Genius, Deity, Reason

It does not seem to occur to Kant that on the basis of one premise, his attribution of Genius to the inspiration of Nature is at the same time an attribution of it to God.  That premise is, of course, a definition of Deity other than his own, one example of which is the ancient Logos, but the more recent one of which is Spinoza's, with which Kant is well familiar.  While, because of Kant's prominent acknowledgement, his most formidable rival is generally thought to be Hume, the bigger problem for him is Spinoza--in contrast with his methodical overcoming of the former, the best that he can muster against the latter is a relatively feeble a posteriori argument that is buried deep in the labyrinth of the Critique of Judgement.  But, unlike Hume, Spinoza cannot be overcome by method.  For, the challenge to Kant's doctrine is substantive and fundamental--a concept of Deity that Kant cannot easily attribute to a "dogmatic slumber", i. e. that of a Pantheistic Deity.  Following from the latter concept is a concept of Reason other than Kant's super-Natural concept, one that can be characterized as Creative Reason, since Reason is an attribute of divine Creativity.  Now, absent the underlying Theological dispute, Kant's concept of Genius can be recognized as presenting a notable extension of Spinoza's doctrine, one that Spinoza does not recognize--the role of Art in the propagation of Deity.  For, while within his doctrine, divine revelation is privately enjoyed by a Mode, via Genius Art, it can be communicated to other Modes, and, in the process, is transformed from revelation to empowerment.  But Kant's Theological commitments blind him to this methodical response to Spinoza.