Reason, Maxim, Agent

The locus of evaluation in Kant's Moral doctrine is the Maxim that is acted upon, independent of the acting upon it, and Reason is the source of that evaluation.  Thus, Reason determines whether or not a Maxim should be enacted.  But whether or not it is so enacted depends only on whether or not the addressee of the Categorical Imperative decides to obey it.  Now, who exactly that addressee is is not specified in Kant's formulation, but since the instruction is to "Act", a minimum characterization of it is the 'Agent', expressed as 'I act'. 'I will' could also express it, but Kant uses 'Will' otherwise, i. e. to conceive a Maxim as elevated to a Law.  Regardless, insofar as the Agent can defy Reason, it is not in itself Rational, at least as Kant conceives Reason.  In contrast, on the basis of a different concept of Reason, the Agent, even as it defies its apparent Categorical Imperative, can still be Rational. For, on the basis of Reason conceived as Technical Reason, Rationality consists autonomously and sufficiently in the enactment of a Prescription, even one forbidden by some extrinsic selection criterion.  Now, Kant's ambition may be that the selection criterion of his Categorical Imperative is not extrinsic to the enactment of a Maxim, but is internal to the concept of Reason, e. g. as a Principle of Sufficient Reason, by which Reason determines the proper use of Reason in a Maxim.  Nevertheless, the treatment of the Agent as outside the Rational structure of his Imperative, entails, conversely, that the Imperative is extrinsic to the Agent, and, hence, to the Technical Reason by which the Agent enacts a Maxim.  In other words, the object of a Principle of Technical Reason is the enacting of a Maxim by an Agent, and not merely the Logical scope of a Maxim.