Matter, Chemistry, Proximate Causality

As has been previously discussed, in Spinoza's example of Proximate Causality, Matter is not merely a shaped inert given, as it is for Aristotle, but is produced.  Now, only a divine power can create Matter, so such production of Matter by humans is recreated, or, in other words, consists in a transformation of Matter.  The process might involve Efficient Causality, and thus be subject to laws of Physics.  But the transformation of Matter is usually better known as a different Science--Chemistry.  Now Modern Physics is primarily a study of Locomotion, with Acceleration its fundamental unit, on the basis of which Force is defined.  Thus, insofar as Modern Chemistry has been conceived to be constituted by microscopic Locomotion, it can be classified as a branch of Modern Physics.  But with the unveiling of the subatomic stratum of Chemistry, it becomes increasingly susceptible to Quantum analysis, and, hence, independent of Physics.  Accordingly, it can be re-conceived as a study of phenomena in its own right, specifically of the transformation of Matter.  So, its antecedents include the extraction of metals from ores, distillation, and Alchemy.  But the significant leap forward begins with the works of Boyle, which appear before Newtonian Physics, and begin to mature with the development of the Periodical Table of Elements.  Still, regardless of the complexity, Chemistry is fundamentally the study of the transformation of Matter, which, within the scope of immediate proximity, can be conceived as the production of Matter.  So, Spinoza's concept of Proximate Cause modestly implies the independence of Chemistry from Physics.

The Four Causes and Proximate Causality

According to Aristotle, the falling of an object to the ground is an instance of Teleological Causality--of an object seeking its natural place.  According to Galileo, Newton, and subsequent Physics, the falling of an object to the ground is the resultant of the interaction of two forces, each Gravity.  So, in Modern Physics, the Ancient primacy of Teleological Causality is replaced by that of Efficient Causality.  Likewise, prominent Philosophical  study of Causality has focused on the relation between Efficient Causality and Teleological Causality.  For example, Kant assigns the former to world of Phenomena, and the latter to the Moral realm.  Similarly, but with different assignations, Whitehead integrates them into his concept of Process, with neither privileged.  Spinoza's concept of Proximate Causality is a simpler repudiation of the soundness of Teleological Causality--it denies the causal efficacy of an event that is subsequent to its purported effect.  Thus, Spinoza likely agrees with Dewey that what Aristotle classifies as a Teleological Cause in ordinary experience, i. e. the use of an object, is actually an 'end-in-view', which, as the cause of the making of the object, precedes that action.  So, Spinoza shares with other Philosophers a focus on the Efficient and the Teleological of Aristotle's Four Causes.  But unlike any of his peers, his concept of Proximate Causality also repudiates, as has been previously discussed, the Aristotelian Material Cause, thereby altering the relation between the Material Cause and the Formal Cause on grounds that are completely independent of the discovery of Gravity.  Rather, they reflect the rise of manufacturing processes that transform, and not merely shape, Matter.

Proximate Cause and Parallelism

As has been previously discussed, a significant distinction between the Aristotelian concept of Material Cause, and Spinoza's, as it is incorporated into his concept of Proximate Causality, is that the former is given, while the latter is produced.  Accordingly, there is a significant distinction between the two concepts of the relation between the Material Cause and the Formal Cause.  According to Aristotle, the Formal Cause imposes shape on inert Matter, whereas according to Spinoza, the Formal Cause shapes the production of the Material Cause.  In Spinoza's example of the drawing of a Circle according to a definition, the definition is the Formal Cause of the production of ink on a piece of paper.  Similarly, a singer both produces sounds and shapes them into notes.  The potentially significant implication for Spinoza's doctrine is the Parallel processes between Mind, expressed in the sequence of producing the Formal Cause, and Body, expressed in the sequence of the production of the Material Cause.  In other words, his concept of Proximate Cause illustrates his Parallelism, and suggests that Mind and Body are related as Form and Matter, which they are for Aristotle, but with a significant variation.

Proximate Causality and Material Causality

At first glance, Spinoza's concept of Proximate Cause might seem no more than a less informative combination of the Aristotelian Four Causes.  However, it diverges significantly from the latter in one respect.  According to Aristotle, the Material Cause of something is what it is made out of, e. g. the clay of a bowl.  But, then, the Material Cause is, unlike the other three, not part of the process of producing the thing.  In sharp contrast, in the one example of Proximate Causality that Spinoza provides, the drawing of a Circle, the Material Cause of a Circle, e. g. the producing of ink, is part of the process of producing the thing.  This kind of inclusion of Material Causality in the productive process is much more relevant to Modern production, than to Ancient production.  For, with the rapid technical developments of the Modern Era, what something is made out of has likely been radically transformed from some natural resource, in contrast with the mild alterations of Matter that constitute Ancient production.  But, as is this case with many of the Recreative implications of his doctrine, Spinoza leaves his concept of Proximate Causality underdeveloped.

Creativity and Proximate Causality

Though Spinoza does not use the term in the context, his propositions in the Ethics regarding the movement of one Body by an external Body plainly instantiate Efficient Causality.  In contrast, in the Improvement of the Understanding, he does specify a type of Causality, but it is none of the traditional four.  Rather, it is what he calls "proximate causality", and his characterization of it suggests that it reduces to none of the four.  For, it is what causes a "created" thing, i. e. what produces it, which exceeds merely moving it, e. g. the drawing of a Circle.  So, even if he does not mention the term in the Ethics, the Causality of all Human creativity is Proximate.

Creativism and Recreativism

Spinoza's divine Nature Naturing could be characterized as a Vitalist principle, thus aligning it with e. g. Bergson's Elan Vital.  But it does more than energize; it produces.  Thus, a more accurate characterization is Creativist, which reflects that it is a Pantheist variety of the deity of Genesis.  Now, among its Creations are Modes, who, at the culmination of the Ethics, discover the immanence of the Creativist principle.  But insofar as a Mode functions in the image of the Creativist principle, i. e. invents, manufactures, it itself Creates.  Thus, its fundamental behavioral principle can be characterized as Recreativist, signified by Spinoza's emphasis on Action over Passivity.  Now, Recreative behavior overcomes a Fear--the Fear provoked by the perhaps most influential superstition of the tradition--that Recreative behavior, e. g. invention, disobeys the deity of Eden and risks divine punishment.  So part of the bliss in the discovery that Recreative behavior is in the image of divine Creativity consists in defiance of that superstition, which is only a part of the more general superstition of the Theology of a transcendent punitive deity.

Inner, Outer, Holism

The revelation of inner divine Causality does not occur until Book 5 of the Ethics. So, it seems likely that the analysis of the external Causality of Bodies in Book 2 is deliberately incomplete.  Still, left undeveloped is the relation between such inner Causality, which occurs in Modes, and the concept of Nature as an individual Body, which Spinoza briefly considers in Book 2. As is, the relation is susceptible to a Noumenon vs. Phenomenon interpretation, according to which Inner and Outer are not inconsistent, but are otherwise not systematized.  A perhaps more coherent alternative is to attribute a Holist principle to Nature Naturing, i. e. by which Modes are produced not as the products of discrete, independent Individuations, but of Holistic pre-organization.  Such Holism can be a principle of the Thought that Spinoza attributes to Nature.  One potentially significant implication of this adjustment of his concept of production of Modes is that the endeavor of each to persist in its being is already systematically related to that of every other, which has profound consequences for his Ethics, and for his Political Philosophy, i. e. a social dimension is entailed in each individual endeavor. So, whether or not he would accept such a resolution of the relation of the Inner and Outer in his doctrine is unclear.

Body and Motion

According to Spinoza's Lemma III on Body, a Body remains in motion or at rest unless acted upon by an external Body, perhaps anticipating Newton.  It would seem to follow, as has been previously discussed, that Nature considered as an individual Body is, as a Whole, inert, with only its internal parts in motion.  But even if he were satisfied with that consequence of Lemma III, still unexplained is its apparent inconsistency with a more fundamental factor in his doctrine.  For, the cardinal behavioral principle of the doctrine is the endeavor to persist in one's being, from which it would seem to follow that a Body can be moved by that principle, independent of being affected by an external Body.  Now, Spinoza cites Proposition I:xxviii, as the ground of Lemma III, according to which every finite being is a conditioned being, and, hence, is subject to other influences.  However, a Mode is ultimately conditioned by God/Nature/Substance as a modification of it, a conditioning sufficiently expressed in the principle of the endeavor to persist in one's being, i. e. as an instance of the infinite divine vital force.  Furthermore, that principle, which Spinoza calls Appetite, transcends the Mind/Body distinction.  Hence, the fundamental conditioning of the Body of a Mode is internal, and, so, does not necessarily entail that it can be moved by only an external Body.  So, Lemma 3 remains anomalous in the context of the doctrine.

Holism, Nature, Motion

In his consideration of Body Motion as Holist, previously discussed, Spinoza introduces the possibility of the increasing complexity of such wholes.  At the maximum there is the "whole of nature", which anticipates an Ecological concept of Nature. Now, he characterizes any such Body in Motion as "affected" by "another body", according to one of the Lemmas. The thesis of that Lemma, that a Body maintains Motion or Rest unless affected by an external Body, seems Newtonian, except that the Ethics precedes Newton's work by two decades.  Regardless, in the context, Spinoza does not consider the problem of the Motion of the whole of Nature, which entails the existence of no external Body, and, hence, of nothing to affect it.  One potential solution is to apply his Nature Naturing vs. Nature Natured distinction, with the concept of Body, the maximum of which is Nature, in these passages, of the latter variety.  That leaves open the possibility of immanent, esoteric Motion, but with no explanation of how it systematically relates to the exoteric Motion of one Body affecting another, and their Holist coordination.  Otherwise, it is unclear how he might resolve the apparent problem.

Proprioception and Holism

Spinoza does not explicitly refer to Proprioception, but he alludes to its effects in the course of his Lemmas on the Body--while in motion, if parts of the Body maintain their "mutual communication", then the "individual will retain its own nature" "as a whole". The passages are notable in several respects.  First, in even routine Motility, the parts of the Body are unified.  Second, the Unity consists in a "whole", and, hence, not in a mere aggregate of associations.  Finally, by implication, a failure of Unity is equivalent to a loss the individual's "own nature". Such a breakdown thus constitutes a disruption of the Essence of the individual, i. e. a failure of its endeavor to persist in its own being.  In other words, the breakdown is equivalent to Death.  But this cause of Death has internal sources, contrary to his thesis that Death can come only from without.  So, in these passages, he is plainly affirming a Holism that seems to remain underdeveloped through the remainder of the Ethics. And perhaps Proprioception is the ground of that Holism.

Proprioception, Parallelism, Formal Causality

One of the functions of Proprioception is to help coordinate Motility, e. g. by maintaining balance.  Thus, Proprioception exerts Causality on the Body.  Now, Spinoza denies Causal interaction between Mind and Body, which is one of the characteristics of the Parallelism that he attributes to them.  It would thus seem to follow that Proprioception does not exemplify his concept of the Mind-Body relation, contrary to what has been previously proposed here.  However, the only Causality that he recognizes is Efficient Causality--in which Mind is the cause of Motility or conversely--whereas coordination is an example of Formal Causality, i. e. because it unifies a manifold of motions.  Thus, his Parallelism, at least as is, is not inconsistent with Proprioception.  Indeed, an interpretation of his Mind-Body relation as that of Form-Matter, grounds Proprioception, and maintains a Parallelism in which Efficient Causal interaction is precluded.

Proprioception, Mind, Body

Proprioception is the awareness of one's Motility.  It is also known as Kinesthesia, and is sometimes characterized as the 'sixth sense'.  Of scholarly significance in the latter case is that it thus constitutes a kind of Sense-Experience that is outside of the range of standard Empiricism, but of any concept of Experience that begins either with a sedentary scenario, or one that abstracts from the Body from the outset.  Hence, Proprioception is unknown in the main systems of Modern Philosophy, and their descendants.  The one exception, of course, is Spinoza's doctrine, according to which Mind is the Idea of the Body, a concept perhaps influenced by concepts of Proprioception that precede the Ethics. Spinoza does not develop it as such, but entailed in the concept of Proprioception is the concept of the activity of the standard five Senses as fundamentally motor, i. e. as grounded in the active exercise of Sense-Organs--looking at, listening to, touching, tasting, and, smelling.  The very possibility of this concept of Sense-activity exposes the arbitrary abstraction from Motility of the standard accounts, an abstraction likely rooted in an effort to separate Mind and Knowledge from Corporeality.

Theoretical Knowledge, Technical Knowledge, Evolution

Plainly, the development of the Human thumb has exponentially increased the Adaptation-Of of the species, i. e. its capacity to modify its Environment for its own purposes.  Thus, the relation between Technical Knowledge and Theoretical Knowledge transcends mere Epistemology, i. e. insofar as Theoretical Knowledge seeks only fidelity to its Object, it has less Evolutionist value than does Technical Knowledge, as the Human thumb exemplifies.  But, Adaptation, -To or -Of, is not the only relation between an Organism and an Environment.  The most notable example, at least hitherto, of an alternative is the departure of an Organism from an aquatic Environment, to a land Environment.  Such a transition is more than an origination of a new Species; it is the origination of a new Species in a new Environment.  Now, what Adaptive processes prepared that transition can only be speculated about.  But Adaptive processes are in immediate evidence in a more recent, more radical departure of a Species from its Environment--the Human Species venturing beyond its terrestrial Environment, an event that may have no precedent in the history of the Earth.  Those Adaptive processes are, clearly, exercises of Technical Knowledge.  But, while they have hitherto consisted in an Adaptation-Of natural resources, e. g. fuel, Technical Knowledge is now vital to new Adaptation-To processes, e. g. spacesuits that facilitate survival in the new Environment.  Likewise, Theoretical Knowledge is becoming paramount in the study of the new conditions, e. g. whether or not water exists on a planet. So, the relation between Theoretical Reason and Technical Reason, long considered to be fixed, even if inverted, is now proving, at the outset of a perhaps much longer period, to be mutable, and contingent on much more powerful factors than Epistemological theories.

Mind, Hand, Object

Spinoza's concept of the Mind-Object relation is eccentric with respect to the standard Epistemological schools.  But it can be more versatile, and, hence, more instructive, than most of them.  The versatility is exemplified in the case in which an Object is being grasped by the hand, which is thus an Idea in the Mind.  According to Empiricism, the Knowledge of the Object can be no more than a datum of Touch, with no capacity to accommodate the encompassing of the Object by the hand.  For Rationalism, the shortcoming is the opposite--Knowledge of a Unity that is not a mere Thought of some kind.  Furthermore, the hand can not only grasp an Object, but can manipulate it, and even wield it, e. g. as a tool.  Thus, on Spinoza's account, the Knowledge of the Object is not only merely Theoretical, but potentially Technical, as well.  Finally, his concept has the potentially far-reaching consequence of explaining the Evolutionist superiority of the Human Mind--as corresponding to the superiority of the hand.  That faculty can be precisely called Comprehension, a faculty that seems to have no peers in rival theories, even when that term is only loosely used, e. g. for Whitehead, 'prehension' is only equivalent to 'feel'.

Evolution, Body, Mind

The replacement of Geocentrism by Heliocentrism is the replacement of one hypothesis by another, to accommodate the addition of a new set of data to the old one.  Kant's 'Copernican Revolution' is constituted by a replacement of one hypothesis by another with greater explanatory power.  But a different reason for the replacement of one hypothesis by another is a change in the original data.  For example, Kant's replacement of the concept of Mind conforming to Object, by that of Object conforming to Mind, could occur not because of a superior explanatory power, but because of the development of new Mental powers.  Now, if it is believed that Mind is changeless, then the latter change is impossible.  However, Spinoza's doctrine grounds the possibility of such a development.  According to it, Mind is the Idea of Body, so corresponding to any novel development in the latter would be a novel Mental development.  Now, Spinoza himself has no example of such a physical change at his disposal, but Evolutionist theory is rife with such examples, including, of course, the development of the human thumb.  So, such changes are not only possible, but are actual, perhaps within the course of intra-Species development, and not necessarily appearing immediately or dramatically. Hence, so too are novel Mental developments possible, perhaps even the capacity of Mind to adapt an Object to its structures, thus constituting the basis of Kant's Copernican Revolution.

Copernican Revolution and Evolution

Kant uses the term 'Copernican Revolution' to signify a transition from the concept of Mind conforming to Object, to that of Object conforming to Mind.  But, more precisely, as is, the two concepts are merely converses, with neither privileged, i. e. a reverse of the transition also constitutes a 'revolution'.  Likewise, for Kant, the superiority of the concept of Object conforming to Mind, is due to its greater explanatory power, independent of the direction of the 'Revolution'.  Now, as has been previously discussed, the contrast between Mind conforming to Object, and Object conforming to Mind, is a special case of two kinds of Adaptation: Adaptation-To and Adaptation-Of.  Furthermore, a transition from the former to the latter can be explained as an Evolutionary development, i. e. as an increase in the control by a Species of its Environment, as part of a longer-term preparation for the eventual origination of a more highly evolved Species.  In those terms, Kant's Copernican Revolution can be conceived as the motor of a transition to a superior concept of the Mind-Object relation, i. e. as a transition from Adaptation-To, to Adaptation-Of.

Magnification and Intuition

According to a standard Empiricist analysis, the perception of an object with the naked eye and the perception of an object under a magnifying glass are two distinct acts, any identification of which is problematic.  However, the shortcoming of such an analysis is its applicability to a related case.  This is when an object is already under the eyepiece of a microscope or telescope, and the degree of magnification is gradually altered.  In this case, Magnification is directly perceived, not derived from two discrete perceptions.  So, none of the terms of Atomist Empiricism, e. g. Impression, appropriately characterizes the Perception of Magnification.  In contrast, Bergson's Intuition is dynamic and continuous, so, is not constrained by the inherent discreteness of those terms.  Such Intuition can thus ground the comparison of the perception of an object with the naked eye, and the perception of it via one of the devices as magnified. On the other hand, Bergson's Intuition is simple, so, as is, it cannot accommodate the change in size that is essential to Magnification.  Still, a modified version of that Intuition, i. e. Sense-based, unmediated, dynamic, seems more appropriate to the process than any of the perceptual types of either standard Empiricism or standard Rationalism, neither of which has attempted to explain a Perception that has had profound consequences for human history.

Abstraction, Inference, Magnification

His work as a lens-grinder, for microscope and telescope lenses, seems to have no influence on Spinoza's Philosophical work.  In this respect, he is not alone.  But the absence of any Philosophical attention to these devices is especially conspicuous in an era when their influence is beginning to become patent, especially in the case of Copernicus, and when Epistemology has become the focus of Philosophy.  So, from neither Empiricists nor Rationalists has there been an adequate grounding of the phenomena that is perceivable to humans only via these devices.  Now, the source of that perceivability is Magnification.  But, the problem for the Empiricist is that Magnification does not reduce to Abstraction, whereas for the Rationalist, the problem is that Magnification does not reduce to Inference.  So, there seems to be lacking from both schools an adequate account of the type of Perception that has had a profound influence on human history the past 500 years.  But perhaps the strongest indication of this neglect is that from neither has there even been the rigorous Skepticism that each has exercised on some cognitive processes.

Adaptation-Of and Comprehension

As has been previously discussed, Spinoza's recognition of the capacity of the human body to move and arrange external objects can serve as a foundation of a doctrine that aims at the cultivation of Techne.  But he misses the more relevant examples of that capacity--to grab, to hold, and to wield objects, which are distinctively human skills facilitated by the uniquely versatile human thumb.  In other words, it is because of the unprecedented capacity of specifically this part of the Body that Human Adaptation-Of far surpasses that of other species, e. g. the use of tools is grounded in the capacity to wield afforded by the thumb.  Now, according to Spinoza's Parallelism, the Mind has Knowledge of that capacity of the Body.  So, insofar as one characterization of that capacity is 'grasp', the apt term for the Knowledge of it is Comprehension, i. e. rather than Understanding, Reason, Intuition, etc.  Furthermore, insofar as wielding is part of that capacity, Comprehension is Technical Knowledge, not merely Theoretical Knowledge.  Thus, likewise, Comprehension is Knowledge of the Body's Adaptation-Of its Environment, so it is human Comprehension that is the Mental faculty that far surpasses the capacity to Comprehend that other species possess.

Adaptation and Quantification

The primary distinction between Adaptation-To and Adaptation-Of is that in the former, an Organism modifies itself, while in the latter, it modifies its Environment.  Now, one of the simplest ways of Adapting-To an Environment is exemplified by the chameleon, which takes on the coloring of its circumstances.  Thus, Mind conforming to an Object can be conceived as an Ecological process that typically gets reduced to an Epistemological relation.  Furthermore, via the Kantian Revolution, a relation that is typically taken to be Epistemological, the conforming an Object to Mind, can correspondingly be recognized as an Ecological process--Adaptation-Of.  That relation is Quantification, plainly the pivotal intellectual factor in the rapid post-Copernican Technical development of the species. Accordingly, the most significant innovations of Descartes and Leibniz are not the Meditations or the Monadology, but the inventions of Analytic Geometry, Calculus, and Binary Universal Language.  At the same time, conspicuously absent in this respect is the Philosopher among them who most explicitly promotes Technical Reason--Spinoza, who offers no Mathematical innovation.  Regardless, the introduction of the concept of Adaptation into Epistemology helps illustrate the broader significance of the latter, while at the same pinpointing the source of the Adaptation-Of that is unique to the Human species, and is expressed in its rapid Evolutionary development of the past several centuries--Quantification.

Persistence in Being and Adaptation

One of Spinoza's Postulates is "The human body stands in need for its preservation of a number of other bodies, by which it is continually, so to speak, regenerated." However, he does not explore the relation of this Postulate to "The human body can move external bodies, and arrange them in a variety of ways", i. e. he does not explore how the latter capacity serves the former need.  Nor does he incorporate the two of them into his fundamental principle, the endeavor to persist in one's being.  A concept that can mediate that incorporation, one that emerges two centuries later, is Adaptation, thus revising the principle as, e. g. 'the endeavor to persist in one's being via Adaptation', which expresses that interaction with external bodies is essential to that persistence.  Now, the second of the Postulates signifies a cardinal distinction--between Adaptation-To those bodies, and Adaptation-Of.  One Philosopher who recognizes that distinction is Kant, who contrasts the conformity of Mind to Object, and the conformity of Object to Mind, but restricts the recognition to Epistemological relations.  The distinction is potentially decisive to Spinoza's doctrine--an Active relation to external bodies vs. a Passive relation to them, a contrast that is at the heart of what he is cultivating.  And, as Kant characterizes it, the transition from the latter to the former constitutes a 'revolution'--from Homo Sapiens, to Homo Techne.  So, the incorporation of the concept of Adaptation into Spinoza's doctrine can clarify its primary ambition.

Self-Cultivation, Homo Techne, Adaptation

As has been previously discussed, self-cultivation can be not only a means in a program of Ethics, but its goal, e. g. if the goal is the cultivation of Homo Techne.  As has also been shown, by incorporating the Body into the doctrine, the goal of Spinoza's Ethics can be interpreted as the cultivation of Homo Techne, a goal consistent with his commitment to Pantheism/Monist Naturalism.  That doctrine is heterodox for the era in two respects--it jettisons Homo Sapiens as the definition of Human, and it advocates the very behavior that according to prevailing Theology is the cause of a divine curse on the Human species.  Now, in 1660, such obliquely presented digressions might be easily overlooked.  But the rapid Technical development of the species in subsequent centuries proves that Humans have entered a new epoch, in which old definitions and old myths have perhaps become obsolete.  The full meaning of the radical change becomes perhaps clearer two centuries latter, when Adaptation becomes recognized as a fundamental behavioral principle.  Now, Adaptation is equivocal--it can signify Adaptation-To, or Adaptation-Of, i. e. a relation to an environment that is passive vs. one that is active.  So, the emergence of Homo Techne signals an epochal Evolutionary development--Humans becoming more active in relation to their habitat, which Spinoza signifies by his emphasis on Activity in his doctrine.

Ethics and Self-Cultivation

A contrast that Spinoza only briefly mentions, thus leaving it undeveloped, is 'Nature Naturing' vs. 'Nature Natured', which, given the identity of God and Nature, can also be rendered 'Creating' vs. 'Created'.  One instructive application of the contrast is to his concept of Ethics.  Following Aristotle, he conceives Ethics to be a program of self-cultivation, thus entailing both a creating dimension and a created dimension.  In Aristotle's doctrine, the created dimension consists in the Virtues, whereas in Spinoza's it consists in behavior in accordance with Adequate Knowledge.  So, in Aristotle's doctrine, there is no systematic relation between the two dimensions, i. e. between Courage and the cultivation of Courage.  But in Spinoza's there is.  For, behavior on the basis of Adequate Knowledge is his corrective to unhealthful external influences, but so, too, is the methodical process of inculcating that behavior, i. e. while one is in the very process of cultivating oneself, one is overcoming the influence on one of external influences.  Thus, the Method by which one cultivates oneself, e. g. the Axiomatic Method, itself exemplifies the goal of the cultivation.  In other words, the Creating of the Ethics exemplifies the Created, thus establishing a paradigm for the concept of Ethics as self-cultivation that even Aristotle does not achieve.

Ethics, Education, Epistemology

In contemporary Epistemology, Belief typically signifies Empirical Perception.  Likewise in that context, Spinoza's concept of Opinion can seem to signify Belief, so his concept of the relations between Opinion and the other types of Knowledge can seem to be an Epistemological topic, i. e. Justified True Belief.  But, "hearsay" as an example of Opinion indicates a different range of concerns, beginning with the relation between Language and Knowledge.  Now, one application of that relation that is germaine to his doctrine is Education based on Hearsay, which most systems of Education in most societies exemplify.  His doctrine thus proposes a method of Education that is a corrective to those systems--how to determine for oneself what is True vs. being told what is True.  In that respect Spinoza is a forerunner of someone not usually associated with him--Dewey, whose Philosophy of Education is based on the cultivation of Knowing-How, as opposed to Knowing-That.  In contrast, Kant's attempt to reconcile Rational methods with conventional Morality are antithetical to Spinoza's doctrine, according to which the former must overcome and replace the latter. But there is no antithesis between Epistemology and Education--the former is just a specialized version of the latter, that, like Philosophy of Language, has gotten increasingly insular in recent decades.  In contrast, Spinoza's doctrine combines Ethics, Education, and Epistemology--it shows how learning to think for oneself methodically is equivalent to overcoming adverse external influences, and, thus, to achieving Happiness.

Stoicism and Homo Techne

According to one prevailing interpretation, the Ethics presents a Stoic doctrine, culminating in the overcoming of Fear of Death via the self-Intuition of Mind as an eternal Idea in God that survives the death of its Body.  On this account, Spinoza's heterodox Pantheism/Monist Naturalism/Mind-Body Parallelism becomes irrelevant.  Now, a very different doctrine begins with the modest Postulate "The human body can move external bodies, and arrange them in a variety of ways", that Spinoza leaves almost completely undeveloped.  He thus misses the variety of its consequences, notably that the human body can fashion tools to increase its capacity to move other bodies, can multiply and systematize such moves and arrangements, and can do so methodically.  In general--the Body has a perhaps infinite capacity to modify its surroundings.  Now, a Postulate is an Adequate Idea, so a Mind has Adequate Knowledge of this capacity of its Body.  Furthermore, entailed in the Knowledge of the capacity to move an external body is the Knowledge that the Body is stronger than the other in that respect.  It also follows that the Mind has Knowledge that modification of surroundings involves an exercise of strength greater than that involved in merely perceiving external forces or even detaching from them. Plus, Intuition can be defined as the awareness that the strength involved in such an exercise is that of the divine Substance that is immanent in every individual Body.  In other words, the Postulate grounds the development of a doctrine that surpasses Stoicism as a corrective to Emotional Bondage to stronger external influences, i. e. changing the world vs. merely detaching from it.  The aim of this doctrine is thus the post-Copernican cultivation of a new type of human--Homo Techne, a culmination that is as heterodox as the Pantheist/Monist Naturalism foundations of the Ethics.  Subsequent events, e. g. The Industrial Revolution, have proven that doctrine to be prescient, while some scholars continue to reduce the Ethics to a quirky version of Medieval Dualism.

Intuition and Fear of Death

Spinoza's one example of Intuition is of solving '1 : 2 = 3 : x' without hearsay or calculation.  Yet, Intuition becomes essential to his final formula of liberation from the Emotions--from Fear of Death.  In that context, the significant characteristic of Intuition is that it consists in Mind reflecting on Mind, and, hence, as detached from Body, in apparent violation of his thesis of Mind-Body Parallelism. On that basis, he argues that Intuition can be Knowledge of one's Mind as surviving the death of one's Body, a Knowledge that thus liberates one from the ultimate Fear.  Now, these passages are the least heterodox of the Theological dimension of his doctrine, and an effort to appease multiple hostile social groups can be appreciated.  Still, he has other resources in his doctrine at his disposal, beginning with a distinction between Fear as a response to a specific threat, and Fear as a response to Death in general.  For, on the basis of his fundamental principle, the endeavor to persist in one's being, Death is an Inadequate Idea, and, hence, has no reality.  Accordingly, Fear of Death, which is a cardinal factor in the orthodox Theology that has dominated much of human society for millennia, is as idle as an emotional response to a piece of fiction.  Instead, Intuition can soundly serve other functions in his doctrine, e. g. the immediate awareness that one's creativity is immanent divine creativity, thus providing the Ethics with a completion that is as heterodox as its beginnings.

Ethics and Opinion

In contemporary academic syllabi, Spinoza is typically classified as a 'Continental Rationalist', set in opposition to the 'British Empiricists'.  But this classification is doubly misleading.  First, the highest kind of Knowledge in his doctrine is Intuition, not Reason.  Second, in sharp contrast with the others in these sequences, including Kant, in whom they culminate, the opposition is not to Sense Experience.  Rather, the antithesis within Spinoza's doctrine is between Adequate Knowledge and Inadequate Knowledge, and the prototype of the latter is Opinion, e. g. "hearsay".  Thus, insofar as liberation from Emotional Bondage, according to the doctrine, is achieved via conduct on the basis of Adequate Knowledge, the implicit source of that Bondage is behavior on the basis of Opinion.  Arguably, his focus on the Theological uses of Intuition, only clutters this aim of the doctrine, which is perhaps more clearly delineated in the development of a Method in Improvement of the Understanding.  But his priorities are perhaps best expressed in the structure of his Theologico-Political Treatise, in which an exposure of Theological Opinion is preparatory to the development of a Political Philosophy based on individual Freedom. Accordingly, the targeting of Opinion as the source of the weakness that the doctrine would correct makes society, not the individual Mode, its scope.  The work thus has more in common with the Republic than with the Theatetus, the Meditations, the Monadology, or even the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.

Invention and Method

In general, Invention involves the adaptation of available materials and processes for some purpose.  Now, according to Spinoza, Mind has a natural propensity to construct more complex Ideas from simpler ones.  Thus, his Method of constructing more complex Ideas out of simpler ones is an Invention.  Likewise, all the notable Philosophical Methods are inventions.  Conversely, though, the execution of these Methods has usually left no room for invention, which has left them inadequate to the concept of Invention.  So, for example, Spinoza's principle of the endeavor to persist in one's being seems to entail a continuation of the given, and, hence, to leave his Invention ungrounded.  In contrast, the modification of his principle proposed here--the endeavor to maximize the exercise of strength--does entail the possibility of digressing from the given, and, hence, of inventing.  However, the difficulty that the modification poses for his doctrine is that it is antithetical to a concept of Eternity qua changeless, whereas he often ascribes that concept to his God/Nature/Substance of which a Mode's principle of behavior is an instance.  So, his Method, as well as any Invention, seems to be underivable from at least some of the premises of his doctrine.

Invention and Extension

Some objects of invention are famous epochal machines, e. g. the wheel, the incandescent light bulb, etc.  Others are more modest makeshift devices that facilitate everyday activities.  And others are not objects, but problem-solving courses of action.  Common to all cases is a moment when nothing becomes something, a moment that is familiar to most people.  Nevertheless, Philosophers who dedicate themselves to the micro-analysis of human experience tend to ignore such moments.  Instead, they tend to gloss over them with an application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason to invention, usually in terms of the purpose an invention is designed to serve.  But while the need for e. g. efficient reliable illumination might explain the functioning of the incandescent light bulb, it does not explain the moment when the mental 'light bulb' suddenly appears to Edison.  The general difficulty that invention poses to most Philosophical systems is that it consists in a moment of discontinuity, whereas they aim for experiential homogeneity.  Now, Spinoza's doctrine entails a potential accommodation of discontinuity--the attribute of Extension, which, if conceived as dynamic, becomes Extending, and to extend is discontinuous with a previous resting point.  Accordingly, Extending creates discontinuity, while Thinking re-integrates it.  Spinoza does not analyze the attributes in this way, but it does accommodate invention.

Method and Invention

Spinoza's Method has come to be commonly called Axiomatic or Deductive, and it seems likely that he conceives it as derived from the divine progression of Ideas, especially if he conceives his deity to be the ancient Logos.  But, if so, then there is a significant discrepancy in his likening the construction of more complex Ideas from simpler ones to that of more complex tools from simpler.  For, the latter sequence has often involved a transition that eludes reduction to a Method, especially an Axiomatic Method--invention, which Spinoza glosses when he renders the invention of tools as the "making of tools".  Putting the pattern of divine Thought to human use might be likened to stealing fire from the gods, but the wheel has no pre-human precedent, which is why it is commonly recognized as the prototypical 'invention'.  On the other hand, human invention is an instance of divine action insofar as the deity being instantiated is a creative deity.  And, if human Reason is a Mode of divine methodical Thought, then perhaps human Intuition is the awareness that invention is a Mode of immanent divine creativity.  Spinoza does not address these possibilities, but without them, his tool-Idea analogy involves a significant discrepancy.

Method and Comprehension

In Improvement of the Understanding, Spinoza characterizes an Idea as a "tool", and likens the propensity of Mind to construct more complex Ideas from simpler ones to the construction of more complex tools from simpler ones.  But the passage is no mere observation of a propensity of Mind--it proposes a Method. The work, probably inspired by Descartes, is Spinoza's Discourse on Method, in preparation for the Ethics, and its "Geometric" Method.  Like Descartes, Spinoza does not examine the concept of Method per se, thereby leaving it ungrounded, i. e. the Idea of the Method of constructing more complex Ideas out of simpler ones is not one of those Ideas.  Likewise, therefore, insofar as the Ethics consists in the execution of a Method, the Method is independent of all its constituent Ideas, including God/Nature/Substance, the Intuition of God/Nature/Substance, and the principle of the endeavor to persist in being.  Now, the Idea of the construction of more complex Ideas out of simpler ones comprehends the entire sequence of such constructions.  Hence, that Idea is a product of Comprehension.  Thus, likewise, the Idea of the Ethics as a whole is one of Comprehension.  But then Comprehension spans the three types of Knowledge that are developed within the work--Opinion, Reason, and Intuition.  Thus, implicitly expressed by the Ethics is a fourth kind of Knowledge--Comprehension, which spans not only the Ideas of the other three, but Ideas of the relations between them, as well.  Now, since that Idea includes that of Opinion, and Opinion, as inadequate, is not in divine Thought, the object of Comprehension cannot be God/Nature/Substance, so must be of a whole that exceeds that Idea.