Holism, Atomism, Morality

The Subject-Object relation is fundamentally Epistemological, and Epistemology is fundamentally a Subjective process.  So, to classify Spinoza as an Objectivist is still Subjectivist.  Thus, more accurate, is that he is a Holist, whereas the systems of most of his peers in the era is Atomist.  His Substance-Mode relation is that of Whole-Part, so accordingly, his 'Intuition of God' is the awareness of a Mode that it is a part of the whole.  Knowledge is Holistic, so that the shortcoming, which he calls 'inadequacy' of most perceptions, including sensations, is that they present only parts of a whole, and that error consists in taking a Part as a Whole.  Similarly, the shortcoming of Pleasures is that they are only parts of a whole Good, and behavior or Moral error consists in treating as if they were sufficient as motivation.  Thus, the 'Intuition of God' in his doctrine is liberating because the awareness of the Whole frees behavior from an erroneous perceptions of external influences, facilitating control over how to proceed.  So, his Ethics is opposed to both the predominant Rationalist and Empiricist varieties of Atomist Morality.  For example, Kant's Atomist Rationalism consists in an individual person conceiving themselves as an Instance of a Universal, not as a Part of a Whole.  Thus, the irony of his charge that Spinoza's virtuous Part is deficient in Happiness is that, to the contrast, it is his virtuous Atom who is so deficient, i. e. because it can never experience the exhilaration of discovering that it is part of Whole, the alienation from which is only inadequately compensated for by a divine reward. Likewise, the Utilitarian Good is constituted by the aggregate of individual Pleasures, not their harmony as a Whole, i. e. as Health.  Plus, Mill's elusive distinction between 'higher' and 'lower' Pleasure is easy to explain as that between a Holist Pleasure vs. a localized Pleasure.  But, as is typical of most of its peers, Rationalist and Empiricist, Utilitarianism, as Atomist, cannot accommodate Holist elements, even those that afford simple solutions to vexing problems.

Rationalism vs. Empiricism and Objectivism vs. Subjectivism

The standard grouping together of Descartes and Spinoza as 'Rationalist' obscures how they are radically opposed in another respect.  While Descartes derives God and World from private sensory experience, Spinoza derives private sensory experience from God and World.  In other words, Descartes is a Subjectivist, and Spinoza is an Objectivist.  Leibniz, too, is an Objectivist, i. e. the concept of a Windowless Monad could not be derived from private experience.  Locke, Berkeley, and Hume are all Subjectivists, though, unlike the latter two, Locke does not deny any Objective existence.  Now, Kant's credit to Hume of wakening him from "dogmatic slumber" seems to imply that Objectivism is dogmatic.  However, he misses how Hume's Subjectivism is also dogmatic--the acceptance of the irreducibility of Sense-Data suppresses the sequence of abstractions that isolate them from ordinary immediate experience.  Now, Kant does eventually posit himself in an Objectivist vs. Subjectivist opposition to Hume, but on the basis of redefining it in terms of Form vs. Matter within the Subjectivist context. So, he never comes to consider that his waking from a dogmatic slumber might be a dream within another dogmatic slumber.  Regardless, the usual classification of the era in terms of Rationalist vs. Empiricist obscures the dynamic of the Objectivist vs. Subjectivist opposition.

Pleasure, Pain, Subjectivist Morality, Objectivist Morality

Spinoza defines Pleasure and Pain as an increase and a decrease, respectively, in strength.  In other words, Pleasure signifies a condition of vitalization, and Pain signifies a condition of de-vitalization.  Thus, according to his doctrine, Pleasure and Pain are not irreducible data, and, hence are not two foundational Psychological principles, but are modifications of a single fundamental Physiological principle.  Now, the implications of these definitions extend to Morality.  For according to Sentimentalism, e. g. Hedonism, Utilitarianism, Emotivism, etc., Moral valuation is rooted in the Pleasure vs. Pain contrast, i. e. most generally as Approval vs. Disapproval, and including Good vs. Evil, Right vs. Wrong, etc.  The general classification of such doctrines is thus Subjectivism, the pervasive acceptance of the Psychological foundations of which is expressed in the recourse to a Deontic principle in the attempt to establish an Objectivist doctrine that overrides it, Kantianism, most notably.  In contrast, Spinoza grounds an Objectivist doctrine by undercutting Subjectivism directly, at its root--by analyzing Pleasure and Pain as derivative data, an argument not likely at the disposal of anyone who does not accept Mind-Body Parallelism.

Homo Faber and Exhilaration

The originality of Spinoza's vision is not that of a new way of looking at the same thing, e. g. a Pantheistic vision of the world.  It is a vision of the beginning of a new era in human history, characterized by a transition from Homo Sapiens to Homo Faber, and correspondingly, by the supplanting of Theoretical Reason by Technical Reason.  In the Pantheistic context, Homo Faber is transformed from an original sinner to a Mode of a creative deity, i. e. of the deity of Genesis 1, as opposed to the deity of Genesis 3.  The ascendance of Technical Reason also applies to Instrumental Reason--Reason does not merely function as a slave of the passions by calculating Means to its Ends, it becomes creative, the autonomy of which becomes salient when construction is for its own sake--in Art.  Because Kant ignores the role of Technical Reason even in a purposive context, e. g. a labor-saving invention, he cannot recognize the Pleasure of it--Exhilaration--that is communicated in Genius Art.  But he is far from alone; centuries later, the subject of most Philosophy is still Homo Sapiens.

Stimulation and Exhilaration

As has been previously discussed, Spinoza's concept of physical Pleasure differs from the conventional one.  For, while the latter signifies sensory Satiation, his, which he calls Stimulation, signifies an increase in volitional power.  However, the feeling itself is a passive condition, which seems antithetical to the Pleasure involved in the harnessing of divine creativity that constitutes the peak moment of his doctrine.  So, active Pleasure, i. e. the enjoyment of one's own creativity, might be better termed Exhilaration.  Thus, Exhilaration entails a Dualism other than that which, as has been previously discussed, Serenity entails: Active-Passive vs. Incorporeal-Corporeal.  Both signify liberation from Pain, but the latter Dualists have usually blamed Corporeality in general for suffering, while in the Corporeal dimension of Spinoza's God/Nature/Substance, suffering is rooted specifically in passivity, which is a consequence of finitude.  So, his doctrine aims at the maximization of Creativity, and, hence, the enlarging of finitude, while traditional Dualist doctrines aim at the transcendence of Corporeality, while maintaining degree of finitude, e. g. from individual Body to individual Soul.  In other words, while in the latter, the highest Pleasure is Serenity, in the former, it is Exhilaration.  Spinoza thus presents a radically heterodox vision, that has been shared in varying respects by Kant, Pragmatists, Marx, and Nietzsche, but remains of marginal interest in contemporary Anglo-Saxon academic Philosophy.

Serenity and Dualism

Because it is easy to interpret an organism as naturally seeking pleasure and avoiding pain, Pleasure and Pain are often posited as the fundamental Psychological principles.  Accordingly, intelligence is often conceived as functioning primarily in the service of maximizing Pleasure and minimizing Pain.  However, as human invention demonstrates, the capacity to cause suffering increases in proportion to the capacity to end suffering and to produce pleasure.  So, a higher wisdom often begins with the insight that Pleasure and Pain are inextricably entwined in Nature, so freedom from Pain requires a purified Pleasure that transcends Nature, i. e. Serenity.  Popular versions of that super-natural realm are Heaven and Eden, and the prototypical Philosophical version is The One of Parmenides.  Now, Serenity entails transcendence of natural Pleasure and Pain, so these various hypostatizations of it entail a systematic Dualism, the second term of which for Parmenides is Motion/Multiplicity.  A more general characterization of the Duality is Incorporeality vs. Corporeality, one to which most successors of Parmenides have adopted.  So, these traditional Ontological or Epistemological Dualisms are usually Psychological in origin, and their ultimate aim, implicit or explicit, is to ground the cultivation of Serenity.

Pleasure, Satiation, Stimulation, Serenity

Not often clearly distinguished by Philosophers or others is three kinds of Pleasure--Satiation, Stimulation, and Serenity.  Satiation is sensory, and ephemeral. Stimulation is volitional, and transitional.  Serenity is mental, and continuous. The distinction between Satiation and Serenity is one of the bases of many Philosophical projects, the prototype of which is Stoicism.  Stoicism seeks detachment from both Pain and Pleasure, a detachment that consists not in Apathy, but in Serenity.  Likewise, the standard Philosophical subordination of Corporeality to Incorporeality is rooted in the Pain vs. Serenity contrast, i. e. what is usually presented as Ontological, Epistemological, or Theological Dualism, is an expression of Psychological Dualism.  So, the concept of Pleasure in Spinoza's doctrine, in which its immanent, creative, deity has parallel corporeal and incorporeal attributes, is that of Stimulation, even when instantiated in a Mode. In contrast, in Kant's system, there seems to be no concept of Stimulation, while Aesthetic Pleasure is Serenity, and incorporeal Reason requires the thesis that an incorporeal deity recompense Satiation that has been foresworn in the restraint from seeking it at the expense of the Satiation of others. Accordingly, his charge that Spinoza's concept of Pleasure is deficient in a Satiation that only an incorporeal deity can deliver is uncharacteristically misguided in several respects.

Pleasure, Beauty, Super-Beauty

To attack Spinoza's concept of Rationalist Ethics, that has no need for the existence of his own deity, Kant resorts to a Utilitarian argument.  Compounding the inadequacy of such an argument is Kant's inattention to the fact that Spinoza does not share his concept of Pleasure.  For, while he conceives Pleasure as causing a maintaining of the experience of its source, Spinoza conceives it as an increase in Power, equivalent to Stimulation.  Now, the distinction bears upon Kant's concept of Beauty that is a symbol of his concept of the Good.  For, the basis of the former is Pleasure in the Beautiful object, a feeling that thus causes maintaining the experience of it, a traditional example of which is the Contemplation of the object.  In contrast, as has been previously discussed, the Pleasure involved in the experience of Super-Beauty is Stimulation, and, hence, in Empowerment, thereby functioning as a prelude to some further action.  Spinoza has no Aesthetic Theory, but if he had one, Super-Beauty might be its highest value, and be systematically related to his own concept of the Good, just as Aesthetic and Moral values correspond in Kant's doctrine.  The contrast further emphasizes that Spinoza's doctrine is an incommensurable rival to his own, not an internally flawed version of it, not accessible via a Utilitarian argument based on an equivocal use of 'Pleasure'.

Beauty, Sublimity, Super-Beauty

As original and exemplary, a work of artistic Genius can stimulate new ways of experiencing the world.  Such a work is not what Kant classifies as 'Beauty', since it does not harmonize with the cognitive faculties, but challenges them to develop in new ways.  Nor is it classifiable as his 'Sublime', since that characterization does not apply to Artworks, and the aim is not refuge in a super-natural realm, but a natural overcoming of human experience as is.  Accordingly, the term 'Super-Beauty' has been introduced here to classify such works, though without the established connotations, 'sublime' would be instructive.  So, the experience of Super-Beauty is stimulating, and whether or not that sensation is universally communicable, as Kant requires of the pleasure in the experience of Beauty, is irrelevant.  Instead, what is relevant is that unconventional modes of behavior be stimulated, perhaps even Supererogatory action.  So, Super-Beauty is beyond the scope of Kant's Aesthetic Theory, and, correspondingly, beyond the scope of his Moral doctrine.

Genius, Super-Beauty, Supererogation

One of the shortcomings of Deontic Morality is an incapacity to accommodate Supererogatory action.  Correspondingly, a shortcoming of a concept of Beauty as a symbol of Deontic Morality is an incapacity to deal with what can be called Super-Beauty, the source of which is an elevated creative process called Genius.  Now, just as Supererogatory action is personal, and non-universalizable, the enjoyment of Super-Beauty, too, is personal, and non-universalizable.  Indeed, Kant does detect the personal component of Aesthetic experience--the recognition, in reflection, that a work is 'for-me'.  However, he attempts to universalize this component, i. e. as the "universally communicable" component of Taste.  Now, there may be cases in which it is universalizable; but there are others in which it it is strictly personal.  He, thus, cannot recognize the concatenation Genius to Super-Beauty to Supererogation.

Beauty, Reflection, Pleasure

According to Alexander, Beauty is a Tertiary Quality--neither a property of an object, nor a feeling of a subject, but a characteristic of the experience of an object.  In other words, 'X is beautiful' means 'The experience of X is beautiful'.  Now, Kant seems to agree with Alexander's classification, adding the analysis that it is upon reflection that a beautiful relation is first revealed.  But he also discovers in the reflection the emergence of a further pleasure--the pleasure that he characterizes as "universally communicable", i. e. Taste is a Reflective Judgement.  But that reflective pleasure is distinct from the unreflected-upon direct pleasure of an object, e. g. enjoyed dancing to music.  Likewise, the beautiful relation itself is independent of the reflection upon it, and of the pleasure that emerges in the latter.  So, Beauty as a Tertiary Quality may become an object of Reflection, but the pleasure that Kant attributes to the Reflection is extrinsic to Beauty.  In other words, Aesthetic Experience may be enriched by Aesthetic Judgement, but it is independent of it.

Aesthetic Pleasure, Communication, Morality

In Kant's system, Taste is the appreciation of Beauty, constituted by universalizable Aesthetic pleasure.  The locus of the pleasure is the interplay of universal cognitive structures, so his concept of Beauty is Formalist, and he often characterizes Taste as consisting in "universally communicable" pleasure.  But this attribution is perhaps a misnomer--what is universally communicable in his analysis is not the pleasure per se, but one's judgement that a work is pleasurable, i. e. his topic is not the Art of Criticism, but the Criticism of Art.  Regardless, conspicuously absent in his introduction of the concept of Communicability into Aesthetic Theory is an explicit recognition of where Communication does occur--in the presentation of a work to an audience, prior to any inter-audience interaction. Communication is implicit in the artist-audience relation, and, indeed, universal Communicability is entailed in his criterion that a work of Genius be "exemplary".  By failing to consider the initial act of Communication, Kant misses the complete phenomenon, and, so, fails to trace the Communicable pleasure to its source--the work of Genius.  He, thus, does not consider that what is communicated might be other than pleasure, i. e. a creative impulse, which is pleasurable, one discharge of which is the excited recommendation of the work to another.  Accordingly, he suppresses the characteristic of Beauty that indicates that it is an impulse to Creativity, by representing the hortatory 'Act in an exemplary manner' as the categorically imperative 'Act only on that Maxim that you can at the same time will to be a Universalization Law'.  He thus misses that the latter is a special case of Examplification--i. e. in which the example is codified.  So, in addition to the two derivations of Moral principle of which Kant is aware--from the concept of Duty, and from the concept of Reason--there is a third of which he is unaware--from the concept of Genius, via the concept of Communication.

Genius, Deity, Reason

It does not seem to occur to Kant that on the basis of one premise, his attribution of Genius to the inspiration of Nature is at the same time an attribution of it to God.  That premise is, of course, a definition of Deity other than his own, one example of which is the ancient Logos, but the more recent one of which is Spinoza's, with which Kant is well familiar.  While, because of Kant's prominent acknowledgement, his most formidable rival is generally thought to be Hume, the bigger problem for him is Spinoza--in contrast with his methodical overcoming of the former, the best that he can muster against the latter is a relatively feeble a posteriori argument that is buried deep in the labyrinth of the Critique of Judgement.  But, unlike Hume, Spinoza cannot be overcome by method.  For, the challenge to Kant's doctrine is substantive and fundamental--a concept of Deity that Kant cannot easily attribute to a "dogmatic slumber", i. e. that of a Pantheistic Deity.  Following from the latter concept is a concept of Reason other than Kant's super-Natural concept, one that can be characterized as Creative Reason, since Reason is an attribute of divine Creativity.  Now, absent the underlying Theological dispute, Kant's concept of Genius can be recognized as presenting a notable extension of Spinoza's doctrine, one that Spinoza does not recognize--the role of Art in the propagation of Deity.  For, while within his doctrine, divine revelation is privately enjoyed by a Mode, via Genius Art, it can be communicated to other Modes, and, in the process, is transformed from revelation to empowerment.  But Kant's Theological commitments blind him to this methodical response to Spinoza.

Genius, Creative Reason, Beauty

According to Kant, one characteristic of a work of Genius is that is exemplary, while another, that it is original.  Now, the ultimate source of Genius, according to him, is Nature, to which he elsewhere attributes "reason". So, Material Reason, i. e. the source of the concept of setting an example, as has been previously discussed, is an expression of Nature in the production of a work of Genius.  But insofar as Genius is original, another Natural Reason is involved--Creative Reason.  Now, being exemplary and being original might be independent characteristics.  But they can also be combined--when it is originality itself that is exemplary.  When that combination occurs, the goal of a work of Genius is to stimulate general creativity, which could occur in times of general stagnation.  Thus, the Reason involved in that combination, which includes Material Reason, is Creative Reason, an expression of Nature seeking to stimulate change in the species via artistic Genius. Under those conditions, the function of aesthetic Beauty is to stimulate further Creativity, as is the case in reproductive activity, but as is not the case when the function is, as Kant defines it, to symbolize Morality, as he conceives it.  Conversely, his Aesthetic Theory is specific to his concept of Reason, which is not necessarily identical to Creative Reason, which is why his attempt to harness Genius with Taste is ungrounded.

Material Reason and Rational Ethics

As has been previously discussed, Examplification, i. e. setting an example, is a concept of Material Reason.  Hence, a Principle of Material Reason is 'Act in an exemplary way'.  So, three distinctions between this Principle of Material Reason, and Kant's Fundamental Principle of Pure Practical Reason, which, as has been previously discussed is, more precisely, a Principle of Practical Formal Reason, are: 1. It is a hortatory prescription, not a categorical imperative; 2. It does not presuppose a Maxim; and 3. It is positive, not negative.  It is thus a Principle of Sufficient Reason in a way that Kant's principle is not. For, while the PSR is generally conceived as a ground of an existent, it can also provide a ground for a non-existence, i. e. why something did not or should not occur. In other words, there is both a Positive Principle of Sufficient Reason, and a Negative Principle of Sufficient Reason, with the latter rarely recognized.  Kant's Categorical Imperative is plainly an example of the latter, i. e. it aims at stopping some behavior from coming into existence.  So, what constitutes a 'Rational Ethics' depends on what the definition of 'Reason' is, as does whether or not a Rational Ethics is consonant with a conventional Deontic Morality.

Material Reason and Formal Reason

As has been previously discussed, the pattern One-Becoming-Many can be characterized as Material Logic.  Accordingly, what can be called Material Reason is the source of such thinking.  So, one product of Material Reason is setting an example, which can be called 'Examplification'. Now, Examplification can also be analyzed as the universalization of personal behavior, and, thus, as in accord with the conditions of Kant's Categorical Imperative.  Nevertheless, even though he recognizes that Examplification is a dimension of a production of Genius, he still subordinates Genius to the Universalist condition of Taste.  More specifically, Taste consists in universal Pleasure, which is possible only as a response to the formal features of a product of Genius.  Thus, what is exposed in the purported conflict between Genius and Taste is a conflict between two kinds of Reason: Material and Formal.  Indeed, that what Kant calls 'Pure Reason' is actually Formal Reason is evident from his pervasive use of 'Form' throughout his system, plus, that his Pure Practical Reason is actually Practical Formal Reason is a focus of Hegel's criticism of Kantian Morality.  So, the introduction of the concept of Material Reason exposes this limitation of Kant's system.

Dynamic Matter and Logic

Prior to Marx, Matter is traditionally conceived to be inert.  In contrast, he conceives it be dynamic, the Logic of which is Dialectical.  However, since that Logic has already been ascribed to Immaterial processes, by Hegel and others, it is not proper to Matter.  Instead, because the Form-Matter relation is that of Unity-Multiplicity, the proper character of dynamic Matter can only be Becoming-Multiple.  That is why it has been proposed here that because Causality is dynamic, Material Causality properly conceived is Diversification, not the Aristotelian 'inert substratum'.  Similarly, therefore, a Logic of Matter conceived as dynamic is that of One-Becoming-Many.  Now, by representing the initial One in that pattern as the Universal of the Many, a part of the Many can be represented as a Particular, or as an Instance, of that Universal.  In other words, the standard processes of traditional Logic--Universalization, Particularization, and Instantiation--are all derivable from what can be called Material Logic, i. e. in which Matter is conceived as dynamic.

Universalization and Setting an Example

In concrete terms, Kant's Moral principle prescribes a constraint on certain behavior.  In some cases, the effect is non-action, e. g. not harming oneself or others, but in other cases--constraint from laziness or indifference to the suffering of others--the effect is a positive action, but only mediately.  So, it is not merely because Reason functions independently of any Passion, but because its Causality is insensible, that this concept of it is beyond the scope of Hume's subordination of it to Passion, and, hence, beyond the Sentimentalist limitation of the role of Reason in behavior.  Still, insofar as the prescription can be defied, in itself, the principle is no more than a heuristic device, as is the concept of Universalization that constitutes its content.  So, what Kant's principle prescribes is not to be confused with a familiar phenomenon in which personal behavior is concretely Universalized--Setting an Example.  But he is not unaware of that phenomenon--he recognizes it in the case of the productions of artistic Genius, and yet he cannot accept it as such.  For, even after explicitly affirming that such works are exemplary, he still insists that they be further subordinated to another Universalist criterion--Taste.  So, it is not Universality that Kant's Moral doctrine promotes, but a constraint on some behavior.  Or, in other words, in his doctrine, its conventional Deontic component has priority over its Rational component, which Hume could interpret as confirming his thesis that Reason is never more than a slave.

Skill and Purpose

At the heart of Kant's concept of Cognition is the structuring of the sensory manifold that he calls Schematism.  However, he misses a correlate of Schematism in behavior--organized Motility, a common term for which is Skill.  Skill is the basis of behavior, evident in the learning of children from the earliest age, e. g. walking.  Skill is Know-How, and, hence, is the exercise of Technical Reason, i. e. the enactment of some explicit pattern, and, a special case of Technical Reason is Prescriptive Reason, in which the pattern is verbally formulated.  Now, Skill is autonomous and is enjoyed for its own sake.  So Skill that is heteronomously put to further Ends is derivative behavior, just as the pleasure from such Ends is extraneous to the enjoyability of Skill per se.  Hence, the common concept of such behavior that it is the basic unit of Psychology is erroneous, as is any Moral doctrine that takes such Psychology as its presupposition, e. g. Kant's doctrine.  The confusion bred by such superficial Psychology is aptly expressed by Kant's clumsy term 'purposeless purposiveness', that has no other way of characterizing a pre-purposeful phenomenon.  But the more fundamental problem for Kant is that the superficiality of his concept of 'Natural' behavior leaves the ground of his Moral doctrine unsteady, a problem that he might have avoided with a Groundwork that begins with his concept of Schematism, rather than with a popular concept of Duty.

Reason, Maxim, Agent

The locus of evaluation in Kant's Moral doctrine is the Maxim that is acted upon, independent of the acting upon it, and Reason is the source of that evaluation.  Thus, Reason determines whether or not a Maxim should be enacted.  But whether or not it is so enacted depends only on whether or not the addressee of the Categorical Imperative decides to obey it.  Now, who exactly that addressee is is not specified in Kant's formulation, but since the instruction is to "Act", a minimum characterization of it is the 'Agent', expressed as 'I act'. 'I will' could also express it, but Kant uses 'Will' otherwise, i. e. to conceive a Maxim as elevated to a Law.  Regardless, insofar as the Agent can defy Reason, it is not in itself Rational, at least as Kant conceives Reason.  In contrast, on the basis of a different concept of Reason, the Agent, even as it defies its apparent Categorical Imperative, can still be Rational. For, on the basis of Reason conceived as Technical Reason, Rationality consists autonomously and sufficiently in the enactment of a Prescription, even one forbidden by some extrinsic selection criterion.  Now, Kant's ambition may be that the selection criterion of his Categorical Imperative is not extrinsic to the enactment of a Maxim, but is internal to the concept of Reason, e. g. as a Principle of Sufficient Reason, by which Reason determines the proper use of Reason in a Maxim.  Nevertheless, the treatment of the Agent as outside the Rational structure of his Imperative, entails, conversely, that the Imperative is extrinsic to the Agent, and, hence, to the Technical Reason by which the Agent enacts a Maxim.  In other words, the object of a Principle of Technical Reason is the enacting of a Maxim by an Agent, and not merely the Logical scope of a Maxim.

Law and Categorical Imperative

The term 'Categorical Imperative' is so commonly associated with Kant's Fundamental Principle of Pure Practical Reason, that it is a general grammatical classification, of which Kant's Principle is an instance, is not always recognized.  In fact, the Principle presupposes another instance of a categorical imperative, one that is one of its constituents--a Universal Law, a formulation that requires unconditional obedience.  So, the primary distinction between a Maxim and a Law is while each is a Prescription, and the scope of each is Universal, the former applies to the all the members of that Universe conditionally, while the latter, unconditionally.  Now, the primary function of Kant's Principle is as a procedure for choosing whether or not a Maxim is to be adopted for enactment.  It is hardly the only such procedure, and it is hardly the only universally mandatory selective procedure, i. e. any such Principle is implicitly universally mandatory, e. g. that one promotes maximum Utility.  So, the characterization of it as 'categorical' is not only not unique, but trivial.  Plus, as any Law-breaking demonstrates, any force connoted by the characterization 'categorical' is in itself only nominal.  So, the term 'categorical imperative' might have rhetorical value in the Deontic dimension of Kant's Moral doctrine, but, if anything, only adds confusion to its Rational Ethics.

Maxim and Causality

A Maxim is a special case of Prescriptive Reason, and its two-term structure that privileges the second term, i. e. Means-End, is not common to all cases.  For example, a recipe is often constituted by multiple steps, and even if it has a culminating step, the entire process is enjoyed without privileging the final step.  Indeed, instructions for a dance have no culminating moment.  So, in these cases, the Causality of the Prescription is not Teleological, thereby suggesting that, contrary to the standard interpretation, neither is the Causality of a Maxim. Instead, the general cases demonstrate that a Prescription functions as the Formal Cause of the enactment, unifying a sequence of motions. Furthermore, they demonstrate that it is not by the Teleological Causality of the final term that enactment is initiated.  Rather, it is by a second Causality that the process is mobilized, just as driving a car combines both accelerating and steering.  This second Causality has rarely been discerned, so has no traditional name, but it has been defined here as Material Causality, in distinction from the Aristotelian definition.  So, Rational behavior involves two Causes--Formal and Material--known to Kant as Legislative Will and Freedom of Choice, respectively.  But because he does not develop his concept of Acting on a Maxim methodically and meticulously, he does not know how they are systematically related, leaving them as loose ends in his doctrine.

Acting on a Maxim and Rational Will

To Act on a Maxim is also to instantiate it.  In other words, in Technical Reason, and, more generally, in Prescriptive Reason, Actualization and Instantiation are one and the same.  Thus, while the conclusion of the traditional Practical Syllogism is an Imperative of some kind, that of the Technical Syllogism is not; rather, it is an Action of which the Prescription that it actualizes is a Universal.  So, the basic unit of Rational behavior is an actualization of some Prescription, such as a Maxim.  Now, Kant seems to be arguing that in some cases, Acting on a Maxim is not Rational, i. e.  when a Maxim is not Universalizable.  But, a Maxim is already Universal, and Acting upon any Maxim does incorporate Reason to instantiate it.  So, Kant's Moral test is not so much that a Maxim can or cannot become Universal, but that it can or cannot become a Law, which all obey.  Still, this calculation is merely heuristic, and, hence, involves no Causality.  Nor does the Imperative that one choose a Maxim on the basis of that calculation involve Causality, even though it is Categorical, the Deontic correlate of Necessity.  For, as Kant himself acknowledges, one is always still free to disobey the results of the calculation, and to adopt a Maxim that is 'forbidden'.  So, the only Causality of Prescriptive Reason occurs when a Maxim, forbidden or otherwise, is enacted.  Thus, insofar as Will is a kind of Causality, the only Rational Will is that which enacts a Maxim.  Kant attempts to attribute volition to the elevation of a Maxim to the status of Law, but such volition is only Virtual.

Acting on a Maxim, Reason, Causality

Because Kant's concept of Practical Reason is verbal, a more instructive term that captures both of its innovative features is Prescriptive Reason.  Likewise, Theoretical Reason is more accurately Descriptive Reason.  Now, the foundational concept of his Moral doctrine is not his Fundamental Principle of Pure Practical Reason, but the component that it presupposes, and that Kant introduces with no preparation--Acting on a Maxim.  A Maxim is a verbal formulation of a Means-End relation, and, hence, is an incorporation of a Cause-Effect relation into behavior.  It is thus subject to two of Hume's criticisms--that the Causal connection is not Necessary, and that the End is not Rational.  However, and Kant seems to not consider it, Acting on a Maxim is outside of both of those criticisms--1. The Causality involved in Acting on a Maxim is Formal, i. e. a Maxim unifies a sequence of motions; and 2. The Reason involved is Technical, i. e. an expression of Know-How.  Now, a Kantian Maxim is hardly a unique example of Prescriptive Reason--any set of instructions, directions, recipes, etc. all exemplify it, as does Wittgenstein's Following a Rule.  But a reason why so common a phenomenon has received so little specialized Philosophical attention may be because it includes an irreducible physical component, and much of the history of Philosophy has been hostile to Corporeality.

Practical Reason and Language

Laws, maxims, and imperatives are all verbal formations.  Thus, so, too, must be Kant's Fundamental Principle of Practical Reason, which is characterized in those terms, even if he does not explicitly describe it as such.  Left unclear is whether or not he also conceives Theoretical Reason to be essentially verbal, or whether or not he is implying that the Philosophical Logos has always been verbal, even if not acknowledged.  In any case, his elevation of a verbal formulation to the apex of his system, and the establishing of such as the fundamental principle of Morality, are perhaps even more innovative than his prioritizing of Practice over Theory.  Among other notable implications is the Causality of Language, which is entailed in his concepts of Maxim, Law, and Imperative, and the question of how that concept of Causality bears upon his debate with Hume on that topic, e. g. whether or not the Causality of Language is of a different kind than that of Nature.

Language and Prescription

'Following a Rule' is not a topic that just happens to appear in the course of the Investigations.  It is an implicit theme from the outset, an ingredient in his concept of a Language-Game, e. g. in the use of Language by two builders.  It also exemplifies the distinctiveness of this work in the history of Philosophy of Language, and why the Investigations is more than just a heterodox approach to the same subject matter that Frege, Russell, etc. study.  Rather, it is the subject matter itself that is different.  Of course, the matter is still Language, but it is Language of an objectively different kind than that of the orthodoxy--Prescriptive Language, rather than Descriptive Language.  And, it is this distinction that is the basis of the classification of the work as 'Pragmatist'.  But, whether or not Wittgenstein prefers it as such, the concept of Prescription also entails that of Psychology, i. e. Language that is acted upon, which is why 'enacting a rule' is more accurate than 'following a rule', as has been previously discussed.  And, whether or not he recognizes it as such, the ancestor of the concept of Language as Prescriptive is not Frege, but Kant, i. e. his concept of Imperative.  So, within Philosophy of Language, Wittgenstein's digression of greater scope is reduced to an alternative concept of Semantics, defended and adopted by some, resisted by others.

Following a Rule and Imitation

Mimesis is a topic that is of interest to Plato and Aristotle, but to few Philosophers since.  Thus, generally unnoticed is a distinctive Logical characteristic of Imitation--than it is constituted by a combination of Identity and Difference that is indefinitely constituted.  For example, both a slavish visual reproduction, and a radical innovation, can be classified as an 'imitation' of a work of Picasso.  This variability is not a deficiency in the concept of Imitation, but is its essential characteristic.  Furthermore, Philosophers have tended to overlook that Imitation is the substratum of all interpersonal interaction, no matter how abstractly expressed.  Thus, Imitation is the substratum of an interpretation of a mathematical formula.  Accordingly, even an interpretation of a mathematical formula is inherently indeterminate as to in what respect it is identical to it and in what respect it is different.  But this inherent indeterminacy is precisely what Wittgenstein characterizes as a "paradox" of following a rule.  Likewise, the solution that he proposes is a specification of Identity that serves his purpose of proving that there can be no private language.  But he leaves unapproached any consideration of the source of the paradox--that following a rule is a special case of Imitation, and, hence, is inherently indeterminate in its Logical character.

Communication, Private Language, Rule

At the beginning of Modern Philosophy, Bacon conceives Knowledge to be a social, provisional enterprise.  But Descartes and Berkeley, each Theologically motivated, internalize Experience, whereupon Knowledge becomes private, incorporeal, and absolute.  Subsequently, it is not the Skeptic Hume, but Kant, who attempts to shatter this privacy, and Pragmatists, Marx, and, Nietzsche, continue to try to undo the influences of Descartes and Berkeley.  But, remaining insular into the 20th-century are Analytic Philosophers, as is signified by their abstraction of 'language' from communication, and its reification of it as an inert object of analysis.  It is because of that insularity that they are so startled when one of their own, Wittgenstein, returns from a hiatus and challenges both the absoluteness of their categories, and the privacy of language.  So, an intrusion of what elsewhere is plainly understood as 'interpersonal communication' becomes a threat to their insularity, under the rubric of Wittgenstein's 'argument against private language', one element of which is his analysis of 'following a rule'. However, as has been previously discussed, he himself still accepts some of their premises, e. g. when he misses that a rule is enacted, by some public, corporeal performance, such as writing a number on a piece of paper.

Following a Rule and Enacting a Rule

As has been previously discussed, what Wittgenstein calls 'following a rule', which he characterizes as paradoxical, consists, more precisely, in three elements--1. representing a rule; 2. giving oneself the rule; and 3. executing the rule--which may eliminate the paradox.  However, even prior to the expansion, he mis-characterizes how a rule is used.  For the term 'follow' signifies a diachronic sequence, i. e. that first, a rule is given, and, subsequently, that it is executed.  But, in the actual incorporation of it into behavior, a rule does not remain a mere antecedent to its execution.  Rather, it guides the execution from beginning to end, e. g. 'n +2' guides the transition from '2' to '3', from '3 to '4', etc. In other words, a rule functions not as the transcendent Efficient Cause of its execution, which is what 'follow' connotes, but as its immanent Formal Cause.  So, more accurate than 'following a rule' is 'enacting a rule', which is better appreciated upon the inclusion in the process of giving oneself a rule.

Following a Rule and Giving a Rule

Among Philosophers, 'following a rule' is best known as a topic in Philosophy of Language, originating with Wittgenstein.  Typically in that context, the 'rule' is a mathematical formula, the 'following' of which consists in the listing numbers of numbers that instantiate it.  However, this type of example is a special case of rule-following, which more commonly consists in the performance of some non-verbal action.  Hence, in general, following a rule is primarily a topic in Psychology, i. e. an explanation of the behavior that ensues upon the perception of a rule.  Furthermore, in some instances, the following is evaluated, in which case following a rule is a topic in Morality, probably the best known example of which in Philosophical Morality is obedience to Kant's Rational principle.  But, that obedience is the obverse side of the giving to oneself the rule.  Now, that one gives oneself a rule that one follows is not exclusive to Kant's system.  For, in any case of rule-following, one first represents to oneself the rule, and then one follows the representation.  Thus, in general, rule-following is the complement of rule-giving, though rarely recognized as such.  Even the usually acute Wittgenstein misses that dimension in his analyses, thereby missing a possible solution to the apparent "paradox" of a rule being followable in multiple ways--there are actually multiple representations of a rule, and, hence, multiple rule-givings, corresponding to each of which is one rule-following.

Temporality and Modality

In common parlance, 'possibility' is usually attributed to an as yet undetermined future.  Likewise, if one such possibility is actualized, it occurs in the present.  And, if there is anything that is absolutely unchangeable, it is what has already occurred, i. e. the past.  Thus, 'necessity', too, has a practical temporal significance, and is systematically related to 'actuality' and 'possibility' in that context.  Accordingly, to abstract the three from this temporal coordination is to eliminate that systematic interaction.  But that is what Modal Logicians do when they cast them as Modal operators, resulting in inadequacies that have been previously discussed.  Furthermore, and perhaps more seriously, treating the future as inevitable can be resigned submission, and treating the past as still open can be delusional.  Accordingly, a concept of Modal Logic as anything other than Methodological, e. g. as Ontological, is perhaps a symptom of a Psychological disorder.