Skepticism and Evolutionism

A standard rejoinder to Skepticism is that Skepticism applied to itself negates it.  However, it is unclear if that procedure restores the original target of some Skepticism.  For example, if it is denied that the Future repeats the Past, the rejoinder that that denial might itself fail to obtain in the Future does not automatically convert into the original thesis that the Future does repeat the Past.  For, the denial of the denial still does not affect the original insight that the Past and the Future are discontinuous, which leaves the repetition unguaranteed.  So, an alternative resolution to the apparent antinomy is a systematization of the two theses.  For example, starting with Peirce, Pragmatists have simply dispensed with the Epistemological criterion of Certainty, and replaced it with Probability, with the result that useful inquiry need not come to a halt.  Another example is the application to uniform Motion--that past Constant Velocity might not continue in the Future does not preclude the possibility of future uniform Motion, i. e. Constant Acceleration.  Similarly, the novelty of a new Species does not preclude the possibility of its being a continuation of its antecedent conditions. So, Skepticism and Evolutionism are not necessarily inconsistent, and, to the contrary, might be systematically related.