Infinitude and Totality

In #25 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant defines Sublimity in terms of the thesis that Infinitude is inferior to Totality, a thesis that has been disputed by many, on a variety of grounds, e. g. Levinas.  While Kant there esteems Totality as the achievement of what Infinitude can only vainly seek, opponents contend that it is inadequate to the singularities and the essentially unlimited processes that constitute Infinitude.  In either case, there is a significant example of the inversion in Kant's own Moral doctrine itself.  For, there, Virtue is the "supreme" Good, and a condition of the combination of it and Happiness, the "highest" Good.  Now, he characterizes Virtue as consisting in an "endless progress", and the Virtue-Happiness combination as "complete".  Thus, there, at least, Infinitude has priority over Totality for him.  Furthermore, insofar as Virtue is the immediate product of the principle of Pure Practical Reason, the latter, is, thus, too, a principle of Infinitude, in which case, the implication, in #25, that it is contrary to Reason, is misleading.