I, We, Private Property

The concept of Property as 'private', i. e. as an immediate I-My relation, abstracts from any process of acquisition.  But, once that process is taken into consideration, so, too, is the antecedent wider context, populated by others, and constituted by non-exclusive property.  From that broader perspective, I-My can be recognized as deriving from an I:We = My:Our proportionality, via a transposition of the middle terms. as a special case i. e. in which I = We, and My = Our.  Now, while, as has been previously discussed, Aristotle does not explicitly address I-We, he does classify both the I-My and the My-Our relations as topics in Ethics, as Retributive Justice and Distributive Justice, respectively.  In sharp contrast, aside from the Logical concept of Property, and the classification of I, We, etc. as 'indexicals', a problem that is among the most contentious issues of human experience has received little attention in contemporary Philosophy.

I-We and My-Our

Mill's Utilitarian calculus is indifferent to both the production and the distribution of General Happiness.  In contrast, both factors are implicit in Bentham's version, in which the General Happiness is the sum of Individual Happinesses, each of which is a product of self-interested endeavor.  However, this version is vulnerable to a Marxist criticism that cites cases of non-correspondence between benefactor and beneficiary, e. g. when the producer of surplus-value is not identical to someone who profits from it.  So, neither version of Utilitarianism adequately represents the Production-Distribution relation that at least in part determines the data of its calculus.  Instead, that relation can be derived from that between the I-We relation and the My-Our one, the possibility of an alternative to which is not obvious.  In any case, as is, a weakness of Utilitarianism is a consequence of an inattention to the I-We relation that is typical in Modern Philosophy.

Dependence, Self-Reliance, Mutual Trust

In some contexts, to 'depend on' means to 'be subordinate to', while in others, it means to 'trust'.  Now, typically implicit in the latter cases is mutuality, i. e. while a Me-They relation, e. g. child-parent, is one of subordination, I-We is constituted by reciprocal trustworthiness.  Furthermore, what usually distinguishes the two concatenations is the emergence of self-reliance, which grounds the reliance of one's allies on one.  Thus, Self-Reliance that stops short of a development of I-We relations remains a stunted phase of independence, e. g. when one trusts oneself to provide sustenance, but lacks any social skills.  So, to the extent that Modern Philosophy either does not or cannot derive from Cartesian Self-Reliance any Social Theory, it remains in a condition of arrested development, as does the radical Individual of American mythology.

I, Me, They, We

The development of an I into a We does not presuppose that the former is given as such.  Rather, an I emerges from a Me, which is the object of a They.  Thus, the I-We relation reconstitutes a preceding They-Me one.  Accordingly, Descartes can be interpreted as deriving an I from a Me, having already abstracted the latter from a They background, i. e. from some group from which he withdraws en route to his chair in front of the fire, thereby leaving unattended any subsequent I-We analysis.  In contrast, Heidegger does recognize the They background of the emergence of an ontological I, and does proceed to conjoin the latter with a We, i. e. his 'being-with-others'.  However, by abstracting the transitions from a Me, which is systematically related to both the They and the I, his newly-found 'others' remains detached from that They, a distinction that he later codifies as 'Ontological Difference', and that, arguably, serves he and his political allies as a rationale for the Ontic hostilities of the era.

I, Thou, We

According to Levinas, 'Ethics' begins with the intrusion of the Face of an Other into Phenomenological Interiority.  As has been proposed here, a divergence from that scenario is that 'Ethics' begins with the response to that intrusion--either a welcoming, or a reduction to another mere phenomenon.  Now, such a welcoming is constituted by the I and the Thou combining as a We.  So, according to this variation of Levinas' scenario, the cardinal moment of Ethics is the formation of We on the occasion of one's encounter with radical Alterity.

Reason, I , We

In Kant's Moral doctrine, a collective of Rational beings is conceived in two ways--as subjects under universal laws, and as ends not to be treated as mere things.  Thus, each Rational being is both an abstract I, and either a Me, a Him, or a Her.  Furthermore, according to the Fourth Thesis of his Idea for a Universal History, the value to an individual of association with others is that the context is one of "antagonism", a "means employed by Nature to bring about the development of all capacities", as one withdraws into isolation.  However, he ignores ample evidence, e. g. in collective sports or artistic events, in which collective activity is the occasion of the positive enhancement of one's abilities.  Such examples illustrate how, as governed by Progressive Reason, the involvement of an I in a We can constitute an amelioration of its given conditions.  So, the absence of a Rational We in Kant's system could explain that of a concrete Political Philosophy in it.

I and We

According to Aristotle, the most noble type of interpersonal relationship is Friendship, though he does not derive that assertion systematically, e. g. via his criterion of a Mean.  Furthermore, he conceives a friend to be like "another self".  However, he does not go so far as to combine the two selves as a We.  In contrast, Meliorism justifies both Friendship and that combination as ameliorating the conditions of each I.  It, thus, also grounds the formation of political association, i. e. a species of We, without recourse to conceiving the development, as Aristotle does, as "by nature", i. e. as governed by a Teleological principle.

We and Us

The We-Us grammatical distinction of Subject-Object corresponds to the experiential contrast of active-passive.  Thus, for example, the 'general' happiness of Utilitarianism is that of an Us--the locus of its calculus is exclusively the members of a collective qua affected by an action, and not at all the agency that produces it.  Sartre goes further to show how an inert Us can be formed via the positing of an antagonistic They, upon which its identity and solidarity is thus dependent.  His most notable application of that analysis is to anti-Semitism, but the breeding of Nationalism via the positing of an enemy is familiar as a pervasive political strategy.  In contrast, typically uniting a We is an internally generated common goal.

Meliorism and 'We'

'We' is the concept of one as a member of a plurality of interdependent agents, i. e. of an organization in which one's I is not delimited.  Thus, We is neither a monolithic They, Aristotle's I-I relation, Kant's universal I, Mill's general Us, nor Levinas' I-Thou relation, and, without a further Teleological modification, is not Sartre's Existential/Dialectical 'We'.  In contrast, in Meliorism, since the formation of a We plainly seems to better any effort to improve given conditions, entering into such an association seems to be a primary mode of self-cultivation.  Thus, for example, while Individualism and Totalitarianism each might constitute a melioration of previous conditions, e. g. mob rule and social chaos, respectively, by losing sight of the We, each is an inferior project, according to Meliorism.

Meliorism

'Meliorism' has been casually conceived as the view that humans can, via their own efforts, improve their living conditions.  However, a stronger 'Psychological Meliorism' is entailed in the Aristotelian thesis that every action aims at some good--that every action aims at bettering some given condition.  Furthermore, via an application of that conatus to itself, 'Ethical Meliorism' can be articulated as the Principle 'Try to better given conditions as much as possible', i. e. 'as much as possible' ameliorates 'better'.  As such, Meliorism proposes not only the improvement of given conditions, but self-cultivation, as well. i. e. what one has hitherto been is part of those given conditions.  As the product of an application of the conatus to itself, that proposal is, thus, self-exemplifying.

Reason and Exertion

As anyone can confirm from their own experience, the immediate correction to Complacency is Exertion, a self-evident, though unprovably voluntary cause of a modification of ongoing behavior.  Furthermore, Exertion can lift one out of suicidal depression, can initiate a more industrious means to raising some money than defrauding someone with a false promise, or can spur one to help another in need.  In other words, Exertion evinces all the characteristics that Kant attributes to Pure Practical Reason, except one--that it is determined by his Principle of Pure Practical Reason.  So, either Exertion is a non-Rational volition, or else it is an expression of a Reason the Principle of which is other than Kant's.  An example of the latter has been introduced here--Progressive Reason--the Principle of which can be formulated as 'Try to ameliorate given conditions as much as possible', but which would likely hold little interest for Kant insofar as one of his ambitions is to conform Rational Ethics to conventional Deontological Morality.

Reason and Complacency

Kant's Principle of Pure Practical Reason immediately targets an already formulated Maxim, as a means to constraining certain behavior.  In contrast, Progressive Reason generates a Resolution, on the basis of which one might conscientiously exert oneself beyond extant behavior.  One advantage of the latter is in the case of one of Kant's own examples--Complacency, i. e. letting "one's talents rust".  For, Kant's procedure is applicable only where a Maxim has already been formed, a dubious possibility in the context of laziness, requiring inaction to be conceived as 'contradictory' in some respect.  In contrast, Progressive Reason directly promotes the voluntary substantive conduct that he himself agrees is the preferred alternative.

Instinct, Conscientiousness, Virtue

Among the given conditions of any situation are not only established facts, but processes, as well, some of which are the instincts of an organism.  Now, Aristotle conceives at least some human instincts as, as Dewey later puts it, 'plastic', which means that in itself, the behavior that an instinct motivates is willy-nilly.  But, he also conceives Reason as introducing an alternative to such behavior--conducting oneself in a balanced manner that his Golden Mean principle formulates.  Accordingly, he proposes an achievable alternative to Living--Living Well.  In other words, in his doctrine, conscientious conduct is virtuous conduct.  In contrast, on the premise that an Instinct is both 'evil' and 'natural', a premise common to many ideologies, the action of Reason on it can be only that of a 'supernatural' constraint, experienced as an intervention by 'Conscience'.  While the most prominent of those ideologies are familiar Theologies, e. g. Christianity and Buddhism, their demonization of Instinct survives in secular dualisms, e. g. in contemporary Deontic Logic, as signified by 'ought'.

Utilitarianism and Conscientiousness

While Kantianism and Mill's Utilitarianism are typically classified as rival Moral doctrines, two significant, interrelated, distinctions between them are that the Principle of the former is both unabashedly normative and integral to implementation, while the latter is insistently merely descriptive, having no influence on its object.  However, Mill's Principle is a response to Bentham's version, contesting, in particular, the thesis of the latter that the only consequences of one's actions that are relevant to the calculation of the Greatest Happiness are those to oneself.  In other words, his revised formulation, whether he acknowledges it or not, proposes a modification of selfish behavior just as much as does Kant's Principle, and, so, is no less prescriptive.  Thus, both that proposal and that modification are expressions of Conscientiousness--the proposal more conscientiously formulates Utilitarianism than does Bentham's version, while adherence to the modification more conscientiously promotes the Greatest Happiness than does selfish behavior.  So, though Mill might prefer to have his doctrine disassociated from Prescriptivism, he cannot as easily abstract it from his normative criticism of his Utilitarian predecessor.

Conscience and Conscientiousness

Kant's Principle of Pure Practical Reason does not merely forbid some action, nor merely adjudicate between refraining and not refraining from some action, it itself creates the possibility of refraining from some action.  Likewise, the Practical Principle of Sufficient Reason does not merely require the selection of the better of two alternative--it creates one.  Furthermore, the immediate object of Kant's Principle is the operation of Reason itself, i. e. his Principle is a Law that governs the formation of Maxims.  Likewise, insofar as the PPSF creates a better alternative to given conditions, it can apply to its own operation, which is part of those conditions.  In other words, as requiring of itself that it do better, the PPSF is an expression of Conscientiousness, in contrast with one of Conscience, which is typically conceived as effecting a constraint on some behavior.  Thus, while Kant's Principle can superficially be conceived as an articulation of Conscience, it, more precisely, is an expression of Conscientiousness, the distinction between which corresponds to the tension in his doctrine between conventional Deontological Morality, and Rational Ethics.

Progressive Reason and Utilitarianism

Progressive Reason is better exemplified by Utilitarianism than by Kant's Moral Law, despite the standard classifications of the two.  The latter does offer a decision procedure, but only in some cases, i. e. when one alternative is prohibited, remaining indifferent to the rest, which contemporary Deontic Logic homogenizes as 'Permissible'.  In contrast, the Utilitarian calculus is more nuanced, and, hence, more versatile, potentially applicable to any situation.  Still, as a formula for the adjudication between two or more possible courses of action, it leaves unrecognized the further alternative that ever-presently underlies them all--not acting at all, thereby maintaining given conditions. Implicit in its procedure, therefore, is that each of explicit choices under consideration is better than non-action, i. e. that it is an ameliorative process, and, thus, is an expression of Progressive Reason.

Progressive Reason and Progressive Logicism

As requiring that the doing of A be better than not doing A, the Practical Principle of Sufficient Reason promotes an amelioration of given conditions.  Thus, regardless of the criterion for determining 'better', e. g. Consistency, Greater Pleasure, Greater Happiness, etc., it can also be called the 'Principle of Progressive Reason'.  Likewise, the corresponding theory according to which Language is derived from Reason can be called 'Progressive Logicism'.

Philosophy and Language of the Future

Nietzsche's subtitle "Philosophy of the Future" primarily means 'Philosophizing at some later date', but, also, 'Values-Creation'.  For, as he proposes, historically subsequent Philosophy will be expressed in a Language 'of the Future', i. e. in Language that temporally precedes its object, of which there are three main varieties: projective, volitional, and prescriptive.  An example of the first is 'X will occur', and one of the second, 'I will do X', from each of which the third is distinguished, because it is a factor in the production of the Future, i. e. volitional 'I will do X' might allude to the production of the Future, while remaining, in itself, inessential to that process.  Clearly, Values-Creation, which aims to concretely determine behavior, is a species of the prescriptive variety of Language of the Future, a use of Language by Philosophers that departs from the long and established tradition in which it typically functions as a description the object of which is presumably 'eternal'.

Philosophy, Universals, Empowerment

Insofar as Language is Descriptive, it functions primarily to convey Knowledge.  Likewise, insofar as the Language of Philosophy is Descriptive and Universalistic, its primary function is to serve as a source of Enlightenment.  Correspondingly, its Language as Legislative expresses a transformation of the function of Philosophy to that of Empowerment, though even the staunchest advocates of that metamorphosis have not quite formulated it as such.  For example, in his promotion of the concept of the Philosopher as a creator of Values, Nietzsche seems unable to decide whether Will to Power is a principle of Empowerment, or of Overpowering, as has been previously discussed here.  Marx' Language certainly aims at Empowerment, though, in the absence of a post-revolution concept of Philosophy, the extent of its generalization is unclear.  While, as has been discussed, Kant's Rational Principle can be interpreted as a Practical Principle of Sufficient Reason, his continued privileging of Consistency indicates a hesitation to whole-heartedly recognize it as source of Empowerment.  Also, though Pragmatists re-formulate Universal Propositions as operational Hypotheses, if they re-conceive the function of Philosophy analogously, they do not make it explicit.  But, perhaps, the best example of this ambivalence is Mill's Utilitarianism--while his Greatest Happiness formula can function as a Practical Principle of Sufficient Reason, i. e. it provides in every instance a procedure for deciding between acting and not acting, he insists that it is a 'Descriptive' Principle.

Practical Logicism and Universals

While, according to mainstream Philosophy of Language, the 'Extension' of a word is all the entities that exemplify it, its 'Intension' is a noumenon shared by all its usages.  Now, while a Rationalist can recognize both kinds of Meaning, a rigorous Empiricist should argue that there are no Intensions per se.  Furthermore, corresponding to the distinction is the interpretation of Universal terms as either Nominalist or Platonist, i. e. as Meaning only all its instances vs. Meaning some Idea.  So, though the Language of Philosophy tends to be Universalistic, it can be ambiguous, depending on the orientation of the specific Philosopher, e. g. when the Empiricist Locke speaks of 'quality', he can only mean every sound, color, etc., while Kant means by it a Category.  In contrast, according to Practical Logicism, the sentences of which are fundamentally Proposals, the distinction is irrelevant.  For, Meanings therein are stipulative and operational, and, therefore, are neither Extensional nor Intensional, the latter not to be confused with 'Intentional'.  Likewise, the Practical Logicist function of a Universal formulation is to establish a general criterion of Conduct, i. e. is Prescriptive and Legislative.  Accordingly, since it, in itself, lacks Extension, it is not Nominalist, and, since it is verbal, is not Platonist.  Rather than representing its particulars, or being in them, it first creates them.

Philosophy of Language, Language of Philosophy, Universals

Philosophy of Language is itself a species of Language, the relation of which to its object is a topic regarding which Wittgenstein is more conscientious than many of his peers.  While in the Tractatus, he conceives that relation to be that of meta-Language to Language, in the Investigations, he denies that hierarchical contrast.  However, he fails to more precisely formulate that contrast, thereby remaining inattentive to an inconsistency in his own Language.  For, plainly, the Language of the Philosophy of Language stands to its object in a Universal-Particular relation, with the primary further question whether the Universal is concrete, or is abstract, i. e. is a generalization.  So, the Investigations can be interpreted as Wittgenstein's denial that the Philosophy of Language is Universalistic, on the grounds that there is no Universal shared by all Languages.  However, he also fails to distinguish between Descriptive and Prescriptive Language, so that while that denial might apply to the former species of Philosophical discourse, he does not hesitate to present Universal Prescriptions, e. g. that Philosophy should not interfere with Ordinary Language.

Biologicism and Dialogicism

While Communication is conceived in Practical Logicism as a social act, its principle is itself Psychological, i. e. pertains to the private motivation of a speaker.  In contrast, two other concepts of Communication have trans-personal grounds.  One, previously discussed, can be called 'Biologicism', according to which Communication serves a vital species function, i. e. the coordination of its members, whether when engaged in purposeless conversation, or when involved in collective purposeful projects.  The other, which can be called 'Dialogicism', conceives Communication as a special case of a Dialectical process that governs not only all human activity, but all Cosmological developments, as well.  Thus, Dialogicism conceives Communication as Teleological, and, so, is perhaps better exemplified by Plato's dialogues, or by historically salient debates, than by idle banter.  Aside from any shortcomings, the explanatory advantage of Biologicism or Dialogicism over more established theories of Language is the provision of a more comprehensive context in which Communication appears, thereby more effectively grounding it.

Practical Reason, Sufficiency, Consistency

Ostensibly, Kant's Principle of Pure Practical Reason is a Principle of Non-Contradiction--an interpretation encouraged by his characterization, in the 294-5 of the Critique of Judgment, of Consistency as the highest Rational value--that, via a Categorical Syllogism, forbids action that entails an inconsistency.  However, on closer examination, his formula can be recognized as a Practical Principle of Sufficient Reason, designed, first, to introduce the possibility of resisting an inclination, and, then, to adjudicate between resistance and non-resistance, by demonstrating that the latter leads to an inconsistency.  In other words, the PPPR is essentially a Disjunctive Syllogism, in which a Contradiction is a factor in the determination of the Minor Premise, not one in that of the Conclusion.  Thus, Consistency is subordinated to Sufficiency in the PPPR.  Any confusion over his priorities in his presentation of it likely originates in his attempt to reconcile autonomous Reason with a conventional Morality that demands unconditional obedience.

Practice, Sufficient Reason, Disjunctive Syllogism

The previously introduced Practical Principle of Sufficient Reason, which requires of any action that doing it be better than not doing it, can be elaborated as follows, with 'refraining from some action' a special case of 'doing A': 1. You can either do A or not do A; 2. It is better to do A than to not do A; 3. Therefore, do A.  In other words the structure of the Principle can be classified as a Practical Disjunctive Syllogism, the significance of which is several-fold.  First, the Disjunction in the Major Premise acknowledges the irreducible choice of an addressee between compliance and non-compliance.  Second, it reflects that an action does not occur in a vacuum, i. e. that the non-performance of it leaves not a Nothing, but some concrete alternative, e. g. the status quo.  Thus, the Disjunction makes explicit what is suppressed in both the more familiar Theoretical Principle of Sufficient Reason, and in the Categorical Syllogism central to Kant's Moral Law and to the Practical Syllogism of contemporary Deontic Logic.  For, it illuminates that the standard Principle of Sufficient Reason abstracts 'Nothing occurs without sufficient reason' from 'There is always a sufficient reason why something occurs rather than does not occur'.  Likewise, it corresponds the inconvenient surd in Kant's doctrine--that a Rational human agent can always disobey the Categorical Imperative--to the alternative that Kant's formulation ignores, i. e. the clause in 'Act, rather than not act, only . . .'  Plus, unburdened by the Disjunct, current Deontic Logic is easily reducible to a species of Modal Logic, i. e. to a Theoretical exercise, the highest standard of which is Necessity, and, hence, is inadequate to Practical argumentation, which is governed by Sufficiency, a condition that is stronger than Necessity.  So. the Disjunctive structure of the Practical Principle of Sufficient Reason reflects the concrete conditions of Communication and Action better than do its established Theoretical Categorical counterparts.

Communication, Practical Logicism, Sufficient Reason

According to Practical Logicism, all Communication is derived from a Rational principle.  Now, one such principle, which can be called the 'Practical Principle of Sufficient Reason', requires of any action A, that it be better to do than to not do it..  But, as has been previously discussed, every Utterance seeks an Enactment from its addressee, and, hence, incorporates some justification for doing so. Thus, every Utterance is an expression of the Practical Principle of Sufficient Reason.  So, Practical Logicism prevails where Theoretical Logicism does not--it applies to Ordinary Language--while, at the same time grounds the proofs of Formal Logic, i. e. the proof a proposition P implicitly attempts to persuade that believing P is better than not believing it.

Communication, Practical Reason, Practical Contradiction

Kant's model of Rational Conduct is constituted as a species of intra-personal Communication, with an Imperative as an 'Utterance'; the issuer of the Imperative, the 'speaker'; and the formulator of a maxim upon which to act, the 'addressee'.  Accordingly, insofar as his Principle of Pure Practical Reason is, essentially, as he explains in #294-5 of Critique of Judgment, a Principle of Non-Contradiction, i. e. in its Practical formulation, 'Do not propose both to do X and to not do X', the phrase in his version,"at the same time as", indicates the conjunction, with its terms that must cohere being 1. the action proposed by one's maxim, and 2. the action proposed by the maxim when universalized.  Now, #2, which according to the passage in CJ, is, strictly speaking, an act of Judgment, not Reason, seems to involve another application of the Principle of Non-Contradiction, i. e. to determine whether or not a maxim is universalizable, but, contrary to some interpretations, that application is subsidiary to the one pertaining to the relation between #1 and #2.  In any case, just as in Communication, in general, an addressee is always free to not comply with an Utterance, even a Categorical Imperative does not suffice to compel obedience, as Kant discovers perhaps belatedly, perhaps to his chagrin.

Practical Principle of Contradiction

Because an Utterance that sends 'mixed signals', i. e. entails 'Do X and do not do X', is impossible to enact, it is self-defeating qua Communication.  Accordingly, internal coherence is a necessary condition of successful Communication, or, in other words, Communication is governed by a Practical Principle of Contradiction, which, as has been previously discussed, is arguably independent of its more familiar Theoretical counterpart.  Now, the scope of the Principle can be extended beyond a single Utterance, by a single speaker, to all Utterances, by that or all speakers.  So, inconsistencies over time erode not only all the attempts to Communicate by that speaker, but Communication in general.

Practice and Contradiction

A young child need not have taken a course in Formal Logic to be stymied if told to both do and tnot do one and the same thing, at one and the same time.  Thus, it is unclear which of the following is more fundamental: 1. Not-(A and not-A), or 2. One cannot simultaneously both do and not do A.  In other words, it is not certain that there is not a Practical Principle of Contradiction that is independent of, if not prior to, what, for millennia, has been accepted as a, if not the, cardinal law of Pure Theoretical Reason.  Indeed, perhaps #1 is derived from #2 just as a Proposition is abstracted from a Proposal, and an Event from a Doing.  Now, if Kant is aware of such an autonomous Practical Principle, his examples in the Groundwork do not effectively illustrate it.

Communication and Truth

Since in Communication, an Utterance is primarily a Proposal, not a Proposition, the evaluation of it as either True or False is misplaced.  Now, a Proposal may be a threat or a promise, buttressed by concatenated causal assertions.  But, there is little evidence to indicate that either the truthfulness or their falsity of those assertions has an intrinsic relation to successful Communication.  For, on the one hand, lies can lead to adverse consequences for the addressee, thereby conducing to eventual unresponsiveness, while, on the other, as the persistent effectiveness of myth demonstrates, so long as a false statement is generally believed, it can be effective in an attempt to persuade.  So, neither Russell's claim that Truth is the highest value of Language, nor Nietzsche's challenge to it, are immediately relevant to Communication.

Logicism and Poetry

In the Investigations, examples from 'ordinary language' help Wittgenstein demonstrate the limitations of the Logistic concept that he advocates in the Tractatus.  But, what might be called 'extraordinary language' can be more effective to that end.  For, one of the main theses of the Tractatus--that Language isomorphically represents its object--is often better exemplified by Poetry than by Logic-adhering Propositions, i. e. via rhythmic and phonetic characteristics that have no place in Logicism.  Indeed, that, for example, 'cacophony' is cacophonous, expresses the achievement of an ideal that seems to exceed Wittgenstein's ambitions, as well as elude Russell's snares--a Word-Object unification that is unhindered by paradoxical self-reference.

Logic and Persuasion

Insofar as the Philosophy of Language studies, as has been proposed here, successful Communication, Rhetoric is the branch of it concerned with the means to that success, i. e. with the art of Persuasion, considered by Aristotle, at least, a branch of Philosophy.  Now, a species of Persuasion is the Logical Argument, on the basis of which one Russell-Wittgenstein debate can be formulated as whether or not Logical criteria should be the standards of Rhetoric.  But, given the actuality of, in comparison with threats and promises, how unpersuasive the Logical Argument has historically and pervasively been, that dispute seems academic, in both senses of the term.  In other words, the Investigations is less an exposure of the hubris of Logicism, as Wittgenstein seems to intend, then a mockery of its vicariousness.