Philosophy of Language, Language of Philosophy, Universals

Philosophy of Language is itself a species of Language, the relation of which to its object is a topic regarding which Wittgenstein is more conscientious than many of his peers.  While in the Tractatus, he conceives that relation to be that of meta-Language to Language, in the Investigations, he denies that hierarchical contrast.  However, he fails to more precisely formulate that contrast, thereby remaining inattentive to an inconsistency in his own Language.  For, plainly, the Language of the Philosophy of Language stands to its object in a Universal-Particular relation, with the primary further question whether the Universal is concrete, or is abstract, i. e. is a generalization.  So, the Investigations can be interpreted as Wittgenstein's denial that the Philosophy of Language is Universalistic, on the grounds that there is no Universal shared by all Languages.  However, he also fails to distinguish between Descriptive and Prescriptive Language, so that while that denial might apply to the former species of Philosophical discourse, he does not hesitate to present Universal Prescriptions, e. g. that Philosophy should not interfere with Ordinary Language.