Pleasure, Pain, Subjectivist Morality, Objectivist Morality

Spinoza defines Pleasure and Pain as an increase and a decrease, respectively, in strength.  In other words, Pleasure signifies a condition of vitalization, and Pain signifies a condition of de-vitalization.  Thus, according to his doctrine, Pleasure and Pain are not irreducible data, and, hence are not two foundational Psychological principles, but are modifications of a single fundamental Physiological principle.  Now, the implications of these definitions extend to Morality.  For according to Sentimentalism, e. g. Hedonism, Utilitarianism, Emotivism, etc., Moral valuation is rooted in the Pleasure vs. Pain contrast, i. e. most generally as Approval vs. Disapproval, and including Good vs. Evil, Right vs. Wrong, etc.  The general classification of such doctrines is thus Subjectivism, the pervasive acceptance of the Psychological foundations of which is expressed in the recourse to a Deontic principle in the attempt to establish an Objectivist doctrine that overrides it, Kantianism, most notably.  In contrast, Spinoza grounds an Objectivist doctrine by undercutting Subjectivism directly, at its root--by analyzing Pleasure and Pain as derivative data, an argument not likely at the disposal of anyone who does not accept Mind-Body Parallelism.