Whitehead and Intensity

According to Whitehead, every Process is concrescent, and every Concrescence aims at a maximum of Intensity. By 'Intensity', he means 'Complexity', a balance between Identity and Diversity. Hence, a maximum Intensity entails a balance between a maximum Identity and a maximum Diversity. Therefore, by implication, every Concrescence aims at both a maximum Identity and a maximum Diversity. But, 'concrescence' means 'growing together', so its primary pattern is unification, not diversification. Thus, either the aim at Intensity partially contradicts the more general concrescent pattern of any Process, or the aim of a Process at maximum Intensity is the more comprehensive structure of Organism. If the latter, then Whitehead's neglect of diversifying processes in his system is otherwise pervasive, and would explain his inattention to, as previously discussed, motor processes, with are, arguably, diversifications.

Whitehead, Locke, Bergson, Perception

Whitehead's concept of Perception follows Bergson's in some crucial respects, but not in at least one other. That concept is also essentially Lockeian, i. e. perceptual objects combine Primary Qualities that inhere in an object, with Secondary Qualities that are the projections back into the Primary Qualities of modified received physical transmissions. Since perceived Secondary Qualities are not actually in those objects, Whitehead refers to perceptual objects as 'object-images', which is evocative of Bergson's similar analysis of Perception, i. e. for Bergson, perceptual objects are "images". However, for Bergson, Perception is inherently preparation for subsequent physical modification of a perceiver's environment, in accordance with its practical needs. In contrast, Whitehead only briefly, and vaguely, alludes to the potential future "relevance" of object-images to a perceiver, i. e. while he exhaustively analyzes the development of a received physical transmission to the formulation of a purpose, he seems to have no specific account of the experiential transition from the formulation of a purpose to its being physically carried out. So, the comparison with Bergson regarding Perception exposes Whitehead's lack of attention to what the former characterizes as the motor phase of experience.

Whitehead, Sartre, Consciousness

According to Whitehead, the fundamental mode of experience is Feeling, of which there are two main kinds--Physical and Mental. A Physical Feeling is primarily a reception of an influx of energy, which the concepts of Mind subsequently operate upon in a variety of ways. On such way is the introduction of negative Feelings into experience, via a conceptual potential that is diverse in some respect from the given Physical actuality, a special, advanced case of which is Consciousness. Whitehead thus aligns himself with Bergson, and anticipates Sartre, in characterizing Consciousness as essentially entailing a negation of actuality. However, his more versatile scheme avoids some of Sartre's more awkward formulations. To begin with, for Whitehead, Consciousness is always subsequent to some positive, conformal Feeling, so the latter entails neither Consciousness, nor, hence, the 'non-thetic' Self-Consciousness that Sartre is forced to concoct, in order to explain how someone can be both absorbed in an external object, and, yet, apparently, simultaneously aware of what one is doing. Furthermore, the subsequent Feeling of a given Conscious Feeling is, in Whitehead's analysis, not a negation of it, but a conformal reproduction of it. Hence, the subsequent Feeling is, for Whitehead, not, strictly speaking, the 'Consciousness' of a Consciousness that, for Sartre, devolves into a labyrinth of reflecting Nothingnesses. In general, Whitehead's theory of Feelings exposes the oversimplifying reductionism of Sartre's theory of Consciousness.

Whitehead and Hume

Whitehead presents a multi-faceted critique of Hume's privileging of the sensory 'Impression', an immediate, simple, discrete, immobile datum of experience, that somehow escapes the attention of Bergson. First, he shows how an Impression is an hypostasization of an antecedent feeling of a transmission from an external source. Second, since that more primitive reception entails a feeling of the Causality of its transmitter, that awareness of Causality antecedes Hume's pivotal concept of Causality i. e. that Causality is a combination of Impressions. Third, the imaginability, which Hume himself acknowledges, of a color not previously sensed, disproves, for Whitehead, contrary to Hume's dismissal of the example as trivial, the latter's principle that all experience is derived from Impressions, and proves that some components of experience originate in Platonistic 'Eternal Objects'. Finally, these explicit criticisms imply a fourth, of Hume's Moral Sentimentalism, which originates in feelings of like and dislike, and eventuates in the recognition of Sympathy as the highest Good. For Whitehead, valuations originate in Eternal Objects, and Sympathy originates in the primitive feeling of a transmission. Hence, Hume's Moral doctrine is not rooted in an Impression. More generally, Whitehead demonstrates why the stringency of Hume's Impression inevitably leads to the latter's Scepticism.

Whitehead, Bergson, Duration

Whitehead argues, against Bergson, that the spatialization of Duration is not an Intellectual distortion of lived experience, but is fundamental to the constitution of any physical object. In other words, his target is not so much the structure of Bergson's concept of Duration per se, but Bergson's denigration of physicality, in general. However, Whitehead's own concept of Duration provides the resources for a direct criticism of Bergson's concept of Spatialization. His does not preclude the possibility of intra-Durational contemporaneity. Furthermore, the consciousness of Contemporaneity entails a consciousness of Spatiality, i. e. as obtaining between any two contemporaneous elements. Now, as Deleuze notes, Bergson is ambivalent about the possibility of intra-Durational Pluralism, which shows that he, at minimum, entertains a concept of non-distorted Spatiality. Regardless, in Bergson's account, any Intuition is a consciousness of a process that is contemporaneous with the Duration of the Intuition of it. Hence, Whitehead's stronger argument against Bergson is that Duration is essentially Spatial, with respect to which the Spatializations that constitute ordinary lived experiences are only a special case.

Whitehead and Organism

Whitehead's concept of 'Organism' is innovative in two main respects. First, it is primarily a Metaphysical notion, of which the more familiar Biological version is a special case. Second, it connotes the pattern of a dynamic process, not the structure of a static entity. This second feature resolves a difficulty that, as previously discussed, Kant encounters--cognitive-purposive heterogeneity, that the Kantian system cannot systematize without recourse to a fiction. For, qua process, Whiteheadian Organism consists in precisely a transition from a multiplicity of cognized givens, to their unity as the realized satisfaction of a purpose. Whitehead's system does not accommodate all the antitheses encountered by Kant or Bergson, e. g. he merely describes, without explanation, that in an organism, organic and inorganic processes are found to stand in a "regnant"-"subservient" relation. Still, he does manage to find middle ground between Biology and Physics, i. e. by classifying the motility of an organism as a 'Physiological' phenomenon.

Bergson, Kant, Organism

The Critique of Judgment implicitly acknowledges the inadequacy of the Intellect to biological phenomena, and, hence, implicitly affirms the irreducibility of Biology to mechanistic Physics. Bergson agrees with that affirmation, furthermore proposing that Intuition is adequate where Intellect is not, i. e. as cognitive access to the primal biological force, Elan Vital. However, Intuition is, nevertheless, inadequate to a significant biological phenomenon, for a reason that is inverse to that of the shortcoming of Intellect. An Organism is a vital unity of multiple functions, of which, as Kant shows, Intellect can constitute only those functions, thereby requiring a complementary postulation of uncognizable Purposiveness to account for the unity entailed in any knowledge of Organism. In contrast, Bergson's Intuition is a consciousness of only unitary phenomena, which is reflected in his struggle to account for the multiplicity of physical relations that are unified in an Organism. His vacillating descriptions of the Matter of an Organism present that multiplicity as sometimes a degenerate aspect of, as sometimes an incidental byproduct of, but, in either case, as incommensurate with, its Spiritual unity. In other words, while asserting the irreducibility of Biology to Physics, Bergson leaves the inorganic processes that constitute an Organism severed from its vital principle.

Bergson, Kant, Succession

At first glance, Bergson's concept of Duration is Kantian, with a minor variation. For both, the structure of inner experience is successive, but, for Bergson, with the added refinement that the succession is fluid, not atomistic. However, Bergson's distinction constitutes more than a descriptive nuance. For Kant, the inner succession is inadequate as objective knowledge without the coordination of an Intellectual concept, without which an inner and an outer sequence cannot be distinguished. However, Bergson agrees with Schopenhauer that the Kantian construction of objective experience not only remains within the realm of appearances, which Kant himself acknowledges, but that it further remains only at the service of the pursuit of personal interests, and, hence, never transcends subjectivity. In contrast, Durational Consciousness, i. e. Intuition, alone gives, according to Bergson, direct access to the fluid in-itself, and, hence, is the true objective mental faculty, not Intellect. For Bergson, proof of the cognitive superiority of Intuition over Intellect is the adequacy of the former in contrast with an inadequacy of the latter that Kant himself recognizes, namely to biological phenomena.

bergson, Spinoza, Rational Ordering

Bergson asserts that the sequence of successive inner states is a coherent but, in comparison with the necessary causal connectivity of Matter, a looser, indeterminate concatenation. In contrast, according to Spinoza's theory of Mind, the degree of coherence of those states is variable, a function of the degree of activeness of experience, with the most active, i. e. Rational experience, generating a connectivity that is equivalent to that of physical relations. Furthermore, according to Spinoza's Ethical theory, a Rational experience is superior to the loose and indeterminate one, because it constitutes Freedom. However, Bergson is unmoved by Spinozism, since he maintains that Rational ordering reflects an artificial accommodation of Mind to Matter, thereby compromising the native Freedom of indeterminate Consciousness. But, in a different context, Bergson implicitly undermines his resistance to Spinoza. For, he plainly appreciates Music, and it seems difficult for him to deny that Music impresses a greater coherence upon Consciousness, via Material means, i. e. the playing of instruments. Hence, that appreciation implicitly acknowledges that the coherence of the inner sequence is variable, that a more coherent sequence can be a superior one, and that the influence of Matter is irrelevant to the latter judgment. Now, such an acknowledgment is not an explicit concession to Spinozism, but it does undermine his grounds for rejecting that Rationalism.

Bergson's Cone

One notable contrast between Time and Free Will and Matter and Memory is that while the former is critical of the misrepresentation of lived experience by geometrical figures, in the latter Bergson uses them on several occasions to illustrate his theory of Memory. For example, he portrays experience as an inverted cone, with the down-pointing apex representing the Present in its engagement in action upon Matter, and with the base representing the Past, constituted by pure Memory, therewith presenting the emergence of Memory into action as a "descent". However, just prior to this demonstration, he characterizes the Past as an immaterial powerless limbo. Hence, by means of the geometric illustration, he inverts that characterization, recasting Memory as a effective, superior influence upon action, thereby recasting his descriptions to suit his Spiritualism. In other words, by means of the properties of a geometrical figure that he himself has chosen to represent experience, he proves the contrary of what description apparently reveals, and defies the main theme of his earlier work.

Bergson and Immateriality

A central thesis of Matter and Memory is that the Past does not cease to exist, rather, that it ceases to have present use, leading Bergson to conclude that Memory does not require any special storage facility. Now on the definition of 'material' as 'important', the Past is thus 'immaterial'. Thus, when he classifies Memory, the realm of the Past, as 'Spirit', he, perhaps unwittingly, refers it to a Practical, not to an Ontological, category, i. e. to 'Spirit' qua 'immaterial' = 'unimportant'. So, regardless of what he argues in other contexts, he here demonstrates that Spirit is derived from Matter.

Bergson, Pure Memory, Motor-Memory

Bergson distinguishes pure Memory from motor-memory, and his assertion of the independence of the former from the latter is essential to his thesis of the superiority of Spirit over Matter. According to him, experiential evidence of such independence is that the stages of the development of a motor-memory, e. g. the learning of a lesson, can also be remembered as individual events, independent of their implication in a cumulative process. However, on that interpretation, my recollection of having stated "three" is independent of my having stated "one" and "two", or that my memory of passing a soccer ball to a high school teammate is independent of my having learned to play soccer, having attended that high school, having lived in that town, etc. In other words, Bergson's example does not demonstrate that his assertion of the independence of these individual memories from others is not question-begging, i. e. that the independence is not a product of abstraction. Hence, the example does not demonstrate the independence of pure Memory from motor-memory, thereby weakening his thesis that Spirit is superior to Matter, to whatever extent that thesis depends on the example.

Bergson, Nietzsche, Moral Vitalism

A significant ambivalence in Bergson's Philosophy comes to light in a comparison with a Nietzschean principle. 'Vitalism' can be defined as both a Metaphysical and a Moral doctrine. Metaphysical Vitalism holds that everything that exists is an expression of an immanent Life force. Moral Vitalism holds that Life is the Highest Good and the criterion of all normative judgments. Nietzsche is both a Metaphysical and a Moral Vitalist--he asserts that everything that exists is an expression an immanent Life force, i. e. Dionysus, and he affirms that Life is the Highest Good and the criterion of all normative judgments. In contrast, Schopenhauer is a Metaphysical Vitalist, but not a Moral Vitalist, since while he asserts that all existence is an expression of Will, for him, Moral Goodness consists in Life-denial. Now, Bergson is a Metaphysical Vitalist, since he holds that everything that exists is an expression of Elan Vital. However, that he is not a Moral Vitalist is evident from his depreciation of repetitive life-forms, which shows that he would not affirm Eternal Recurrence, Nietzsche's fundamental Moral Vitalist formula. Rather, he affirms Life only insofar as it is innovative, which, according to Nietzsche's criterion, is only conditional Vitalism. Instead, Bergson's unconditional Moral principle is Spirit, so, he is more accurately classified as a Metaphysical Vitalist, but a Moral Spiritualist.

Bergson, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche--Individuation

Bergson agrees with Schopenhauer that a human being is an individuated incarnation of a universal vital principle, in his case Elan Vital, in Schopenhauer's, Will. He also agrees that the human condition is an unsatisfactory one, though he disagrees with Schopenhauer regarding the unalleviability and the degree of the suffering involved. However, while Schopenhauer seeks freedom from Will, Bergson finds freedom in excarnated Elan Vital. Now, the earlier Nietzsche is Schopenhauerian, calling Will 'Dionysus', but otherwise accepting the general scheme of Schopenhauer's concept of the human condition. However, he eventually repudiates Schopenhauer, with a variation that also entails a critique of Bergsonism. His 'Will to Power' is more than a mere surrogate for Schopenhauer's 'Will'--while the latter is Monistic, the former is Pluralistic. That is, intrinsic to the dynamic of Will to Power is its specificity of actualization, i. e. its production of individual entities. In other words, from Nietzsche's perspective, Bergson, as much as Schopenhauer, errs in conceiving corporeal individuality as a misfortune that befalls Vitality, not its intrinsic actualization.

Bergson, Spirit, Pluralism

While Bergson's Spirit is Monistic, he, at minimum, lacks grounds for denying that it is Pluralistic. Its Monism is based on the presumption that the creative impetus is, in every case, e. g. in the drawing of a line, in the writing of a poem, in the generating of a new species, one and the same process. But, evidence of such identity cannot be given to the immediate consciousness of such movements. To the contrary, the positing of that identity appears to concrete consciousness as entailing abstraction and generalization. What is instead concretely given is the occurrence of distinct acts of creativity, in which specific 'congealing of Matter', as Bergson characterizes it, is not a digression from creativity, but constitutes its very fulfillment. On that interpretation, which Bergson, at minimum, lacks grounds to refute, Creativity consists in the Materialization of Spirit, in which both Matter and its multiplicity are intrinsic to elan vital.

Bergson, Spirit, Dualism

The etymological root of 'spirit' is 'breath', and it seems likely that Spiritualism is inspired by the metaphor of the invisibility of the source of vitalization. But, breathing entails both inhalation and exhalation, both of which are processes that are vital to life. Thus, holding one's breath is only delayed exhalation. Likewise, the relaxation caused by a 'detente' of Spirit that, according to Bergson, generates extensive Matter, is an interruption of the mobility of Spirit, but a withholding of its active distending expansiveness. Bergson's incorrect diagnosis of the moment of 'detente' leads him to interpret Spirit as a monistic principle, and not, like breathing, entailing two inverse processes. On the latter interpretation, the production of Matter contributes to, not hinders the Evolution generated by elan vital.

Bergson--Spirit, Form, Matter

Though the relation between Spirit and Form has rarely been a topic of Philosophical examination, that they are each often presented as the antithesis of Matter suggests that the relation must be intimate. Bergson, for one, proposes that Form is Spirit in its interaction with Matter, and that Form, upon interruption, becomes Matter, thereby proving that Matter is congealed Spirit. In one of his examples, the drawing of a line is a mobile Formative process, which, when halted, is observed to have left in its wake Matter, i. e. an immobile line. Now, this drawing-drawn relation has been regarded by others as significant, e. g. Spinoza's naturing-natured and Schopenhauer's Will-objectification contrasts seem analogous. But, Bergson's interpretation of it as one of Form-Matter is questionable. For, the process of drawing a line is a shaping of lead, ink, or paint, so, one of them, not the line, is the 'Matter' of the example, and this Matter is contemporaneous with the 'Formative' drawing motion, not subsequent to it, the result of the halting of it. Hence, as an attempt to prove that Matter is congealed Spirit, the example backfires on Bergson. Furthermore, treating Form as a surrogate for Spirit only transposes the more fundamental problem with that thesis--it fails to explain how a monistic, intrinsically dynamic principle such as Spirit comes to relax, let alone cease movement, to begin with. Instead, the example reinforces the counter-thesis that Matter is an independent, complementary principle to Spirit or Form.

Bergson and James

Given Bergson's repeatedly expressed denigration of Praxis, his association with seminal Pragmatist William James seems surprising. However, his Intuitive method is almost surely inspired by James' anteceding study of the 'stream-of consciousness', as James coins it, a method which, in turn, James, in his later period, begins to appreciate. Still, this latter appreciation is not a renunciation of James' long-time espousal of the value of Practical Reason, but a supplement to it, according to James, suggesting that he never repudiates the Pragmatist thesis that experience is the criterion of Truth, nor that he ceases being a "man of science", as Peirce puts it. So, any similarity between the two philosophies does not override the fact that James' demonstrates that Bergsonian Spiritualism is neither a necessary nor an exclusively valid interpretation of the meaning of the data of the stream of consciousness.

Bergson and Imagination

What is probably most notable about Bergson's theory of Imagination is that he has none. Perhaps he considers one unnecessary, since he classifies all objects of Consciousness, including outer ones, as already "images", thereby preempting any need to attribute them to some mental faculty. In any case, the lack of such a theory is potentially damaging to his cardinal thesis that Intuition is the creative mode of Consciousness. For, both conventional wisdom and many philosophers associate mental creativity with Imagination, not with a receptive faculty like Intuition. Now, Bergson can be excused for his unfamiliarity with Sartre's not yet extant theory of the radical creativity of Imagination, and he might argue that a notion with which he is familiar, Kant's theory of Productive Imagination, is ultimately only at the service of Intellect, and, hence, is not truly creative. Still, it is difficult to accept that it never occurs to someone who appreciates music as much as he does that the inspiration for the compositional process is at least sometimes the sudden imagination of a melody. In contrast, Bergson, as has been previously argued, never successfully demonstrates that, as he seems to presume, the Consciousness of Creativity is a Creative Consciousness. Accordingly, his thesis that Intuition is the pre-eminent creative mode of Consciousness seems implicated in his generally unsatisfactory speculations, e. g. his Spiritualistic interpretation, of the meaning and value of the immediate data of lived experience.

Bergson, Praxis, Morality

Bergson affirms the priority of Intuition over Intellect, and he defines Intellect as a mode of Consciousness conditioned by practical need. Hence, his critique of Intellect is a re-affirmation of the traditional priority of Contemplation over Praxis. However, by segregating Intuition from practical activity, he undermines the potential efficacy of his doctrine. To begin with, by treating the Free Will vs. Determinism debate as a de jure and not a de facto question, he eliminates, from the outset, any possibility of recognizing that some behavior is, in fact, free, and some is, in fact, conditioned. Hence, he preempts the possibility of distinguishing, within the flux of Duration, repetitive data patterns. Therefore, Bergsonian Intuition lacks the capacity to recognize, let alone influence, the conditioned behavior that is typically involved in practical interests. Consequently, his Moral doctrine offers no program for the cultivation of creative conduct, e. g. by equating Intuition and Attention, and promoting attentive behavior. In the absence of any concrete application of Intuition to conduct, his Highest Good is as much a contemplative state as is Aristotle's.

Bergson and Superman

Bergson asserts that Philosophy "should be an effort to go beyond the human state", and, indeed, he refers to the product of the evolutionary transcendence of man as "superman". This Superman is a possessor of "supra-consciousness", i. e. Intuition, which Bergson characterizes as pure "creative activity". Though he does not cite Nietzsche, the implicit reference to the latter seems likely. In any case, the comparison is not flattering to Bergson. For, Nietzsche's concept of Superman entails a clear distinction from the all-too-human, the transition from which is also a transformation, i. e. to life-affirming, ressentiment-free conduct. In contrast, nothing new emerges in the attainment of Bergsonian supra-consciousness. First, Intuition is no more than 'vision', so it itself generates nothing new, even when its object is a creative process. Second, a transition from Intellect to Intuition does not affect its subject--even mechanical, repetitive inner states appear to Intuition as part of the continual flow of Duration. The general problem for Bergson is that by isolating Intuition from practical activity, he segregates it from all activity, and, hence, from creativity, without which it is difficult to ascribe to any mode of Consciousness the novelty that his concept of superiority requires.

Bergson, Counting, Evolution

At the heart of Bergson's critique of the Intellectualization of lived experience is the quantification of it, which originates in Counting. For, insofar as the latter process entails that its objects share a common characteristic, it must homogenize the contents of Duration. However, he also asserts that Duration continually "accumulates: it goes on increasing." Hence, he does recognize a fundamental quantitative characteristic of Duration, i. e. the one that is implicit in the notion of 'increase'. Furthermore, this continual accumulation is one expression of what has previously here been termed the 'Ordinality' of Duration. More generally, Bergson might have recognized that continued accumulation is a fundamental pattern of any 'evolutionary' process, i. e. of the production of increasingly complex entities. However, such possible recognition is obscured by his vacillation between that concept of Evolution, and one in which it is conceived as the ongoing Spiritualization of Nature, which, while arguably progressive, is not a cumulative process.

Bergson and Ordinality

Bergson attributes to Duration 'succession', but not 'order'. That is, lived experience is given sequentially, but to assert an ordering relation between any two moments entails a comparison of them, which, according to Bergson, is possible only via an homogenizing abstraction of them from the flow of Duration. Hence, he glosses over another, more fundamental, ordering characteristic of Duration, that can be termed its 'Ordinality'. 'Ordinality' can be defined as the 'earlier-later' character of Duration, also often variously called the 'directionality', the 'asymmetry', or the 'anisotropy' of Time. If he recognizes the Ordinality of Duration, it is not apparent when he seems to affirm that Succession is reversible, or that the contents of Memory can return to the Present upon becoming useful. For, reversibility is antithetical to Ordinality, applicable only to an abstraction from it. For example, an experiential arc from older to younger is imaginable, but it seems impossible to imagine that even that course can be lived from later to earlier, i. e. even older=earlier and younger=later in that imaginary scenario. Furthermore, Bergson's analysis of the process of counting abstracts from its directionality, thereby bypassing an opportunity to better examine its evolutionary nature.

Bergson and the Critique of Technology

Bergson's demonstration that Intellect falsifies lived experience, especially insofar as it quantifies it, is sometimes interpreted as a 'Critique of Technology'. However, neither an Epistemological distinction, i. e. Intuition vs. Intellect, nor a Metaphysical one, i. e. Spirit vs. Matter, no more suffices as a 'Critique' than does the Ontological distinction between Being and beings, which is the context of a presumed similar effort from Heidegger several decades later. The implicit premise in such an interpretation is that Technology dehumanizes, which, however, is a vulnerable ground of a Critique of it, since, just as Intellect, as Bergson himself agrees, has been beneficial to humanity, arguably, so, too, has been Technology. Regardless, even if it is granted that Technology is universally and absolutely a dehumanizing influence, the premise still lacks what is necessary to any Critique, namely some normative principle. In other words, a Critique of Technology is first and foremost a Moral issue, and, hence, must be based on some normative principle, which Metaphysics, Epistemology, or Ontology, at best, only obliquely supplies. In contrast, Bergson's Moral doctrine does seem to present such a principle--'Spiritual e\Evolution is good'. However, even that thesis is not a sound ground for the proposition 'Technology dehumanizes', since Evolution itself is arguably a dehumanizing process, i. e. it is the promotion of a post-human entity. In contrast, Kant's Rational principle--'Never treat a human being as a mere means to an end'--does sufficiently address the common underlying concern with Technology. It is therefore ironic that perhaps the definitive basis of a Critique of Technology is a product of the very Intellect that is the prime target of Bergson's version of such a Critique.

Bergson and The Future

For Bergson, the distinctive characteristics of Duration include its mobility, its continuity, its heterogeneity, and its indefiniteness. Accordingly, his critique identifies traditional four falsifications of Duration, under the rubric 'time', by Intellect--immobility, discontinuity, homogeneity, and completeness. However, he misses a further characteristic that invites a conflation to which he himself subscribes. His concept of lived experience is similar in some crucial respects to the Phenomenological ones of Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty--immediately given to Intuitive Consciousness are what he calls "images", which practical Intellect interpretively represents as potential use items, thereby projecting upon them a futural character. But every such representation is concomitantly a current presentation. Hence, the Intellect imports the Future into the Present, thereby encouraging the Determinist thesis that the Future is settled in the Present. Bergson seems to miss this further falsification of lived experience, and, hence, a similar one in Intuition. For, on his account of the Intuition of Duration, the 'Future' is 'nascent' in the data that are immediately given to Consciousness. But, since, in even the bare immediate categorical Intuitive datum, 'there will be subsequent data', something futural is settled in advance in the Present, the Intuition of Duration is as susceptible to a Determinist interpretation as is the Intellection of it.

Bergson, Memory, Spirit

In Matter and Memory, Bergson studies the interaction of Matter and Memory in lived experience, as part of his development of a theory of the relation between Spirit and Matter. Accordingly, in contrast with the intricacy of his examination of the Memory-Matter relation, that Memory is an instance of Spirit seems almost taken for granted. Bergson thus seems to overlook a problematic consequence of that latter assumption. Every memory begins as a perception, and, while Bergson's definition of Perception tends to vacillate, all its varieties entail a Material component. In other words, Memory originates as at least partially Matter, a process which, therefore, demonstrates that Spirit can originate in Matter, which is contrary to a main thesis of Creative Evolution. So, once again, Bergson's commitment to a speculative doctrine such as Spiritualism seems to complicate the results of his methodical direct examinations.

Bergson, Attention, Intuition

According to Bergson, Attention is a mode of Consciousness that involves physical effort, and that entails an interpretation of its object. While he does not explicitly formulate the relation between Attention and Intuition, his discussions suggest that they, at minimum, often coincide. For, on the one hand, he does affirms that his method is 'Intuition', and, on the other, throughout his works, he pervasively characterizes an examination of a phenomenon as an operation of 'Attention'. In any case, it is difficult to conceive Intuition as inattentive. So, in the absence of any explicit exclusion of Attention from acts of Intuition, the Duration that Bergson presumes to be the object of immaterial, transparent Intuition, is indistinguishable from a reflected product of sustained attentive effort. For example, the segues in experience that he posits as being discovered by the nuanced awareness exclusive to Intuition might, in fact, be introduced into it by reflective Attention, as Gestalt theory shows. On that account, Duration is, as proposed here previously, a characteristic of conscious performance, not of Consciousness of its own accord. Bergson's more general problem is that if there are grounds for rejecting such a proposal, it seems impossible that they can be cognized by his method of Intuition alone.