Pleasure, Beauty, Super-Beauty

To attack Spinoza's concept of Rationalist Ethics, that has no need for the existence of his own deity, Kant resorts to a Utilitarian argument.  Compounding the inadequacy of such an argument is Kant's inattention to the fact that Spinoza does not share his concept of Pleasure.  For, while he conceives Pleasure as causing a maintaining of the experience of its source, Spinoza conceives it as an increase in Power, equivalent to Stimulation.  Now, the distinction bears upon Kant's concept of Beauty that is a symbol of his concept of the Good.  For, the basis of the former is Pleasure in the Beautiful object, a feeling that thus causes maintaining the experience of it, a traditional example of which is the Contemplation of the object.  In contrast, as has been previously discussed, the Pleasure involved in the experience of Super-Beauty is Stimulation, and, hence, in Empowerment, thereby functioning as a prelude to some further action.  Spinoza has no Aesthetic Theory, but if he had one, Super-Beauty might be its highest value, and be systematically related to his own concept of the Good, just as Aesthetic and Moral values correspond in Kant's doctrine.  The contrast further emphasizes that Spinoza's doctrine is an incommensurable rival to his own, not an internally flawed version of it, not accessible via a Utilitarian argument based on an equivocal use of 'Pleasure'.