Monday, February 29, 2016

Perspective and Education

By learning of the not immediately perceivable factors that condition one's Perspective, one can enlarge it, via a displacement of the focal point, with the previous focal point, and its causes, now objects of perception.  Among the methodical ways of such learning are Psychoanalysis, for revealing personal formative factors, and a Liberal Arts education, for discovering some of the general influences, e. g. ethnic prejudices that are deeply entrenched in one's society.  Included in those general influences, according to Marxism, are Economic conditions, e. g. the fragmentation that breeds Egoism.  So, for example, the routine denigration of a Liberal Arts education, on the grounds that it is 'impractical', is, according to Marxist analysis, a product of Capitalist conditioning for two reasons--it has no inherent market value, and it is a potential threat to undermining that conditioning, i. e. by facilitating the enlarging of one's Perspective that exposes that otherwise latent conditioning.

Sunday, February 28, 2016

Perspective, Prejudice, Education

Relativistic models in Physics illustrate that from a Frame of Reference, the condition of the Frame of Reference itself cannot be accurately determined, e. g. from a point on the Earth, that the point is in motion relative to the Sun is not immediately perceivable, and is subject to further misinterpretation.  The lesson of the well-known example for Perspectivism is that one cannot immediately perceive that one's judgments are conditioned by prejudices, and, so, reflect nothing absolute about either judge or judged.  But, through education, prejudices can be revealed, thereby altering judgment, i. e. by a broadening of a Perspective, just as the perception of the relation between the Earth and the Sun is transformed via the incorporation of more information about the properties of both.

Saturday, February 27, 2016

Perspectivism, Relativity, Comparativism

In Physics, a Perspective is termed a Frame of Reference.  Now, from a given Frame of Reference, any perception of Motion or Rest is only relative, i. e. via a comparison with another Frame of Reference.  Thus, Parmenides and Heraclitus are each wrong--both Motion and Rest are real, but relational.  Also, this concept of Relativity underlies Einstein's two theories that go by that name.  Conversely, Physicist Relativism is instructive for Perspectivism--it shows that Self-Knowledge requires a comparison, as Kant argues in his Refutation of Idealism, e. g. 'I am running' means 'I am moving faster than the spin of the Earth'.  Likewise, Moral judgment is always comparative--even Kant's Categorical Imperative entails a contrast between acting as required and acting otherwise.  But, while such judgments seem intra-personal, they are the products of an internalization of a social relation, i. e. in which one of the terms one casts oneself as another.  So, Perspectivism entails Comparativism, and is fundamentally social.

Friday, February 26, 2016

Appearance, Phenomenon, Perspective

In #10 of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche contrasts "appearance" and "perspective".  But, more sharply distinguished from the latter is Phenomenon, which, though often used interchangeably with Appearance, is not quite equivalent to it, and, in fact, has more in common with Perspective.  For, in Phenomenalism, and in most of its Phenomenological variations, a Phenomenon is an absolutely private and discrete element of Experience, whereas, according to Perspectivism, the object of Perception, while also "for me", is an appearance of an object that is in the world, and to which the objects of alternative perspectives can be attributed.  In other words, according to Phenomenalism, there is no inherent relation between the perception of one side of a house and that of another, while Perspectivism accepts that each visual image can be attributed to one and the same substratum.  Furthermore, and correspondingly, the concept of a Perspective, but not of a Phenomenon, entails the possible existence of other subjects of Perception, whose Perspectives might delimit one's own.  In other words, Perspectivism is essentially a social concept, entailing the possibility of coordination between members, while Phenomenalism is inherently Atomistoc.

Thursday, February 25, 2016

Self-Overcoming, Power, Species-Principle

A concept of the Will to Grow is expressed in #257 of Beyond Good and Evil as "continual self-overcoming".  Now, because Nietzsche's primary ambition in the context is to demonstrate that the conventional concept of Moral improvement is the product of internalized subjugation, he leaves unconsidered several other implications of the concept.  First, the apparent difficulty in deriving a cumulative process from a momentary "discharge of strength" (#13), indicates that the Will to Grow is independent of the Will to Power.  Furthermore, his focus on Overcoming as an Egocentric drive obscures that one expression of Self-Overcoming can be outwardly directed action, e. g. in the Empowerment of others.  But, then, in that case, the drive is revealed as perhaps being more than Egocentric to begin with--as a Species-Principle.  In other words, implicit, but undeveloped, in the passage, is a derivation of the Will to Power from the Dionysian.

Wednesday, February 24, 2016

Perspective, Will to Power, Dionysian

Perspectivism is often classified as an Epistemological theory, presenting an alternative to the traditional debate over whether or not the object of Perception is Real or semi-Real, e. g. mere Appearance.  In Perspectivism it is Real, but not whole, e. g. only a surface from a specific angle.  However, there is no such debate regarding Perception as it functions in Action--Action is essentially Perspectival, or, better, Prospectival, since it approaches its object from a specific angle.  Therefore, the Perception involved is likewise Perspectival.  So, since the Will to Power is fundamentally a Practical concept, i. e. is a concept of Action, it is inherently systematically related to Perspectivism.  However,  some of Nietzsche's passages stray from that Praxis, e. g. Beyond Good and Evil #257, in which the Will to Power is characterized as a "state".  Furthermore, he misses an opportunity to connect the Dionysian moment to Perspectivism--insofar as is an empowering experience, it is a stimulus to Action, which is Perspectival.

Tuesday, February 23, 2016

Dionysian, Perspective, Power

According to Nietzsche, the Dionysian experience shatters the image of the Self as an independent entity.  Now in many places, he seems to advocate that the subsequent challenge is to accept the inherent vanity of any such representation, and to ironically construct a new image.  But, an alternative interpretation begins with concept of the experience as not so much shattering the Self, but as revealing it as a Part of a Whole, with the implication that its representations are perspectives, not illusions.  That implication is briefly developed in #10 and #257 of Beyond Good and Evil, including the considerations that Perspective can be more or less comprehensive, and that the Will to Power seeks greater comprehensiveness. In other words, Perspectivism is not necessarily egalitarian.  But, it also does not necessarily follow that the scope of a perspective is fixed, or that, as he contends in 257, the relation between members with greater perspective, to those with lesser, is one of subjugation.  Rather, it could also be one of education, in which the seeking of greater comprehensiveness of lesser scopes is promoted.

Monday, February 22, 2016

Dionysian and Power

In the first section of Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche describes a moment of the Dionysian experience of a celebrant as "he is no longer an artist, he has become a work of art."  This moment of uncanny clarity has more in common with Spinoza's Blessedness or Heidegger's Appropriation, than with the obliviousness often associated with the term 'Dionysian'.  It is an experience of not the dissolution of the Self, but of the Self as a part of a primordial whole.  But, it is not a moment of Enlightenment--it is one of creativity, and, hence, of Empowerment, in which Power is experienced as elevating, not subjugating, on the basis of which can be developed a different concept of Will to Power than the one usually associated with Nietzsche.

Sunday, February 21, 2016

Immortality of the Soul and Vitalism

The concept of the Immortality of the Soul is Atomistic--it affirms the continued existence of an Individual after its separation from the Species.  However, despite his anti-Atomist Vitalism of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche misses this feature of the after-worldly doctrines that are the targets of his Dionysianism.  That may be because the Apollonian dimension of his doctrine is paradoxical--the Individual that it creates may be irreal in some respect, but the Apollonian principle itself is as real as is the Dionysian, a paradox that he inherits from Schopenhauer.  So, without a substantive alternative, he cannot quite invalidate the concept of an Immortal Soul, even while consigning it to Irreality.  However, a substantive alternative is available--the concept of the Individual as a Part, rather than as an Atom, and, likewise, the interpretation of the Apollonian as Diversification, rather than as Atomization.  On the basis of that alternative, Vitalism can entail a Principle of Individuation, and can unequivocally repudiate the concept of the Immortal Soul as antithetical to Life-affirmation.

Saturday, February 20, 2016

Will to Power and Will to Grow

A Power is an ability.  So, Empowerment consists in an increase in ability.  But, to increase in ability is to grow in some respect.  Thus, within a system, e. g. a society, the Will to Power qua the Will to Empower is an expression of the Will to Grow.

Friday, February 19, 2016

Power, Organism, Society

The bearer of Schopenhauer's Will to Live is uncertain--in some passages, it is a ubiquitous principle, according to others, it is the reproductive drive of a particular species, while in many expositions, he attributes it to individuals, even while denying their reality.  Nietzche's Will to Power is similarly indeterminate, but in most contexts, its bearer is an individual that is independent of other such subjects, which sets the stage for conflicts that are resolved by one overpowering another. He thus hardly considers that in an Organism, the parts mutually empower each other, so, insofar as a society is an Organism, the members of which are parts, Empowerment, not Overpowering, is the fundamental expression of Power.  From that perspective, societies that are constituted by relations of subjugation are expressions of systemic weakness.

Thursday, February 18, 2016

Will to Power, Empowerment, Vitalism

Usually, Nietzsche's Will to Power is equivalent to a Will to Overpower, but occasionally, e. g. in the image of a Gift, in Zarathustra, the principle is, rather, a Will to Empower.  Likewise, "seeks to discharge its strength", from #13 of BGE, can be correspondingly intepreted as either 'in order to subjugate', or 'in order to strengthen'.  Now, while Overpowering seems attributable to inorganic and organic phenomena alike, Empowerment seems possible only insofar as some fellow-feeling obtains between two entities.  In other words, a Vitalist principle is derivable from the concept of the Will to Power, though it does not figure prominently in Nietzsche's oeuvre.

Wednesday, February 17, 2016

Will to Live, Will to Power, Will to Grow

As has been previously discussed, Nietzsche's definition of Life, at #642 of the Will to Power collection, presupposes a concept of Growth.  Now, in #13 of Beyond Good and Evil, his grounds for replacing the Will to Live with the Will to Power as the fundamental principle is that "a living being seeks above all to discharge its strength".  But, again, the process of Growth is presupposed in the concept of "living being", and, furthermore, insofar as Growth entails the accumulation of strength, it is independent of, if not antithetical to, the concept of discharging strength.  So, at minimum, his attempt to reduce Schopenhauer's Vitalist principle to a more general one only exposes the inadequacy of the latter with respect to another Vitalist principle--the Will to Grow.

Tuesday, February 16, 2016

Vitalism, Will to Live, Will to Power

As has been previously discussed, Schopenhauer's Will to Live suggests a supplanting of Physics by Biology as the defining concept of Nature.  Now, Nietzsche's Dionysian principle continues that Vitalism, applied to specifically the Human species.  However, because his Will to Power does not inherently distinguish between inorganic and organic processes, it constitutes a relapse to Physicism.  Furthermore, he lacks an adequate definition of Life from that later principle. For, the one that he offers in #642 of the Will to Power collection, "an enduring form of processes of the establishment of force, in which the different contenders grow unequally", leaves undefined the decisive Vitalist term of the formulation--"grow".  Absent that adequacy, his various representations of human society are inherently de-humanizing, and the relation between the Dionysian and the Will to Power principles remains problematic.

Monday, February 15, 2016

Physics, Biology, Society

In the combination of the Critique of Pure Reason and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant shows how Newtonian Physics is derived from Reason, a system of Phenomena grounded in the Noumenon.  Now, Schopenhauer argues that Reason, too, is no more than part of the Phenomenal World, with Will as the underlying Noumenon, suggesting a supplanting of Rationalism by Volitionism, with Nietzsche as continuing the trend.  However, usually under-appreciated in that concept of Intellectual History is that Schopenhauerian Will is, more precisely, Will to Live, best exemplified by the reproductive drive, and, hence, that it is a Biological principle.  Thus, Schopenhauer can be interpreted as ushering in an ascendance of Biology over Physics as the defining 'Natural' Science, anticipating Darwinism.  Included in that ascendance is the re-interpretation of the atoms of human society as parts of a whole.

Sunday, February 14, 2016

Individuation and Dehumanization

While Individuation interpreted as Diversification produces parts of a whole, Individuation interpreted as Atomization produces atoms in external relations with other atoms.  Now, the Parts-Whole relation is Organistic, so, the interpretation of Individuation as Diversification is Biological.  In contrast, the concept of an association of Atoms is Inorganic, so the interpretation of Individuation as Atomization is Mechanistic.  But, to reduce a biological person to a thing is dehumanization.  Thus, the Social Atomism that informs much of Modern Political-Economic theory is dehumanizing.

Saturday, February 13, 2016

Atomization, Diversification, Society

If Individuation means Atomization, there is a discontinuity between Individual and Collective.  As a result, either one or the other has been treated as real, e. g. according to Nominalism, the latter is irreal, while according to Epiphenomenalism, it is the former that is irreal.  Correspondingly, the only two possible social systems are Anarchism and Totalitarianism, each of which trivializes the concept of System.  In contrast, if Individuation means Diversification, there is no incommensurate polarity of Unity and Multiplicity, only a continuum of greater and lesser degrees of tight-knittedness.  Similarly, a society the members of which are individuals in that sense, can be organized in a variety of different ways, each of which is coherent, and, depending on circumstances, appropriate.  For, example, loosely organized Capitalism can be effective in dissolving a Feudal Oligarchy, while Socialism can be an effective remedy for a Capitalist society that has become too fragmented.

Friday, February 12, 2016

Individuation, Atomization, Diversification

Nietzsche's Apollonian is his version of Schopenhauer's Principle of Individuation.  Like not only this but most every predecessor, he interprets Individuation as Atomization, and, thus, the Individual-Collective relation as antithetical, which he sees resolved in Tragedy.  However, Individuation can also be interpreted as Diversification, with Individuals as, thus, parts of a whole, in which case the antithesis that besets Modern Political Philosophy disappears.

Thursday, February 11, 2016

Dionysian, Species-Principle, Capitalism, Marxism

Nietzsche conceives the Dionysian as his version of Schopenhauer's Will to Live.  However, while the latter is plainly a principle of all biological nature, Nietzsche treats the former as one that is specific to Humans.  In other words, it is his Species-principle.  Now, according to the descriptions in Birth of Tragedy, in the ancient Dionysian festivals, not only class, but even individual, distinctions are dissolved.  Thus, his Species-principle is inherently neither Capitalist nor Marxist.  For, Individuality is inessential to it, and Revolution is not its resolution of Class-Conflict.

Wednesday, February 10, 2016

Dionysus and Species-Principle

Inadvertently deleted has been the 2-9-16 posting, which proposes that the production and dissemination of Art, as presented in the Critique of Judgment, can be conceived as the manifestation of a Species-principle, perhaps an Evolutionary one.  The key point is that while the Universality of his concept of Reason transcends Humanity, i. e. his deity is Rational, that of Art, i. e. the Universality of Taste, and the exemplariness of Genius, is strictly Human.  Furthermore, the novelty of Art is indicative of an at least Micro-Evolutionary principle.  Now, Kant likely conceives the process as multi-phased, since his exemplars of Art include Poetry and Painting, the productions of which are not simultaneous with their receptivity.  But, one case of artistic and audience immediacy is Music, which suggests that Nietzsche's Dionysus is a Species-principle, which would the communal spirit of some musical events.

Monday, February 8, 2016

Sympathy, Reason, Species-Principle

Several significant features of Kant's system are Rationalist counterpoints to some Hume's Empiricist-Sentimentalist concepts, notably that of Causality, and that of the I.  Likewise, whereas Hume's Universal principle is Sympathy, Kant's is Reason.  However, Kant cannot match Hume's characterization of Sympathy as a Species-principle.  For, according to the Groundwork, there exists at least non-Human Rational being, which he chatacterizes as the "head" of the Kingdom of Ends, a likely allusion to his deity.  Nor can easily respond to Hume by simply jettisoning that allusion, since there is nothing in his concept of Reason that distinguishes humans from any other entity, a generality that is a characteristic of Spinoza's concept of Reason, as well.  So, if there is a Rationalist Species-principle, it is unclear how it might be constituted.

Sunday, February 7, 2016

Freedom and Sympathy

A concept of Responsibility towards Others is easy to derive from that of Sympathy, except insofar as Individual Freedom is the fundamental principle, with respect to which Sympathy is, therefore, an imposition.  Kant's analysis of the Duty to promote the Happiness of Others typifies this subordination.  For, the obligation in this case is not towards others, but to refrain from not benefiting them.  So, on this analysis, helping others is a Virtue only because laziness or indifference is a Vice, as is expressed in his classification of the Duty as 'Imperfect'.  In contrast, Aristotle has no difficulty in conceiving Generosity as an unmediated Virtue, so the purported imperfection is not inherent in Reason, as Kant seems to imply.  Rather, underlying Kant's convolution is the implicit classification of Sympathy as a Passion, and, hence, as an unfree motivation.  In other words, Kant's privileging of Reason over Sympathy is ultimately at the service of protection the Freedom of the Individual, one consequence of which is that there is fundamental Responsibilty towards others.

Saturday, February 6, 2016

Right, Freedom, Responsibility

A Right is a protection of Freedom.  A Responsibility is a delimitation of Freedom.  Thus, the primacy of Freedom in modern Political Philosophy is reflected in absence of attention to Responsibility corresponding to that of Right, i. e. there is no concept of a Natural Responsibility, no Bill of Responsibilities in the U. S. Constitution, etc.  Likewise, the U. N. Human Right to an adequate standard of living is, essentially, a formulation of a responsibility to help those in need, assigned to no one in particular, i. e. it avoids any delimitation of Freedom.

Friday, February 5, 2016

Self and Sympathy

Hume has two concepts of Self.  One is explicitly estabished and well-recognized: 'a bundle of perceptions'.  The other is undeveloped and has been rarely noticed, deriving from his fundamental Moral principle, i. e. Sympathy.  For, the latter entails a perception of Self and of an Other.  Now, that a perception of Self and a perception of non-Self are conjoined but distinguishable within Sympathy, indicates that neither is derived from the Self qua bundle of perceptions,   Furthermore, since it is plain in Hume's system that Passion has priority over Reason, insofar as there are two concepts of Self, one Cognitive, one part of a Feeling, it is the latter one that has priority.

Thursday, February 4, 2016

Species-Instinct and Herd-Instinct

A Species is not to be confused with a Herd--the latter is no more than a subset of the former, e. g. a Herder is a member of the former, but not of the latter.  Likewise, a Species-Instinct is not to be confused with Herd-Instinct, e. g. the most notable concept of the latter, Nietzsche's, connotes the meekness of sheep, a reference primarily to the shepherd-sheep imagery of Christianity  Nor, like Herd-Instinct, is Species-Instinct necessarily an Egalitarian principle.  For, that all members of a Species are equally of that type does not preclude internal differentiation, e. g. between Herder and Herd, as Nietzsche recognizes, though some interpret him as distinguishing Herd from Individual, an interpretation not supported by numerous passages.

Wednesday, February 3, 2016

Sympathy, Sorrow, Conviviality

While Hume's concept of Knowledge is the prototype of Atomist Associationism, his Moral doctrine, though not systematically presented as such, is conversely structured.  His fundamental Moral principle is, as he explicitly presents it in the Enquiry, a Species-Instinct that he calls Sympathy, a feeling that admits of degrees of comprehensiveness.  Accordingly, an Egoist impulse is not antithetical to Sympathy, rather, is its least comprehensive manifestation.  Now, by 'Sympathy', Hume means, literally, 'feeling-with', with respect to which the more common connotation, 'feeling sorry for', is only a special case.  Thus, Conviviality is also an instance of Sympathy.  So, Capitalism codifies the suppression of any feeling-sorry-for-others, but also any shared joy, which more effectively illustrates the thesis that Smith's system promotes psychological disorder.

Tuesday, February 2, 2016

Human Right and Indifference

A Capitalist can deny the previously discussed charge that profit-seeking is Greed, and is, hence, a disorder, to which there is no Right.  For, rather, it can be argued that Profit is just a mode of Growth, i. e. a healthy process, the interference in which is, therefore, the violation of a Natural Right.  However, it is more difficult to deny that Smith explicitly promotes the indifference to the interests of others, via the suppression of any sympathetic instincts.  So, it is open to the advocate of a Right to an adequate standard of living to respond that Capitalism violates that Right--by actively suppressing the Species-instinct that would naturally correct a potential deficiency in one of its members.