Material Reason and Rational Ethics

As has been previously discussed, Examplification, i. e. setting an example, is a concept of Material Reason.  Hence, a Principle of Material Reason is 'Act in an exemplary way'.  So, three distinctions between this Principle of Material Reason, and Kant's Fundamental Principle of Pure Practical Reason, which, as has been previously discussed is, more precisely, a Principle of Practical Formal Reason, are: 1. It is a hortatory prescription, not a categorical imperative; 2. It does not presuppose a Maxim; and 3. It is positive, not negative.  It is thus a Principle of Sufficient Reason in a way that Kant's principle is not. For, while the PSR is generally conceived as a ground of an existent, it can also provide a ground for a non-existence, i. e. why something did not or should not occur. In other words, there is both a Positive Principle of Sufficient Reason, and a Negative Principle of Sufficient Reason, with the latter rarely recognized.  Kant's Categorical Imperative is plainly an example of the latter, i. e. it aims at stopping some behavior from coming into existence.  So, what constitutes a 'Rational Ethics' depends on what the definition of 'Reason' is, as does whether or not a Rational Ethics is consonant with a conventional Deontic Morality.