Eternal Recurrence and Will to Power

Nietzsche's second main doctrine, Will to Power, can easily be construed as difficult to reconcile with Eternal Recurrence. Contrary to the most common understanding of it, Will to Power is not an endorsement of rapacity and brutality, but is primarily intended by Nietzsche as a rival to Will to Live as an hypothesis of human motivation, though he later extends it to not only all biological, but to all inorganic phenomena, as well. The source of the common misunderstanding is the unawareness that Nietzsche conceives 'Power' in its pure scientific sense, i. e. as equivalent to 'causal efficacy', of which the political variety is only a special case. Now, Will to Power interprets phenomena as linear and expansive, which seems to contradict the Eternal Recurrence interpretation of them as circular and constant. Possibly the only passage in which Nietsche tackles their relation directly is an untranslated fragment that seems to accord priority to Eternal Recurrence--it speculates that linearity and explansiveness are only localized characteristics of phenomena, subsequently subject to supervening erosion and contraction, e. g. autumn following upon summer, eventually returning them to their initial condition. However, this scientific account of their relation seems irrelevant to what is implied in more prominent passages. From the outset of its introduction, Nietzsche emphasizes that the idea of Eternal Recurrence is distinct from the affirmation of it. Furthermore, the latter process is fundamentally determined by momentary strength. And, though he does not state it explicitly in these passages, the exercise of strength is an expression of Will to Power. So, the central evidence suggests that for Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence and Will to Power are two different explanatory orders, reminiscent of Kant's Nature-Freedom, or of Schopenhauer's Representation-Will pairs, respectively.

Pessimism, Ressentiment, Nihilism

Initially, his affirmation of Eternal Recurrence serves Nietzsche as an overcoming of Schopenhauer's Pessimism, but he subsequently deepens and broadens the diagnosis of the latter. He later goes on to isolate the psychological phenomenon 'Ressentiment', which is the vicarious revenge of the powerless against the powerful. In its most immediate manifestations, Ressentiment is directed against particular people, e. g. rulers, but Nietzsche conceives it to have more general targets, notably Life itself, e. g. as expressed in 'Life sucks', and 'I didn't ask to be born'. According to this deeper diagnosis, anti-naturalistic Philosophies, including Schopenhauer's, are, at bottom, vicarious condemnations of Life. Hence, Schopenhauer's Pessimism is an expression of Ressentiment, which, as such, remains a localized phenomenon. But Nietzsche's etiology further diagnoses it as a symptom of a more general contagion, 'Nihilism', which is more pervasively manifested in, especially, the enervating homogenization of the era. Thus, while his affirmation of Eternal Recurrence serves initially to overcome Pessimism, Nietzsche eventually conceives it as an antidote to Nihilism.

Nietzsche's Overcoming Schopenhauer

Nietzsche's affirmation of Eternal Recurrence is an overcoming of Schopenhauer's Philosophy, in two respects. The first, which he explicitly addresses, is Pessimism, the overcoming of which he does not accomplish by denying Schopenhauer's thesis that Life inevitably entails suffering, due to individuation. Nor does he accomplish it by either a Leibnizian-Hegelian response--that knowledge of the total picture brings happiness, or a Stoic one--detachment from the vicissitudes of circumstance brings happiness. Rather, Nietzsche distinguishes inarguable fact from free response, and, where Schopenhauer rejects Life, Nietzsche embraces it, suffering and all. Therein lies the second overcoming, namely, of Schopenhauer's Fatalism--by showing that Eternal Recurrence can be freely either affirmed or rejected, Nietzsche also demonstrates that Schopenhauer's Pessimistic attitude is one that the latter has freely adopted, which would seem to refute the Fatalist thesis. Schopenhauer's likely response is that every decision is actually a pre-determined product of immutable character, with the sense of 'freedom' merely illusory. Now, granting that Schopenhauer can explain how a System in which individuality also is illusory can accommodate any notion of 'character', Nietzsche agrees that the encounter with Eternal Recurrence is a matter of character. But, more precisely, it is a test of strength of character, which he passes, and Schopenhauer fails. In other words, his affirmation of Eternal Recurrence exposes both Pessimism and Fatalism as expressions of weakness, and, more generally, it reconfigures the traditional Free Will vs. Determinism debate as Stronger vs. Weaker.

Nietzsche's Interrogative, Not Imperative

Thus far, the discussion has subscribed to the characterization of Nietzsche's articulation of Eternal Recurrence as an 'imperative'. The main value of such a characterization is the fruitfulness of the evoked comparison with Kant's Moral Principle. However, on fresh consideration, a different grammatical classification more suitably expresses Nietzsche's treatment of his doctrine, sharpens its contrast with Kant's Principle, and better illuminates one of the flaws of the latter. As has been discussed, Kant has difficulty explaining how his Principle compels disobedience, or, to put it conversely, how disobedience is possible, for, according to him, it can be only freely adopted or rejected, whereas, Freedom, on his account, emerges only in the acting upon the Principle, i. e. only subsequent to its being adopted. Consequently, apparently alert to the problem, he begins to vaguely allude to a second type of Freedom, one which is not derived from the Principle, without incorporating it into his System. In contrast, Eternal Recurrence lacks the kind of compelling power behind it that Reason supplies Kant's Principle. Hence, the decisive moment of Nietzsche's encounter with Eternal Recurrence, i. e. whether or not to affirm it, completely transcends any pre-motivation. In other words, Nietzsche's, and anyone's, affirmation of Eternal Recurrence is an absolutely free act, which aligns the doctrine with the 'Existentialisms' of Kierkergaard, Jaspers and Sartre, that revolve around moments of absolute freedom and complete responsibility, though, arguably, the standard association of Heidegger with this group is problematic. Furthermore, highlighting such Freedom illuminates, by contrast, its lingering obscurity in Kant's System. Now, a response to either explicit or veiled compulsion is not truly free, so a free choice is not the response to an imperative. But, what it can be a response to is an interrogative formulation. So, in other words, the more accurate expression of Nietzsche's challenge is 'Can you will Eternal Recurrence?'

Eternal Recurrence as a Theory of Time

Early in the unveiling of Eternal Recurrence, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche dismisses the thesis, expressed by a 'Dwarf', that 'Time is a circle', as an evasion. This dismissal has inspired the interpretation, especially among Heideggerians, that Nietzsche's doctrine of Eternal Recurrence is primarily a theory of Time, one that challenges the tradition for which the Present is the seamless transition from Past to Future. But, regardless of the merits of this challenge, it, too, is evasive. For, it, too, remains outside of its object, thereby exempting itself from confronting the substantive component of the doctrine, namely the re-experiencing and eternalizing of past suffering and ignobility, which comprises Zarathustra's main struggle. Furthermore, even the thesis that the Present is a constituting node that knots Past and Future, abstracts and distracts from Nietzsche's self-understanding that the thinking of Eternal Recurrence is itself an event in the circle. Elsewhere, in some of the Will to Power fragments, Nietzsche does indeed explore some of the theoretical features of the temporal aspect of Eternal Recurrence, but not enough to warrant the interpretation that the doctrine for Nietzsche is primarily a theory of Time.

Analyzing Ethical Imperatives

Kant's Moral Imperative can be analyzed from four different perspectives, which, for the sake of the discussion, can be called 'theoretical', 'psychological', 'physical', and 'consequential'. The theoretical analysis investigates the structural relations entailed in the Principle, e. g. the relation between maxims and universal laws. The psychological explores its motivational power, e. g. how it elicits Freedom. The physical details the process of the Principle being acted upon, e. g. constraining selfish impulses, treating others with respect. And, the consequential analysis considers the effects of acting upon it, the most significant of which to Kant is the raising of the question 'What can I know hope for?', but which to a Utilitarian is the happiness it brings. Nietzsche's 'Act only is such a way that you can will its eternal recurrence' is similarly subject to four types of analysis. First, it presents a theory of Time. Second, it is an expression to Nietzsche of the challenge of Schopenhauerian Pessimism. Third, as Thus Spake Zarathustra dramatizes, unforeseen difficulties can emerge, especially, for Nietzsche, that of coming to grips with the entailed eternalization of human mediocrity. Finally, the consequences of this successful struggle include his subsequent development of Will to Power to facilitate his attempts to undermine Christian Morality. Now, while the theoretical components of both these Imperatives are understandably intriguing to adventurous Philosophers, Kant's primary concern is the psychological dimension, because it alone is the locus of Freedom. In contrast, what is most important about Eternal Recurrence to Nietzsche, is the actual transformation that adoption of the Imperative effects, for the account of which he devises a style that is unique in even his unorthodox oeuvre, namely, the mythologizing of Thus Spake Zarathustra. So, as fruitful as they might be, the theoretical analyses of these Ethical Imperatives are inadequate to their central psychological or physical dimensions.

Nietzsche's Ethical Imperative

Kant's Moral Principle is prescriptive and constitutive, or, to put it more plainly, it tells people how to behave. Such Ethical substance has been rare in the Philosophical tradition. Aristotle's principle 'Act in moderation' is another of example of substantive Philosophical Ethics, but unlike Kant's, it is for him only a subordinate Systematic feature. Otherwise, Moral Philosophies have generally been either substantively indeterminate, or descriptive, i. e. either the Good is asserted to be indefinable, or it is presented as what is, in fact, pursued, not what ought to be pursued. One chronic difficulty in offering a Moral Theory that attempts to avoid prescriptivity is exemplified by Mill's Utilitarianism, which vacillates between asserting that people do, in fact, promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number, and that they should do so, thereby creating the impression of someone trying to disguise a personal opinion as an objective fact. In contrast, the Evolvemental Principle that has been presented here is unequivocally intended as focal, prescriptive, and substantive. Perhaps, then, the only significant rival in the tradition to Kant's Principle is Nietzsche's 'Act only in such a way that you can will its eternal recurrence'. For even many of those who take Nietzsche seriously, his elliptical style makes it easy to doubt that his idea of Eternal Recurrence functions for him as an Ethical Principle, e. g. for some of them, it is only a theoretical hypothesis, while for others, it is an 'existential' imperative. Nevertheless, there is significant evidence in his texts that show that at least on some occasions he does treat it as a practical precept that can transform and guide conduct, so 'ethical imperative' is not an inapt characterization of it.

Constituting a Totality

To constitute a Totality, a Principle must entail the production of both a diversity and a unity. Kant's Principle of Pure Practical Reason generates the latter with its universalizability requirement. It accomplishes the former by addressing an entity that acts upon maxims. A Maxim is a causal connection applied to the pursuit of purposes--some entity wants to achieve some E, there is available a theoretical law that asserts that M causes E, so the entity adopts the maxim, 'In order to achieve E, I will do M'. In the process, the calculation and application of the causal law is rational behavior, but as Aristotle and Hume agree, while E itself might have been adopted as a means to some other end, ultimately, there is some end which is not the product of calculation. Hence, the use of maxims in behavior is never more than partially rational, and the adopter of a maxim is ultimately no more than a node in a causal chain, i. e. is indistinguishable from any other responder to a stimulus. Kant's Principle breaks the chain, offering an alternative which can be freely chosen, only, which, when chosen, individuates the choser. Thus, via its distributive 'you', it produces a diversity, which it also unifies, thereby constituting a Totality.

Kant's Moral Sun

From Kant's Principle of Pure Practical Reason, 'Act only on that maxim that you can at the same time will to be a universal law', the components 'act', 'maxim', 'can at the same time will', and 'universal law' have been thoroughly analyzed over the centuries. But perhaps the decisive element of the formulation is 'you'. With this 'you', the Principle functions as Plato's 'Sun' does--it illuminates an 'I' which can function as a subject that can act and will in the prescribed manner. It, thus, transforms what had previously been, as much as any other entity in the cave of sense information, only a shadow on a wall, a point which seems to generally have remained only implicit in the millenia of exegeses of those passages from the Republic. Furthermore, it surpasses Plato's Sun by offering an articulation of what is presumably no more than an instantaneous intuiton.

Ratio and Reason

The main connection of the notion 'Ratio' with common connotations of 'reasonability' and 'rationality', is the concept of Balance. Since a given ratio, per se, would seem to be neither balanced nor unbalanced, while it is, more accurately, the derivative notion, 'Proportion', i. e. equality of ratios, that is entailed by Balance. Still, Ratio is a relation between two numbers that transcends their particularity, e. g. a relation between 5 and 3 is not a ratio until it is equated with, e. g. that between 10 and 6. So, Proportion is fundamentally Ratio. Now, the concept of Balance is plainly central to many Philosophical topics, primarily Justice, but the relevance of Ratio to the cognitive power Reason is not so clear, e. g. even 'unbalanced' people seem to have 'reasons' for what they do. On the other hand, like a ratio, a reason transcends particularity, but the 'reasons' of the unbalanced lack generalizability. In other words, both Ratio and Reason can be expressed as a universal formula, i. e. just as the latter can be defined as a function which, given an argument, e. g. a cause, yields a value, e. g. an effect, the former can be defined as a function, which, taking one number as an argument, yields another, i. e. the 'Rule of Three' in Mathematics. So, Rational Balance consists not in the comparison of magnitude peculiar to Ratio, but in the uniformity of instantiation, of either Ratio or Reason.

Kant and Totality

Kant's thesis is that Reason seeks to totalize, an aim which, as the Critique of Pure Reason shows, exceeds the grasp of Theoretical Reason. It is only given a manifold that totalizing Reason itself constitutes that totalization is possible, so it is only as Practical that Reason can achieve its aim. For, in governing, via its Pure Principle, specific actions, it constitutes a synthesizable manifold. But, despite the success of Reason in this respect, it fails, despite Kant's best efforts, in another. Totality is the synthesis of heterogeneity and homogeneity, which means that it must preserve the independence of its parts, or otherwise it collapses into unity. So, a totalizing principle that is adequate to what it would subsume must also confer freedom on its potential particulars. This, as has been discussed, Kant's Principle of Pure Practical Reason, does not quite accomplish, since its being adopted presupposes a freedom of choice, i. e. his 'willkur', in agents, that it does not entail. So, it is perhaps this second shortcoming in the pursuit of Totality that motivates a third attempt, namely the Critique of Judgement. The latter offers two notions of Totality--Subjective Universality, i. e. the structure of Aesthetic Judgement, and Organic Whole, the structure of Teleological Judgement. The former given a part, attempts to generate a whole, while, conversely, the latter, given a whole, attempts to specify its parts. But, while both come closer to striking a balance between unity and multiplicity than the preceding Critiques, the former remains arbitrary and contingent, while the latter cannot quite conceive of the organs of an organism as independent of it. In Formaterialism, Evolvement, the balance between homogeneity and heterogeneity is fortuitious, but cultivable, much like Genius, in Kant's system.

Reason and Evolvement

With its emphasis on the process of Totalization, Kant's notion of Reason expands on Leibniz', the primary principle of which is reductionistic Identity. Kantian Reason thereby gives rise to the pan-Rationalism of Hegelianism, for which the limits of its predecessor become fodder for further Totalization. For Kant, Reason is inadequate to the Totalization of the Nature that it did not create, so its pre-eminence lies in the Practical sphere. But, even in the latter, there are two caesuras in the proposed totality. First, as has been previously been discussed, Kant's Practical Rational Principle, while sufficing to impart Freedom to an agent, fails to account for the preceding freedom inherent in one's choice to act Rationally to begin with. While that caesura can be classified as an 'irrational' moment in the System, the second eludes such easy characterization. The other is Kant's category of 'imperfect duties'. The 'perfect duties' are all prohibitory, e. g. against false promising, and, hence, are constraints against the disruption of a totality. In contrast, imperfect duties, e. g. cultivating one's talents, promoting the happiness of others, neither create, maintain, nor disrupt a totality, but increase it. Hence, therein, Reason produces a new particular, and then re-totalizes the result. In other words, in Kant's System, Reason becomes not only a totalization process, but an Evolvemental one, as well.

Kantian Reason

Three familiar uses of the term 'reason' are to signify a cause, a purpose, or a justification. An example of a cause is, 'The reason the grass is wet is that it rained last night'. An example of a purpose is, 'The reason that I am out walking is that I am going to the library'. An example of a justification is 'The reason that I believe that he is lying is his shifty eyes'. So, in common parlance, last night's rain, my wanting to go to the library, and a man's countenance are the 'reasons' in their respective cases. However, each example suppresses a general proposition--in the first, 'Rain wets objects'; in the second, 'Walking is a means of transportation'; in the third, 'Shifty eyes is a sign of a liar'. More accurately, it is these general propositions that are the 'reasons' in each case, i. e. by them alone can otherwise mere facts become cause, purpose, or justification. Similarly, why Kant does not settle on defining Reason as 'the power of inference' is that it is, more fundamentally, the source of Principles, i. e. the major premises from which deductive inferences are drawn, and of Ideas, i. e. the notions of totalities entailed by Principles. Hence, for example, Pure Practical Reason's 'Act only on that maxim that you can at the same time will to be a universal law' provides a Principle from which specific correct conduct can be deduced, and entails the Idea of a totality of rational agents, i. e. his 'kingdom of ends'. Thus, this fundamental character of Reason serves as an unstated ground of Kant's challenge to Humean Moral Sentimentalism. For, the latter holds that Universal Sympathy is the basis of Morality, and, hence, that Morality is essentially irrational. But, the Kantian response is that Reason is the sole source of any notion of Universality, so even Sentimentalism is Rational, at heart.

Philosophy and The Logos

Cassirer's project is based on the thesis that what is common to Language, Myth, and Knowledge is the use by each, in differing ways, of Symbols. However, he also very briefly alludes to another shared factor, one which, despite its significance to not only his own study, but to Philosophy, in general, he does not further investigate. That factor, which is arguably the common root of all three realms, is the 'Logos', the earliest evidence of which conceives it as the superhuman source of both order and Language. Later, as Aristotle de-mythologizes it, Logos becomes formal 'Logic', in separation from less orderly modes of Language, and, with the Theological appropriation of it in the Medieval Era, 'Logos' seems to disappear completely from the Philosophical lexicon. Nevertheless, its continues to reappear in other guises. Kant's Pure Practical Reason, no mere subjective faculty, but a trans-personal, super-sensible expressive power, is evocative of the original Logos. Hegel's, and possibly Marx's, 'Dialectical Reason', as the inner dynamic of not only all thought, but all reality, also exhibits the family resemblance. Even the staunch anti-Hegelian, Russell, seems to share the ambition of recovering the Logos, i. e. his effort to reduce all Language to impersonal, universally necessary, 'Logic'. Given the diversity of such manifestations, perhaps the essence of Philosophy is not "Logic", as Russell has it, but the Logos.

Cassirer and Impersonalism

As has already been pointed out, as meticulous as Cassirer's semiogenealogy is, it loses track of the most primitive characteristic of Language, its presumed efficacy, i. e. he fails to pursue the link between magic words, etc. and prescriptive language. As a result he offers no account of the emergence of descriptive language. Another, perhaps related, lacuna in his studies is the transition from personal to impersonal Language and Knowledge. As he recounts it, the most primitive experience is of the expressive 'thou', e. g. the face of a parent, the manifest anger of a god, on the basis of which he can explain the emergence of a rudimentary 'I' Knowledge and Language. But, his further assertion that the consciousness of a 'he' also appears at about the same stage, is presented with no derivation, and, soon, equally suddenly appearing in his account is the consciousness of an 'it'. Subsequently, now given the impersonal 'it', the seamlessness of the development of theoretical Knowledge and Language is relatively easy for Cassirer to show. But, both lacunae only contribute to the widespread priority, in theories of both Knowledge and Language, enjoyed by Fact and Descriptivity over Value and Prescriptivity, even to the extent that some theorists exclude the latter from the scope of Philosophy. While Cassirer is, unlike many of them, no Positivist or Analytic Philosopher, he often seems to share their priorities.

Acts and Facts

It is widely held that facts cannot entail values, so many argue that an 'ought' cannot be derived from an 'is'. Searle has attempted to refute that presumption by proposing the existence of a third realm, which he calls 'institutional facts', e. g. the fact of uttering the phrase 'I promise. . .' commits one to an institution in which the utterance is the assumption of an obligation. Presumably in contrast is the derivation of the evaluation 'X ought to be stopped' from the fact of X's utterance 'I will kill you', because the latter can occur without the former obtaining. But, the distinction between the two examples is not clear. For, every act, Speech or otherwise, is subject to valuation, which suggests, on analogy with Searle's proposal, that the realm of institutional Facts, is the realm of Acts, i. e. every act can be similarly construed as commitment to an 'institution', namely to the social realm. So, the derivation that even Searle leaves unexplored is that of Fact from Act.

Cassirer, Knowledge, and Symbols

Cassirer's stated purpose is to re-define the 'animal rationale' as 'animal symbolicus', based on his insight that human Knowledge is only a special case of the cultural use and development of the Symbol. For example, the highest variety of Knowledge, Scientific theory, is, according to Cassirer, impossible without symbols that can facilitate the transcendence of immediate experience, i. e. as presented in universal laws, an exaltation that surpasses even that of Mathematics. What is surprising about the subordinate status of the latter is that in, notably, the Formalistic theory, which holds that Mathematics is no more than operations rigorously defined by, and performed on, non-representing symbols, the Symbol would seem to have reached an apotheosis, revealing it as it is in itself. However, Cassirer's reluctance to recognize the essence of the Symbol in this construal of Mathematics seems based on the very consideration that in that context, the Symbol becomes emptied of significance, whereas, Scientific symbols, even if mediately, always retain content. Thus, Cassirer's criterion for the superiority of Scientific to Mathematical symbols is not some intrinsic, pan-cultural characteristic of the Symbol, but, rather, the scope of Knowledge, which would seem to undercut his stated purpose. If, instead, he had pursued the alternative, he might have discovered that at its ultimate, animal symbolicus is transformed into homo ludens. But, as is, his study of Knowledge does not demonstrate even animal rationale becoming animal symbolicus.

Plato, Kant, and the Sun

In Plato's image, the sun is a symbol of the Form of the Good, by which other Ideas are illuminated. It is unclear whether he means such illumination to be intellectual or to be normative, but insofar as Ideas and Ideals are one and the same to him, there is no difference between the two interpretations. For Kant, the sun serves most explicitly as a gravitational metaphor--just as Copernicus shows that the earth revolves around the sun, and not the converse, Kant characterizes his theory of Knowledge as the adaptation of the world to cognitive structures, rather than, as had hitherto been the case, the converse. But Kant's metaphor entails some complications that are rarely explored. First, the status of Humanity is not made explicit, so, insofar as humans are terrestrial beings, the 'Copernican revolution' can also be interpetated as a transition from subjective knowledge to objective knowledge, i. e. from knowledge as it appears, to knowledge as it actually is, which is certainly an important theme in Kant's theory. But, if objective knowledge is knowledge from the perspective of the sun, and the parameters of that knowledge are in the human subject, then the human mind itself has become the 'sun' of knowledge, as a result of the 'Copernican' revolution. Furthermore, apparently unexplored, is the relation between the Platonic and Kantian 'suns', and, in particular, to what extent the latter might be not only an intellectual sun, but a moral one, as well. On that hypothesis, Kant's Principle of Pure Practical Reason too is a 'sun', the criterion of worthy conduct. As such, his Copernican revolution converges with his theory of human autonomy--by internalizing the 'sun', i. e. the Practical Principle, one freely gives the Good to oneself. Granted that hypothesis, since Kant never explicitly explains the relation between the theoretical 'I' and the practical 'I', how many 'suns' are in his System remains unresolved.

Language, Ediction, and Motivation

Edicts illustrate the motivational function of Language, to which theories that treat Language as an inert object can be oblivious. Some of the alternatives to that treatment at least implicitly aim to re-accommodate that function--in Wittgenstein's basic Language-Game, an utterance is a prompt to action; Austin's Illocutionary Acts are attempts on the part of a speaker to induce an audience in some respect or another; Cassirer's studies of primitive Language demonstrate its original efficacy, i. e. magic words, animal interjections, a child's cries. Even where Language is recognized as a medium, it is often reified. In such cases, it is construed as serving as an envelope in which a thought can be be packaged for transmission, to be discarded upon receipt. However, such a model does not account for the process of transmission, in contrast with e. g. copper as medium that conducts electricity, in analogy with which Ediction is a charged process, in which Language is a conductive medium. As motivating, Ediction is indefinite, made definite by the formation of specific words. That is, the Meaning component of Language is its motivational dimension made determinate.

Examplification and Ediction

'Ediction' means 'speaking out', so every utterance, to some extent or another, is an instance of Ediction, an 'edict' being only a familiar and dramatic type. Ediction is a special case of Examplification, i. e. it formulates a private thought, feeling, etc. in general terms, which is as much as to say that saying is a kind of doing. However, framing the relation between doing and saying as Examplification-Ediction resolves a chronic problem in Language theory that even Language-Game and Speech-Act models do not avoid. That is, even reducing saying to doing still maintains the traditional meaning-word heterogeneity, i. e. the content of a saying remains irreducible to the doing of the saying. In contrast, Ediction is a significant special mode of Examplification. The latter expands the Individual, and what is sometimes underappreciated about Language is that, despite its limitations, utterance is perhaps the most intricate of human performances, and, hence, the activity through which one can attain to one's widest scope, as an edict illustrates. In other words, Ediction is the most Examplifying of Examplifications.

Examplification

The word 'example' has two common uses that are logical inverses of each other. In one sense, an 'example' is an instance of something general. But, in the other, in 'setting an example', some specific course of action is projected as general. The latter process can be called 'Examplification'. Examplification is a fundamental component of the Formaterial concept of the Individual--it characterizes Exposition, i. e. the efferential dimension of Conduct. It is the Individual's self-projection into overtness, and, thereby, the source of public emanation. Examplification is entailed in the process of the universalization of a maxim that is a phase of Kant's Practical Principle, but which the standard analysis of the latter tends to gloss over in its focus on the resultant universality. Also in Kantian terms, Examplification is the dynamic efficacious appearing that Kantianism reifies as Appearance, and, similarly, it is the generation of Sartre's Being-for-Others that precedes what is treated primarily as an inert phenomenon. Otherwise, the Examplery aspect of Conduct seems to have received little attention, despite its relevance to, e. g. leadership qualities. Regardless, the transition from private to public, that is a phase of every Individual action, effects the transition from singular to general that contrasts Examplification to exemplification.

Communication Act and Meta-Ethics

One of the central debates in Ethical Theory is over the meaning of the sentence 'X is Good'. On one view, e. g. Utilitarianism, it means 'X satisfies an objective criterion of Goodness'. On a second view, e. g. Kantianism, it means 'One ought to do X'. On the third view, e. g. Emotivism, it means 'I like X'. Typically, the presentation of any of three is accompanied by an attempt to dismiss the other two and/or to reduce them to it. But, on a Commuication-Act analysis, each of the three interpetations represents a variety of Communication Act--Description, Prescription, and Expression, respectively--which are irreducible to one another. Furthermore, what accompanies the presentation of each is itself a Communication Act, aiming at the acceptance of the particular theory by an audience. In other words, regardless of the content of a theory of the meaning of 'X is Good', its presentation asserts 'Subscribing to this theory is Good', meaning 'One ought to subscribe to this theory'. Hence, regardless of which theory is being explicitly espoused, its being espoused implicitly subscribes to the Prescriptive interpretation of 'X is Good'.

Kant, Genius, and Communicability

According to Kant, Genius consists in both an ability to discover an apt image for an Idea, as well as an animating power that makes a Symbol universally communicable. However, in order to achieve Beauty, Genius must be complemented by Taste, and, in the case of a conflict between the two, the latter has priority. Now, Taste, as he defines it, is the ability to judge whether or not an artistic production is universally communicable. But, that ability is already a part of Genius. So, Taste would seem to be a superfluous principle in Kant's System, perhaps analogous to the intrusive 'Socratic' principle in Nietzsche's analysis of Tragedy. Also, insofar as Beauty is the Symbol of Morality for Kant, the priority of Taste over Genius has its analogue in the standard reading of his Moral Principle. 'Act only that maxim that you can at the same time will to be a universal law' could be interpreted as the inspirational exhortation to 'Act in an exemplary manner', i. e. because 'will to be a universal law' can be seen as a more precise formulation of 'set an example'. However, Kant reads it as the prohibitory 'Do not act in a contradictory way', which implicitly accords priority to judgement over action. Such precedence encourages the Utilitarian interpetation of Kant's Moral theory, and compromises the power of Philosophy to inspire.

Symbol and Exhibition

Plato's likening of the Good to the sun is an example of what Kant calls the exhibition of an Aesthetic idea. In Kant's System, an idea in itself is purely intellectual and without any empirical manifestation. An Aesthetic idea is an analogy that supplies the intellectual idea with an empirical image, often to help develop the latter, e. g. his analogy helps Plato explicate the notion that Knowledge is possible only through its illumination by the Good. Furthermore, Kant calls an Aesthetic idea a 'Symbol'. However, it would be erroneous to characterize a Symbol as functioning as a representation. For, a representation implies the pre-existence of what it represents, whereas a Symbol is an original presentation, e. g. Plato's Symbol does not report a pre-existing relation between the Good and the sun, it creates it. Thus, Kant insists on the term 'exhibition' to characterize the function of a Symbol, even briefly alluding to the inappropriateness of a synonym of 'exhibition', 'demonstration', to characterize, as it commonly does, a proof, and suggesting that 'expounding' would be more accurate. So, Peirce's use of 'Symbol' diverges significantly from Kant's, insofar as it serves a representative function. In contrast, Cassirer's notion 'Symbolic Form' is Kantian, though his contention that Symbol-making is strictly an Artistic process, i. e. occurs only in Artistic activity, is puzzling, in the light of e. g. Plato's imagery.

Proof and Communication

Some Philosophers might have an adversion to a Communication-Act theory of Language, because it classifies rational proof as an act of 'argumentation' or, in other words, as an act of attempted persuasion. As such, it is measured in terms of its success in e. g. persuading someone to do something, in which case a verbal threat might be a better 'argument' than a sound proof that falls on deaf ears. Platonism can be understood as a response to this depreciation--the concoction of a world, i. e. of Forms, in which the superiority of Socratic Dialectic to sophistic rhetoric is recognized. In contrast, for a Pragmatist such as Dewey, the Platonist response is an escape from a challenge to Philosophers to broaden their appeal, e. g. via the development of improved educational methods. But, also, rational proof is involved in another category of Communciation Act--the demonstration. While a demonstrative proof might have a secondary interest in persuasion, it serves primarily to show that and/or how a sequence of statements can be constructed, e. g. to show that there is a sound justification for the acceptance of some conclusion and/or how it can be constructed. Insofar as Logic is a study of demonstrative proofs, it is a study of a type of Communication Act, just as insofar as Rhetoric is a study of argumentative proofs, it is a study of another type of Communication Act.

Speech-Act, Communication-Act, and Generality

The Communication-Act theory of Language has one important advantage over the Speech-Act theory. Both explain the specificity of Language, i. e. both types of Act are concrete events. But, Language is general, as well, which entails syntactical and/or semantic components that survive the immediacy of a given utterance. That the Speech-Act theory is an inadequate ground of Language's generality is evinced by Austin's respect for the non-performative status of Propositions, i. e. his Locutionary and Constative categories, which implicitly concedes to e. g. Logicism, the exclusivity and the self-sufficiency of a transcendent source of generality, e. g. an objective ontology, an a priori structure, etc. In contrast, the Communication-Act theory need make no such concession. For, generality is immanent to Communication, which entails a plurality of participants, and a commonality amongst them, which, in turn, suffices to ground the generality of Language, i. e. without common linguistic structures and meanings, communication would be impossible.

Cassirer and Genius

The widely-held opinion that Einstein was a genius can be disputed on two grounds, neither of which impugns his intelligence, diminishes the magnitude of his accomplishments, or questions the qualifications of many people to offer such a judgement. First, the popular locution 'is a genius' transforms a specific talent into a general type of human being, so, 'Einstein's work in Physics was the product of genius', would be a more accurate expression of that opinion. But, second, and more substantively, is in the same application of Kantianism that motivates Cassirer's judgement that Newton's innovations were not the product of genius. Kant's System distinguishes between 'Ideas' and 'Concepts', and it is the latter that are the sources of the laws of Physics, whereas, 'genius' produces only the former. Hence, as he concludes, 'genius' is not applicable to Newton, or to Physics, in general, and, so, presumably, not to Einstein, either. Now, Kant's discussion of Genius appears as part of his study of Art, e. g. "Genius is the ability to exhibit Aesthetic ideas", on the basis of which Cassirer asserts that Art is the only activity to which it is attributible. Conspicuously absent in his presentation of that assertion is any consideration of Philosophy. Surely the exhibition of ideas is central to not only Kant's own work but to most Philosophy, so lacking any further discussion, the assertion remains questionable.

The Essence of Mathematics

The history of Mathematics evinces a transition in the concept of Number from concrete to abstract, i. e. from tool of enumeration, to Natural Number, to Integer, to Rational Number, etc., to, more recently, Transfinite Number. A central debate in Philosophy of Mathematics is whether the essence of Mathematics is in its concreteness, i. e. its rootedness in, experience, or in its abstractness, i. e. in which its structures are purified of any contingency. Cassirer sees the development itself as most significant, because it symbolizes the growth of Human Knowledge from particularity to universality. Hence, in his System, the essence of Mathematics is that it serves as a transition between empirical and theoretical knowledge. Formaterialism agrees with Cassirer that the entire development is significant, but disputes the need to seek the essence of Mathematics outside of its sphere, i. e. in its relation to other branches of knowledge. For, it regards Number as fundamentally Ordinal, and finds the nature of Number sufficiently entailed in the notion of enumeration, in the establishment of a unit for the basis of further operations. That is, the unit is concrete, and what it anticipates is abstract, so, different theories tend to focus on one aspect or the other. For example, counting is the recursive process of achieving, and then exceeding, finitude, so, all counting can be described as a process of 'transfinition'. Hence the 'first Transfinite Number' is always the next number. So, the Transfinite realm of some theories is the result of a detachment and an hypostasization from the process of counting, and neither a self-subsistent Platonistic world nor a fulfillment of a potential.

Communication and Reference

One of the chronic challenges to Philosophy of Language is explaining Reference, i. e. the relation between linguistic and non-linguistic items. Primitive language has little problem accomplishing it, insofar as it takes words to incarnate the objects that they signify. But, upon de-mythologization, the link between word and object is broken, and re-connecting such heterogeneous entities becomes difficult. The standard theory of Reference is the Associationist one: 'Word W refers to object O' = 'W and O are constantly conjoined', i. e. the perception of W is an occasion to expect to perceive O as well. Critics of this theory charge that it is question-begging, since it fails to explain the initial conjunction. For example, slapping the label 'ball' on some object does not specify whether it signifies the object, its color, its shape, what it is made of, etc. Hence, many theories simply jettison Reference entirely, and invest the meaningfulness of Language in the interrelation of its components. An alternative to both approaches is to retain Reference, but to deny that it is Language that refers. For, a more accurate, and less tenuous, account of Communicative Reference entails someone attentively perceiving some object, and presuming upon a shared experiential and linguistic background with someone else, attempting to communicate that perception to the latter. That is, 'W refers to O' = 'Person A utters W to communicate to B their perception of O'. Such a theory of Reference is not without its potential complications, but at least it avoids attributing to Language a power that is every bit as magical as that primitively attributed to it.

Speech Acts and Communicative Acts

In Austin's theory, all speech acts consist of a Phonetic, a Syntactic, and a Semantic component, which together he calls 'Locutionary'. Most Locutionary acts are, furthermore, either, what he calls, 'Illocutionary' or 'Perlocutionary', which, based on his discussion, seem characterizable as 'Communicative' acts, though he himself never puts it that way. One of the main aims of his theory is to demonstrate that Propositions are a species of neither Illocutionary nor Perlocutionary speech acts, but he never seems to acomplish more than to show that they are mere abstractions from Illocutionary acts, such as 'X states that P'. Now, to more decisively argue for the derivative nature of Propositions, his Phonetic act corresponds closely to what has been presented here as 'Phrasing', without the distinction drawn within the latter between its Material and Formal components. Also previously discussed is the further distinction between 'nonsensical' and 'meaningful' Formal components, based on whether or not the Form of a Phrase has generally-accepted import. But generally-accepted import is Communicative import. So, it is within Austin's Locutionary act, i. e. within the Phonetic stage, that a speech act becomes a Communicative act, as underscored by the point that Syntax and Semantic are generally-accepted aspects of speech, and, hence, pertain to Communicative acts. Hence, Propositions are fundamentally Communicative.