Freedom and Will

The denial of the existence of Free Will can mean either 1. Such a thing as 'Will' does not exist, or 2. Will does exist, but it is not 'free'.  The most prominent version of #1 is Epiphenomenalism, according to which what is taken to be 'Will' is actually the inefficacious consciousness of causal events occurring elsewhere in the organism.  Noted advocates of this position are Schopenhauer, the pre-Zarathustra Nietzsche, and Santayana, as well as, though his formulations are relatively crude, Einstein.  But not Spinoza, who asserts #2.  He recognizes the existence of Will, i. e. of a conscious causality, but one that always has a prior ground, i. e. always has a reason that activates it.  Thus, for example, one might eat because of a pleasing aroma, or because doing so promotes health, but not free of any reason.  Accordingly, as a result of a superficial, immediate, interpretation of one's experience, one might believe that one is acting 'freely', when, in fact, one has abstracted a response from a prior stimulus, of which one is not, in fact, 'free'.  Spinoza's target is thus very different from that of Einstein and the Epiphenomenalists, as is, therefore, the remedy that his doctrine offers, applicable to some of the commonest uses of 'freedom' in contemporary society.