Thursday, February 28, 2013

Representation, Time, Will

To 'represent' means to 're-present'.  Thus, a represented object is fundamentally 'temporal' not because the subject locates it in some order of successiveness, as Schopenhauer conceives it, but because the process of representing an object is necessarily subsequent to its object.  Accordingly, in self-representation, the subject of representation and the object of representation are identical only on the basis of some extrinsic intellectual principle.  This is why it is not merely the case that Time is 'the form of Inner Sense', as Kant proposes, but that it is necessarily such.  Schopenhauer thus errs when he asserts the identity of the 'I' of 'I think', and the 'I' of 'I will' that appears to it in Inner Sense.  Likewise, insofar as he derives the possibility of the self-denial of the Will from the self-knowledge of the Will, his efforts to promote the former are self-defeating.

Wednesday, February 27, 2013

Phenomenon, Illusion, Will

What, in the World as Will and Representation, begin as Kantian 'phenomena', e. g. physical bodies, end as 'illusions'.  In contrast, at B69 of the 1st Critique, Kant clearly denies that "these objects are mere illusions."  He then proceeds, at B70, to diagnose the fundamental target of his entire Critical enterprise: "it is only when we ascribe objective reality to [subjective representations], that it becomes impossible for us to prevent everything from being transformed into mere illusion."  But, ascribing objective reality to a subjective representation is precisely and plainly what Schopenhauer does when what he first discovers as "I will", in #42 of the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, becomes impersonal 'Will' in WWR.  Hence, what, from a Kantian perspective, is illusory in Schopenhauer's system, is its purported noumenon, not its phenomena.

Tuesday, February 26, 2013

Music, Composition, Dancing

In #52 of World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer characterizes Music as "independent of the phenomenal world", as possibly existing "even if there were no world at all", as the innermost soul of the phenomenon without the body", and as perceived "with absolute exclusion of space".  Thus, his likening of a composer to a "somnambulist" undermines that concept of Music, because being a 'somnambulist' entails having a body, that exists in the phenomenal world, and that moves through space.  Accordingly, a composer is, rather, a special case of a dancer, who expresses Music as essentially phenomenal, spatial, and embodied.  Likewise, the function of Contemplation in the process of composition is not to catch a glimpse of some noumenal language, but to project an imaging of possible motion.  In other words, to compose is to actively structure, not to passively describe.

Monday, February 25, 2013

Suffering, Asceticsim, Oblivion

In #68 of World as Will and Representation, in the context of an exposition of Asceticism, Schopenhauer asserts that "With the complete abolition of knowledge the rest of the world would of itself also vanish into nothing, for there can be no object without a subject."  The key words in this statement are "also" and "world".  For, the former implies that the subject, as well, would vanish into nothing, while the latter is not qualified either as 'Will' or as 'Representation'.  So, with this assertion, Schopenhauer, perhaps unwittingly in the context, is promoting Oblivion, not Asceticism as the solution to suffering.  The conflation here is not incidental--in its diagnosis of suffering, his system vacillates between attributing it to the individuation that is the product of the severing of subject from object in Representation, and to the incessant striving of Will.  The ambiguity of 'world' in the assertion epitomizes that fundamental incoherence in his system.

Sunday, February 24, 2013

Life and Suffering

The perhaps cardinal tenet of Schopenhauer's doctrine is that "all life is suffering" (from #56 of World as Will and Representation).  He derives it from: 1. Life is Will-to-Live; 2. Will-to-Live is constant striving; 3. Striving can be, at best, only temporarily satisfied; and 4. Dissatisfaction is Suffering.  Now, as has been previously discussed, #1 is problematic, because he bases it on a contingent volitional interpretation of his own inner experience.  Furthermore, #3 entails that at least some striving is satisfied, and, hence, that not "all" Will-to-Live is suffering.  So, he shows no more than that his own experience is predominantly unsatisfactory, which might resonate on occasion with others, but which is inadequate as the cardinal tenet of a universal doctrine.

Saturday, February 23, 2013

Will and Life

Nietzsche suggests that given that Will is already alive, Schopenhauer's equation of 'Will' and 'Will-to-Live' is superfluous, a suggestion that Schophenhauer implicitly endorses when he dismisses 'death' as merely phenomenal.  However, the superfluity of the equation that poses a more serious threat to Schopenhauer's doctrine is the converse--that Life is Will.  For, as Heidegger proposes, any concept of 'will' is derived from Subjectivistic Psychology, as are the presumably noumenal characteristics that Schopenhauer attributes to it, i. e. "urge" and "striving".  Specifically vulnerable to Heidegger's challenge is the fundamental premise of Schopenhauer's theory of Will--that the volitional processes that he perceives in his own inner experience are noumenal, and are not merely already the objects of an interpretation.  Accordingly, Schopenhauer's own fundamental principle can be conceived as individualistic as he claims Kant's, i. e. Pure Reason, to be.

Friday, February 22, 2013

Music, Contemplation, Will

The perhaps epochal significance of Schopenhauer's theory of Music is that it posits Will as the essence of it, with respect to which, in the millennia-old Pythagorean mathematical concept, Music is "considered merely externally" (#52 of World as Will and Representation).  However, he does not concomitantly propose an analogously exclusive access to Music, unlike e. g. Bergson's 'Intuition', so, in his system, the preeminent experience of Music remains the same Contemplation that is that of Numbers and other traditional Platonic Ideas.  Thus, the ultimate value, for him, of Music, lies in the contemplation of it, insofar as the latter affords detachment from it, and, thus, from Will.  In that respect, the Contemplation of Music is less effective than the Contemplation of Will itself, and, is, therefore, of value only as preparation for the latter.

Thursday, February 21, 2013

Music, Phenomena, Temporality

Towards the end of #52 of World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer observes that "I might have much to add on the way in which music is perceived, namely in and through time alone, with absolute exclusion of space, . . . but I do not wish to make these remarks more lengthy."  However, what he omits is arguably essential to what he does present.  For, the segregation of the contemplation of Music from the representation of spatio-temporal phenomena is, to that point, at least, a cardinal feature of his system, plus the suggestion of an attribution of 'temporality' to Music also draws attention to the non-static character of noumenal Will.  Perhaps the significance of what he is avoiding is illustrated by contrast with Bergson's radical innovation at a similar juncture, i. e. the introduction of 'Duration' as Temporality appropriate to Music, and to a metaphysical principle, i. e. his 'Elan Vital'.  Accordingly, an analogous application of such an innovation to Schopenhauer's system would lead to his re-conceiving the phenomenal realm as spatial, but not temporal, i. e. the converse of his cited insight that the perception of Music excludes space.  Instead, what Schopenhauer leaves unexamined is more than a mere addendum to a concept of Time that, as is, seems overextended.

Wednesday, February 20, 2013

Art, Contemplation, Communication

In #36 of World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer asserts that the "sole aim" of Art is the "communication" of the "knowledge of Ideas".  Now, by 'knowledge of Ideas' he means Contemplation, which, according to his system, is a Will-less condition.  But, if it is Will-less, then it precludes any 'aim' that might motivate communication.  Furthermore, also in Contemplation, according to his theory, Individuality is dissolved, whereas Communication is a relation between at least two individuals.  So, granting him that Communication is at least part of Art, his system seems to lack the resources to represent that dimension of it.  In contrast, Kant's analysis of Aesthetic experience faces the converse problem--by preserving Individuality, it grounds the possibility of Communication, but to the neglect of an examination of both the absorption of an individual in an object of Beauty, and the subordination of one to impersonal Genius in the production of a work of Art.

Tuesday, February 19, 2013

Contemplation, Genius, Play

At first, according to Schopenhauer, Representation functions as what can be called Technical Reason, i. e. as the cognition of causal relations that can serve the Will-to-Life, a subordinate role from which it can free itself, by contemplating Ideas.  The "ability for such contemplation" is "genius", as he characterizes it in #36 of World as Will and Representation, in notable contrast with Kant, for whom the locus of of Genius is the process of production of a work of Art, as has been previously discussed.  The contrast thus highlights that for Schopenhauer, Genius is independent of physiological processes, a thesis that seems more difficult to defend in the case of a Dance performance than in that of writing Poetry.  But, if, Genius is indeed a characteristic of such processes, then the liberation from the tyranny of Will that it effects begins with the emergence of Technical Reason as informing Play, i. e. as skilled activity performed for its own sake, and not with some transcendence from that type of Representation.  Now, as has been previously discussed, though Kant acknowledges the liberating value of Play, his commitment to Deontological principles tempers his appreciation of it.  In contrast, because Schopenhauer ultimately seeks a complete escape from corporeality, he cannot even acknowledge that value.

Monday, February 18, 2013

World and Will

For Schopenhauer, the 'World' qua 'Representation' is, more precisely, the object of a representation of a totality of represented individual objects, and, hence, is itself an individual.  Now, as he derives it, the 'World' qua 'Will' begins with the discovery, by a subject of representation, of Will within itself qua one of its own objects of representation, i. e. within its own body.  In other words, as initially presented, Will and body are two aspects of one and the same subject of representation.  Then, according to Schopenhauer, the subject projects an analogous inner aspect, i. e. Will, to each of its represented objects, even though, unlike in its own case, it does not have direct access to it.  Accordingly, he derives the World qua Will from the World qua Representation as its inner correlate.  But, then, World qua Will is as individuated as is its correlated representation, which conflicts with his thesis that Will is independent of the Principle of Individuation.  In other words, Schopenhauer explains how the world can be Will, without explaining how Will can be a World.

Sunday, February 17, 2013

Noumenon, Vitalism, Pessimism

Schopenhauer finds little joy in what is his perhaps most significant philosophical innovation.  That innovation is the product of an inversion of Kant's concept of the relation between Physics and Biology, i. e. in which Kant derives the latter from the former via a heuristic hypothesis.  In contrast, for Schopenhauer, Biology, with its principle of Will, is fundamental, with respect to which Physics is a representation.  His system can thus be classified as 'Vitalistic', and as a forerunner of Bergson's and Nietzsche's, in that respect.  However, Will is not merely fundamental for Schopenhauer, it is noumenal, which means that the latter realm is constituted by an incessant striving that is the source of human suffering.  Thus, his inversion displaces from that realm Kant's God who is a source of a positive answer to the question 'What can I hope for?', resulting in a doctrine that he characterizes as 'Pessimism'.

Saturday, February 16, 2013

Noumenality and Plurality

Schopenhauer's assertions, in #23 of World as Will and Representation, that plurality is "possible only through" space and time, and that the noumenal realm is "free from plurality", implicitly challenge Kant's attribution of plurality to that realm, e. g. his Kingdom of Ends, and his a priori distinction between duties to self and duties to others.  Nevertheless, Schopenhauer attributes to his own concept of noumenal Will "a variance to itself" (#27), and differences of "degree of manifestation" (#21), a multiplicity that somehow is "foreign to plurality" (#25).  So, his challenge to Kant in this respect is not without its own complications.  Now, the problem for both is to reconcile three theses that each accepts: 1. The noumenal realm is the ground of phenomena; 2. The noumenal realm is independent of phenomena; and 3. The phenomenal realm is plural.  Accordingly, one solution to the problem is a concept of the noumenal realm as essentially and exhaustively consisting in the generation of phenomena, e. g. the identity of the Will-to-Live and the Principle of Individuation, in Schopenhauer's system.  However, that solution is untenable in both systems, which, alike, assert an absolute heterogeneity of the two realms that is the basis of the Moral doctrines of each.  Instead, each leaves unexplained the positing of distinctions where discernibility has presumably been precluded.

Friday, February 15, 2013

Will and Individuation

Popular psychological tends to interpret sexual impulse as a fundamentally subjective experience.  In contrast, Schopenhauer recognizes it as a species drive that occurs within an individual spatio-temporal locus.  Furthermore, he conceives that drive as exemplifying noumenal Will, with respect to which the popular interpretation is not merely superficial, but is an extrinsic phenomenal representation.  Now, just as he conceives perpetuation of the species to be the principle of reproduction, he conceives Will to be, more precisely,Will-to-Live.  Hence, he opposes the Will-to-Live to the Principle of Individuation, i. e. as essential noumenon to extrinsic phenomenon.  However, the reproductive drive does not merely appear in individuals as an object of representation--it produces individuals, an outcome that is much more difficult to dismiss as an extrinsic mere phenomenon.  In other words, Schopenhauer has no grounds for denying that Will is itself essentially a Principle of Individuation, and, hence, is, more accurately, a Will-to-Pluralize.

Thursday, February 14, 2013

Will and Self-Denial

When Schopenhauer characterizes the structure of Asceticism as 'self-denial', he means, more properly, "denial of the will-to-live".  But, despite the greater precision of the latter formulation, it abstracts from the reflexivity of the former, thereby enabling an evasion of any analysis of the subject of the process of denial.  Now, implicitly for Schopenhauer, that subject is the same will-to-live as the will-to-live that is being denied.  But, if so, then lacking is an explanation of how a negation can be derived from a principle consisting solely in persistence, a difficulty that convinces Spinoza of the logical impossibility of Suicide.  For, within Schopenhauer's system, Contemplation, as absorption in an object, might suffice to ground Compassion, but not Asceticism.  In contrast, Kant and Nietzsche each recognize Self-Denial as an instance of Self-Control, the basis of which must be a volitional principle that is an alternative to Will-to-Live, i. e. Pure Practical Reason, and Will-to-Power, respectively.

Wednesday, February 13, 2013

Morality, Asceticsim, Compassion

Schopenhauer conceives Morality consisting in Self-denial serving as a cure to human suffering.  Because suffering has two roots, 'self-denial' has two meanings to him.  The two roots are Individuality and Will, so, accordingly, Self-denial can be expressed in two ways--Compassion, in which Individuality is overcome, and Asceticism, in which the Will is suppressed.  Thus, insofar as Kant's Highest Good is of an individual, i. e. the combination of Virtue and Happiness, it fails as a Moral doctrine, from Schopenhauer's perspective.  However, Kant could respond, with Spinoza and Nietzsche, that the source of suffering is weakness, the solution to which is empowerment.  He could then point out that Schopenhauer implicitly agrees with that diagnosis, since Asceticism is an instance of self-empowerment that is inferior to the capacity of Reason.  Still, that response does not account for the 'duty', in Kant's doctrine, to promote the happiness of others, though not that of one's own, which does not necessarily empower others, thus effectively functioning as a duty of Compassion, and, thus, as vulnerable to Schopenhauer's challenge.

Tuesday, February 12, 2013

Noumenon, Reason, Happiness

According to Schopenhauer, the noumenal realm consists in undifferentiated 'Will', with respect to which Reason is demoted to operating on phenomena, at the service of empirical, differentiated, individuals, just as Hume argues.  Now, insofar as the principle of Pure Practical Reason  cannot be derived from empirical sources, and is self-evidently efficacious, as Kant argues, it is immune to Schopenhauer's proposed subordination of Reason.  However, once he starts attributing Plurality to the presumably inscrutable noumenal realm, i. e. when he speaks of a multiplicity of Rational subjects, he becomes vulnerable to Schopenhauer's challenge.  But, the perhaps fatal weakness in his doctrine is when he classifies Happiness as a Rational Good.  For, even with the latter as conditioned by Virtue, it leaves the principle wide open to the charge that it is merely part of a circuitous means to an individual's securing of personal Happiness, just as Hume might have suspected.

Monday, February 11, 2013

Genius, Morality, Theology

According to Kant, in #50 of the Critique of Judgment, Taste, the source of judgments of Beauty, "consists in disciplining genius".  It does so with the "morally good . . . in view" (#59).  Entailed in that Moral Good is a "moral theology". (#86).  Now, Nietzsche's system can be understood as inverting that hierarchy--its fundamental principle is a creative process, such as Genius, in terms of which Kantian Moral Theology is not merely derived, but is a degenerate mode.  But, within Kant's system itself, Genius is ascribed to Spirit, which is posited as identical to Reason.  Hence, not only does Nietzsche present a derivation of that Moral Theology that is an alternative the one that Kant offers, it suggests a conflict within Kant's doctrine, i. e. the generative principle of Pure Practical Reason vs. the totalizing deontological Highest Good of the doctrine, and even a usurpation of the former by the latter.

Sunday, February 10, 2013

Tragedy, Sublimity, Music

According to Kant, in #52 of the Critique of Judgment, tragic verses present an "exhibition" of Sublimity.  But, in his system, Sublimity is a product of Reflective Judgment.  Thus, his concept of the relation between Tragedy and Sublimity is mediated by Reflective Judgment, with Sublimity extrinsic to the events to which it is attributed..  In contrast, according to Nietzsche, those verses are born out of Music, the Schopenhauerian concept of which, that Nietzsche accepts, ix an expression of Genius.  Now, as has been previously argued here, Genius is itself Sublime, i. e. independent of subsequent judgment.  Thus, according to Nietzsche, Sublimity is a dynamic intrinsic factor in Tragedy, with respect to which Kant's concept of their relation is superficial.

Saturday, February 9, 2013

Crystallization, Genius, Sublimity

In #58 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant examines how Crystallization is a natural process that can produce a beautiful object.  It thus follows that insofar as "nature gives the rule to" (#46) the generation of human Art, i. e. via Genius, a performance such as Dance can be the product of Crystallization.  Furthermore, as has been previously argued here, Genius is sublime.  Hence, human Art can be constituted by a combination of Beauty and Sublimity, i. e. can more than merely present a beautiful "exhibition" of the latter, as Kant characterizes their combination at #52.

Friday, February 8, 2013

Judgment and Evaluation

The Critique of Judgment studies three judgments: 'X is beautiful', 'X is sublime', and 'X is an organism', united as products of Reflective Judgment, i. e. as entailing the structure of the positing of some universal proposition, given some particular data.  However, the three are distinguished in important respects.  For, example, each of the first two, but not the third, can also be classified as an 'evaluation'.  Also, while, each of the three claims universal validity, universal communicability is a dynamic factor in only judgments of Beauty.  Indeed, the salient characteristic of some judgments of Sublimity, i. e. that they denote finding safe haven in Reason in the face of fearful Nature, is individual.  On the other hand, that antagonism is also a factor in judgments of Beauty, i. e. insofar as they 'severely clip the wings', as he puts it #50, of powerful Nature, i. e. of Genius.  In such cases, Judgment thus exemplifies a function that Nietzsche attributes to the process of Evaluation--mastery over its object.

Thursday, February 7, 2013

Genius, Sublimity, Tragedy

In #46 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant observes that "Genius is the innate mental disposition through which nature gives the rule to art"  Now, it is unclear if he would go so far as to explicitly agree with Nietzsche that, in the process, the medium of Genius is "no longer an artist, has become a work of art", as it is characterized in section 1 of Birth of Tragedy, though agreement seems implicit in the possibility that Dance, which combines process and product, can be 'beautiful' in Kant's system.  Still, though he does briefly classify Tragedy as 'sublime', i. e. in the General Comment and #52, he shows none of Nietzsche's appreciation for the implication that the creative process, in which an individual is completely overwhelmed by Nature, is itself 'sublime', even as its product is judged as 'beautiful'.  But, if he had recognized Genius as occasioning Sublimity, he might have more sharply distinguished the pleasure enjoyed in transcending Nature to Reason, from the pleasure accompanying the representation of the universal communicability of Sublimity.  That is, he might have more sharply distinguished what Nietzsche calls the 'Apollinian' principle, from the 'Socratic' principle.

Wednesday, February 6, 2013

Beauty, Sublimity, Morality

In #23 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant characterizes the theory of the Sublime as "a mere appendix" to that of Beauty.  In contrast, in the General Comment, he conceives Sublimity as transcending Beauty as a cultivator of Morality.  For, as he explains in the latter passage, Beauty consists in "play", whereas Morality is a "task", involving "sacrifice or deprivation" that is found in Sublimity, not Beauty.  The vacillation illustrates a distinction between conceiving Beauty and Sublimity in themselves, and embedding them in a system that is dominated by Deontological Morality.

Tuesday, February 5, 2013

Sublimity, Rationality, Selflessness

Kant's theory of Sublimity elevates a minor recent intellectual curiosity to a perhaps unprecedented Philosophical status.  The curiosity, which intrigues Burke and others, is the compelling admixture of pleasure with pain involved in sublime experiences, an apparent defiance of Hedonistic Psychology.  Kant's Transcendental solution analyzes such experiences as consisting in painful self-belittlement serving as a prelude to self-elevation, i. e. the belittlement of the empirical self en route to the discovery of the Rational self.  This analysis is philosophically worthy for Kant, since it entails the systematic linking of Imagination and Reason, and of Beauty and Sublimity.  However, accordingly, this concept of Sublimity shares a weakness with that of Beauty that has been previously discussed--the lack of systematic resources for contending with the concept of Selflessness that can be extended from Schopenhauer's explanation of the experience of Beauty to that of Sublimity.  But it is not merely that the availability of a counter-example undermines the premise of Universalizability that is essential to Kant's concepts of both.  For, in Schopenhauer's system, Rational Totality is an inadequate approximation to Selflessness, so, likewise, the 'absolute largeness' of the former inadequately characterizes the Sublime, contrary to Kant's definition of the latter.

Monday, February 4, 2013

Infinitude and Totality

In #25 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant defines Sublimity in terms of the thesis that Infinitude is inferior to Totality, a thesis that has been disputed by many, on a variety of grounds, e. g. Levinas.  While Kant there esteems Totality as the achievement of what Infinitude can only vainly seek, opponents contend that it is inadequate to the singularities and the essentially unlimited processes that constitute Infinitude.  In either case, there is a significant example of the inversion in Kant's own Moral doctrine itself.  For, there, Virtue is the "supreme" Good, and a condition of the combination of it and Happiness, the "highest" Good.  Now, he characterizes Virtue as consisting in an "endless progress", and the Virtue-Happiness combination as "complete".  Thus, there, at least, Infinitude has priority over Totality for him.  Furthermore, insofar as Virtue is the immediate product of the principle of Pure Practical Reason, the latter, is, thus, too, a principle of Infinitude, in which case, the implication, in #25, that it is contrary to Reason, is misleading.

Sunday, February 3, 2013

Contemplation, Beauty, Communicability

According to Kant, 'X is beautiful' means 'The private pleasure that attends the contemplation of X is universally communicable", with the 'contemplation of X' consisting in an interaction of Imagination and Understanding.  In contrast, according to Schopenhauer, Contemplation is an event entailing loss of subjectivity.  On that basis, any subsequent evaluation of X that is based on a private feeling is antithetical to the engagement with X that precedes it.  Now, Kant's Aesthetic theory, which is formulated entirely in terms of the cognitive faculties, lacks the resources for disputing Schopenhauer's description of that moment, on either factual or interpretive grounds.  Thus, even if the pleasure that attends the contemplation of X is universally communicable, Kant's meaning of 'X is beautiful', is not.

Saturday, February 2, 2013

Communicability and Pluralism

Communication involves more than one participant.  Thus, grounding, for Kant, the entailment of the universal communicability in judgments of taste is the concept of the latter as necessarily "pluralistic . . . based on some a priori principle", as he puts it in the 'General Comment' that follows #29 of the Critique of Judgment.  However, a priori Pluralism is a problematic concept for not only his system, but for any.  For, it presupposes the possibility of noumenal differentiation, which is arguably indemonstrable, as, for example, some Medieval thinkers, as well as Schopenhauer, hold.  In other words, the thesis of the existence of a plurality of minds, souls, etc. is the product of sheer speculation, with differentiation a characteristic of phenomena alone, according to such views.  Indeed, Kant's theory that cognitive faculties are identical in distinct corporeal entities tends to support such positions.  So, the thesis of a priori Pluralism grounds his Aesthetic theory inadequately, a weakness which is, perhaps, the source of the problems with his concept of Communicability that have been previously discussed.

Friday, February 1, 2013

Universally Communicable Pleasure

Perhaps summing up Kant's Aesthetic theory is his assertion, from #32 of the Critique of Judgment, "To say, This flower is beautiful, is tantamount to a mere repetition of the flower's own claim to everyone's liking."  The assertion thus characterizes Aesthetic experience as consisting in a sequence of two distinct moments: 1. A compelling engagement with an object, and 2. A judging that the object is 'beautiful'.  Now, it is clear from his theory that #2 is a product of Reflective Judgment, in contrast with which the plainly figurative language that he uses to express #1, as well as the "tantamount to a mere repetition", that links the two moments, are less well-defined.  Still, his description suffices to at least provisionally establish that the first moment involves the production of pleasure, the ground of which is the object, a process that is distinct from the subsequent subjective formulation of a judgment.  To that extent, his concept of 'universally communicable pleasurable', that appears regularly elsewhere in the work as central to his theory, conflates those two moments, and those two processes, i. e. a conflation of the causing of pleasure by the object, with the subsequent communication of that enjoyment to others,via a judgment.