Bergson, Attention, Intuition

According to Bergson, Attention is a mode of Consciousness that involves physical effort, and that entails an interpretation of its object. While he does not explicitly formulate the relation between Attention and Intuition, his discussions suggest that they, at minimum, often coincide. For, on the one hand, he does affirms that his method is 'Intuition', and, on the other, throughout his works, he pervasively characterizes an examination of a phenomenon as an operation of 'Attention'. In any case, it is difficult to conceive Intuition as inattentive. So, in the absence of any explicit exclusion of Attention from acts of Intuition, the Duration that Bergson presumes to be the object of immaterial, transparent Intuition, is indistinguishable from a reflected product of sustained attentive effort. For example, the segues in experience that he posits as being discovered by the nuanced awareness exclusive to Intuition might, in fact, be introduced into it by reflective Attention, as Gestalt theory shows. On that account, Duration is, as proposed here previously, a characteristic of conscious performance, not of Consciousness of its own accord. Bergson's more general problem is that if there are grounds for rejecting such a proposal, it seems impossible that they can be cognized by his method of Intuition alone.