Philosophy, Marxism, Practice

As Marx attends to the distinction between Philosophy as interpreting the world, and Philosophy as changing the world, he overlooks another distinction that is implicit therein--that between changing the world, and a specifically Philosophical mode of changing the world. Now, the distinctively Philosophical dimension of Marxism is Dialectical Materialism. But, that system never functions as more than an interpretation of the world, even when applied to future events. What it is not applied to is the specifically Practical dimension of the doctrine, crystallized as the Ten Planks in the Manifesto. For those proposals are as randomly organized a mere list as are the Ten Commandments. In contrast, the paradigms of specifically Practical Philosophy are the principles articulated by Kant and Mill, each of which is applicable in each and every experience, and from the former of which is derived a system of duties. On the basis of those models, a distinctively Philosophical presentation of the Ten Planks would be methodically organized, beginning with the formulation of a fundamental Practical principle, followed by a derivation of any other proposition, e. g. a demonstration of 'Abolish private property' as following from 'Conduct oneself in accordance with the General Will', perhaps via an application of Dialectical Logic. As is, Marxism in its Practical dimension is not a Philosophical doctrine.

Practical Consciousness and Necessity

As has been previously discussed, Practical Consciousness is constituted by attention guiding physiological motion. Now, such attention is not required in habitual behavior, in which an outcome arrives, under normal circumstances, as expected. Where it is required is when habit is either not established, e. g. in a novel experience, or is inadequate to the circumstances, e. g. in which unusual factors, such as illness, intervene. So, the outcome of Practical Consciousness is essentially uncertain, even if intended. which can explain why Practice is depreciated in the Cartesian tradition. Likewise, a significant problem for Marxism is that either Revolution is not a product of Practical Consciousness, or else it is not governed by historical Necessity.

Self-Consciousness and Practical Consciousness

A common instance of self-consciousness, rarely recognized as such, is when one pays attention to what one is doing. In such cases, one is not merely observing what one is doing, one guides it, as if one were carrying out a set of instructions. Hence, in the process, Consciousness functions as a cause of behavior. Thus, this Self-Consciousness can be classified as Practical Consciousness, in contrast with the mere Consciousness of Practice. Now, the physiological motions that can be affected by this guidance are not only those of the limbs, but of the sense organs as well, e. g. keeping one's eyes and ears trained on some object. Hence, in the 'consciousness' of an outer object, there are distinct strata that are often conflated in some theories of Perception, such as in the Phenomenological one adopted by Marx-Engels. The suppressed distinction also signifies the main shortcoming in their concept of Practice.

Consciouness and Others

A common use of the term 'self-conscious' is to one's concern for how one appears to others, applicable to most looks in a mirror. Implicit in that usage is the attribution of Consciousness to others. Thus, there is a distinction between the awareness of oneself in association with others, and one of oneself in association with others who possess their own such awareness. Now, Consciousness, which is inherently "for me", as conceived by Marx-Engels, cannot recognize the latter possibility, which entails an in-itself existence, and so lacks the capacity to account for a concept of Self-Consciousness that even in Capitalist conditions, transcends an egocentric orientation. Furthermore, their concept thus also lacks the capacity to distinguish between conscious beings and inanimate objects. It, therefore, includes no ground for the elimination of the treatment of the former as the latter, i. e. of the exploitation of others, which is a necessary condition of their concept of Socialism.

Consciousness and Selfishness

According to Marx-Engels, the fundamental object of Consciousness is oneself in some relation with others.  Now, because that relation is indeterminate, and the Consciousness is "growing", a range of structures is possible, including that of one as a member of an exploited Proletariat, i. e. Class-Consciousness.  Still, regardless of the stage of development therein, Consciousness is inherently "for me", according to this concept of it, perhaps a Phenomenological one adopted from Hegel.  Hence, it is an inherently egocentric one, and, thus, in the service of Selfishness.  Yet, they do not seem to recognize that it may be an historically contingent one, a likely product of a Capitalist society, that itself requires revolutionizing, if the Consciousness of living in a Socialist society is not to remain a reactionary factor.

Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Society

Marx-Engels assert of Consciousness that it is of "other persons and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious".  So, in other words, they identify Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, as opposed to, say, Hegel, who distinguishes them.  And, therefore, their concept is one that is essentially social, in significant contrast with, notably Descartes',  However, the concept of Self-Consciousness as essentially social is not exclusive to Materialism--neither Kant's, in his Refutation of Idealism, nor Heidegger's Being-in-the-World, each implicitly social, is Materialist.  Regardless, nothing in Marx-Engels' formulation of Self-Consciousness includes Practice qua Purposiveness; rather, it entails only association with others, which can be for its own sake.  Hence, rather than as another means to the survival of the individual, Self-Consciousness can also be interpreted as a manifestation of a Formal Species-principle, the main function of which is to integrate its otherwise randomly compresent members.

Consciousness and Practice

According to Marx-Engels, Consciousness is a distinctively human characteristic the fundamental function of which is social and practical.  Their exposition of the concept in the German Ideology includes the following analysis:  "Where there exists a relationship, it exists for me: the animal does not enter into 'relations' with anything, it does not enter into any relation at all.  For the animal, its relation to other does not exist as a relation."  Now, the "for me" signifies a concept of Consciousness that is either Phenomenological or Epiphenomenal, in contrast with concepts in which the object of Consciousness is no mere appearance, but a reality, in itself.  So, implicit in the Consciousness of a relation is that it represents some indeterminable Species interaction, from which it follows that Class Consciousness is no more than a special case of such an representation, and that 'Revolution' is only an interpretation of some Species activity, as is the attribution to it of 'Necessity'.  But, the deeper problem for them is that such a concept of Consciousness lacks causal efficacy, so no Consciousness, and no degree of development of Class Consciousness, suffices to motivate the Proletariat to Revolution.  In other words, their concept of Consciousness may be a Consciousness of Practice, but it is not a Practical Consciousness.

Consciousness, Language, Species

At various points in the German Ideology, Marx-Engels assert the following: 1. "Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life"; 2. "Language is practical consciousness; and 3. "Consciousness only arises from the need, the necessity of intercourse with other men."  Now, from #3, it follows that in the case of self-sufficient humans, they would possess neither Consciousness nor Language.  Hence, the concepts of Consciousness and Language entailed is Atomist, in which such relations are contingent.  Furthermore, from #2, it follows that Consciousness is essentially non-practical, and, hence, theoretical, thereby re-opening the possibility precluded in #1, namely, that it transcends Life.  So, their concepts of Consciousness and Language seem muddled, one solution to which is to jettison the Atomist model, in favor of one that includes the possibility of a transcendence that is yet immanent in Life.  In that one, it is the Individual, but not Life, that is transcended--by the Species, with Consciousness and Language fundamentally functioning as a Formal Species-principle, i. e. functioning to maintain social cohesion, with respect to which communication with others as a means to the satisfaction of vital needs is a frequent, but inessential application that presupposes the fundamental function.  On that basis, the Consciousness-Language relation is that of implicit-explicit.

Print and Class Consciousness

Marx might regard the content of the Bible as abstract Ideological fiction, but the influence of Gutenberg's invention--an unprecedented concrete homogenization of society--is independent of both the Roman Catholic interpretation of that content, and the Protestant decentralization of it that the invention enables.  Similar developments have been in evidence very recently--in the extension of that homogenization, via the extending of print technology through the 'World Wide Web', which includes the capacity of virtually instantaneous translations between different languages.  Likewise, lacking in standard Marxist analysis, is any consideration of the role that Print, as a prevailing Means of Communication, plays in the cultivation of Class Consciousness, i. e. of the generalized awareness of the specific sufferings of individual members of the Proletariat.

Form, Matter, System

This solar system consists in the Sun and 8 or 9 planets organized in a certain manner.  In traditional Logical terms, the Sun and planets are its Matter, and the manner of their organization, e. g. gravitational relations, are its Form, a pairing that for Plato was also Ontological and Epistemological.  So, a 'System' can be defined as a combination of Form and Matter, with the latter two mutually independent, but complementary.  Thus, Atomism, as Matter without Form, is not a System, and Nominalism, as excluding Form, is inadequate as a Semantics of Systems.  Now, Capitalism is barely a System, with its only Formal principle the vague Invisible Hand.  In contrast, Marxism entails a more emphatic Formal principle--History--but is otherwise as Materialist, in this sense, as is Capitalism, with its group terms, e. g. Class, Society, etc. essentially Nominalistic.  But, in sharper contrast with both Systems, the concept of Species entails a more influential Formal principle, manifested in both reproductive processes, and in the capacity of its members to communicate, neither of which is adequately grounded in either Capitalism or Socialism.  That is, both reproduction and communication are adjuncts to individuals in both those Systems, and, hence, are in them contingent Materialist properties, rather than Formal principles independent of those individuals.

Individual and Species

The Earth both spins on its axis and revolves around the Sun, and while distinct, the two motions regularly combine, e. g. the Summer Solstice is the 'longest day'.  Also, other familiar phenomena may be due to relations with planets in other solar systems.  In any case, the example illustrates one of the limitations of both Atomism and Nominalism, since the Earth clearly simultaneously has both properties that are specific to it as an individual planet, and those that are a function of it as one of a solar system.  Furthermore, the relations of the Earth to other planets in the system are ultimately at least partly centrally determined.  But, while these distinctions are usefully drawn in Astronomical study, Economics, both Capitalism and Socialism, remains bogged down by an Atomism and a Nominalism that are explicit in the former and implicit in the latter.  Thus, remaining unexamined by either is that the behavior of individuals can be co-determined by both internal drives and social forces, and that interpersonal relations can be grounded in a species principle.

Capitalism, Marxism, Nominalism

According to Nominalism, the 'human race' is no more than its individual members, i. e. there is no 'human species' that is distinguishable from that manifold.  Likewise, in Nominalism, no group concept, e. g. Nation, Family, Society, Class, etc. is distinct from its members.  Now, Capitalism is plainly a Nominalist system, in which any group is no more than an association of members.  But, despite its focus on groups, especially on Class, Marxism never abandons Nominalism, distinguished from Capitalism by conceiving individuals as related dialectically, rather than associatively.  So, one challenge to it, as much as to Capitalism, is to explain why the respective mode of relation is specific to certain entities, or, in other words, why either kind of relation does not extend outside of the species.  Such circumscription suggests that the behavior of its members is, at least to some extent, governed by a Species-principle that transcends the members to which it applies.

Species, Individual, Contradiction

An unwanted pregnancy is an example of a biologically inherent conflict between the interests of a species, i. e. propagation, and the interests of an individual, e. g. incapacity to support a child.  Now, since subsistence, e. g. food, is an individual-interest, so, too, is the Means of  Production, e. g. agricultural equipment, food processing plants, etc., to which it is an end.  On the other hand, the end of the Means of Communication--collective coordination--is a species-interest.  So, what Marx-Engels cite as one of the fundamental contradictions of Capitalism--that between the Means of Production and the Relations of Production--has deeper Biological roots than that or any particular system.  Likewise, insofar as Socialism is designed to resolve that Economic contradiction, it must also address the deeper one in order to be successful.

Writing, Printing, Society

Since Writing can survive the moment of utterance, it surpasses the capacity of oral speech to record History.  But, the significant enhancement of that capacity is facilitated by the development of Printing, and, hence, of the possibility of the reproduction of a piece of Writing.  Entailed in such a possibility are the concepts of Egalitarianism and Pluralism, which are concretely realized in the influence on History of the introduction of the Gutenberg Bible.  Accordingly, the social transitions out of Medieval Monarchism and Oligarchism are easily attributable to developments in the Means of Communication, thereby posing a challenge to the Marxist thesis that the Means of Production is the primary determinant of social relations.  So, in the absence of an elaboration of the relation between Means of Communication and Means of Production, the more accurate thesis, that combines both, is that the primary determinant of social relations is Technology, in general.

Writing, Materialism, History, Money

Because of their inattention to Writing, Marx-Engels miss an opportunity to strengthen Materialism, as Derrida does over a century later--by showing that any system of Ideas presupposes a concept of Writing.  They also cannot appreciate that History as they conceive it is virtually impossible without Writing, in comparison with which the only alternative, oral transmission of the past, is significantly limited.  But, the most important influence of Writing on modern Economics is that Money is a special case of it.  For, without the inscription of value, the utility of any medium of exchange is drastically diminished.  So, Marxism neglects what is, at minimum, a pervasive relevant factor in its purview.

Writing, Means of Production, Means of Communication

Attention to the process of Writing, which is the most immediately given fact to Marx-Engels in their observation of concrete phenomena, can lead to modifications of two of their main principles.  First, it is evidence that humans uniquely use implements not only to produce their subsistence, as they propose, but to communicate, as well.  Second, it is evidence that social relations are determined by not only the prevailing Means of Production, as they assert, but by the available means of Communication as well, e. g. their ability to promote revolution would be significantly diminished without a pen and paper, and without Gutenberg's extension of those implements.  Now, perhaps the Means of Communication can be classified as a special case of the Means of Production.  But, even if so, one significant distinction is that while the immediate purpose served by the latter is the subsistence of individuals, that of  the former is that of the species, the basic internal coherence of which inheres in the communication of its members.

Nature, Necessity, Art

Insofar as the possession of opposing thumbs facilitates the instinctual drive in humans to use tools as a means of survival, one way to overcome such 'natural necessity' is to detach the means from the end.  And, indeed, the enjoyment of artistic implements, e. g. musical instruments, for their own sake, exemplifies such detachment.  Now, it seems difficult to establishment which is historically prior--the purposeful or the purposeless, use of implements.  Regardless, the latter is available to Marx-Engels as a model of the Play into which Labor can be transformed through their posited overcoming of 'natural necessity' by the transition to Socialism.  On that interpretation of their plan, Socialism transcends Necessity, but not Nature.

Practice, Writing, Consciousness

Just as, due to the possession of opposing thumbs, the human organism uniquely, as Marx-Engels note, employs tools as a means to survival, it also uniquely communicates via implements--in writing.  Now, if they had observed their own writing as an immediate example of concrete Practice, they could have discovered implicated in it Consciousness functioning not as a detached recorder of data, but as an attentive guide of the motions of the hand.  On that basis, they could have extended the discovery to all motile processes, including to Perception, which is similarly constituted by the attentive guidance of the motions of the eyes, ears, etc.  They thus could have concluded that the concept of Consciousness as the detached observer of concrete Practical phenomena is as Theoretical as that of it as the detached observer of thoughts.

MInd and Practice

If, as Marx proposes, the distinguishing characteristic of the human organism is the capacity to make and use tools as a means to subsistence, then the biological fact, if not evolutionary development, that grounds that capacity is opposing thumbs.  Likewise, if there is a distinctive characteristic of human Mind, it is the capacity to operate the opposing thumbs., not a mere awareness of them.  Thus, the occasional synonymity of  'understand' and 'grasp' is more than merely metaphorical.  More generally, a concept of Mind as Practical is one of it as fundamentally volitional and not cognitive, as Kant and Spinoza advocate, but from which Marx-Engels occasionally lapse, e. g.  when they conceive it as Consciousness, i. e. as a data-recording medium.

Nature, Maturation, Socialism

Growth is a characteristic of most organisms, and includes becoming larger and the development of abilities.  Now, one phase of Growth is Maturation, in which previously dependent beings become relatively independent.  So, the main features of the Marxist transition to Socialism, e. g. voluntariness, a diversification of experiences, etc., can be interpreted as a special case of Maturation.  Now, Growth is a natural principle, and, yet, Marx-Engels oppose "nature" to "voluntary" activity.  Consequently, their concept of Socialism is as non-natural as is any Idealist concept of a human ideal.

Socialism and Empowerment

Working for someone else who is the owner of the means of production is a heteronomous condition that constitutes self-alienation, according to Marx-Engels.  Likewise, self-employment is autonomous.  However, the shortcoming of the latter is that one's power is limited to the scope of the means of production which one owns, usually to one activity.  In contrast, as they observe, the collective ownership of the means of production opens the autonomy of any member to a wide, perhaps infinite, range of activities in which to exercise one's abilities.  So, central to their Moral argument for Socialism is that it empowers any individual to an extent impossible in any other system.

Alienation and Labor

What Marx-Engels, in the German Ideology, call the "abolition" of Labor under communism, to be replaced by "self-activity", is actually the abolition of an involuntary Division of Labor.  For, though in places, what they describe seems to be an anarchist vision, in which each does whatever one wants, whenever one wants, relatively muted is that the leeway is grounded in a collective and voluntary Division of Labor, presented without details as to, for example, how all necessary tasks, e. g. cleaning the latrine, get performed.  Regardless, specifically entailed in the abolition is that of role-playing in terms of involuntary and exclusive societal categories that are determined by the extant Means of Production, e. g. a transformation of 'being an X', to 'doing X' by someone who is more than 'an X'.  Now, such a transformation falls short of an Aristotelian, as has been previously discussed, elevation of Labor to skilled activity, e. g. to Art or Craft.  But, it can still be described as overcoming an 'alienation from one's Labor' that precedes the alienation from the fruits of one's Labor.    

Socialism and Play

On one formulation, the synthesis of a working class and an ownership class yields a Socialist concept of a class-less society in which everyone both works and owns the means of production.  But, entailed in that antithesis is another--leisure and drudgery.  So, likewise entailed in the concept of the Socialist synthesis is that of what can be called Play, i. e. Labor that is creative and enjoyable, as it is for a musician or an athlete.  Thus, while some of Marx-Engel's passages seem to suggest that in Socialism, Labor is eliminated, perhaps to be replaced completely by technology, in this concept of it, Socialism restores necessary activity to a dignity possibly experienced by pre-industrial artisans, a true Ethical or Moral elevation of human conduct.

Labor, Artisanship, Socialism

Lost in history are distinctions between Ethics and Morality, including the difference in Aristotle's version of the former between living and living well.  The basis of that difference for him is the principle of Balance, which can be classified as either a Rational or an Artistic concept.  So, one application of Aristotelian Ethics to Marxism, is to distinguish between the use of tools in order to survive, and the skilled use of tools in order to survive, or, in other words, between Labor and Artisanship. On that basis, an Ethical vision of Socialism includes the concept of a means of production that synthesizes Artisanry and Industrial Technology.  Now, ownership of the means of production might be a necessary condition of the actualization of that concept, but it is hardly sufficient, an indication of one of the shortcomings of Marxist Socialism that Trotsky does not rectify.

Socialism and Survival

As has been previous discussed, Trotsky proposes that the ultimate justification of Socialism is its elimination of the exploitation of humans by humans.  However, implicit in Marx's definition of humans as the animal that produces its means of sustenance, is that what justifies any human activity is its effectiveness in promoting the survival of the species, i. e. its "sustenance".  Accordingly, the only justification of not only Socialism, but of the elimination of exploitation, is that it promotes survival more effectively than any alternative.  So, not only is Trotsky's thesis inconsistent with the premises of Marxism, his neglect of the latter is entails that of the possibility that some other doctrine is more effective as a means to its implicit ends.

Socialism, Means, Ends

Trotsky, in Their Morality and Ours, by asserting that an End itself needs further justification, seems unaware that it is therefore itself a Means to whatever justifies it.  Furthermore, that proposition, by itself, does not rule out the possibility of some other Means to that further End.  Thus, specifically, he is declaring that Socialism is a means to a non-exploitative society, without ruling out the possibility of some other system also being effective in that respect.  He also does not consider a positive conception of a non-exploitative society, e. g. a We.  In any case, as has been previously discussed, he clarifies one of the most important Moral questions confronting Marxism--whether or not violence is a permissible means--with a negative answer about which Marx-Engels' position can only be speculated, though with which his murderers are in obvious disagreement.

Means, End, Violence

While the traditional criteria of Theory include Truth and Validity, those of Practice include Goodness and Justice. However, if in Marx-Engels' privileging of Practice over Theory there is any attention to those values, it is not explicit. So, instead, Trotsky's version of Marxist Morality might be taken as definitive for the doctrine. Now, three important theses that he presents in 'Their Morals and Ours' are: 1. "A means can be justified only by its end"; 2. "The end in its turn needs to be justified"; and 3. "The end is justified if it leads to the abolition of the power of man over man". Furthermore, by 'justification' he means 'is governed by the values of'. Hence, it follows that 4. "Not all means are permissible", i. e. that any means that involves the power of man over man is not permissible. In other words, though he expresses it long-windedly, he does not endorse any violence in Revolution that is not a mode of self-defense. Whether or not Marx-Engels would concur with this version of a Marxist Morality can only be speculated about.

Revolution and Abstraction

Marxism is a declaration of war against Capitalism, the Philosophical dimension of which is its various justifications of the declaration, e. g. the flaws of that system, the historical process by which such flaws get resolved, the superiority of Socialism, etc. However, the description of the conduct of that war, i. e. of Revolution, remains abstract, since lacking in the midst of that jargon is a concrete account of what the action entails, including the possibility of violence against Capitalists. Likewise lacking is any attempt at a Philosophical justification of that possibility, i. e. one that specifically addresses the possibility of doing physical harm to another human being. So long as its concept of Revolution remains abstract, e. g. represented as an "abolition of private property", the attempt of Marxism to 'set Philosophy back on its feet' remains groundless.

Necessity, Need, Revolution

Practical Necessity, i. e. Need, can be distinguished from Theoretical Necessity, i. e. the Modal category, and can still be conceived as evincing a Dialectical pattern, i. e. with an organic deficiency conceived as a Contradiction, and the satisfaction of it as a Synthesis. Now, in at least some passages in the German Ideology, the 'Necessity' that Marx-Engels attribute to Revolution is Practical, e. g. when it is motivated by the suffering of members of a society. However, the 'Necessity' that they attribute to a Revolution as a response to contradictions in the status quo is Theoretical. Likewise, while overthrowing those who are the source of suffering is a Practical Revolution, it is not equivalent to more radically abolishing the system that might be perpetuated in such an upheaval. Furthermore, the Necessity of responding to suffering is not equivalent to the Necessity of the success of the response, which, in Dialectical Theory, it is. So, some of their pivotal arguments in defense of the revolutionary means to Socialism are afflicted by a significant equivocation.

Science, Practice, Experiment, Socialism

In Marxism, 'Science' is a species of Theory, i. e. a representation of a sequence of events as Necessary, which creates the problem of reconciling Revolution as an object of Theory, with Revolution as the product of free Practice. However, Marx-Engels do not seem to consider not only that Science is a species of Practice, but that it is predominantly so in the Modern era. For, since Galileo, Science is fundamentally the product of a mode of Practice--Experimentation, as is the Technology that constitutes the Means of Production that is the determining factor in the course of events represented by the Marxist theory of Revolution. Now, an essential characteristic of Experimentation is uncertainty of outcome. So, on the basis of a Practical concept of Science, Socialism is an Experiment, not an inevitability.