Nietzsche's Ethical Imperative

Kant's Moral Principle is prescriptive and constitutive, or, to put it more plainly, it tells people how to behave. Such Ethical substance has been rare in the Philosophical tradition. Aristotle's principle 'Act in moderation' is another of example of substantive Philosophical Ethics, but unlike Kant's, it is for him only a subordinate Systematic feature. Otherwise, Moral Philosophies have generally been either substantively indeterminate, or descriptive, i. e. either the Good is asserted to be indefinable, or it is presented as what is, in fact, pursued, not what ought to be pursued. One chronic difficulty in offering a Moral Theory that attempts to avoid prescriptivity is exemplified by Mill's Utilitarianism, which vacillates between asserting that people do, in fact, promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number, and that they should do so, thereby creating the impression of someone trying to disguise a personal opinion as an objective fact. In contrast, the Evolvemental Principle that has been presented here is unequivocally intended as focal, prescriptive, and substantive. Perhaps, then, the only significant rival in the tradition to Kant's Principle is Nietzsche's 'Act only in such a way that you can will its eternal recurrence'. For even many of those who take Nietzsche seriously, his elliptical style makes it easy to doubt that his idea of Eternal Recurrence functions for him as an Ethical Principle, e. g. for some of them, it is only a theoretical hypothesis, while for others, it is an 'existential' imperative. Nevertheless, there is significant evidence in his texts that show that at least on some occasions he does treat it as a practical precept that can transform and guide conduct, so 'ethical imperative' is not an inapt characterization of it.