Speech Acts and Communicative Acts

In Austin's theory, all speech acts consist of a Phonetic, a Syntactic, and a Semantic component, which together he calls 'Locutionary'. Most Locutionary acts are, furthermore, either, what he calls, 'Illocutionary' or 'Perlocutionary', which, based on his discussion, seem characterizable as 'Communicative' acts, though he himself never puts it that way. One of the main aims of his theory is to demonstrate that Propositions are a species of neither Illocutionary nor Perlocutionary speech acts, but he never seems to acomplish more than to show that they are mere abstractions from Illocutionary acts, such as 'X states that P'. Now, to more decisively argue for the derivative nature of Propositions, his Phonetic act corresponds closely to what has been presented here as 'Phrasing', without the distinction drawn within the latter between its Material and Formal components. Also previously discussed is the further distinction between 'nonsensical' and 'meaningful' Formal components, based on whether or not the Form of a Phrase has generally-accepted import. But generally-accepted import is Communicative import. So, it is within Austin's Locutionary act, i. e. within the Phonetic stage, that a speech act becomes a Communicative act, as underscored by the point that Syntax and Semantic are generally-accepted aspects of speech, and, hence, pertain to Communicative acts. Hence, Propositions are fundamentally Communicative.