Will, Doubt, Habit

Descartes' exercise in Doubt is offered, and is usually interpreted, in Epistemological and Metaphysical terms, i. e. as a demonstration that 'I think' is the basis of Knowledge, and that Mind and Body are separate. However, with a different set of premises, the project takes on Psychological and Moral significance. For, given that sense-experience is belief about sensory input, that such belief is part of the formation of a plan of action, and that doubt is effected, as Descartes himself implies, by Agito, then such Doubting effects a disruption of behavior, i. e. it is nascent digression from a course of action that would begin with one's current circumstances. More precisely, insofar as Action combines Will and Comprehension, i. e. combines indeterminate Motility and some cognitive representation that imparts structure to it, Doubting disengages the former from the latter, thereby dismantling Action. Thus, insofar as Doubting can disrupt behavior, it can disrupt habitual behavior, which has Psychological significance, and insofar as habitual behavior is undesirable, Moral significance.

Will and Belief

James' notion 'Will to Believe' is often regarded as conflicting with his Pragmatism. For, while the notion entails a leap of faith, without evidence, to the affirmation of the proposition 'God exists', the Pragmatist concept of Truth requires the verifiability of an assertion, the possibility of which seems lacking in James' expression of religious belief. His main defense, that that proposition is a working hypothesis, still does not explain how it can be tested, but, furthermore, it reflects a deeper problem for him--that while he and his pioneering colleagues have formulated a distinctive Pragmatist criterion of Truth, they, nevertheless, continue to accept, from a tradition from which they otherwise divergence, the concept of 'belief' as fundamentally truth-aspirational. In contrast, here, a Belief functions primarily as structurer of Will, i. e. it provides indeterminate Motility with organization, thereby resulting in concrete action. Thus, on this model, to believe that 'God exists' is to adopt it as a plan of conduct, one that might, e. g. influence how one treats others. So, a Belief, in this sense, can be evaluated in terms of, for example, effectiveness, but whether or not it is 'true' has no meaning in the context. Hence, Belief, as a determinant of Will, is more authentically pragmatic than a psychological state that aspires to Truth.

Will and Non Sequitur

'Non sequitur' literally means 'does not follow', but in some contexts, e. g. in Logic, it means, more precisely, 'does not follow according to the rules'. By contrast, in other contexts, it is not necessarily a lapse, for a well-placed non sequitur can enhance an artistic or a comedic project. Furthermore, where it is taken intellectually seriously is as a Zen Koan, by which a teacher attempts to stimulate the wakefulness of a student. This provocative capacity of a non sequitur is not as extrinsic as it can seem. For, it is a pure expression of Will, the principle of Variation in Experience, and, hence, as such, it can occasion the disruption of automatic thinking patterns, and of mechanical behavior, in general. It is thus a virtue of a non sequitur that it eludes formularization.

Will and Negation

In systems of Dialectics, doubting is a species of Negation, which, in coordination with a synthesizing process, i. e. Sublation, produces Absolute Knowledge. For Dialectical Materialists, thinking is, essentially, negative--it negates existing 'material' conditions, i. e. it expresses a conflict with them. Implicit in this Materialist concept of Negation is the notion of obliteration. Now, while obliteration can be glossed as the absolute elimination of its object, in actuality, the destruction of something does not effect its complete disappearance, but consists in the transformation of it into another state, e. g. to ashes or to dust. In other words, obliteration in experience is never more than a variation of conditions, which requires Will, the principle of Diversification. Accordingly, Dialectical 'Negation' is a mode of volitional thinking, just as 'the negation of X' always means ' other than X'.

Will, Thinking, Counter-Example

While Descartes holds that volition and thought are distinct processes, for Spinoza, they are one and the same. Now, insofar as, Will is a principle of Diversification, as it is defined here, and 'thinking' is a process of synthesizing, volition and thought are not only distinct, but are inversely related. On the other hand, insofar as Exteriorization is, following Levinas, experiential Diversification, and Cartesian doubting is a departure from the given, 'thinking' qua 'Cartesian doubting' is volitional. Likewise for Spinozistic 'thought', insofar as it is conceived as deduction, emanation, or expressive, each of which entails the explication of what is implicit in God, i. e. explication is a type of exteriorization. However, both varieties of thinking remain circumscribed by the scope of the given that they modify. In contrast, a more decisive transgression of the given is effected by the thinking that generates counter-examples, a truly agitative process that not only introduces a rogue element, but often provokes a subsequent quest for a more comprehensive theory that can better accommodate the novelty. Such 'thinking' better exemplifies the concept of Will than does that of either Descartes or Spinoza.

Will, Doubt, Belief

While walking, one might pause because one suddenly suspects that the pavement directly ahead might be covered in black ice. Entailed in that hesitation is--an impulse to step, a belief that the pavement ahead is as stable as that behind has been, and a doubt that the pavement ahead is as stable as it appears to be. By comparison, Descartes' doubt that his situation is as it appears to be is exposed as abstracting not only from some ongoing Motility, but from the context of the appearance--that it is the content of a belief. In other words, the immediate object of Cartesian doubt is not some data, but some belief regarding that data, a belief that is in the service of Motility. Thus, by suppressing the role of Belief in his meditative scenario, Descartes effects the abstraction of Intellect from its more fundamental function as a structurer of Will. Similarly, just as the hesitancy to step is a prelude to skirting the patch, the doubt of given data is an abstraction from nascent variation of Motility, and is not the effecting of detachment from corporeality, as Cartesianism and other doctrines have it.

Will, Epistemology, Foundationalism

Many of Descartes' successors disagree with his thesis that 'I am a thinking being' is the basis of Knowledge. Nevertheless, they remain Cartesians insofar as they conceive Philosophy fundamentally as a project of Epistemological Foundationalism, and insofar as they accept sedentary meditation as the prototype of Philosophical activity. Now, just as every sound itinerary begins with one's current location, every sound plan of action entails a perception of one's given situation. In other words, sedentary meditation is abstracted from its organic involvement in Motility, i. e. from its role in supplying the intellect with information that is essential to its structuring of Motility. Thus, the tradition of Epistemological Foundationalism--Rationalism, Empiricism, Phenomenology, etc.--presupposes and abstracts from the functioning of Will, the self-activation principle of Experience.

Will, Intellect, Praxis

To prove, against Hume, that Causality consists in more than a conjunction of images, Kant contrasts an 'objective' succession of images with a 'subjective' one--the former can not be experienced as otherwise, while the latter can be. In other words, the order of the objective succession is necessary, while that of the subjective one is not, and, that order is determined by a rule. However, he does not entertain that the objective succession might have been otherwise, e. g. something that rotates clockwise, rather than counterclockwise. Furthermore, he does not consider how the subjective succession per se is rule-governed--even if I might have walked counterclockwise around an object, insofar as I do walk clockwise around it, my Motility is rule-governed, i. e. is governed by the plan of action 'walking clockwise around the object'. This neglect is characteristic of the entire Cartesian meditative tradition--the failure to consider the role of Intellect in ordering Will qua Motility. If he had been interested in the intellectual structure of Action, Kant might have devised a set of Categories for Practical Reason.

Will, Doubt, Aporia

Descartes' demonstration of the unreliability of the senses is easily interpreted as a continuation of the Platonist tradition. However, a more careful examination of his philosophical DNA suggests a different genealogy. His 'I am certain that I am a doubting being' is more immediately akin to Socrates' 'I know that I know nothing', which might have become more generally recognized if he, too, had maintained his original impiety, i. e. doubting theological dogma, in the face of a likely stake-burning. Entailed in that recognition is a possible comparison of Cartesian Doubt with Socratic Aporia, revealing, for example, the former as an active version of the latter. It also involves the reminder that the immediate matter of Cartesian Knowledge is the process of Doubting, i. e. that the foundation of Knowledge is Will, the source of Doubting.

Will, Method, Meditation

Any plan of action, just like any itinerary, begins with one's current circumstances, and provides a structure to Will, i. e. to the Motility involved in the action. Now, a method is just a generalized plan of action, and an analysis of a method could be called a 'discourse' on it. In contrast, to 'meditate' connotes to 'calmly reflect', which can thus be sharply distinguished from 'cogito', derived from 'agito', i. e. from Descartes' original characterization of his method. In other words, Descartes' project can be divided into two phases--the first, in which he analyzes the structures of action, and the second, in which he calmly reflects on those structures. Subsequently, the rubric 'Cartesian' becomes attached to those structures insofar as they are objects of meditation, not insofar as they are structures of Volition.

Will, Doubt, Practical Reason

Kant's 'I think', meaning 'I synthesize', is the inverse of Descartes' 'I think', meaning the dissociative 'I doubt'. On the other hand, his 'I reason', meaning 'I detach myself from an intention', parallels Descartes' 'I detach myself from a perception'. These, more precisely, are based on the possibility of doing otherwise, and of perceiving otherwise, respectively. So, while Kant shows more explicitly than does Descartes that Doubting is an expression of Will, Descartes' accepts the validity of his principle as self-evident, i. e. he adopts it as a method without either defending its possibility, or casting it as an objective rational law, as Kant does.

Will and Skepticism

The ancient Skeptics, e. g. Zeno, were Parmenideans whose methods were in the service of Stasis and Unity. That Cogito is rooted in Agito reveals that Descartes is not one such Parmenidean, but a bold adventurer with allegiances elsewhere. For, he can be regarded as a Heraclitean attempting to determine if one can swim in the same water twice, with the discovery that one remains the same swimmer even if the water does not remain the same water. What follows from that discovery is the establishment of the seaworthiness of other stable structures, especially of beliefs such as the existence of God and the principles of Mathematics. He thus demonstrates that Skepticism is rooted in dynamic Will, not in static Cognition.

Will, Doubt, Modality

Descartes' unquestioning acceptance of logical principles, in combination with his methodological emphasis on 'can' doubt and on certainty, suggests that his deity is a modalized version of the Logos. For example, the various objects of doubt are Possible, the ongoing 'I think' event is Actual, and the hypostasized 'I am a thinking being', of which he is certain, is Necessary. These classifications are derived from the previously discussed modality of Volition, in which Will opens up indefinite possibilities of Motility, one of which determinate structure actualizes, and the settled past, as immutable, is a necessary precondition of all that ensues. One implication of this analysis is that the 'God' that Descartes proves to be the cause of his existence is Necessary only insofar as it is part of his immutable past, i. e. he proves only that that God must have once existed, not that it exists eternally. This implication conforms to one involving the more conventional concept of Necessity, i. e. Descartes does not show that this 'God' exists at a world where no thinking transpires.

Will, Doubt, Logic

With his doubt of Mathematics, Descartes' investigation surpasses the sphere of sensory information. However, he leaves unquestioned at least some of the principles of Logic. The thesis that he cannot doubt that he is doubting presupposes the validity of the Law of Contradiction, as does his reliance throughout on inferences, including those involved in his proofs of the existence of God. Without such presuppositions, his method illustrates the Logic of Will--indefinite diversification.

Will. Cogtio, Mathematics

As previously discussed here, the quantification of Will is not an extrinsic contrivance, but is an expression of the essence of Volition. For, quantification is a product of Counting, and Counting entails the generation of novel units, which is effected by Will, the principle of Diversification in Experience. Now, to doubt is to diversify, i. e. 'I doubt X' means 'X may be otherwise than it seems to be'. Hence, Cogito is, likewise, intrinsically quantifiable. Thus, Descartes has the resources to derive Mathematics without the mediation of the belief that God would not deceive him about the truth of its propositions.

Will, Doubt, God

Descartes' eventual assertion that God is not a deceiver, leaves his previous Doubting without a divine source. In other words, his proof that God is the cause of his existence does not suffice as a proof of that God is the cause of his self-evident ability to originally doubt that God is not a deceiver. In contrast, Spinoza distinguishes God qua natura naturans from God qua creator of Modes, and Nietzsche distinguishes Dionysus from Apollo. Common to each of the former of the two pairs is that they entail volition, in one sense or another. Likewise, Cartesian Doubting is a mode of Will, as defined here--a process of diverging from the given, which, as has been previously discussed is accurately expressed in the literal meaning of 'cogito', i. e. 'I activate myself'. However, here, Will is a special case of the Material Principle of the system, whereas, without a demonstration of how doubting the honesty of God is a gift of God, Cartesian doubting remains impious.

Will, Certainty, God

Since valid proof is truth-preserving, it is also certainty-preserving. Thus, Descartes adheres, at least in principle, to his method, as he first certifies 'I am', and then, derives from it 'God exists'. At that juncture, however, he abandons any method, by first affirming that 'God is good', and, then, that 'A good God would not deceive me'. The first is problematic, since he has not submitted 'is good' to any methodical examination. The second is problematic, since, even granting the first, that a good God would not deceive him for his own good is groundless. Now, it is unclear whether Descartes' acceptance at this juncture of dogma that he had previously called into question is sincere or is an expression of prudence under hostile conditions. Regardless, what he demonstrates is that what he henceforth accepts--the laws of Mathematics, the existence of the physical world, etc.--are meaningful only as the beliefs of an cogitating 'I', i. e. as structures that supply Will with determinacy.

Will and Certainty

Descartes' inference from 'I think' to 'I am' suppresses a transition from 'I think' to 'I am a thinking being', a transition which plainly entails a reification of the preceding process of Doubting that 'I think' denotes. Now, reification fixes what it refies, and, hence, makes it certain. In other words, in the suppressed transition, Descartes demonstrates a power to certify that is as native as is the ability to doubt. These two powers are manifestations of the two fundamental principles of Experience--Will, which effects Uncertainty, and Comprehension, which, as the example shows, effects Certainty.

Will, Cogito, Dualism

Descartes cannot doubt 'Cogito', which, as has been discussed, means 'I set myself in motion'. Thus, the only corporeality that he can doubt is a representation of body, not any involved in Motility. Similarly, the duality that he establishes is that of Will, the source of Motility, and Representation. Thus, to characterize that duality as Body-Mind entails the problematic classification of Thinking as a non-mental process. In contrast, on the model being developed here, the duality of Will and Representation is that of Material Cause-Formal Cause, with each entailing both a Mental pole and a Corporeal pole.

Will, Doubt, Think

Descartes' project in the Meditations is based on the premise that Doubting and Knowing are both species of Thinking. In contrast, according to the model of Experience being developed here, they are incommensurate with one another--Doubting is a discrescent process, while Knowing is concrescent. That is, according to this model, Doubting is a mode of the Material Principle of Experience, i. e. of Will, and Knowing is a mode of its Formal Principle, i. e. of Comprehension. On that basis, Descartes' inferences, first from 'I doubt' to 'I think', and then from 'I think' to 'I know', entail an equivocation. In particular, insofar as 'cogito', derived from 'agitare', as has been previously discussed, means 'I set in motion', the second inference, which initiates the constructive phase of the Meditations, remains ungrounded.

Will and Cogito

'Cogito' derives from 'co-agitare', with 'agitare' meaning 'to set in motion'. But, setting oneself in motion is Motility, and Motility is Will. Thus, 'cogito ergo sum' , at bottom, means 'I will, therefore I am', with the standard 'I think' losing the dynamic connotation of 'I cogitate'.

Will, Doubt, Morality

According to the standard modern interpretation of the passage in the Republic best known as 'Plato's Cave', its main theme is Epistemological, i. e. it demonstrates the unreliability of sense information. However, given the contrast in the passage between the Good and the chains of conditioned behavior, the broader topic is plainly Moral. The progenitor of that modern interpretation is Descartes, when, instead of pursuing a Moral theme in the Discourse and the Meditations, he concerns himself with the establishment of Knowledge. That is, instead of 'I can doubt that X is true', he might have examined 'I can doubt that X is good', by which he could have detached himself from heteronomous influences, e. g. from received dogma, as well as from external stimuli. The two projects have the same basis--Doubt is an expression of the ability to do otherwise, i. e. of Will, as has been previously discussed. So, with a subtle inflection he could have explored detaching himself from a set of practices, rather than from one of cognitions.

Will, Dubitability

As Sartre, notably, emphasizes, what Descartes asserts is not 'I doubt', but 'I can doubt'. Hence, what he establishes as indubitable is not that he doubts but that he can doubt. Now, an ability to doubt entails an ability to consider that a situation is otherwise than it is given to be, which entails an ability to modify the situation, e. g. that one may be dreaming entails that one can wake up and discover oneself to be lying in a bed, and to be not sitting in a chair in front of a fire. So, Descartes' 'method of Doubt' entails Will, i. e. an ability to change a given situation.

Will, Method, Power

Descartes' establishment of a foundation of Knowledge is preceded by his adoption of a method that empowers him to effect that establishment. Like, any method, his supplies the raw energy of Will with determinacy, thereby facilitating concrete performance. In other words, the fundamental principle of his doctrine is 'I can, therefore I am', from which he abstracts his more famous thesis. His empowerment is the real inception of Modern Philosophy--a liberation from Medieval dogmatism, even if not necessarily from the theological substance of that dogma. But, it is not Doubt per se that is the source of that liberation--that freedom is already accomplished by his adoption of and commitment to his own method.

Will and Method

Though Descartes is widely recognized as the 'father of Modern Philosophy', probably a majority of his successors do not accept his principle 'I think, therefore I am'. Under-appreciated is that that principle is the product of a more fundamental innovation--his making Method an explicit Philosophical topic. Indeed, his true legacy seems to be his 'Methodism', which is pervasive in Rationalism, Empiricism, Criticalism, Dialecticism, Phenomenology, Pragmatism, etc., regardless of the status of 'I think, therefore I am' in a doctrine. Now a method is opposed to haphazard procedure, or, in other words, it supplies otherwise indeterminate Will with structure. Furthermore, since a commitment to a method supersedes any results, Methodism is independent of Teleology. Thus, the Formaterial model of Experience being developed here codifies what has perhaps been the central implicit theme of the post-Cartesian era.

Will, Schematization, Intelligent Behavior

Traditional concepts of intelligent behavior seem to have it as consisting of a conjunction of two distinct components, a means and an end, derived from two different sources, reason and instinct, respectively. Now, while a journey might be casually characterized as consisting of a route and a destination, it is inarguable that, in actuality, it originates with a first step from a given location, guided by some plan, the initial stage of which is a representation of that location. Likewise, intelligent behavior, in actuality, combines Will, as originating Motility, and a Schematized Intention, the first moment of which is a representation of one's given situation. Furthermore, just as travel entails these initial components whether or not some pre-set destination is arrived at, the achievement of a pre-set goal is extrinsic to intelligent behavior. In other words, the traditional teleological model of intelligent behavior abstracts from the Will-Schematization combination of actual intentional conduct.

Will, Intention, Schematization

An Intention is a plan for Motility, and a plan, at some point is originally devised. Any such process of devising is, at least in part, improvised, and, hence, as has been previously discussed, entails Schematization, for its coherence. Hence, any intentional behavior, premeditated, or otherwise, combines Will, i. e. Motility, and Schematization.

Will, Schematization, Experience

Kant's Schematism 'temporalizes' his Categories, thereby facilitating their application to empirical cognitive processes, which he also temporalizes. Those Categories are, thus, presumably applicable to similarly temporalized 'spatial' representations. However, his temporalization of 'space' does not touch upon the Spatialization that, as has been previously explained here, first produces Space, and cannot touch upon it, because Spatialization and Temporalization are inverse processes. Accordingly, the Schematization of Will, the process of Spatialization in Experience, involves not a mediation, but a coordination of two independent principles, a coordination that is part fortuitous, part cultivable. Unlike the Kantian concept of 'experience', which is merely cognitive, the model of Experience being developed here entails Motility, and is truly binary, combining, without mediation, Will and Schematism, with neither, in principle, reducible to nor subordinate to the other.

Will and Schematization

Will indeterminately diversifies the course of Experience, requiring, in order to become actualized as a concrete performance, structuring. Usually, the representation of a purpose serves as such an organizing influence, thereby encouraging the traditional subordination of Formal Causality to Teleological Causality. However, the example of an improvising musician demonstrates the independence of the former from the latter--the player produces new notes while, concomitantly, organizing the flow, without any prepared arrangement to satisfy--an example that can be generalized to the performance of any type of act. This process of creative structuring can be called 'Schematization', evoking the Kantian Schematism, which, as either subordinate to the Understanding, or as 'free', is, however, cognitive, only. In other words, Kant does not consider that Schematization is effective in a motile context, combining with Will to produce concrete action, nor does he consider that cognitive Schematism might be a special case of motile Schematization.