Communication, Practical Reason, Practical Contradiction

Kant's model of Rational Conduct is constituted as a species of intra-personal Communication, with an Imperative as an 'Utterance'; the issuer of the Imperative, the 'speaker'; and the formulator of a maxim upon which to act, the 'addressee'.  Accordingly, insofar as his Principle of Pure Practical Reason is, essentially, as he explains in #294-5 of Critique of Judgment, a Principle of Non-Contradiction, i. e. in its Practical formulation, 'Do not propose both to do X and to not do X', the phrase in his version,"at the same time as", indicates the conjunction, with its terms that must cohere being 1. the action proposed by one's maxim, and 2. the action proposed by the maxim when universalized.  Now, #2, which according to the passage in CJ, is, strictly speaking, an act of Judgment, not Reason, seems to involve another application of the Principle of Non-Contradiction, i. e. to determine whether or not a maxim is universalizable, but, contrary to some interpretations, that application is subsidiary to the one pertaining to the relation between #1 and #2.  In any case, just as in Communication, in general, an addressee is always free to not comply with an Utterance, even a Categorical Imperative does not suffice to compel obedience, as Kant discovers perhaps belatedly, perhaps to his chagrin.