Certainty, God, Mathematics

In #3 of the pre-Meditations Rules for the Directions of the Mind, Descartes offers a potentially clearer explanation for the priority of God over Mathematics than the problematic, as has been previously discussed, one of the later work.  In the earlier one, he conceives Mathematics to be an object of "intuition", a mode of Knowledge that is certain, plus, he allows that valid deduction is a certainty-preserving procedure.  Furthermore, he also recognizes the possibility of divine revelation, which is "more certain than our surest knowledge", i. e. knowledge of God is superior to that of Mathematics.  However, a problem with this scheme, that might have led to the eventual abandonment of it, is that it is unclear where in the hierarchy the Cogito is, and another is that in it, Certainty is conceived as admitting of varying degrees, and, hence, might be unsuitable to function as an absolute criterion in a formal Method.  Still, its flexibility accommodates the elevation of God over Mathematics, without the implausible doubt of the latter that he resorts to in the Meditations. 

Doubt, Mathematics, God

Descartes' contention that even the simplest Mathematical proposition is uncertain, because it could be the product of demonic deception, seems explainable in one of two ways.  First, that it is possible that all Mathematical propositions are fictions, or, second, that there exists some realm in which Mathematical relations are other than they have always appeared to be.  However, as Descartes acknowledges, that a mathematical proposition is merely imaginary does not falsify it, so, what it asserts is no less certain in that scenario.  Furthermore, the existence of a realm in which there subsist Mathematical relations that are other than have always been represented by a human being, is more implausible than whatever grounds for qualms that Descartes has about those representations, and, so, hardly suffices to even give pause about them.  So, his doubt of Mathematics seems itself a specious contrivance, perhaps designed to promote the questionable Theological thesis that God is more powerful than Mathematics, i. e. can ultimately override its propositions.

Doubt and Morality

One reason that Descartes does not submit Moral phenomena and judgments, e. g. the Ten Commandments, to Doubt might be that it would expose his method to the charge of 'demonic temptation', if not to outright 'apostasy' and 'heresy'.  But, even aside from the fate of Bruno looming over that application of his criterion, the project would seem to stall at the implication that the Cogito is 'Evil', a significant consequence of which would be that a 'Good' God would not likely be available to underwrite any further knowledge claims.  Progress from that juncture might, therefore, require, as Nietzsche shows two centuries later, a more radical Skepticism than what Descartes is willing to commit to.  Instead, the Moral dogma that he does not challenge becomes entrenched in the Epistemology-dominant tradition that he pioneers, i. e. even Kant and Mill ultimately accede to it, e. g. the Deontology of the former, and the 'high'-'low' distinction of the latter.

Deception and Temptation

The possibility, which Descartes arrives at towards the end of the first Meditation, of an "evil genius" deceiving an incorporeal entity that it has a body, makes little Theological sense.  In contrast, the prototype of Deception in the scriptures of his religious orientation is Temptation, i. e. the presentation of Evil as if it were Good.  On that basis, the concept of God as a non-deceiver is as a presenter of the Good, not, as Descartes portrays it, of theTrue.  But, the underlying problem, that he does not even begin to address, is the application of his method of Doubt to Moral judgments, en route to the establishment of at least one attribution of Goodness of which he can be certain.  In other words, in sharp contrast to The Republic and the Nichomachean Ethics, the Meditations not only enthrones Epistemology, but marginalizes Ethics, the legacy of which in subsequent Modern Philosophy is perhaps best exemplified by the currently pervasive reduction of Moral Reasoning to a branch of Modal Logic, under the rubric 'Deontic Logic'.

God and Epistemology

Descartes' introduction into the Meditations of the Moral predicates "good" and "evil" leads to that of a concept of a God the primary function of which is to intervene in Cognitive processes.  As, a result, Epistemology becomes Theologized, and, thereby, elevated to a predominance that is maintained even as Philosophy in subsequent centuries becomes more apparently secular, e. g. the justification of contemporary Analytic Philosophy as a corrective to conceptual confusion.  However, that introduction is ungrounded, and, so, violates his own method.  In contrast, for example, on the basis of, as has been argued here, the more rigorously established principle that he is a writing being, an appeal to God might be elsewhere directed, e. g. as an expression of his hope that a reader would not misunderstand him.  In more radical contrast, for example, he might have recognized the severe limitations of Certainty as a criterion, and abandoned it in favor of Probability, thereby obviating any need for involving God.  So, the implication of God in Epistemology is, at minimum, arbitrary and unnecessary, in both the Cartesian project and the tradition that it has spawned.

Mind and Soul

As has been previously argued, if the Meditations were truthful, its setting would be Descartes at a desk, writing the book.  Now, granting him that in the process of expressing himself, he could somehow, at the same time, carry out the detachment of his 'Mind' from the hand wielding a pen, and maintain that separation through various cogitations, e. g. proving the existence of God, re-embodiment, via the pineal gland, would re-attach that Mind immediately to not his senses, but to his motile Body, in which case the governing mental principle is 'I act, therefore I am.  Though while that formulation might have redirected subsequent Philosophy from the predominance of Epistemology, it is consistent with the tradition that precedes it.  For, Cartesian 'Mind' is a variation of the Platonist-Aristotelian-Medieval 'Soul', which, in each of those systems is an principle of Animation, and not merely one of Cogitation.  So, whatever Descartes' ambition for his 'I' is, at least part of it needs to include an explanation of how it initiates Motility.

Philosophical Reflection and We

As has been previously discussed, if Descartes were more rigorous, the Meditations would begin with him not--sitting in a chair gazing at a fire, but--at a desk writing, from which he might have arrived at the realization that "I am writing" is certain whenever it appears.  From there, he might have concluded that since he intends this act to be shared with others, in a common language, it is also certain that 'We exist'.  Such Reflection could provide the ground of a refutation to any scriptural, i. e. written dogma, i. e. that asserts the existence of a disembodied individual 'soul', for example.  Furthermore, it could serve as a reminder that the Socratic tradition begins as an act of civil disobedience, and continues as a body of literature.  In other words, any denial of a systematic relation between Philosophical Reflection and We, not merely has the preponderance of evidence against it, but, as an expressed assertion, is self-defeating.

One Thinks, Therefore One Is

Descartes' reflective effort to eliminate all uncertainty from his experience is also an attempt to eliminate all contingency from it, and, therefore, to detach it from what may be not the case.  Thus, in logical terms, it aims to isolate a universal substratum of Experience.  Furthermore, as many of his successors agree, his reflecting I and his reflected-upon I do not coincide.  So, while the procedure modifies the latter, the former remains unaffected, i. e. the depersonalization of the latter does not transform the former.  Thus, Descartes, perhaps unwittingly, demonstrates that Philosophical Reflection is constituted by an Individual-Universal relation, or, in other words, his reflected-upon fundamental principle is more accurately formulated as 'One thinks, therefore one is'.

Reflection, I, One

With the Socratic dicta 'Know thyself' and 'I know that I do not know', Philosophy, to combat superstition and dogma, matures from a speculative or an oracular, to a reflective activity.  However, despite the general assumption of that posture in the subsequent two millennia plus tradition, there has been less agreement regarding the structure of Reflection.  For example, on the one hand, Descartes posits it as a coincidence of an I and an I, while, on the other, Sartre discerns a profound abyss between reflecting Subject and reflected-upon Object.  Now, more radical analyses of that non-coincidence are I-Me, I-He/She, and I-One.  Of those three possibilities, the shortcoming of I-Me is that the Me is no longer a Subject, and, hence, offers to an examining I no evidence of the operation of an I, while that of I-He/She is that though it might relate two Subjects, the intimacy of Reflection can be severed.  In contrast, I-One entails non-coincidence, without complete rupture, while preserving Subjectivity.  On that analysis, the Object of Philosophical Reflection--One--is a putative universalization of I, i. e. Reflection is, as Husserl insists, not to be confused with mere Introspection, which is only a particular intra-personal awareness.

We, Reason, God

As has been previously discussed, derivable within Kant's system, as the third of the Practical Rational Ideas, is We, rather than his God.  Now, the function of the latter is to effect the rewarding of Virtue, i. e. the rewarding of the promotion of the Happiness of others.  Thus, that function is to compensate for an absence of social reciprocity.  But, a We is constituted by total mutuality.  Thus Kant's postulation is not necessary, as he asserts, but is contingent, and, more precisely, is contingent on a deficiency in social relations.  Thus, the contrast of We and the Kantian God makes explicit the implied alternative in Marx' concept of Religion as an opiate.

We, Reason, Practical Idea

One of the peculiarities of Kant's triad of Rational Ideas--Soul, World, God--is that in his system, the third is the synthesis of the first two.  Another is the inconsistent translation of the three into Practical correlates.  For, if, as he proposes, the Soul qua Practical is an Agent, not a subject of Cognition, then the analogous 'World' should be, similarly, a Society, e. g. his Kingdom of Ends.  Accordingly, the synthesis of the two Ideas should be We, which could also provide him with a basis for a solution to the otherwise unresolved problem of explaining the possibility of Noumenal Plurality.  So, within his system is the potential for the classification of We as a Practical Idea.

We, Rationalism, Empiricism

Since We combines Unity and Multiplicity, it eludes the tradtional reductions of both Rationalism and Empiricism--in the former, Multiplicity is irreal, while in the latter, it is Unity that is irreal.  Now, despite his innovative appreciation of Synthesis, Kant remains a Rationalist regarding We.  For, a constant in his system, e. g. as expressed by his Moral Law, is the priority of Noumenon over Phenomenon, and only the latter can be manifold.  However, he does briefly break both molds--Productive Imagination, the ground of e. g. the drawing of geometrical figures, generates schemes, which are both One and Many.  So, if his Kingdom of Ends were ascribed to Productive Imagination, its influence on conduct would be constructive, one scheme of which being We.  In other words, if the Constructivism that is often attributed to Kant's Cognitive theory were extended to his Moral doctrine, a We that is excluded by both traditional Rationalism and traditional Empiricism can be derived.

We, Communication, Philosophy of Language

Insofar as Communication entails commonality, e. g. vocabulary, it is a We activity.  Likewise, abusive language, lying, and irony are all examples of divisive language designed to undo a We.  So, Leibniz' vision of universal communication is that of the establishment of a universal We, and, hence, is essentially a Moral ideal.  Thus. despite the prevailing classification of it as a topic in Logic, Philosophy of Language is fundamentally a Moral problem.  Likewise, any effort of Logicists to depersonalize Language, e. g. the reduction of all Language to 'objective' Propositions, the exclusion of 'Propositional attitudes', is a manoeuvre that is subject to Moral judgment.

We, Handwriting, Printing

As even Derrida seems to miss, a distinction between handwriting and printing suggests a criticism of Platonism.  For, while, as Criminologists and Psychologists tend to agree, handwriting expresses the personality of its author, printing is anonymous, thereby encouraging the impression that the content of Gutenberg medium is a stenography of an omniscient vantage point, e. g. a representation of a 'World of Forms'.  At the same, the distinction also refutes the Platonist thesis that Writing is a copy of a copy of the Forms--because Writing is handwriting, and, hence, is personal, and, thus, cannot be sufficiently derived from some impersonal original.  Likewise, the presumed 'universality' of a Philosophical book is grounded in the 'We' of its author and intended audience.  Even Nietzsche seems to overlook this overturning of Platonism, in the contrast between his subtitle of Thus Spoke Zarathrustra--"A Book for Everyone and No One"--and the titles of the chapters in Beyond Good and Evil that include "We".

We, Respect, Trust

Unlike conceiving a person as an It, referring to them as 'He' or 'She' does not dehumanize them.  Furthermore, unlike 'Him' or 'Her', each expresses the recognition of someone as an autonomous subject.  But, each is exclusionary, i  e. a He or a She is implicitly not part of a We.  Thus, He or She can be respected, though not necessarily trusted.  Hence, contrary to Kant's principle, a society mediated by Respect is not an optimal one--it can lack Trust, a shortcoming perhaps stemming from a limitation in his concept of Reason.

Friendship, We, Morality

Friendship exemplifies a convergence of Kantianism and Utilitarianism--it is an unarguably enjoyable experience, constituted by the mutual respect of peers--though it seems to receive no special consideration in either Moral doctrine.  Furthermore, while Aristotle does devote extended attention to it, he undercuts his esteem for it when he proposes that Happiness is a function of Self-Sufficiency, thereby implying that Friendship is conditioned by a human deficiency.  In contrast, in Meliorism, it is recognized as an instance of We, and, hence, as an unconditionally enriching experience for its members, an appreciation that is apparently unmatched in the preeminent  doctrines in the Philosophical tradition, though one that conforms to ordinary judgments.

We, Groups, Politics

Not every group is a We--in some, the association is too loose, while in others, it suppresses its individual members.  Interestingly, both of those flaws are ascribed to contemporary American society, depending on political orientation.  Regardless, it seem difficult for either of those antagonists to deny that a We, which combines coherence and individual freedom, is not a superior model.  Similarly inferior to it is Kant's Moral paradigm, which, because it entails the partial suppression of Individuality, seems more an ideal of Deontology than of Reason.  Nor, like that model, is a We, in principle, unattainable, as any circle of friends proves, i. e. that a We might be unwieldy on a mass scale is inadequate as an a priori argument against it as an ideal in Political Philosophy.

I, We, Benefit

On the assumption that it is a static entity, an I remains unaffected by involvement in a We, and, hence, does not personally benefit from it.  In contrast, on the premise that an I progressively accumulates, every experience is an occasion of growth.  Hence, its involvement in a We is enriching, and, thus, is personally beneficial.  Now, both hostility towards interpersonal association, and the traditional promotion of it, e. g. Kant's doctrine, tend to presuppose a static concept of I.  In contrast, given the progressive concept, personal benefit and collective benefit are neither antithetical nor paradoxically conjoined.

We, Individual,Tragedy, Religion

A We achieves an equilibrium between Dionysian unity and Apollinian individuation.  Thus, as an antidote to painful individuation, joyful collective Play constitutes an alternative to beautiful self-illusion.  Similarly, insofar as Religion is an 'opiate', is that for an isolated individual, offering only an ersatz We.

We and Play

In some cases, a We aims at the generation of a concrete extrinsic product, e. g. a building crew, while in others, the purpose is an activity, e. g. an orchestra performing a symphony.  And, sometimes, a We is not a means, but what can be classified as either, with equal justification, 'purposeless', or an 'end-in-itself', e. g. a party, to which a product or an activity serves as to occasion.  Such examples illuminate We as essentially Play, i. e. the substratum of even a serious purposeful We is its playfulness.

Trust and Certainty

Modern Philosophy perhaps takes an alternative tack if Descartes posits Trust, not Certainty, as his criterion.  On that basis, he would begin by finding the Senses to be untrustworthy, eventually arriving at the realization that he cannot mistrust that he mistrusts, from which he can establish his trust in God, and, thereby, in Mathematics, etc. A primary difference between Trust and Certainty is that the former is unambiguously Practical, while the latter is problematically Cognitive, i. e. even if Descartes can show that the act 'I doubt' coincides with the object 'I doubt', it cannot be more than instantaneous, whereas Trust entails temporal continuity.  Likewise, the weakness of Sense Experience is not that it is necessarily false, but that even if on one occasion its objects are what they appear to be, it is only via Trust, i. e. Certainty does not suffice, that that moment can be extended.  So, one alternate course of Modern Philosophy is Pragmatist from the outset.

Trust, Democracy, Capitalism

Trust entails both that the involved parties are peers, and that they are voluntary participants.  Thus, as combining Freedom and Equality, Trust is Democratic, and, conversely, Democracy expresses Trust.  Now, Trust can obtain in the bartering of two Feudal artisans.  However, it can be lacking in a job interview in a Capitalist system.  For, unless one of the preconditions of that interaction is a job market Supply-Demand equilibrium, the parties involved are not peers.  Thus, there is no necessary correlation between Democracy and Capitalism.

Egoism and Trust

Often conflated are Psychological Egoism and Moral Egoism--the former is the thesis that all behavior is, by nature, motivated by self-interest, while the latter is the doctrine that one ought to act in one's self-interest, which implicitly rejects Psychological Egoism.  Now, often unacknowledged by its advocates, each has its limitations--Psychological Egoism is vulnerable to being overridden by a Moral principle, e. g. Kant's, while Moral Egoism is relevant only to circumstances in which one is being repressed by an external force, i. e. it is not applicable where Psychological Egoism is in effect, nor where one is in voluntary relations with others.  Still, the two share one premise--that social interaction can be grounded on Self-Interest.  However, as has been previously suggested, the flaw in that supposition is that the positing of Egoism in others is the attribution to them of loyalty to only themselves, and, hence, of the ever-present possibility that they will betray one, in which case, one would be as foolish to engage with them as if they had already cheated one.  In other words, in both varieties, mistrust is inherent, and, so, neither can ground social interaction, e. g. notably, the process of forming a Hobbesian contract.

Trust, Democracy, Selfishness

Promise-breaking is often the occasion of Selfishness subverting Trust, suggesting a weakness in an influential premise of Hobbes'.  For, if, as he posits, humans are 'by nature' in a self-preservative state of universal mistrust, in the absence of another principle, they will not suspend suspicion to even contractually codify that condition.  In other words, even weariness of perpetual hostilities does not suffice for the grounding of a We on Selfishness.  Likewise, as current American political events tend to confirm, Selfishness corrodes the Democracy into which its advocates insist on being accepted as participants.  Kant might liken their self-defeating maxim to that of False Promising.

Trust, Respect, Sympathy, Tolerance

Regardless of the promotion of them in some societies, Sympathy and Tolerance each entails condescension, and Tolerance often retains the hostility to which it is projected as a counter.  Instead, according to Kant, the Rational expression of interpersonal equality is Respect.  However, Respect remains a static I-I relation, if not an I-Your, e. g. when one treats another as an End.  In contrast, a dynamic We is mediated by mutual Trust.  Indeed, while Kant struggles to demonstrate how False Promising is conduct unbecoming a Rational being, the recognition of it as breaking Trust is not nearly as convoluted a process.

I, We, Elasticity

Between rigidity and fragmentation there is elasticity, and We is a condition of elasticity amongst its constituent Is.  Thus, We is inconceivable on the basis of either the concept of an Atomistic I, e. g. Russell's, or of an illusory I, e. g. Schopenhauer's.  Instead, the Is that constitute a We are mutually variably diverse and variably uniform, so that it is neither contradictory nor paradoxical to posit that one's maturation into an I is, at the same time, an entry into a We.  Now, Kant attempts to formulate that the thesis by equating Autonomy and submission to Universal Law, but his system lacks the resources, e. g. the possibility of a plurality of noumena, for distinguishing one such I from another, i. e. for conceiving a We.  Conversely, the 'rugged' individual of American mythology is merely an adolescent Me in arrested development. So, to render 'elasticity', as 'interdependence', e. g. here, previously, is inadequate, since the latter is constrained by the rigid antitheses that constitute it, i. e. by 'dependence' and 'independence'.

We The People

We the people begins as action by the people, i. e. as a process of collective construction, the consequent product of which is contingent.  For example, Hobbesian Democracy is based on a contract, the content of which is, nevertheless, essentially monarchic.  Now, one fundamental challenge to such a Democratic impulse is the historical ephemerality of the We, which does not preclude a relapse into dynastics, the corrective to which is the incorporation of a dynamic mechanism into the original contract, i. e. by which a perpetual renewal of We is possible. So, one of the central political tensions in contemporary America is that between the fetishization of the Constitution, and its amendability.

Hedonism, My-Our, I-We

In its prescriptive dimension, Mill's Greatest Happiness for the Greatest Number doctrine is a critique of Selfish Hedonism, i. e. it proposes, as a ground of action, the coordination of My pleasure with Our pleasures.  Hence, it remains a variety of Hedonism, which is essentially a doctrine of passivity, even when he awkwardly attempts to distinguish 'high' pleasures from 'low' ones.  In contrast, the more incisive internal critique of received Hedonism begins by drawing a different distinction among 'pleasures'--between Satiation and Excitation, one of which ends activity, the other stimulates it.  On that basis, because Excitation is observably a stimulus to action, it, unlike Satiation, cannot be contained, which is empirical evidence that it is the quantitatively 'greater' pleasure of the two.  Furthermore, as is also easily confirmable, great excitation, e. g. artistic inspiration, is an impulse to share with others.  So, with a correction of a traditional Psychological conflation, Mill's Hedonism becomes an I-We doctrine.

Doing, Using, Utilitariansim

Using is a species of Doing, in which the object of Use serves the Doer as a means to an end.  So, Using entails Intention.  Now, according to Utilitarianism, the value of a consequential process is indifferent to the personal factors of its production, and, hence, to whether or not it is intentional, e. g. the value of even Liberty is contingent, according to Mill in On Liberty.  Thus, since 'use' and 'utility' are synonymous, Utilitarianism does not merely abstract from I, We, and Doing, in general--it is a misnomer.

I-We and Doing-Having

The thesis that My-Our is derived from I-We expresses the subordination of Having to Doing.  It, likewise, expresses that of Economics to Politics, an ordering that is pervasively inverted, e. g. where Capitalism is taken as 'Democracy', where Socialism degenerates to centralized Communism, and where Theocracy functions to reinforce the distribution of wealth.  The inversion is also at the heart of Mill's ambivalence regarding whether Utilitarianism is a descriptive theory or a prescriptive doctrine.  For, his tinkering with Bentham's version does not transcend Smith's influence on the latter, in which the value of action is determined solely by its outcome.