Friday, June 30, 2017

Duration and Praxis

According to Bergson, Duration, under the rubric 'Time', is falsified in two ways, in both Physics and common experience.  First, it is hypostasized, as when it is represented as an immobile, complete, line.  Second, it is homogenized, as when it is counted in terms of identical units.  But, the latter involves a third falsification, which Bergson does not recognize.  For, the process of counting, independent of its object, is in itself Durational, and, furthermore, is only first produced as a characteristic of an active process.  In other words, Duration is fundamentally Practical.  Kant approaches that concept when classifying Time as a Form of Experience, but 'Experience' for him connotes merely Cognition, while Heidegger does recognize that Time is the general structure of behavior, but stops short of conceiving it as actively produced by Praxis.  So, Bergson's correction of the standard concept of Time remains incomplete, and, given his stated familiarity with Kant, underinformed.

Thursday, June 29, 2017

Duration, Modification, Comparison

Bergson basically agrees with the Phenomenalist that the familiar experience--warm water feeling hot to a hand that has just been in the cold--shows that the quality inheres in the subject, not in the object.  He diverges from that tradition by conceiving the transition from cold to hot to be a continuum, with no lacuna.  Regardless, what the example more precisely demonstrates is that the transition is not from cold to hot, but from colder to hotter, i. e. that its terms are comparative, not positive, qualities.  Furthermore, any experiential transition is a modification of some given.  In other words, Duration is Modification, and a result of a modification is what it is only in comparison to what has been modified.  The inherent comparativeness of Duration may not be obvious from hypothetical examples of random sequences the Physicist analysis of de-vitalized Motion, but it is plain in ordinary experience, which is typically constituted by action that aims at improving given conditions.

Wednesday, June 28, 2017

Duration, Gestalt, Locomotion

As has been previously discussed, for Bergson, Duration is an object of Description.  He, thus, does not consider the possibility that it is a product of a Gestalt.  Now, on his own account, the perception of Duration, and, hence of the Elan Vital of which Duration is a characteristic, is not casual, but requires exertion, i. e. attention.  Now, the physicality of such exertion can go unnoticed when it is directed at maintaining the immobility of the rest of the body.  But it becomes patent when the occasion is full mobility, e. g. when trying to keep an erect posture while walking.  In those wholistic cases, a Gestalt can involve the coordination of multiple motions, i. e. their Synchronization.  So, though he recognizes the volitional significance of Locomotion, as has been previously discussed, he neglects that it can exhibit that its Duration can also have an inner synchronic dimension, i. e. has volume.  On that basis, the seemingly passively observed, diachronic, disembodied, flux, that is his usual topic of interest, is the object of a superficial consciousness of an immobile subject.

Tuesday, June 27, 2017

Simultaneity and Synchronicity

As has been previously discussed, Relativity entails Chance.  Accordingly, an Einsteinian deity that abhors the latter would correct any non-Simultaneity that might arise, i. e. would synchronise any non-Simultaneous Frames of Reference.  In other words, Synchronicity and Simultaneity are related as Active to Passive.  However, Synchronicity is no transcendent, hypothetical, super-human capacity; it is a familiar operation, beginning with the coordination involved in simple Locomotion, as has been previously discussed.  Thus, Einstein's and Bergson's shared attention to Simultaneity, and neglect of Synchronicity, indicate that for each, Time is passively experienced, i. e. is an object of description.

Monday, June 26, 2017

Relativity and Chance

Bergson rejects Einstein's concept of Relativistic Time, on the grounds that any denial of Simultaneity expresses a comparison that presupposes a vantage point from which Simultaneity obtains.  He could furthermore argue that a universe of non-Simultaneity is a universe constituted by random encounters, i. e. that Relativity entails Chance.  But, Einstein insists that God does not play dice with the universe.  Hence, Bergson could conclude, Relativistic Time is precluded by Einstein's own Theological principles.

Sunday, June 25, 2017

Duration, Locomotion, Polyrhythms

Like Einstein's Time, Bergson's Duration is linear.  In contrast, the Temporality of Locomotion, which, as has been previously discussed, is, according to Bergson, the occasion of the origin of Free Will, involves the synchronization of multiple physiological motions.  Such synchronization does not simplify but actively coordinates.  Likewise, the Temporality of Action in general is Polyrhythmic, as is expressed in dancing.  On that basis, linear Duration is the Temporality of passivity.

Saturday, June 24, 2017

Determinism, Indeterminism, Locomotion

As has been previously discussed, on the topic of Time, the theories of Bergson and Einstein may be merely alternatives, not in opposition.  In contrast, the former does directly contradict the Determinism of the latter, arguing that there is Indeterminacy in the physical world--at the moment of the initiation of locomotion in the Animal kingdom, which is its fundamental distinction from Plants.  Put otherwise, according to Bergson, the Stimulus-Response relation does not reduce to the Cause-Effect connection of Physics, because, unlike that of the latter, there is a discontinuity between its two phases. Now, there might be a Determinist rejoinder that fills in that purported gap; but, it is not that of Einstein, whose dismissal of Indeterminacy on the grounds that it is psychologically illusory does not touch Bergson's concrete analysis.

Friday, June 23, 2017

Duration, Repetition, Rhythm

An alternative to both Duration and Repetition is Rhythm.  Rhythm shares continuity and vitality with the former, while entailing more clearly the heterogeneity that is ingredient in any Change.  On the other hand, it shares with the latter objectivity, i. e. it cannot be reduced to mere psychological datum, and it gives meaning to the part of a cycle that is not the moment that is enumerated, e. g. between the "1 second" and the " 2 seconds".  So, like Duration, Rhythm is irrelevant to the Repetition that is basis of the quantification of Physicist Mass in motion.  But, if Einstein means to reduce human Time to the latter, just as he reduces human behavior to Inanimate Determinism, then, as an objective characteristic, Rhythm more decisively than Duration exposes the dehumanization involved.

Thursday, June 22, 2017

Time, Duration, Repetition

The primary topic of the exchange between Bergson and Einstein is 'Time', with the former arguing that what the latter calls "time" is actually Spatialized Duration, and the latter responding that Duration is a merely "psychological" experience that is irrelevant to the objective feature that Physicists study.  Bergson thus misses a cue from Kant, who shows that inner experience is constituted by not merely empirical psychological data, but also cognitive structures that ground both the perception of 'objective' "time", and its quantification.  Similarly, Bergson could easily assert that the essence of Physicist Time is Repetition, i. e. the basis of Quantification, and that Repetition entails both intra- and inter-cycle continuity, or, in other words, Duration. Put otherwise, Repetition is Duration that has been subsequently subdivided.  For example, the motion of Einstein's orbiting Moon, is, in itself, continuous, becoming enumerable only by the introduction of some extrinsic reference point by means of which the motion can be subdivided into cycles. Likewise, all Quantification involves overlaying a substratum of Duration with recurring homogeneous units. Bergson thereby could follow Kant by making the stronger argument that Einstein's concept presupposes his, which avoids the impasse of two question-begging positions that constitute the actual exchange.

Wednesday, June 21, 2017

Vitalism and Physics

Rarely recognized is that Spinoza's Pantheism is Vitalist. But, while its Animate-Inanimate distinction is one of degree of complexity, in Bergson's Vitalism, Matter is degenerated Life.  On that basis, Physicist reductionism of humans is degradation of them.  However, in his 1920s exchanges with Einstein, Bergson does not resort to a Moral argument to challenge that concept of the Physicist universe.

Tuesday, June 20, 2017

Freedom and Will

The denial of the existence of Free Will can mean either 1. Such a thing as 'Will' does not exist, or 2. Will does exist, but it is not 'free'.  The most prominent version of #1 is Epiphenomenalism, according to which what is taken to be 'Will' is actually the inefficacious consciousness of causal events occurring elsewhere in the organism.  Noted advocates of this position are Schopenhauer, the pre-Zarathustra Nietzsche, and Santayana, as well as, though his formulations are relatively crude, Einstein.  But not Spinoza, who asserts #2.  He recognizes the existence of Will, i. e. of a conscious causality, but one that always has a prior ground, i. e. always has a reason that activates it.  Thus, for example, one might eat because of a pleasing aroma, or because doing so promotes health, but not free of any reason.  Accordingly, as a result of a superficial, immediate, interpretation of one's experience, one might believe that one is acting 'freely', when, in fact, one has abstracted a response from a prior stimulus, of which one is not, in fact, 'free'.  Spinoza's target is thus very different from that of Einstein and the Epiphenomenalists, as is, therefore, the remedy that his doctrine offers, applicable to some of the commonest uses of 'freedom' in contemporary society.

Monday, June 19, 2017

Animate Determinism and Inanimate Determinism

To illustrate the error of the human belief in the existence of Free Will, Einstein uses the image of a conscious Moon that attributes its orbiting to a motion of its own volition, an image that is reminiscent of Spinoza's of a thinking stone that believes that it is falling of its own accord.  But, the reference misses one significant dissimilarity between the two cases--in Spinoza's system, a stone, like every other entity, does possess a Mind, though one much simpler than a human Mind.  Thus, Spinoza's stone is sharply distinguished from a diver with the requisite complexity to deliberately set themselves in motion.  The more general distinction between the two anti-Free Will positions is that Einstein's universe is essentially inanimate, while Spinoza's God/Nature is essentially animate, with the distinction between stone and human one of degree.  In other words, Einstein seems to not consider the possibility of a distinction between Animate Determinism and Inanimate Determinism.  In other words, his argument against Free Will applies to only inanimate entities, and his Moon metaphor begs the question.

Sunday, June 18, 2017

Mass, Light, Metaphysics

According to Newton, Mass is resistance to Acceleration, and is the Matter that is the inherent substratum of any change of an object, knowable only by its effects.  Thus, in some Metaphysical systems, it has the status of Substance.  In contrast, according to Einstein, as an object approaches the Speed of Light, that substratum is transformed into Energy, which conforms with the Mass-lessness of Acceleration-resistant Light, the existence of which is only inferrable from the visibility of objects. Thus, conversely, as an object slows down, Energy is transformed into Matter, just as it is according to Bergson.  In other words, Einstein's variation of Newton's Physics has at least some of the fundamental characteristics of Bergson's inversion of a Materialist Metaphysics.

Saturday, June 17, 2017

Determinism, Self-Causality, Mass

Free Will can be conceived as a Cause that is not the Effect of a prior Cause.  Accordingly, Determinism can be conceived as entailing the denial of the possibility of a Free Will.  However, that concept does not preclude the possibility of a vacillation between Causes, which is the variety of Determinism which Spinoza exemplifies.  For, in his system, behavior can be either self-caused or externally caused, neither of which is a case of Free Will.  This variability is grounded in the possibility of internal strengthening via the acquisition of Adequate Ideas, i. e. via empowering education.  In Newtonian terms, the variability is in the Mass of an object, i. e. in its capacity to resist external forces, and to effect external objects.  In his apparent allusion to Spinoza in order to reinforce his advocacy of Determinism, Einstein seems unaware of these nuances.

Friday, June 16, 2017

Determinism and Submission

According to many Determinists, 'free will' is an illusion in which one's apparent 'freedom of choice' is actually only the passive observation by one of a stronger cause of behavior outweighing a weaker one.  Now, on closer examination, to which it is rarely subjected, that analysis does not demonstrate that free will is illusory, but, rather, overrides it by incorporating into a more comprehensive analysis other causal relations.  So, applying its own method to itself, and broadening its causal context, the argument does not subsist in itself, but is communicated to an audience, either orally or graphically, for reasons that could include promoting acquiescence to established power relations.  Ditto for the Physicist embracing of Determinism for a system in which animate beings are reduced to inanimate entites.  In both cases, elevating the position to the status of insurpassable, immutable truth functions to reinforce it as an ideology of submission.

Thursday, June 15, 2017

Formal Causality and Adequate Causality

According to Spinoza, Adequate Causality is Proximate Causality comprehended in a definition, often characterized as an 'operational' definition.  The example that he offers is that of a Circle: "the figure described by any line whereof one end is fixed and the other free."  But, that definition unifies a sequence of motions.  Hence, it is also an example of Formal Causality.  Thus, his repudiation of Teleological Causality does not entail that all Causality in his system is Efficient, which complicates the classification of him as Determinist, insofar as Determinism is equated to Behaviorism.

Wednesday, June 14, 2017

Formal Causality and Unified Field Theory

Unlike in Efficient Causality, in Formal Causality, there is no Conservation of Momentum.  In other words, if A is part of a manifold being organized by some Formal Cause, that unity is not automatically transferred to the internal manifold of A.  For example, if a Constitution organizes the members of a polity, it does not necessarily follow that the cerebellum of a member will coordinate its motions.  For, the scope of the latter Formation is heterogeneous with respect to that of the former, unlike in the case of Efficient Causality.  This distinction between the two Causalities is perhaps instructive to physicists who, following Einstein, in the pursuit of a Unified Field Theory, have been stymied by the apparent irreducibility of macrocosmic forces to cosmic and micro- ones.  Perhaps they believe that God does not play heterogeneity with the universe.

Tuesday, June 13, 2017

Formal Causality and Biology

As has been previously discussed, the extension of Modern Physics to Biological phenomena can be problematic.  In sharp contrast, the unity of the parts of an Organism can be attributed to Formal Causality. Likewise, the influence of a Species on its members, e. g. experienced instinctively, is another example of that variety of efficacy.  But, Formal Causality is a basic feature of the original concept of Physics, i. e. Aristotle's.  So, if there is difficulty in extending a Newtonian explanation to Biological phenomena, it is not a reflection of the limitations of 'Physics' per se, but merely of the Efficient Causality reductionism that constitutes one version of the enterprise.

Monday, June 12, 2017

Formal Causality and Efficient Causality

In his Physics, Aristotle recognizes four distinct Causes, with Teleological primary.  Now, unlike the supplanting of Aristotelian Geocentric Cosmology, the jettisoning of all but Efficient Causality in Modern Physics is not based on any newly discovered Empirical evidence.  Instead, when given, the justification is typically based on a Theological premise, probably most notably Spinoza's assertion that Teleological Causality is only a factor in human activity, not a principle in Nature.  However, such an argument does not address the possibility that Formal Causality is such a principle, in evidence wherever a manifold is organized, e. g. a solar system, the internal structure of an atom, etc., none of which can be reduced to Efficient Causality, the scope of which is only change of location.  For example, Efficient Causality explains the gravitational pull of a sun on one of its planets, while Formal Causality explains the coherence of an entire solar system.  So, evidentiary grounds for the exclusion of that variety of Causality from Modern Physics remain lacking.

Sunday, June 11, 2017

Formal Causality and Practice

Probably the most prominent recent example of Formal Causality is the Gestalt concept of Cognition, according to which the percipient structures the sensory manifold.  However, though Gestaltism is usually classified as 'Psychology', it has offered little application to behavior, leaving some passages from Nietzsche as among the few sources of examples of what might be constituted by a Practical Formal Causality, e. g. characterizations of a ruler as 'imposing Form' on a society.  Accordingly, also an artist can be conceived as imposing Form on material.  So, between these examples and an extrapolation of Cognitive Gestalism, Practical Formal Causality can be recognized as operative whenever an organism adapts something in its environment to its own processes, e. g. cutting up a piece of food so that it fits in their mouth.  Likewise, any organizing, e. g. of one's own activities, is accomplished by Practical Formal Causality.  So, even if Formal Causality is subordinated to Efficient or Teleological Causality, it cannot be reduced to them, i. e. neither of them can account for the shaping that is pervasive in human behavior.

Saturday, June 10, 2017

Physics and Formal Causality

Newtonian Physics can represent the Work involved in throwing a snowball, and in packing the snow into a ball-shape.  But, it cannot recognize the influence of an image of a ball on that packing.  For, that influence is traditionally classified as Formal Causality, a variety of Causality jettisoned by Modern Physics, which is constituted exclusively by Efficient Causality.  Likewise, no process of organization, whether the human founding of a political order, or a bird's construction of a nest, can be adequately represented by that system, a further reminder that its value is Practical--its quantification of motions that facilitates their appropriation for manufacturing instruments, the shaping of which is also beyond its scope.

Friday, June 9, 2017

Physics, Activation, Reactivity

Relatively unnoticed has been that Hume's analysis of Causality also applies to Force--that it is a conjunction of motions.  In other words, there is nothing extraordinary about Einstein's thesis that Gravity is not a Force.  But, as Kant shows, Hume fails to distinguish between anterior and posterior motion, i. e. between 'cause' and 'effect'.  Now, as is clear from his Laws, Newton's primary attention is on posterior motions, e. g. the First Law concerns the Velocity of Effects.  In contrast, Work is a Cause, i. e. a motion that is necessarily anterior to the motion with which it is conjoined.  Now, as has been previously discussed,  Nietzsche's Will to Power is comparable to Work, thereby revealing that it is distinguished from Will to Live not only by what it aims for, but also because it is a principle of Activation, rather than of Reactivity.  Similarly, Modern Physics, as primarily a system of Effects is inadequate to a system of Physics derived from Will to Power.

Thursday, June 8, 2017

Will to Power and Work of Potential Energy

In Physics, Power is defined as Work/Time, with Work defined as Force x Distance.  So, Nietzche's concept of Power is closer to that of Work than to that of Power.  Furthermore, the Force required to do the Work is, for Nietzsche, accumulated, ready to be discharged.  Now, in Physics, strength ready to be discharged is Potential Energy, i. e. a concept of stored Energy that entails its possible release.  So, Will to Power is correlates to the Physi ist concatenation Work of Potential Energy.  The value of this formulation is that is offers an analysis of Nietzsche's concept without the connotations of violence that tend to obscure its essential structure.

Wednesday, June 7, 2017

Physics and Behavior

A rudimentary Physicist model of behavior is basic Behaviorism--all behavior is a response to a stimulus, i. e. is a reflexive effect of a cause.  Now, Spinoza's concept of Behavior introduces an analogue to Momentum--a principle of Persistence.  He further posits that an entity seeks to increase its strength, an event that in Sentimentalist models is known as experiencing Pleasure. But, the Physicist model offers no explanation for such a Conatus, i. e. seeking an increase in strength cannot be ascribed to Momentum, which only retains given strength.  So, the Physicist reduction of behavior, e. g. Einstein's Determinism, cannot be adequately derived from Spinoza's model.  Likewise weak is the standard Behaviorist concept.

Tuesday, June 6, 2017

Physics and Growth

The reduction of Biological phenomena to Modern Physics seems to require following Spinoza by deriving the fundamental Vital principle from Newton's first law, i. e. in which Self-Persistence is an instance of constant Velocity.  However, Spinoza includes the possibility of Growth in that principle, a process analogous to not Velocity, but Acceleration, which is not entailed in the First Law.  Furthermore, if Growth is conceived as constituted by an Evolutionary leap, and, therefore, as Indeterministic, the inadequacy of the Physicist reduction of Biology is compounded.  Ultimately, as has been previously discussed, it is the abstraction of Physics from Praxis that leads it into these Theoretical difficulties.

Monday, June 5, 2017

Observer Effect and Praxis

The Ecological challenge to the Observer Effect can be interpreted as a more general indication of the limits of Modern Physics.  But, those limits may be indicative of a more fundamental transgression.  For, as the Pragmatists hold, a Law is a working Hypothesis.  Accordingly, the difficulties arising in the Observer can be diagnosed as symptoms of Modern Physics abstracting Theory from Praxis.

Sunday, June 4, 2017

Observer Effect and Ecology

In at least one case, generally accepted, the Observer Effect is literal--since visibility involves the loss of an electron, an object is altered simply by being observed.  But, more slowly coming into acceptance is the recognition that the cause of variability is the general condition that can be called the Experimenter Effect.  Guiding this analysis is the Ecological principle that everything is in interaction with its environment, a principle from which experimentation has long been presumed to be exempt, because of the efforts taken to isolate the context from its surroundings.  But, perfect isolation is similar to concepts such as a frictionless surface--a heuristic device, rather than an actuality, the imperfections of which become detectable by unprecedentedly precise instruments at the Quantum level.  So, the objections to the Observer Effect need to accommodate the Ecological defense of it.

Saturday, June 3, 2017

Observer Effect and Interpreter Effect

Einstein's objection to some of the varieties of the Observer Effect--that Observer and Observed are independent, in combination with his Relativism, amounts to standard Perspectivism, in opposition to Phenomenalism.  However, he does not consider the possibility that Physics is not Description, but Interpretation, in which case the Observer Effect is actually the Interpreter Effect.  Now, in a familiar example of Interpretation, Translation, the Translator converts a word in one language into that in another.  Hence, in the Translator-Translated relation, the Translated is effected by the process of Translation, and yet is also separate from the Translator.  Furthermore, where Physics is plainly interpretive is in the process of quantatification, which, as the various approximations that are employed indicate, is not descriptive.  So, by not considering the possibility that the Observer Effect is actually the more complicated Interpreter Effect, Einstein does not address all the ways that the Physicist might affect the objects of study in the process of studying them.

Friday, June 2, 2017

Narcissus and Observer Effect

The Narcissus of myth is transfixed by the beauty of an image, unaware that it is his own reflection.  In other words, the contemporary meaning of 'Narcissism'--'self-absorption'--pioneered by Freud, aped in the current American political scene, abstracts from the irony of the original tale.  In contrast, among those who have been mindful of that lesson have been Kant and the Gestalists, who have not merely posited, but have proven, that an object of perception can, at least in part, reflect the perceiver, i. e. because cognitive structures have contributed to the final product.  Thus, insofar as Modern Physics is conceived as Description, not Interpretation, it is Narcissistic, in the original sense of the term, i. e. Physicists are unaware that at least part of what they observe is a reflection of their own structuring of it, one consequence of which is an Observer Effect of which they are likewise unaware.

Thursday, June 1, 2017

Observer Effect, Determinism, Reflection

Among post-Einstein physicists, the Observer Effect, i. e. the thesis that observation influences its object, has been gaining wider acceptance.  Thus, since uncertainty is introduced into the behavior of the Observed, Determinism has become more difficult to defend.  But, a challenge to Determinism is unwittingly posed by Einstein himself even as he rejects the OE.  For, if Determinism is correct, then the entire history of Physics is Deterministic, e. g. not merely the apple dropping onto Newton's head, but his subsequent development of a theory of Gravitation necessarily follows.  Still, granting him that, he needs to further explain the act of reflection by which any judgment, pro or con, regarding the relation between Observer and Observed, an act in which Observer and Observed are one and the same, is possible.  In other words, if Determinism entails the independence of Observer from Observed, then Einstein himself refutes it simply by reflecting on the Observer function of the Physicist, regardless of whether or not he accepts the OE.