Eternal Recurrence as a Theory of Time

Early in the unveiling of Eternal Recurrence, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche dismisses the thesis, expressed by a 'Dwarf', that 'Time is a circle', as an evasion. This dismissal has inspired the interpretation, especially among Heideggerians, that Nietzsche's doctrine of Eternal Recurrence is primarily a theory of Time, one that challenges the tradition for which the Present is the seamless transition from Past to Future. But, regardless of the merits of this challenge, it, too, is evasive. For, it, too, remains outside of its object, thereby exempting itself from confronting the substantive component of the doctrine, namely the re-experiencing and eternalizing of past suffering and ignobility, which comprises Zarathustra's main struggle. Furthermore, even the thesis that the Present is a constituting node that knots Past and Future, abstracts and distracts from Nietzsche's self-understanding that the thinking of Eternal Recurrence is itself an event in the circle. Elsewhere, in some of the Will to Power fragments, Nietzsche does indeed explore some of the theoretical features of the temporal aspect of Eternal Recurrence, but not enough to warrant the interpretation that the doctrine for Nietzsche is primarily a theory of Time.