Will, Intellect, Praxis

To prove, against Hume, that Causality consists in more than a conjunction of images, Kant contrasts an 'objective' succession of images with a 'subjective' one--the former can not be experienced as otherwise, while the latter can be. In other words, the order of the objective succession is necessary, while that of the subjective one is not, and, that order is determined by a rule. However, he does not entertain that the objective succession might have been otherwise, e. g. something that rotates clockwise, rather than counterclockwise. Furthermore, he does not consider how the subjective succession per se is rule-governed--even if I might have walked counterclockwise around an object, insofar as I do walk clockwise around it, my Motility is rule-governed, i. e. is governed by the plan of action 'walking clockwise around the object'. This neglect is characteristic of the entire Cartesian meditative tradition--the failure to consider the role of Intellect in ordering Will qua Motility. If he had been interested in the intellectual structure of Action, Kant might have devised a set of Categories for Practical Reason.