumenal Cause, thereby immunizing it from both of Hume's main theses--by arguing that the concept of Causality as a Constant Conjunction, and that of Reason as the slave of Passion, each applies only to Phenomena.  Accordingly, the Noumenon-Phenomenon distinction could be taken to signify a new era in Human history--that of a causal efficacy with respect to its Environment that is not a mere reaction to it, i. e. a transition to Adaptation-Of as its primary of interaction with its Environment. However, there is a more traditional ground to that distinction.  The repudiation of Geocentrism creates a Theological crisis--by displacing the deity from physical contiguity with the Human world, the concept of divine causal efficacy becomes groundless, and, hence, problematic for a doctrine such as Theism, according to which divine intervention in Human affairs is always possible, though not necessarily always actual.  So, the Phenomenon-Noumenon distinction provides a home for that deity, and a new ground for its causal efficacy.  Now, much of Kant's trilogy seems to express the more secular of the two orientations, perhaps one that foreshadows an Ecological concept of Human history.  But, the dedication of the final sections of the Critique trilogy to a restoration of the the existence and power of a deity, i. e. at the very end of a discussion of Teleology in the Third Critique,  is indicative of what Kant's ultimate priority is.

Reason and Sufficient Reason

The Principle of Sufficient Reason is generally considered to be a description of how Reason functions, with, according to Schopenhauer, four varieties, one of which is Physical Causality, the formulation of which is: Everything that occurs is the effect of a preceding cause that sufficiently determines it.  But, the Principle can be normative, as well, in two different ways.  First, it can emphasize the criterion of Sufficiency in the specific use of Reason, one significant application of which is to Hume's concept of Causality, since Constant Conjunction does not explain Sufficiency.  Second, it can similarly apply to the use itself of Reason--requiring sufficient grounds for any use.  For example, according to Kant, the measure of Sufficiency is Universality, so any use of Reason that is not Universalizable is insufficiently Rational.  But that formulation is nothing other than that of his Principle of Pure Practical Reason, i. e. is the Principle of Sufficient Reason applied to Maxims of behavior, e. g. to notably  Hume's concept of Instrumental Reason.  But, having established an autonomy of Reason, one which arguably every Philosopher, even the Skeptic, adheres to, he attempts to further derive a concept of a deity from autonomous Reason--one which rewards Rational behavior.  However, if a deity is required to reward Rational behavior, then the latter is in itself insufficient to that end, and, hence, violates the Principle of Sufficient Reason.  Kant thus squanders an insight with potentially radical consequences.

Passion, Reason, Adaptation

Kant's response to Hume regarding the relation between Passion and Reason is more radical than it is often taken to be.  The main point of that response is that Hume's thesis applies to Instrumental Reason, i. e. to the use of Reason in determining the Means to Ends, but not to Pure Practical Reason, in which Reason functions to mediate interpersonal relations.  The specific decisive evidence, according to Kant, is that this Reason can control the Passions, which prompts Schopenhauer, implicitly defending Hume, to argue that Kantian Reason has ulterior passionate motives.  However, Kant's Copernican Revolution suggests that at issue is more than an internal Psychological struggle.  For, from an Ecologic perspective, Kant, perhaps inspired by the emergence of Automation, detects that the basic Human Experience is undergoing a more radical transformation: from Adaptation-To to Adaptation-Of, with Reason emerging as Technical Reason.  However, because of his Theological commitments, in this pre-Darwinian period, he can develop his insight only in terms of a Psychological struggle between Heteronomous and Autonomous influences, i. e. between Passion and Reason.

Power, Causality, Adaptation

The popular image of Nietzsche's concept of Will to Power as a promotion of political deceit and brutality falsifies it.  It is a descriptive theory of all human behavior, not a prescription for some, the immediate target of which is Schopenhauer's more traditional descriptive principle Will to Live, the immediate application of which is to Schopenhauer's promotion of a denial of the Will to Live--by exposing the Will to Power that is at the root of that doctrine of apparent Willlessness.  So, the full implications of Nietzsche's novel thesis have generally remained unexplored, including how it bears on one of the central topics of Modern Philosophy--Causality.  From the perspective of Newtonian Physics, which strongly influences the Philosophical concepts of Physics, notably those of Hume and Kant, Power is derived from Causality, i. e. from Force, Distance, and Time. But, from the perspective of the Will to Power, Causality is an abstraction from Power, as is Theory from Practice.  On that basis, any mystery regarding how 'A causes B' is transformed into 'A is a means to B' is easily resolved--the determination of the former is, from the outset, motivated not by idle curiosity, but by a drive to increase Power.  Likewise, the Adaptation-Of its Environment, far exceeding any Adaptation-To it, that distinguishes the Human species, especially in the past several centuries, is strong evidence of the correctness of Nietzsche's thesis.

Adaptation and Social Organization

Insofar as a Species is the organic whole of its members, it is itself an Organism.  Accordingly, it has its own relation of Adaptation with its Environment, with its internal structure as a factor in that relation.  Thus, the social organization of a Species can be determined by either an Adaptation-To principle, or one that is an Adaptation-Of.  In Human history, the diaspora from its original location to the rest of the planet is one example of its Adaptation-To its Environment.  Another is any organization determined by dependence on natural resources, e. g. a basic agrarian society.  But, just as the development of instruments serving a variety of purposes--manufacturing, transportation, communication, etc.--is part of an Adaptation-Of the Human Environment, so, too,  is consequent social re-organization.  The affect of the Means of Production on social relations, the concept of which is central to Marxism, is one example of social re-organization that is determined by Adaptation-Of.  Others include high-speed transportation and communication.  So, Ecologism, according to which Adaptation is a fundamental principle, entails possible Political Philosophy and Economic Theory that are radically different than the Atomist doctrines of the Modern era, beginning with the very grounds for such studies and their objects.

Causality and Adaptation

Sometime after stealing fire from the gods, Prometheus might notice that fire can heat up or even burn an object in its vicinity.  According to Hume, his observation is constituted by a constant conjunction, while according to Kant, the connection is ordered.  However, neither of these analyses can explain how Prometheus might, on the basis of that observation, use fire to cook some raw meat, prior to eating it, i. e. can explain the transformation of 'A causes B' into 'A is a means to B'.  Now, as has been previously discussed, such a transformation involves a coordination of Adaptation-To and Adaptation-Of, no different than using the perception of a piece of fruit to guide the locating it and plucking it.  But, the latter coordination is accomplished by Formal Causality, i. e. the perception shapes the motility required to pick the fruit.  Using a Theory to achieve an End is no different--it guides what steps to take, e. g. build a fire, place the meat close to the fire, and eat it when it is sufficiently brown.  So, the prominent Modern concepts of Causality are inadequate to an Ecological process such as Adaptation.

Theory, Practice, Adaptation

A familiar example of the Adaptation-To an Environment by an Organism is a chameleon that taking on the coloring of its surroundings.  Another is an Organism must approach the location of an object in order to have access to it, e. g. a fruit hanging from a tree.  A third, is, as the seeking of fidelity to an object indicates, the effort to present it in perception or language, e. g. the formulation of a Theory. Thus, it is not incorrect to characterize such perception as 'mirroring' its object, or language as 'picturing' its object, despite the protestations of Rorty or Wittgenstein.  Instead, the more accurate criticism of such concepts is that they abstract Adaptation-To from Adaptation-Of, e. g. from the plucking and eating of the fruit, misleadingly implying an antithesis between Theory and Practice.  So, Marx's qualification of "only" interpreting the world signifies an incomplete process, not one that is antithetical to changing it.  However, he seems to miss the application of the contrast to his own concepts--Dialectical Materialism is an Adaptation-To an object, while Revolution is an Adaptation-Of it.