Representation, Time, Will

To 'represent' means to 're-present'.  Thus, a represented object is fundamentally 'temporal' not because the subject locates it in some order of successiveness, as Schopenhauer conceives it, but because the process of representing an object is necessarily subsequent to its object.  Accordingly, in self-representation, the subject of representation and the object of representation are identical only on the basis of some extrinsic intellectual principle.  This is why it is not merely the case that Time is 'the form of Inner Sense', as Kant proposes, but that it is necessarily such.  Schopenhauer thus errs when he asserts the identity of the 'I' of 'I think', and the 'I' of 'I will' that appears to it in Inner Sense.  Likewise, insofar as he derives the possibility of the self-denial of the Will from the self-knowledge of the Will, his efforts to promote the former are self-defeating.