Saturday, January 31, 2015

Pluralization and Democratization

Pluralization and Democratization are not equivalent. The former entails the introduction of novelty into a system, while the latter is one mode of re-organization necessitated by an increase. For, example, the arrival of a baby pluralizes the family, but its role in it is not equal to that of its parents. The entertainment of a Constitutional Monarchy by the authors of the U. S. Constitution is an indication that Democracy is only one product of Pluralization.

Friday, January 30, 2015

Pluralization, Family, We

The most familir example of Pluralization is biological Reproduction, in which 2 becomes 3, or more. But, a family is not in itself a We. For, the former, at least at the outset, is, for some of its members, an involuntary relation, while a We is essentially voluntarily assumed. That some adult children do re-conceive their family as a We only underscores that there are others who repudiate the biological connection, thereby illustrating the difference between Family and We.

Thursday, January 29, 2015

We and Us

Us is a degenerate We, e. g. an arrested case of the latter. For, while We pluralizes some given, Us constitutes a mere opposition to it, casting it as a Them, e. g the Ku Klux Klan, in opposition to racial integration. Thus, as Nietzsche and Sartre each observes, the Us remains utterly dependent on the existence of its enemy, no matter how adamantly its 'freedom' from it is insisted upon. Thus, without the We of the Constitution, the U. S. Declaration of Independence could have remained a mere Us, locked into a perpetual struggle with the British forebearers.

Wednesday, January 28, 2015

We and Antagonism

Hume acutely observes that Sympathy is not unconditionally good, since association with another is often based on some contingent characteristic, and, hence, involves antagonism with others, e. g. patriotic feelings. Accordingly, for him, only Universal Sympathy is adequate for Morality, i. e. fellow-feeling based only on common humanity. We is similarly delimited--only Community conceived as an expression of Pluralization is conclusively not a product of an Us-Them conflict. Such an expression is possible only as a species drive.

Tuesday, January 27, 2015

We and Nobility

Because Nietzsche is sometimes interpreted as a radical Individualist, and, hence, as opposed to Collectivism, he might, therefore, disapprove of We. However, to the contrary, in #45 of Human, All Too Human, he associates the capacity to form community with Nobility, and the inability to do so with Baseness. Thus, he appreciates We as a superior Moral condition, while it is, instead, some anti-Collectivists who are deficient in that regard.

Monday, January 26, 2015

We, Cognition, Practice

According to traditional representations, a group of people is empirically multiple, and intellectually one. Thus, We can be no more than a hybrid concept in either Empiricism and Rationalism. But, We is fundamentally a Practical concept, not a Cognitive one, and is subject to those representations only given the priority of Cognition over Practice, which pervades much of contemporary Philosophy. Absent the assumption of that priority, We proves the inadequacy of the former to the latter.

Sunday, January 25, 2015

Sympathy and General Will

An Empiricist might argue that Sympathy is the ground of We. However, as the etymology of the term indicates, Sympathy is a passive condition, whereas We can connote agency. So, if Hume or Smith conceive Rousseau's General Will as derived from Sympathy, the derivation is inadequate to the latter.

Saturday, January 24, 2015

Society and Member

'Member' sometimes means 'limb', sometimes an 'item in a set'. This distinguishable-isolable contrast can be expressed as that between a part and an element. Accordingly, one of the fundamental questions in Political Philosophy is whether a member of a society is a part of it, or an element in it. Rousseau and Marx are among those who advocate the former, Locke and Smith, the latter. Supporting the latter is the empirical evidence of the spatio-temporal and behavioral dissociation of people, while that of the former is the biological unity of the race. The Theological thesis of the existence of an individual Soul thus has important Poltical implications, indicative of the profound Philosophical grounds that inform the usual rhetoric.

Friday, January 23, 2015

We and Pluralization

As has been previously discussed, traditional Rationalism and traditional Empiricism each seems to lack a concept of a concrete We, thereby raising the Kantian question, 'How is such a concept possible?', the answer to which would need to entail both concrete Unity and concrete Multiplicity. Now, the common example of a 'we', i. e. a group of people engaged in a single task, is inadequate in that regard, since the Unity remains abstract. A little closer to concrete Unity is coitus, in which two become one, but only almost. However, a better possibility is suggested by the latter, but conversely. For, often in that act, two become three, thereby unambiguously actualizing a process of Pluralization, which in the case of Mitosis is one becoming two. So, the concept of We is entailed in the process of Pluralization, even if the latter exceeds the scope of either traditional doctrine.

Thursday, January 22, 2015

Empiricism, Rationalism, General Will, We

For the Empiricist,'general' means 'aggregate of particulars'; for the Rationalist, it means 'universal individual'. But, regardless of their differences, in common is the inadequacy of each to Rousseau's concept of General Will as is expressed in the formulation "We the people". For the Empiricist, 'we' is a mere abstraction, while for the Rationalist, its entailed multiplicity is merely Phenomenal. So, for the entire extant Philosophical tradition, the perhaps cardinal Political idea of the late 18th century, not to mention the first person plural grammatical category of most languages for millennia, is at least partly fictitious.

Wednesday, January 21, 2015

Empiricism, Rationalism, Self-Determination

The tendency in contemporary academic Philosophy to classify the Empiricism vs. Rationalism debate as primarily Epistemological obscures its Moral significance, of which the pivotal thinkers were clearly more aware. Since, for an Empiricist, all experience begins with received sense-data, behavior can only be, as is implied in Hume's concept of it, reactive, i. e. inadequately caused, according to Spinoza, and heteronomous, in Kant's system. In contrast, Rationality, whether as conceived by either of those two, or by Aristotle, is potentially spontaneous, i. e. is the source of adequate causality, according to Spinoza, and is autonomous, in Kant's system. In other words, Empiricism is constrained by its methodology to Behaviorism, thus, perhaps unwittingly, committing any Political or Economic system on which it is based, e. g. Locke's and Smith's, to a 'freedom' that is only superficial. In contrast, Rationalism, as Spinoza and Kant each show, can accommodate the kind of Self-Determination that is entailed in Rousseau's concept of a General Will.

Tuesday, January 20, 2015

General Will, Self, Self-Interest

Kant's representation of Rousseau's concept of General Will as Pure Practical Reason entails a significant transformation of the then prevailing concept of Self-Interest. Hitherto, except in Spinoza's system, the 'Self' is, as Hume analyzes it, a 'bundle' of perceptions, each of which originates as a passive impression, an analysis that Kant accepts, under the rubric of 'regulative', i. e. heuristic, idea. In contrast, the Self entailed in Pure Practical Reason is constitutive and active only by virtue of its self-instantiation of Universal Law, i. e. of what Rousseau calls the General Will. On this rendering, therefore, there is no active Self independent of its participation in a collective We, or, put otherwise, an Individual becomes autonomous only by virtue of its assumption of the General Will, a consequence that Hume lacks the resources to dispute. Similarly, it is not that the General Will supersedes genuine Self-Interest, but that it first creates it. Accordingly, insofar as the Invisible Hand remains a passively experienced analog of the General Will, there is no genuine Self-Interest in Capitalism.

Monday, January 19, 2015

General Will and Self-Interest

One argument against the existence of a General Will that can supersede Self-Interest in an individual is simply that the individual Psyche is governed by an insuperable principle of Self-Preservation. But, not only is that argumentv question-begging, it is false. For, the reproductive drive that most individuals experience is a trans-personal instinct that can be deliberately assumed, e. g. whenever there is a seeking to get pregnant. Likewise, the incapacity to posit and act upon a general idea is a contingent weakness, possibly intellectual, possibly moral, not an inherent structural limitation.

Sunday, January 18, 2015

General Will. Democracy, Capitalism

Any action that deliberately aims at some general Good can be said to be determined by a 'general will'. Thus, a monarch, e. g. Plato's Philosopher-King, or a similarly minded Oligarch, can possess a general will. Hence, what is specifically distinctive about Rousseau's General Will is its democratization, i. e. its principle that each citizen, and not no more than a mere few, can be motivated by the general Good. In contrast, in Smith's system, Self-Interest is the primary determinant of action, thereby indicative of a significant discrepancy between Capitalism and Democracy that continues to be ignored more than 200 years later.

Saturday, January 17, 2015

General Will, General Interest, Invisible Hand

The decisive feature of Rousseau's concept of General Will is the introduction of General Interest as an explicit psychological factor, in contrast with which, Locke recognizes only Self-Interest as the motivation in a Democracy. Among those who attempt to accommodate Rousseau's innovation are Kant, Mill, and Marx, i. e. the universalization of a maxim, general consequences, and class consciousness, respectively. In contrast, inattention to it is often expressed in contemporary American political rhetoric, i. e. in the phrase 'the good of the country' uttered by an advocate of an ideology of Self-Interest. Likewise, while Smith's Invisible Hand is plainly inspired by Rousseau's General Will, he fails to incorporate the latter into his Psychological model, leaving his own version of the innovation fatefully ungrounded.

Friday, January 16, 2015

Self-Interest and Wealth of a Nation

While Marx's alleged employment of a butler is sometimes adduced as a counter-argument to Socialism, it is rarely noticed that Smith has an analogous, though converse, potential problem with respect to Capitalism. For, it is patently likely that the writing of Wealth of Nations aims at the promotion of the general Good. But, if so, then it presents a counter-example to one of the fundamental premises of his system--that the promotion of Self-Interest is the best means to the wealth of a nation. Now, Mill is one of the few Capitalists who have recognized the shortcomings of that Psychological principle, as is reflected in his modification of Bentham's calculus to include the consequences of an entertained action for others, as well as for oneself. Still, the dogma continues, especially in the U. S., despite the absence of theoretical or empirical foundation, and the presence of Smith's unwitting refutation of it.

Thursday, January 15, 2015

Capitalism, Deism, Theism, Pantheism

The terms are commonly used casually, but one way that 'Deism' and 'Theism' have been distinguished is: while, according to the former, God creates the universe, but thereafter has no further involvement in it, according to the latter, God also intervenes in his creation. A prominent example of the former is Newton's clockwork physical world, that of the latter implied by the parting of the Red Sea in Exodus. Similarly, Smith's concept of the Invisible Hand as an immanent balancing mechanism is Deistic, while the American Protestant concept of it as a dispenser of divine justice is Theistic. In contrast with both, Spinoza's Pantheism is less hospitable to Capitalism. For, according to the former, the Empiricist Behaviorism of the latter marks it as an Inadequate Idea, and, hence, as a less than divine system.

Wednesday, January 14, 2015

Evolution, Economics, Social Darwinism.

Hitherto, the closest that Evolutionism has come to influencing Economic Theory has been what is sometimes called 'Social Darwinism', in which the Invisible Hand is aligned with the 'survival of the fittest' principle. Now, while neither Smith nor Darwin might approve of this hybrid, it is not inconsistent with either of their premises. For, any Economic outcome can be attributed to the Invisible Hand, and Profit can be interpreted as an indication of superior Fitness. In contrast, two modifications of classical Darwinism yields the fundaments of a different Economic model: 1. Re-conceiving Evolution as, not a means to survival, but as an end-in-itself; and, 2. Recognizing Humanity as itself as a transitional stage in the origination of a higher species, one in which, e. g. as Nietzsche sometimes proposes,is synthesized all the positive characteristics of the human race. On the basis of that concept, the aim of an Evolutionary Economic system is to promote the well-being of all members, with respect to which a Social Darwinist collective is considerably less fit.

Tuesday, January 13, 2015

Invention and Invisible Hand

According to Smith's Behaviorist Atomism, an invention can be the product of only some individual's self-interest, and can become generally beneficial only via a deus ex machina,e. g. the Invisible Hand. In contrast, on the premise of a species instinct that seeks the optimal collective well-being, the general beneficiality of innovation is not as miraculous. For, that instinct can be the principle that both introduces novelty into the system, and guides its distribution. Thus, absent it, Smith's Atomism requires a Theistic element, as opposed to Newton's Deistic clockmaker who never intervenes in his contraption.

Monday, January 12, 2015

Invention and Zero-Sum Game

The slogan 'A rising tide raises all boats', sometimes advanced in defense of Capitalism, seems rarely to be accompanied by an explanation of how the rising tide occurs. Absent the latter, the formulation is vulnerable to the following argument: 1. Economics is a zero-sum game; 2. In a Zero-Sum Game, there is a one-to-one correspondence between Profit and Loss; 3. Therefore, not all boats can rise. So, a denial of #1 is the beginning of one response, while another is to restrict the scope of the 'game' to human affairs, i. e. by leaving open the possibility of an increase from without, e. g. from non-human Nature. Now, the commonest example of the latter is Invention, in which raw materials are transformed into some useful product. So, technological innovation, as opposed to, say, entrepreneurial ingenuity, is one, and, perhaps, the only, theoretically sound source of general benefit.

Sunday, January 11, 2015

Capitalism, Labor, Slavery

Insofar as Labor is classified as a species of Commodity, it is subject to any laws governing the latter. Thus, for example, according to the principle of profit-maximization, a purchaser of Labor will seek to acquire it as cheaply as possible. Now, as Marx discerns, the minimum expense entailed in the acquisition of Labor is the 'reproduction' of it, i. e. the provision of the minimum that suffices for productivity, e. g. slavery conditions, sweat-shop wages, etc. But, while Smith might not have considered consequences of his system that are immoral, according to Kantianism, post-Marx Capitalists have tended to ignore, obscure, or privately affirm them.

Saturday, January 10, 2015

Labor, Commodity, Wage

Labor-Value is often conceived as, along with Exchange- and Use-, a variety of Commodity-Value. But, as Marx significantly discerns, the concept presupposes that of the Value of Labor itself. Hence, it more fundamentally provides a basis for a theory of Wage-Value. Now, insofar as Labor is treated as a Commodity, Exchange-Value and Use-Value each includes, as a special case, Wage-Value. So, a cardinal thesis of Marxism is that Labor is fundamentally not a Commodity, thereby exposing a Moral dimension of Economic Theory that is otherwise usually suppressed.

Friday, January 9, 2015

Nominal Value and Exchange Value

Smith's use of the 'Real'-'Nominal' contrast to represent the distinction between Labor Value and Exchange Value is not only unusual, but potentially profoundly misleading. For, traditionally, the former pair corresponds to a logical distinction--an individual universal vs. a set of particulars that share some characteristic, whereas the latter contrasts two particular quantities--one, inherent, the other, contingent. Now, while his successors have tended to use Real-Nominal otherwise, the veneer of the rationality of Exchange Value has lingered, fortifying those who tend to profit from the obscuring of the essential arbitrariness of some market prices, especially wages, i. e. it provides them with grounds for a defense against a presumed 'redistribution' of income, familiar in contemporary political rhetoric.

Thursday, January 8, 2015

Intellectual Labor and Value

The earliest example of a Political Philosophy, Plato's, described by him as an "invention", includes a Division of Labor, i. e. the three main necessary strata of a polis. Hence, the earliest Economic Theory is an invention. Thus, as is the case with any invention, a certain quantum of physiological labor is embodied in every copy of the Republic. However, given the profound influence that that work has had, and continues to have, on subsequent civilization, it seems difficult to reduce the amount of intellectual labor embodied in it to the same mere process of writing that produces any other book of the same length. So, granted the thesis that labor is embodied in any product, its quantity, and, hence, its value, may be impossible to assess at any moment in its history. Accordingly, the Exchange Value at any time of a copy of the Republic hardly reflects its Labor Value.

Wednesday, January 7, 2015

Evolution and Value

If Darwin is correct, underlying Labor, Exchange, and Use varieties is what can be called Evolutionary Value. But, as is often the case in his and related theories, 'evolution' should not be confused with 'survival'. For, while, for example, in 2015 the Utility of the Internet is widely recognized, in 1970, the species seemed to be surviving quite well without it, from which it can be inferred that technological invention constitutes a leap in, not a mere continuation of, the life-span of the species. So, given the decisive role that such innovation clearly plays in the formation of Economic systems, e. g. the breeding of Capitalism and Socialism by the Industrial Revolution, the three traditional varieties of Value can each be regarded as superficial.

Tuesday, January 6, 2015

Invention and Value

While some inventions are the children of Necessity, others are the products of more spontaneous brainstorms. Pieces of medical technology are examples of the former, while, in 1965, the need for such a thing as personal access to an Internet was hardly on anyone's mind. Thus, while the usefulness of some inventions is prefigured in the conditions to which they are solutions, that of others is first determined by their arrival. But, in the latter case, they embody the labor involved in producing them. Hence, inventions demonstrate that Labor Value and Use Value can be mutually independent, prior to influencing one another.

Monday, January 5, 2015

Technological Innovation and Economic Theory

Unarguably, Gutenberg's invention decentralized religion, so, perhaps, equally unarguably, its influence on the modern rise of Democracy is greater than those of the theories of Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, etc. If, so, then the events tend to confirm the thesis that technological innovation--communication media, work-tools, weaponry--has been the decisive factor in human history, with respect to which Political or Economic doctrine is a mere afterthought. Smith implicitly acknowledges as much, when he expresses concern over the potential corrosive social consequences of the Division of Labor effected in the emerging Industrial Age. While Marx agrees with him in that regard, whether the Communist Manifesto prescribes or describes a turn of the Dialectical wheel of History implies an uncertainty over his own role in the process.

Sunday, January 4, 2015

Invisible Hand and Ghost in the Machine

'The Ghost in the Machine' usually refers to the Dualist concept of a Mind or Soul inhabiting an otherwise inert or robotic body. But, it can also apply to Smith's Invisible Hand. For, the social order that forms around the mechanical processes that are the predominant means of production in his era itself thereby becomes machine-like, into which the Invisible Hand arrives as a dynamic unifying or harmonizing visitation, according to his system. In other words, the Invisible Hand is what Plato might call a 'writ large' Soul or Mind.

Saturday, January 3, 2015

Division of Labor, Machinery, Dehumanization

Smith's concept of Division of Labor is based on the image of a machine, but not as a mere metaphor or symbol. Rather, it is as the emerging dominant means of production that mechanical processes become the organizing principle of the social relations of those who work them. Now, one potential adverse effect of such division, as has been previously discussed, is a tendency towards disintegration. Another, given the subordination of workers to inert entities, is the dehumanization of them. So, while Smith's Invisible Hand might address the first problem, he seems to neglect the second. In contrast, Marx's proposal to collectivize ownership of the means of production targets both--it integrates social relations, and, it preserves the humanity of workers threatened with a robotizing that results from slavery to a mere machine. He thereby has compelling grounds for a Moral argument for a transition to Socialism.

Friday, January 2, 2015

Invisible Hand and Division of Labor

While the expression "invisible hand" appears sparsely and enigmatically in Smith's works, from the outset of Wealth of Nations, Division of Labor is explicitly advocated as his fundamental principle. Still, perhaps mindful of the consequences of an Atomistic concept of Division, he recognizes in it the danger of a tendency towards social disintegration. However, the only remedy that he offers is a feeble and vague exhortation to goverment intervention. Hence, the Invisible Hand has since emerged as the default binding force counterpoint to Division of Labor in his system.

Thursday, January 1, 2015

Value, Labor, Invention

Spinoza's primary interest in tools is regarding the fact that the making of one usually requires the pre-existence of another, etc., suggesting an infinite regress that approaches an original invention.  His concern is germane to Marxism, the focus of which is Labor aided by tools, aka the 'means of production', the status of which is the decisive factor in the transition from Capitalism to Socialism.  But, while Marx's primary attention is on ownership of the tools of Labor, implicit in the latter is that they themselves are products, suggesting a regression to an original act of Labor, i. e. to some Invention.  Now, in Marx's immediate purview, the latter is plainly the steam-engine, the foundation of the existence of most of the equipment and processes that are the means of production in his era.  Still, while he is certainly mindful of the significance of the Industrial Revolution in the transitions from Feudalism, to Capitalism, to Socialism, he does not seem to quite appreciate that correspondingly underlying a Labor Theory of Value is an Invention Theory of Value.