Saturday, February 28, 2015

Exertion, Freedom, Certainty.

Even if one fails in an attempt to do X, one has not failed in an attempt to attempt X. Indeed, the concept of an attempt to attempt is tautological, if not redundant. Hence, Exertion is independent of any of its objects, and incorporates a 'freedom' that is distinct from any that might be involved in choosing a specific course of action. Thus, broadening the Cartesian project to include Praxis can lead to the discovery that Exertion is in itself always Certain.

Friday, February 27, 2015

Conduct, Two Freedoms, Two Responsibilities

While Exertion is often obscured by what ensues, in cases where one 'tries harder', it is more clearly revealed as spontaneous self-activation, i. e. as a moment of 'freedom' in behavior. Now, in an automobile, the mechanism by which it moves, i. e. ignition, fuel-injection, combustion, etc., is distinct from the steering mechanism, though proper functioning of the vehicle requires both. Likewise, in an organism, that it moves, and where it moves to, are distinct processes, the combination of which is required for effective Motility, and, hence, for effective Action. Thus, the choice to set oneself in motion, and the decision as to where to go and what to do, are distinct. In other words, if there is any 'freedom' in conduct, there may be two, mutually independent, but which espousers of 'Freedom' rarely distinguish. Accordingly, insofar as 'Responsibility' is correlated with 'Freedom', their doctrines rarely distinguish two possible varieties of the former, as well.

Thursday, February 26, 2015

Exertion and Freedom

As can be discovered upon close examination, if there is any aspect of Experience over which one has complete control, it is Exertion, i. e. a successful attempt at even the simplest physiological motions depends on muscular and neurological health, each of which is susceptible to disease or injury, to which the attempt is immune. Hence, even the simplest Motility, let alone complicated Action, requires more than 'individual freedom', i. e. requires cooperation from factors other than itself. Still, some Atomists might argue that the source of Exertion is the 'individual Soul'. But, if so, absent a compelling explanation of Soul-Body Causality, which, e. g. neither Descartes nor Kant provides, their thesis has no actual, i. e. Political or Economic, implications. In contrast, a different dualism--the function-argument relation of Mathematics--avoids such familiar difficulties. On that model, Exertion always operates on something else that is given, e. g. on a physiological network. So, the absolute 'freedom' of action ascribed by Individualists to 'individuals', has no obvious correlate in actual experience.

Wednesday, February 25, 2015

Firstness, Individuality, Deity

As has been previously argued, the common concept of 'the individual' is a product of an abstraction from and an hypostasization of experiential Firstness, i. e. of one's capacity to set oneself in motion. However, such Motility does not occur in a vacuum. Rather, one has already been doing something, even if it is merely sitting in chair or lying on a bed sleeping, in relation to an environment. Hence, Motility, except in the case, if it exists, of a Prime Mover, is always a variation of some antecedent condition. So, Firstness, at least in the case of non-divine persons, is always relative to a context, and, hence, derivative 'individuality', and associated 'freedom of choice', are never absolute. In the doctrines that posit otherwise, the 'free' 'individual' is conceived on analogy with a sibling-less parent-less being, i. e. a monotheistic deity.

Tuesday, February 24, 2015

First-Person, Singular, Plural

The relation between the concepts First-Person Singular and First-Person Plural seems problematic. For, if the Firstness of the former denotes, as has been previously proposed, the centrality of one's Motility in one's experiential field, then its application to multiple agents is difficult to conceive by analogy. Accordingly, First-Person Plurality has often been characterized as abstract, if not illusory. However, a non-factual alternative to abstraction or illusion is possible--an Ethical concept, and, indeed, the We is the assumption of a Moral principle by the I that, therefore, does not conflict with its phenomenological Firstness, i. e. one can conceive of oneself as part of the manifestation of a We without contradicting the fact of one's inherent factual Motility. Furthermore, that such an assumption can have concrete implications, i. e. one's factual treatment of others, distinguishes such a concept from mere abstraction or illusion. In other words, I may be a Psychological concept, while We is a Moral one.

Monday, February 23, 2015

Capitalism and First-Person Singular

The standard grammatical category 'First-Person Singular', entails the possibility of a Second- and a Third-Person, as well as of Plural persons. However, from the 'I' of Capitalism, as a discrete 'individual', no ordinal continuum e. g. seconds, thirds, etc, emanates. Furthermore, the system does not recognize a 'We', and, lacking a Second-Person Singular, does not recognize a Second-Person Plural, either. Nor does Heidegger's 'They' supply a concept of Plurality, since what it connotes is too indefinite to entail any distinction between the quantities Singular and Plural. Instead, what is other than 'I' in Capitalism is simply a 'not-I that is essentially indifferent to its interests. So, the standard grammatical categories do not apply to it.

Sunday, February 22, 2015

Capitalism, Vitality, Inertia

Capitalism promotes both Self-Initiative and the accumulation of Wealth, and does not distinguish Self-Indulgence from Self-Interest. Now, the exercise of Self-Initiative is an expression of Vitality, whereas Possession, even great Possession, is as much a condition of Inertia as is Self-Indulgence. So, an internal contradiction of Capitalism other than Class Conflict is that it both promotes and undermines Vitality.

Saturday, February 21, 2015

Utility, Possession, Utilitarianism

Possession is fundamentally an inert condition, i. e. a static relation between a person and something. In contrast, in its ordinary usage, 'utility' connotes Vitality, i. e. because it entails the involvement of some object in a dynamic process. Now, in Utilitarianism, the 'utility' of something measures the degree of Pleasure that it causes, in oneself, according to Bentham, and, in others, as well, according to Mill. But, in both those varieties, Pleasure is a terminal state, with no further consequences, and, hence, is a static condition, i. e. it is a feeling that is merely possessed. In other words, Utilitarianism is ultimately a promotion of Inertia that corrupts the ordinary usage of its cardinal term.

Friday, February 20, 2015

Vitality, Self-Interest, Self-Indulgence

As has been previously discussed, one's promotion of one's Motility has priority over, but without precluding, one's promotion of the Motility of others. Now, Motility can also be understood as Vitality. Hence, one's promotion of one's vital Self-Interest does not preclude the promotion of that of others. In contrast, Self-Indulgence is a terminal state, entailing no further consequences. Thus, self-indulgent behavior is both anti-social, and a promotion of Inertia. Likewise, the common concept of the 'individual' as an isolated entity hypostasizes the vital Self, i. e. de-vitalizes it. So, Smith's brief worry that the mechanistic division of labor fragments a society misses the deeper problem of the promotion of Inertia, a problem that is already implicit in his failure to distinguish the promotion of one's vital Self-Interest from that of Self-Indulgence.

Thursday, February 19, 2015

Self-Interest and Self-Indulgence

One is 'first' to oneself in one's field of experience by virtue of one's Motility, i. e. one's capacity to initiate one's movements. Accordingly, others are 'second', 'third', etc. by virtue of one's Motility promoting theirs. Hence, one's self-interests are 'first' to oneself only insofar as they conduce to one's Motility, e. g. eating in order to energize oneself. On that basis, Self-Interest that does not conduce to one's Motility is Self-Indulgence, and, therefore, has no privileged status as 'first' among interests. So, an argument for a healthy 'Selfishness' would be that benefiting others requires first benefiting oneself, e. g. a well-fed person can benefit others more effectively than a hungry one can. In contrast, the common rhetoric that one should attend exclusively to one's own wishes is a promotion of Self-Indulgence.

Wednesday, February 18, 2015

Selfishness and Firstness

Advocates of 'Selfishness' rarely distinguish between two varieties--Psychological and Moral. According to the former, an organism can act only in its own interest, i. e. apparent other-oriented behavior always has an ulterior selfish motive. According to the latter, one can ultimately promote the interests of others, but one should not. Now, though Smith does not explicitly address the distinction, his advocacy is arguably of the Moral variety, since he does recognize the capacity of humans to be motivated by Sympathy. Likewise, the general tenor of contemporary Capitalist rhetoric suggests that it follows Smith in this respect. But, regardless of the differences between the two varieties, they are both ill-formed. For, as can be easily observed in ordinary experience, choices are not constrained by a Self-Other mutual exclusivity, but range over a continuum of possibilities, awaiting a determination of an ordering of priorities. So, without distorting that context, in actual selfish behavior, whether instinctive or elective, one's own interests are set as first, without precluding the possibility that the interests of another can, at the same time, without conflict, be set as, and acted upon as, second, etc. Thus, contemporary advocates of 'Selfishness' corrupt this familiar characteristic of everyday experience into a fictitious Political antagonism.

Tuesday, February 17, 2015

First and Individual

Counting is a continuous, cumulative process. Thus, though it is commonly conducted in the medium of Cardinal, i. e. discrete, Numbers, i. e. #1, #2, #3, etc., they are abstractions from the continuum of Ordinal Numbers, i. e. First, Second, Third, etc. Thus, the quantity One is an abstraction from First, that, therefore, gets segregated from subsequent members of the continuum. Now, the field of the ordinary experience of each person is a continuum in which one appears to oneself as 'First', with respect to which others, as relatively more remote, are 'Seconds', 'Thirds', etc. Thus, the concept of oneself as an 'individual', i. e. as a quantity of One, fragments the experiential field, thereby isolating oneself from others. As a result, what is originally an ordered continuum of Self and Others, gets corrupted into a mutually exclusive Self-Other antithesis, typically expressed in apparent antagonisms, such as 'Selfishness vs. Altruism'. In other words, some staples of contemporary Political debates are figments of a corrupted mindset.

Monday, February 16, 2015

Diversification and Mutation

One context in which Diversification is recognized as a potentially progressive development is in Evolutionary Theory, i. e. Mutation. But, as the example of the emergence of opposing thumbs illustrates, the mere variation of the previous 'hand' is only potentially an asset, an actual advantage depending on whether or not the new growths are effectively integrated with the pre-existing appendages. Thus, Mutation is instructive for social Diversification--to benefit a collective, the introduction of new and different members must be welcomed, and without their novel characteristics being suppressed.

Sunday, February 15, 2015

Diversification, Difference, Negation

The generally not fully appreciated significance of the studies of Difference by Deleuze and Derrida is that they constitute the first positive concepts of Diversification in intellectual history, in any tradition, regardless of the appreciation of Variety in ordinary experience. For, typically hitherto, either Multiplicity is presented as given, e. g. in Atomism, or else as a diminishment of Unity or of Nothingness. Deleuze emphasizes the positive character of his Difference when contrasting it with the Negative moment of the Dialectic. But, the same contrast applies to some non-Dialectical cardinal concepts, notably Independence, Freedom, and Individuation qua isolation.

Saturday, February 14, 2015

Diversification, Freedom, Individuation, Equality

Diversification produces a distinctive entity, but not one that can thereby be characterized as 'free'. For, the difference of that entity is with respect to some antecedence, so it cannot be conceived in independence from what precedes it. Furthermore, insofar as the process generates a numerically single new element, it does not reduce to logical Individuation. For, Individual in that respect is always of a certain type, whereas, in some cases, e. g. Mutation, the novel item may not be of exactly the same type as that of which it is a variation. Finally, while the process entails no hierarchical ordering, it does not therefore reduce to an egalitarian development, either. For, mere Difference precedes any determination either of Inequality, or of Equality. So, none of these standard socio-political concepts seems adequate to Diversification.

Friday, February 13, 2015

Pluralization, Diversification, Xenophobia

Pluralization is a special case--quantitative--of Diversification. In other words, while the former increases the number of constituents of a system, the latter introduces new qualities into it. So, Diversification can be the occasion of an increase in the strength of a system, e. g. in Business, it is recognized as growth. Thus, the treatment of 'diversity' as a problem to be overcome with 'tolerance' reflects a xenophobic condition, as does the interpretation of Diversification as a 'dilution of purity'.

Thursday, February 12, 2015

Independence and Inter-Dependability

Inter-Dependability is familiar in any team sport, and in any collective artistic performance, e. g. an orchestra. Independence is familiar in any individual sport, and in any solo artistic performance, e. g. a painter. Now, Inter-Dependability entails Dependence, since each member of the collective relies on every other. But, it does not entail Independence, which entails no relation with another. Nevertheless, for contemporary 'individualists', the ideal 'society' is an assembly of solo performers, with respect to each of which Inter-Dependability is an imposition.

Wednesday, February 11, 2015

Dependence, Reliability, Rationality

As has been previously discussed, the substantive superior correlate to Dependence is not Independence, but Reliability. Still, the latter, like Dependability, is defined from an external perspective. Now, the underlying internal characteristic of Reliability is Consistency. But, Consistency in conduct is a manifestation of a Rational principle. Thus, even if it is not widely recognized by contemporary 'individualists', the substantive overcoming of Dependence requires Rationality.

Tuesday, February 10, 2015

Dependence, Independence, Reliability

Independence is generally regarded as superior to Dependence. However, that priority is itself contingent on circumstances. For, if the antecedent condition is one of Interdependence, then Independence connotes a loss of trust and an unraveling of a social fabric. Furthermore, Independence has no positive content on which to base a comparison. Now, the underlying problem in these evaluations is that the concept of which Independence is the negation is itself a negative one, which preempts the possibility of establishing a positive criterion for these interrelations. Instead, an alternative ground of them can be the converse of Dependence--Reliability, with respect to which Dependence is Unreliability, and, thus, in turn, improvement with respect to which is the achievement of Reliability. The result is, therefore, not social disintegration, i. e. an aggregate of mutually independent entities, but a network of mutually reliable members.

Monday, February 9, 2015

Pluralization and Freedom

Pluralization consists in a positive variation of some given condition. In contrast, Freedom entails a mere negation of an antecedent. Thus, for example, the U. S. Declaration of Independence is a contentless negation of a prior relation to England, whereas the Constitution presents a positive variation on a Monarchic system. Likewise, it is no accident that today's 'individualists', who conceive themselves as independent of a collective, are among the staunchest advocates of 'freedom', often expressing themselves as mere opponents of some policy, without offering a constructive alternative.

Sunday, February 8, 2015

Friendship and We

While Aristotle's classification of Friendship as a topic in Ethics is rarely followed by his successors, its central feature is decisive in Kant's doctrine--the concept of treating another as 'another Self' is represented in the latter system as treating another as an 'End-in-itself'. Regardless, one of the shortcomings of Aristotle's concept is that treating another with such Respect does not suffice to account for other familiar aspects of Friendship--common interests, pursuits, and projects. So, more adequate to Friendship than a mere combination of an I and another I is We, the derivation of which in Aristotle's system may be as problematic as it is in Kant's.

Saturday, February 7, 2015

Individuality and Rationality

As has been previously discussed, the common meaning of 'individual' is antithetical to the standard Logical meaning of it, i. e. the latter connotes an instance of a Universal, while the former usually denotes a negation of some general type. In contrast with both is a third meaning of the term, one rarely used despite being the most literally precise of the three--'undivided'. Now, 'undivided' means 'internally consistent', and, hence, is a product of Rationality. Thus, the ideal of self-sufficiency associated with common 'Individualism' is achievable, and, is only achievable, according to Kant, on the basis of a ground that such 'Individualists' rarely invoke--a Rational principle.

Friday, February 6, 2015

Individualist and Nihilist

Both Logically and Grammatically, 'individual' is properly a quantifier, not a substantive. Thus, 'an individual' either connotes 'an individual X', or else is meaningless. Likewise, the product of a process of Individuation is an instance of some general type. But, a non-conformist is the negation of some general type, not an instance of it. Thus, some contemporary non-conformers, e. g. one conceived as 'self-sufficient', someone who is 'politically incorrect', etc., are often mis-characterized as 'Individualist', when 'Nihilist' would be more accurate.

Thursday, February 5, 2015

Individualism and Dogmatism

Error is not based on an Inadequate Idea per se; rather, it obtains when an Inadequate Idea is taken as if it were Adequate. Now, Spinoza is keenly aware that the attainment of Adequate Ideas is rare and difficult. However, that excuses neither inaction nor the perpetuation of ignorance. For, the alternative is a commitment to conduct on the best evidence available, in combination with persistence in the determination of the latter, i. e. a principle that emerges in Pragmatism. So, the fundamental problem with the Individualism that pervades American society is not so much its Inadequacy per se, but its Dogmatism, i. e. the insistence that each member is inherently incapable of conceiving themselves as part of a larger Plurality.

Wednesday, February 4, 2015

Pluralization, Individuation, Inadequacy

In some methodological contexts, a process of Abstraction is compounded, e. g. Cartesian Doubt, Lockeian tabula rasa, Husserlian Epoche, i. e. in them, Abstraction is effected, and then is itself abstracted from. Thus, the common Social Atomistic concept of the Individual is, as has been previously shown, the product of an abstraction from the process of Pluralization that is itself suppressed, yielding an apparent irreducible simple element. But, in ordinary experience, that concept emerges from a converse pattern, as is more appropriately characterized by Spinoza's term 'Inadequate Idea', or, even more accurately, 'Semi-Adequate Idea'. For, in its ordinary use, 'Individual' is short-sighted, i. e. it signifies a perception of a partial phenomenon that is interpreted as if it were complete. Accordingly, on the basis of spatio-temporal separation and the sense of one's Motility, one appears to oneself as fundamentally independent of others, which as current events regularly illustrate, suffices for Political purposes, but to the detriment of a Pluralistic concept of Society. Usually, a logical demonstration of the inadequacy of such a mindset is less effective in overcoming it than some deliberate educative process implemented at a more malleable stage of development. Such a process can begin with the realization that what one takes as a complete perception is actually incomplete.

Tuesday, February 3, 2015

Pluralization and Individualism

Individuation is Pluralization with the product abstracted from the generating process. The influence of the abstraction on human history has been pervasive and chronic. For, example, it is the ground of the Creator-Creation split of Theological Dualism, as well as of the relegation of the Individual to the status of mere illusion in Buddhism. Furthermore, its Political implications are familiar in contemporary American society--the ethos of 'rugged Individualism', which to Nietzsche, in Human, All Too Human, #45, constitutes an ignoble rabble. Spinoza's Pantheism, and Rousseau's General Will are among the first steps in undermining these related dogmas, though without fully exposing the abstraction at their source.

Monday, February 2, 2015

Empowerment and Technical Knowledge

Power, whether Political or Physiological, is Can-Do, and, more precisely, is Can-Do something specific, i. e. because Doing is essentially specific. Thus, the exercise of Power is always structured, expressed as Know-How, whether instictively, or in elaborate formulation. So, entailed in Empowerement, to a lesser or greater degree of explicitness, is the communication of Technical Knowledge, e. g. the U. S. Constitution empowers citizens by formulating how they can conduct themselves collectively.

Sunday, February 1, 2015

Pluralization, Empowerment, Democratization

A special case of Pluralization is Empowerment, which is a distributive, not a re-distributive process. For, as occurs in charging a battery, or in a dissemination of useful information, the increase in empowered entities is accomplished without detriment to the source. Likewise, the Democratization that is a product of Pluralization can be distinguished from that which results from a mere transfer of Power.