Thursday, January 31, 2019

Interpretation, Change, Change For the Better

Previously discussed have been two problems with Marx's contrast of Philosophy that interprets the world vs. Philosophy that changes the world--that it does not distinguish between the natural world and the human world, and that interpretation is a kind of change.  A third problem is that he ignores two further fields of significant Philosophical work--interpreting human behavior and changing human behavior, aka Psychology and Ethics.  Perhaps he implicitly includes those in 'the world', not only as a convenient generalization, but because he conceives human behavior as a product of circumstances, and, hence, as sufficiently represented in the concept of 'world'.  However, that explanation hardly accounts for the human agency that is at the foundation of the Marxist analysis of the human world--Labor, or, indeed, the human agency that is the addressee of "change the world".  In any case, the Psychology-Ethics relation sharpens the distinction that he is trying to draw, systematizes it, and implies an application of it beyond the scope of Feuerbach's work.  In the context of the Psychology-Ethics relation, the Interpretation vs. Change contrast is more immediately formulated as that between Description and Prescription.  Thus, because an Ethical prescription entails an evaluation of an object of Psychological description, the two are systematically related. So, the insistence of Mill and others that their Philosophical work is Descriptive not Prescriptive, even Ethics, doctrines such as Utilitarianism present Marx with targets that are more significant than Feuerbach's work, because recognizable from his perspective as reactionary, even if associated with 'progressive' aims, e. g. Mill's elevation of the Common Good above mere reduction to the sum of Selfish satisfactions.  So, the Psychology-Ethics contrast illuminates a fourth problem with Marx's formulation: "change" would be more accurately expressed as "change for the better".

Wednesday, January 30, 2019

Interpretation, Change, World, Environment

An interpreter transforms words from one language into those of another.  Thus, the contrast between Interpret and Change is not a sharp as Marx seems to take it to be.  One better alternative is Description vs. Prescription.  But that alternative does not  address one of the implicit issues in the passage in which the contrast appears--the juxtaposition of Feuerbach to the object of his description.  Marx may classify Feuerbach as a Materialist, but the methodology of the latter is Empiricist, and, hence, derives from a Subject vs. Object contrast that, as has been previously discussed, is that of an Organism attempting to detach from an Environment, stopping short of an Adaptation-Of the latter.  But, the object of Feuerbach's description is the Human world, not the Environment that Humans inhabit.  Furthermore, in the German Ideology, Marx-Engels clearly affirm an "empirical way", even though they dub it "Materialist Method", thereby confirming their conflation of Empiricism and Materialism.  So, Marx's Interpret-Change contrast is too simple for this thesis on Feuerbach--whereas Marxist Materialism seeks to change a Human world that is affected by its adaptation of its environment, Feuerbach's Materialism remains content to describe the Human world as if it were its environment.

Tuesday, January 29, 2019

World and Environment

In his contrast of Philosophical interpreting the world and Philosophical changing the world, Marx does not distinguish between the natural world and the social world.  Plainly, the change that he is exhorting is of the social world, but the world interpreted by at least some Philosophers, including that of the topic of his Dissertation, is the natural world.  The ambiguity is not peculiar to him--while Kant does contrast the world of Nature and the world of Freedom, both non-human and human influences are part of the former.  And, the ambiguity is not exclusive to the common use of 'world'--'environment' can be either natural or social in ordinary parlance.  Now, the precision of Kant's analysis reveals the ground of the ambiguity--a Subject that is an individual member of society.  But, in Evolutionism, the Subject is the Species, which entails that the natural world is the Environment that it inhabits, while the social world is an internal organization of it within that Environment.  The Evolutionist re-focus is instructive for Marxism--the Means of Production can be formulated in Evolutionist terms as an Adaptation-Of an Environment that determines the organization of the social world.  But it is also instructive regarding an implicit Marxist exhortation--for Philosophers to break from traditional Individualistic methodology, i. e. with foundations such as Cogito, I Will, or a Sense-Datum--and adopt a Collectivist perspective.  Such a break applies to Marx's own Dialectical methodology, according to which, some fragment of the Species, usually either an individual worker or a Class, is a given condition, and the Collective is merely an eventual destination.  In contrast, for Rousseau, the fragments are products of an original, sub-division--a first privatization of property, a thesis that is unavailable in Dialecticism.

Monday, January 28, 2019

Tool-Use, Dialectical Materialism, Adaptation

Marx' concept of the Organism-Environment relation as one of Dialectical Materialism can be classified as Ecological.  However, one shortcoming of that system is that it is too general to explain one of his cardinal insights--the distinctiveness of the human use of tools.  In contrast, that uniqueness can be better specified in terms of the concept of Adaptation.  For, the Ecological concept of the Organism-Environment relation is bi-lateral, entailing a distinction that can drawn within the concept of Adaptation that does not correspond to one within Dialectical Materialism--that between Adaptation-To and Adaptation-Of.  Now, most vital Ecological functions consist in a balanced combination of the two, e. g. breathing requires an organ such as a lung that is adapted to the air in an environment, from which it adapts needed oxygen.  But tool-use is an adaptation, by an organism, primarily of something in its environment, even the simple stick of Marx-Engels' example of Human uniqueness in the German Ideology.  Likewise, the increasing elaborateness of manufacturing processes in Human society signifies the extent of the Adaptation-Of that, as they propose, is the distinguishing characteristic of the Species.  Furthermore, insofar as that characteristic can be formulated in terms of superiority of complexity of function, its emergence is of Evolutionist significance, i. e. that a such a preponderance of Adaptation-Of is an expression of Evolutionary superiority.  So, Evolutionist concepts are more instructive than are the resources of Dialectical Materialism for explaining one of Marx-Engels' important theses.

Sunday, January 27, 2019

Pantheism and Ecologism

Regardless of Rationalist vs. Empiricist methodological differences, Descartes' Cogito and Leibniz' Windowless Monad are, like the Epistemological Subjects of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, Organisms detached from their Environments.  Thus, likewise regardless of methodological classification, the prominent outlier in the era is Spinoza.  For, though his Pantheism is not Biological, his concept of Mode is that of an entity that is essentially embedded in that of Nature, i. e. is Ecological.  Now, one persistent misconception of his doctrine is that it promotes the Adaptation-To of a Mode, i. e. that the highest achievement is the passive quiescence of a Mode in God/Nature.  However, for Spinoza, Understanding and Will are one and the same, and Adequate Knowledge is Adequate Causality.  Hence, Enlightenment is Empowerment, and unity with God/Nature consists in the harnessing of divine creativity.  In other words, Spinoza promotes the Adaptation-Of Nature by a Mode.  It is because this nascent Ecologism is a threat to the Theological concept, shared by Berkeley and Kant, of an Organism as detached from its Environment, with the latter converted into a medium of communication between a deity and an Organism, that Kant targets Spinoza specifically in the Third Critique--in a strained effort to establish that Reason requires that detachment.  Kant thus implicitly anticipates the more recent explicit Ecology-Theology conflicts.

Saturday, January 26, 2019

Eating, Perception, Adaptation

Perception can be compared to eating.  Eating can be sequential, as one item after another become present to the eater.  Eating can be negated qua fasting, as an item that becomes presented is resisted.  And, eating can involve combining and cooking several items.  Likewise, Perception can be a Conjunction of sequential data.  It can be negated qua Skepticism, as a datum is rejected.  And, it can be the product of Synthesis, in which data are not merely conjoined, but organized and combined.  Whereas the first type of meal is an Adaptation-To an Environment by an Organism, and the second a detachment from an Environment, the third combines both Adaptation-To and Adaptation-Of.  In other words, the latter exemplifies an Ecological concept of the Organism-Environment relation, i. e. an interaction.  Likewise, Kant's contrast of Synthesis to Hume's Conjunction and Skepticism can be interpreted as briefly nascent Ecologism.

Friday, January 25, 2019

Epistemology, Theology, Ecology

In the context of a standard Academic curriculum, Berkeley is presented as radicalizing Locke's Epistemological detachment of an Organism from its Environment, i. e. by denying the existence of all Primary Qualities.  But, in the context of his oeuvre, this development has more than Epistemological significance--it is part of a Theological doctrine that transforms an Environment into a medium of private communication between an Organism and a deity.  Now, Kant's Epistemological theory relocates an Organism in an Environment, but revolutionizes it.  For, in response to a detachment that is, more precisely, the Adaptation-To an Environment by an Organism, progressively effected by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, Kant proposes a concept of Perception that is an Adaptation-Of an Environment by an Organism.  That re-engagement with an Environment is formulated by him as the combination of the sensory influence of the Environment, transformed by the cognitive structures of the Organism into Perception, just as manufacturing processes transform raw material into a useful product.  However, instead of building upon that establishment of a new status of an Organism with respect to its Environment, Kant regresses to Berkeleyan detachment--by, in the second half of the Second Critique and in the Third Critique, conceiving the Environment as a medium of rewards and punishments, dispensed by a deity, to an Organism, on the basis of the intentions of the latter.  In other words, in the arc of Kant's oeuvre, an Ecological concept of Experience, i. e. constituted by Organism-Environment interaction, eventually yields to a Theological concept of Experience, i. e. consisting in the essential detachment of a person from a corporeal world.  So, what is sometimes obscured in standard Academic compartmentalization is that Epistemology is not an autonomous discipline.

Thursday, January 24, 2019

Perception and Environment

According to Ecologism, an Organism is inherently in interaction with its Environment--either adapting to it, or adapting from it.  On that basis, Perception is either an Adaptation-To or an Adaptation-Of or -From.  Thus, for example Locke's Empiricist concept of Primary Quality, which is a copy of something in the Environment, is the product of Adaptation-To.  So, his concept of Secondary Quality is, in itself, signifies a detachment of an Organism from its Environment.  That detachment is further developed in Berkeley' Phenomenalism, and Hume's Skepticism, but without any Environmental consequences.  So, the first suggestion of such consequences is implied by Smith, according to whom an Invisible Hand mediates the interaction with their Environment of Organisms, whose profit-motive remains otherwise insular.  Two centuries later, those consequences have become more fully visible, as the detachment is expressed as indifference to Environmental destruction in the pursuit of profits.  Nor is the standard opposition to such carelessness free of the Empiricist tradition--the locution 'the environment', no matter how caringly expressed, still entails an Organism-Environment separation that, reifying both, only perpetuates the fundamental alienation.

Wednesday, January 23, 2019

Pleasure and Adaptation

Because of its prominence, Kant's response to Hume's concept of the Passion-Reason relation has overshadowed how Spinoza might respond.  To begin with, he would likely reject the premise of their distinction, on the grounds that he conceives Will and Reason to be identical, and, hence, that the latter inherently has motive power, i. e. 'A causes B' inherently means 'Doing A will bring about B'.  Furthermore, Spinoza analyzes 'Passion' as fundamentally Pleasure or Pain, which are not irreducible elements of experience, but are themselves signs of modifications of the capacity of the Causal efficacy of a Mode.  However, despite that analysis, Spinoza shares with Hume an Atomism in another respect: a concept of Experience according to which elements such as Pleasure, Passion, Reason, etc., regardless of how defined, are completely internal to the subject, i. e. are independent of any external circumstances.  In contrast, according to an Ecological concept of Experience, an Organism is inherently in interaction with its Environment, so, e. g. Pleasure is a feeling of the Organism in an harmonious relation with its Environment, and likewise, therefore, so, too, are Passion and Instrumental Reason inherently related to an Environment.  Hence, while Spinoza challenges Hume's immediate abstractions, an Ecological behavioral principle such as Adaptation further exposes the more general arbitrariness of his presuppositions.

Tuesday, January 22, 2019

Passion, Reason, Adaptation

The primary flaw of Hume's formulation 'Reason is the slave of the Passions' is, as Kant proposes, that 'Reason' is ambiguous in it--it probably connotes 'Instrumental Reason', but not what Kant calls 'Pure Practical Reason'. Accordingly, a second flaw emerges--the image 'is the slave of', glosses over, at best, the relation between a Passion and Instrumental Reason.  Presumably, a more precise analysis of the formulation is: 'In the pursuit of an End, a Passion uses Instrumental Reason to determine a Means'.  Instrumental Reason can function in this way, because it is the source of the connection of Perceptions, i. e. the source of an 'A causes B', which, used by a Passion, can convert into 'A is a Means to B', with B the pursued End.  But, this analysis exposes what remains unexplained and unaddressed in Reason-Passion debate--the conversion of an inference from observation, to an ingredient in behavior.  Now, Evolutionism supplies a potential explanation--such a conversion is an instance of Adaptation-Of, i. e. an appropriation, by an Organism, of some feature of its Environment, e. g. the appropriation of the observed connectivity of fire and a burning object, to produce something edible.  So, according to an Evolutionist model of behavior, Instrumental Reason is organically related to the principle that motivates, a relation that is falsified by, first, the Passion-Reason split, and, second, by the representation of it in terms of an Economic antithesis.

Monday, January 21, 2019

Evolvement and Adaptation-Of

Evolvement, i. e. increase in Complexity, as has been previously discussed, consists in two fundamental moments--the introduction of some novelty, and the integration of that novelty into a given System.  In Darwinism, a novelty is often characterized as a Mutation.  But, a Mutation is not automatically integrated with antecedent conditions.  In Darwinism, non-integrated Mutation is known as mere Variation.  In other words, according to Evolvementalism, the concept of Variation is derived from that of Evolvement, whereas in Darwinism, Variation is presented as systematically independent of Evolution.  Thus, Adaptation-Of is Evolvemental--it consists in the incorporation by an Organism, of some feature of its Environment, into its system of vital activities, e. g. the adaptation of the wood of a tree in the building of shelter.

Sunday, January 20, 2019

Genius, Evolution, Evolvement

In contemporary common parlance, 'a genius' is someone fluent in abstruse Physics formulas, and 'evolution' has something to do with the 'survival of the fittest'.  On that basis, a systematic connection between Genius and Evolution is not easy to discern.  But, 'a genius' trivializes the original connotation of a super-personal force guiding a person's behavior, which Kant applies to Artists.  And, 'evolution' has never been formally defined.  To correct the latter, what has been proposed here is 'an increase in Complexity', with Complexity defined as a characteristic of a Unified Multiplicity.  Furthermore, in order to avoid confusion with the vagueness of common parlance, the term 'Evolvement' has been introduced to signify an increase in Complexity.  So, Evolvement is distinguished in at leat two ways from Darwinian 'Evolution'--it is independent of any Survival principle, and it can be in effect at more than moments of new species origination. In other words, Evolvement can occur at any time during, and perhaps throughout, the course of the history of a species.  Hence, for example, an introduction of increased visual powers by means of a Genius painter, can constitute an Evolvemental episode.

Saturday, January 19, 2019

Dionysian, Genius, Evolution

Nietzsche's concept of Dionysian is explicitly inspired by Schopenhauer's Will to Live.  So, since the latter is conceived as a non-Rational Universal principle to counter Kant's Pure Practical Reason, so, too, is the Dionysian apparently at odds with Kantian principles.  However, what corresponds to the Dionysian in Kant's system is not Pure Practical Reason, but Genius, a creative impulse that elevates a person beyond the bounds of ordinary self-interest, and that gets transmitted to others.  For some, such as Kant, the scope of that impulse is Art, but the more recent association of it with Einstein suggests that it transcends any specialized spheres of activity.  Rather, it is manifest in any case of shared creativity, e. g. by social visionaries.  In other words, Genius is nothing other than the Evolutionary impulse in the Species, which Nietzsche later implicitly realizes when he re-formulates the Dionysian principle as a surplus with respect to the Will to Live, i. e. as the Will to Power.

Friday, January 18, 2019

Gravity, Theology, Evolution

In Ancient Cosmology, the relation between Heaven and Earth is literally that of above-below.  So, the Theological interpretation of the Human species as 'fallen' is originally likewise literal, as is, hence, the possibility of 'rising' via Salvation. Now, the 'higher'-'lower' contrast in Biology that corresponds to that between 'more complex' and 'less complex' is figurative, as is, therefore, the characterization of a development from the latter to the former as an 'ascent'.  In other words, Evolution is seemingly figuratively antithetical to Christian Theology.  Now, the discovery that objects accelerate towards the Earth at a constant rate can be appreciated as theoretical fact.  But, the latter also converts into a practical formula that expresses what is required to counter that acceleration, i. e. to literally 'ascend'.  So, the actualization of that formula as, at the same time, that of a Species departing from its Environment constitutes a convergence of Modern Physics and Evolutionism.  The convergence thus recovers the literal inversion that underlies the apparently figurative antithesis of Evolutionism to Christian Theology.

Thursday, January 17, 2019

Gravity and Evolution

Geocentrism is one Ancient theory that is repudiated in the Modern era; another is Teleological Physics. The two are combined in Ancient Philosophy to explain why Humans are Earth-bound: it is in the Nature of this imperfect species to tends towards a Cosmologically inferior realm.  So, concomitant to the replacement of Geocentrism with Heliocentrism is the replacement of Teleological Physics with Mechanistic Physics, according to which what keeps Humans Earth-bound is Gravity.  Now, the apparent Necessity of that fate is implicitly challenged first by Hume's dismantling of Causal Connection, and then by Kant's Constructivist revolution.  A century later, Nietzsche is resisting the "spirit of gravity" and speaking of teaching "men to fly", apparently unaware that within a decade these would no longer be merely figurative expressions.  At about the same time, a theory of Human ascent appears--Darwinism.  So, the departure, about another century later, of Humans from their terrestrial habitat, reveals the common direction of Modern Astronomy, Modern Physics, and Evolutionism--the overcoming of Gravity.

Wednesday, January 16, 2019

Perfection, Genius, Evolution

Having classified non-interference in the well-being of another as a 'Perfect' Duty, Kant is confronted with the problem of characterizing promotion of the well-being of another, behavior that is plainly Morally superior to mere non-interference in it.  However, instead of conceding the possibility of behavior that Supererogatory, Super-Perfect, and/or Super-Rational, Kant instead resorts to the apparently antithetical term 'Imperfect', offering a strained explanation as justification.  Regardless, a stronger example of behavior that transcends Perfection emerges later, in his study of Aesthetic Judgment--that motivated by Genius.  Plainly, Genius reduces to neither Rationality nor Selfish Inclination, yet, again, instead of acknowledging a potential limitation of his system, Kant settles for trying to squeeze Genius into his system, i. e. by subordinating it to Taste.  Regardless, Genius can be recognized as an Evolutionary impulse--the motor of a novelty that surpasses given circumstances, and transcends personal interest.  Indeed, the scope of Genius thus far exceeds the Aesthetic or Intellectual realms to which it is usually restricted, e. g. a social visionary may be as motivated by Genius as is a Picasso or an Einstein.

Tuesday, January 15, 2019

Perfectionism, Super-Perfectionism, Evolution

Despite the abandonment of Ancient Astronomical Perfectionism, entailed by the repudiation of Geocentrism, as has been previously discussed, Modern Philosophy has remained generally constrained by Perfectionism.  For example, even as Kant recognizes some of the revolutionary potential of Copernican discoveries, his concept of Human Morality remains bounded by an unapproachable Rational Perfectionism, i. e. the Passions can be temporarily mastered, but susceptibility to them cannot be permanently eliminated.  Now, the structural flaw in Kant's doctrine is that Freedom of Choice, i. e. to choose Reason, remains an irreducible surd.  But, that failure has generally been interpreted as an ultimate triumph of sub-Rational Sentimentalism, e. g. Schopenhauer's detection of Hedonism, or Mill's of Utilitarian motives, in Kant's Highest Good.  However, a third alternative to Rationalism or Sub-Rationalism has emerged in more recent doctrines--a Super-Rationalism, as evidenced by the possibility of Supererogatory action, i. e. behavior that is beyond the call of duty, and, hence, beyond, not beneath, Reason.  Likewise, an alternative to Perfection and Imperfection is Super-Perfection, an indication of an Evolutionary step beyond the constraints of Perfection, indicative of a transcending of the presumed bounds of Ancient Astronomy.

Monday, January 14, 2019

Perfectionism and Evolution

Perfectionism is a system in which some Perfect condition is a limiting Telos.  Ancient Cosmology, e. g. Geocentrism, the upper bound of which is a divine realm, is, thus, Perfectionist.  Likewise, Ancient Philosophy, writ both large and small, is Perfectionist.  Thus, not only are a world of Forms, and Thought-Thinking-Itself, upper Ontological bounds, so, too, is the correction of deficiency, e. g. the loss of nutrients, of fluid, of energy, of equilibrium, of innocence, etc., a Teleological Psychological or Moral principle.  But, despite the repudiation of Geocentrism, Modern Philosophy has generally remained Perfectionist.  For example, despite the novelty of the concept of Duration as the fundamental stratum of Experience, Bergson's subsequent identifying it with Spiritual Elan Vital exposes it as traditionally Perfectionist.  It is thus antithetical to Evolutionism, in which Increase as the fundamental dynamic is as counter-Perfectionist as is the repudiation of Geocentrism.  Darwin's attempts to subordinate Evolution to Survival are thus also a Perfectionist reaction.

Sunday, January 13, 2019

Evolution and Elan Vital

Bergson is one of the few Philosophers who explicitly and systematically study Evolution.  His Evolutionary principle, Elan Vital is, like his earlier Duration and Spirit, a concept of Flux, i. e. mobile and unitary.  It is thus likewise contrasted with static multiplicity, e. g. the lived experience of vision vs. the structure of an eye.  However, that dualism is problematic for a concept of Evolution.  For, to Evolve is to increase in Complexity, and Complexity entails Multiplicity.  But, in Bergson's system, Multiplicity is a characteristic of Matter, but not of a spiritual principle like Elan Vital.  Hence, the human thumb may be more complex that that of an ape, but there is no way to compare the lived experience of human grasping with that of an ape, and, hence, to judge as more Evolve than the latter.  Nor can Bergson attribute increase qua Acceleration, to Elan Vital, since, as is easy to confirm in ordinary perception, there is no clear distinction in the immediate data of Consciousness between the Flux of constant Velocity, and the Flux of constant Acceleration.  So, Elan Vital is inadequate to the concept of Multiplicity that is entailed in the concept of Evolution.  Indeed, in his subsequent work on Morality and Religion, Spiritualism is recognized as the highest condition.  But if so, and if it is the least multiple condition, then it follows that a unicellular entity is the highest entity, and that the transition from ape to Human is de-evolutionary.  Accordingly, Creative Evolution can easily be read as a Spiritualist critique of a Materialist theory.

Saturday, January 12, 2019

Writing, Acceleration, Evolution

Kant follows the tradition of representing Time as a line, i. e. in which the constituent moments are successive.  However, as he examines the process of the drawing of a line, he misses that the pattern is more than mere Succession.  For, rather, in the drawing of a line, the earlier moments are preserved in the later moments, as are the earlier rings of a tree in the later ones.  Hence, Kant ironically illustrates that Time is actually Cumulative, and not merely Successive.  Likewise, since Writing preserves a moment, the Temporal form of Writing is Accumulation, as is that of written History.  In Physics, the 't-squared' in the denominator of the formula of Acceleration signifies Accumulation, i. e. the preservation of earlier Velocity in the subsequent increase of it.  Finally, Evolution is similarly cumulative--the increase in the complexity that constitutes the origination of a new species preserves the less complex ones that are its antecedents.

Friday, January 11, 2019

Acceleration and Evolution

Perhaps the most significant discovery of Modern Physics is the correspondence between Force and Acceleration.  The discovery refutes any common-sense perception of Motion as Constant Velocity, as well as complicating Aristotle's attribution of 'perfection' to circular motion.  It also challenges the concept of Mechanical Causality as connoting rigidity.  Likewise, the concept of the Conservation of Energy does not connote non-changing Motion, i. e. a system in which total Energy is conserved can be one that is accelerating indefinitely.  Thus, corresponding to Vital Force is Life that is increasing in some respect.  Now, insofar as the increase is constant, that Force can be characterized as Survival, Persistence in Being, etc.  But insofar as it consists in increase, the principle can only be Evolutionary in some respect.  So, it is not by virtue of the generation of novelty that Evolution is distinguished from, say, Gravity, i. e. Motion caused by the latter can be analyzed as constituted by differential 'leaps', just as they are represented in Calculus.

Thursday, January 10, 2019

Writing and Evolution

According to the best evidence, Writing is only a relatively recent development in Human history.  Still, that Writing seems to be a mode of communication that is unique to the species, and that it has been essential to the arc from first appearance in the terrestrial habitat, to departure from that habitat, indicates its Evolutionary significance.  Now, the immediate value of Writing is that its product transcends the moment of its production, thereby becoming indefinitely available to others, at other times, in other places.  Thus, if Derrida is correct to subvert the traditional Thought-Speech-Writing hierarchy, then, intellectual tools like Concepts and Definitions, and Philosophical staples such as Universality and Eternity, are byproducts of the Evolution of the Human species, rooted in the emergence of the thumb that makes Writing possible.

Wednesday, January 9, 2019

History, Writing, Evolution

Marx-Engels' "Materialist" discussion of History in the German Ideology is likely an alternative to the Idealist concept of Hegel, among others.  But, that classification is too broad to account for the specific content of the text--Human History, i. e. because non-Human History is also Materialist in their doctrine.  That content, more precisely, consists in the "modification . . . through the action of men" of "natural bases".  However, they bypass further analysis of such modification, which, as has been previously discussed, is the product of Transformal Causality.  They also bypass any elaboration of the "writing of history".  Thus, to begin with, they do not consider that something else that distinguishes the Human from other species is Writing as a mode of Communication.  They, thus, also do not recognize that Writing is as much a unique "action of men" as is producing means of subsistence.  Accordingly, it does not occur to them that the Writing of History has its own History.  Now, by their own premise, that History is a product of modification, i. e. of Transformal Causality applied to some given concept of History.  But, even if they were to recognize that the Materialist concept of History that is the product of a modification of Idealist, is itself subject to further modification, they likely would not anticipate that the product of that transformation might be Evolutionist History.  For, that History, which is as much a product of a modification as is any means of subsistence, also recognizes that both Writing and tool-wielding are grounded in the same Evolutionary development--that of the Human thumb.  In other words, the writing of Evolutionist History is an Evolutionary development of Marx-Engels' Materialist History, i. e. by incorporating the emergence of the Human thumb, and the act of Writing, into the latter.

Tuesday, January 8, 2019

Techne, Reflection, Evolution

Techne--Know-How--involves the deliberate application of a procedure to a course of action, which involves monitoring one's progress carrying out the procedure, i. e. reflecting on what one has just done.  Thus, Reflection is a factor in Techne, of which the standard  examples of Reflection, e. g. Consciousness of 'I', are derivative cases that abstract from what the 'I' has been doing.  Now, producing the means to satisfying needs involves at least rudimentary Techne.  Hence, it also involves Reflection.  Thus, if, as Marx-Engels posit, Techne distinguishes the Human from other species, and signifies the beginning of Human History, then so, too, does Reflection.  Hence, insofar as the production of such means involves the use of tools, and the use of tools requires the Evolutionary development of the versatile thumb, then Mental correlates of the latter are Techne and Reflection.  Accordingly, Evolutionism entails a concept of Reflection that, contrary to some traditional ones, does not include that Reflection is essentially incorporeal, e. g. is divine Mind contingently incarnate in Humans.

Monday, January 7, 2019

History, Reflection, Transformal Causality

According to Marx-Engels, the production of means to satisfy needs distinguishes the Human species.  It follows that Human History begins with the first such production.  However, it might be an alternative, possibly self-evident, event that signals the beginning of that History--the self-awareness that is presupposed in the self-recording of the species.  Whether or not that is the same moment as that of the first production of the means to satisfy need, i. e. whether or not Reflection and Techne coincide, is not immediately clear.  Regardless, a very likely immediate object of Human reflection is social organization, which, if other species are any indication, likely is constituted pre-reflectively as tribal and/or nuclear family.  Thus, just as the species begins to deliberately modify its environment, it also begins to deliberately modify social organization.  Likewise, just as the former is effected by Transformal Causality, so too is the latter.  Hence, insofar as Transformal Causality is governed by an Evolutionist principle in the modification of its environment, e. g. the harnessing of electricity, so, too, are developments in Political and Economic organization a product of that Causality, governed by that principle.

Sunday, January 6, 2019

Skepticism and Evolutionism

A standard rejoinder to Skepticism is that Skepticism applied to itself negates it.  However, it is unclear if that procedure restores the original target of some Skepticism.  For example, if it is denied that the Future repeats the Past, the rejoinder that that denial might itself fail to obtain in the Future does not automatically convert into the original thesis that the Future does repeat the Past.  For, the denial of the denial still does not affect the original insight that the Past and the Future are discontinuous, which leaves the repetition unguaranteed.  So, an alternative resolution to the apparent antinomy is a systematization of the two theses.  For example, starting with Peirce, Pragmatists have simply dispensed with the Epistemological criterion of Certainty, and replaced it with Probability, with the result that useful inquiry need not come to a halt.  Another example is the application to uniform Motion--that past Constant Velocity might not continue in the Future does not preclude the possibility of future uniform Motion, i. e. Constant Acceleration.  Similarly, the novelty of a new Species does not preclude the possibility of its being a continuation of its antecedent conditions. So, Skepticism and Evolutionism are not necessarily inconsistent, and, to the contrary, might be systematically related.

Saturday, January 5, 2019

Past, Future, Transformal Causality

The common gloss of Hume's analysis of Necessity Connection as 'constant conjunction' abstracts from its decisive clause, 'observed in the past, and expected to continue in the future'.  Thus commonly overlooked is the fundamental lacuna in the purported connection: between Past and Future.  Now, if Kant had noticed that Temporal ordering, he might have applied it to his other main dispute with Hume.  For, as is plain in experience to even the non-Philosopher, there is a profound difference between an action prior to the initiation of it, and the observation of it after it becomes actual.  That difference is the ground of Kant's distinction between Freedom and Nature, and between Free Will and Necessity, in the traditional debate.  Likewise, Kant's contention that the Laws of Nature do not apply to the Laws of Freedom has as its ground the absolute incommensurability of Before and After in experience.  But, that incommensurability does not prevent systematizing the two dimensions; to the contrary, it illuminates not only how they might be combined, but, rather, how they are in fact combined in ordinary experience.  For, as is easy to observe, every new action modifies pre-conditions that necessarily constrain it, e. g. shooting a billiard ball at another modifies the pre-conditions of the spatial juxtaposition of the two balls, on the table, etc.  In other words, Hume's observation about the relation between Past and Future leads easily to the concept of Causality as Transformal, but, because of the baggage of the Rationalism vs. Empiricism debate and related issues, the connection has gotten almost completely obscured.

Friday, January 4, 2019

Epistemology, Economics, Adaptation

From the perspective of Evolutionism, Locke's introduction of Secondary Qualities signifies a detachment from Epistemological Adaptation-To that is furthered by Berkeley's complete elimination of Primary Qualities, and by Hume's Skepticism about Causality.  Kant's Copernican Revolution takes the next step--a concept of Knowledge that consists in the Adaptation-Of an Environment, by an Organism, in terms of its Cognitive Categories.  But, Kant's Revolution then takes a more radical turn--the subordination of Theory to Practice, according to which an Organism is capable of behavior that is not a response to its Environment.  While the development is carried out in abstract terms, it reflects the significant historical trend of the era--the rise of the Industrial Revolution that is constituted by the application of the discoveries of Modern Theoretical Science.  But, while the introduction of Division of Labor can be recognized as another step away from Adaptation-To i. e. from unorganized Labor, the concept of a Free Market overseen by an Invisible Hand can just as clearly be recognized as a regressive development.  Accordingly, any interference in a Free Market signifies an elimination of resistance to the history of Adaptation-Of that, as has been previously discussed, constitutes the Evolution of the Human species.

Thursday, January 3, 2019

Adaptation, Knowledge, Causality

Corresponding to the distinction between Adaptation-To and Adaptation-Of is Knowledge-That and Knowledge-How.  Thus, the distinction between those types of Knowledge is one of kind, not one of degree, e. g. not one of Perfect vs. Imperfect, as Aristotle posits.  Correspondingly, there are two types of Skepticism, e. g. uncertainty that the Sun will once again rise as usual vs. uncertainty that when one billiard ball strikes another, the later will move as had billiard balls in the past under identical conditions, to cite Hume's two well-known examples.  In other words, Hume conflates opposing Dogmatism with cautioning Experiment, thereby obscuring the triviality of the possibility of Uncertainty in the latter. Furthermore, uncertainty that trying something will again lead to the same previous results does not undermine the certainty that attempt must precede whatever ensues, even failure.  Thus, Kant's focus on Temporal order in his concept of Causality suggests that the concept of Knowledge that he is developing is that of -How, and, so, that it primarily targets the second of Hume's two kinds of Skepticism. Accordingly, the rejoinder, advanced by some, that Kant's concept of Causal Necessity still does not guarantee that a specific Effect will follow a Cause, is irrelevant.  So, the Evolutionist distinction between Adaptation-To and Adaptation-Of helps clarify some of the confusion in one of the significant debates of Modern Philosophy.

Wednesday, January 2, 2019

Causality and Adaptation

Divisions that are standard in contemporary academic Philosophy make it difficult to recognize that Kant's Second Analogy challenges Hume on more than the concept of Causal Connection.  For, the observation that Cause-Effect is not merely a Conjunction, but an Ordered Pair is one that Hume himself insists upon, though not in the context of his Epistemological passages.  Rather, it is in the context of developing his concepts of Psychology and Morality that he asserts such an ordering--in the Passion-Reason pair, i. e. when he is adamant that Reason always follows Passion.  So, Kant's thesis actually exposes a significant inconsistency between two aspects of Hume's doctrine, an inconsistency that is not easy to detect in a curriculum that separates Epistemology from Ethics.  In any case, Evolutionism more sharply reveals a fundamental contrast between their two doctrines that is obscured by that division, as well as by the traditional Rationalism vs. Empiricism debate.  For, a cardinal concept in Evolutionism is Adaptation, within which, as has been previously discussed, Adaptation-To and Adaptation-Of can be distinguished.  Furthermore, entailed in that distinction is that between responding to an Environment, and initiating a modification of the environment.  Thus, the Hume-Kant conflict, and, in some cases, the Empiricism vs. Rationalism debate, are, in Evolutionist terms, based on the Adaptation-To vs. Adaptation-Of distinction, in which, e. g. Hume maintains that all Adaptation is Adaptation-To, while Kant proposes that Cognitive processes and at least some behavior are Adaptation-Of.  So, the introduction here of Transformal Causality, entailed in which is the modification of an Environment by an Organism, more explicitly illustrates Kant's Rationalist response to Hume's Empiricism, i. e. as a clearer example of a Causality that is an Adaptation-Of.

Tuesday, January 1, 2019

Transformal Causality, Temporality, Evolution

Hume posits that a Causal Connection consists in nothing more than a past constant conjunction.  Kant's response, in the Second Analogy, is that Hume ignores the Temporal dimension of the Connection, and, hence, that the conjunction is actually an ordered pair.  In turn, that Temporal ordering opens up, according to the Third Antinomy, a sequence of such ordered pairs, entailing the necessity of at least one term, i. e. an uncaused Cause, occurring outside the Phenomenal chain.  Finally, in the Groundwork, he presents Pure Practical Reason as that Noumenal Cause.  This, via the introduction of Temporality into Hume's concept of Causality, he is able to not only refute the latter's claim that Causality lacks Necessity, but also Hume's other significant anti-Rationalist thesis--that Reason is incapable of Causal efficacy, i. e. that Reason is the "slave of the Passions".  Now, Kant's concept of Temporality is Atomistic, i. e. that even if causally connected, two contents of two successive Phenomenal moments are mutually independent.  He, thus, does not consider that an action modifies some given Phenomenal content, and, so, that the subsequent Phenomenal content is, in some respect, systematically related to it.  So, for example, his concept of Causality cannot explain the process of manufacturing, i. e. via which the content of a finished product is derived from that of raw material in some respect.  Likewise, he is constrained to treat the Human thumb as independent of the ape thumb.  In other words, Kant's concept of Causality is inadequate to an Evolutionary principle, and, indeed, is inadequate to his own development of it from Hume's concept of Causality.  In contrast, as has been previously discussed, the concept of Transformal Causality corrects that deficiency.