World and Will

For Schopenhauer, the 'World' qua 'Representation' is, more precisely, the object of a representation of a totality of represented individual objects, and, hence, is itself an individual.  Now, as he derives it, the 'World' qua 'Will' begins with the discovery, by a subject of representation, of Will within itself qua one of its own objects of representation, i. e. within its own body.  In other words, as initially presented, Will and body are two aspects of one and the same subject of representation.  Then, according to Schopenhauer, the subject projects an analogous inner aspect, i. e. Will, to each of its represented objects, even though, unlike in its own case, it does not have direct access to it.  Accordingly, he derives the World qua Will from the World qua Representation as its inner correlate.  But, then, World qua Will is as individuated as is its correlated representation, which conflicts with his thesis that Will is independent of the Principle of Individuation.  In other words, Schopenhauer explains how the world can be Will, without explaining how Will can be a World.