Techne, Anthropomorphism, Praxis

Spinoza is among those who recognize Geocentrism as fundamentally Anthropocentrism.  Kant goes further, discerning Anthropocentrism as inadequately conceived Anthropomorphism, i. e. what appears to be one's perception of oneself as inhabiting the center of one's World is actually an adaptation of the World to the structures of one's Perception.  Accordingly, the perception of Causality is actually an adaptation of perceived phenomena to a human Cognitive structure, i. e. to a Cause-Effect a priori formation.  Now, he eventually establishes the primacy of Praxis over Theory.  However, he stops short of applying that further insight to Cognition.  He thus stops short of recognizing the adaptation of phenomena to a Causal structure as that of a manifold to a Practical Causal structure, i. e. to a deliberate producing of an Effect.  But the deliberate producing of an Effect, i. e. knowingly doing A in order for B to ensue, is Techne.  Hence, insofar as Science is a system of Causal relations, it is a projection of Techne on phenomena, e. g. an apple falling to the ground is interpreted as the Earth pulling the apple towards it.

Techne, Modern Science, Mathematics

A significant factor in the success of Modern Science has, of course, been Mathematics.  So, the traditional concept of the latter as a purely Theoretical object of Contemplation, entails either that Modern Science, too, is an object of Contemplation, e. g. that, following Pythagoras, the Universe has a noumenal Mathematical structure that the Sciences describe, or that Modern Science is an extrinsic application of pure Mathematics.  Either way, Techne is a derivative faculty, according to that concept.  However, fundamental to the structure of Techne is Ordinality: First, Second, etc., i. e. Techne consists in an ordered procedure.  Now, Cardinality is easily derived from Ordinality, but not vice versa.  For, the Cardinal Numbers are discrete integers, with respect to which notable putative connective devices like a Continuum or a Successor Function are extrinsic.  So, the role of Mathematics in the success of Modern Science reinforces the thesis that development of the latter over the centuries has been, and still is, governed by Techne.

Techne and Modern Science

Though Aristotle recognizes the potential value of the fruits of the application of Theoretical Knowledge, any such application remains a contingent subordinate consequence of a satisfaction of the desire to know-that.  Likewise, when the contents of Aristotelian Knowledge are supplanted by the discoveries of Universal Gravitation and the fact that the Earth spins on its axis, Theory remains intellectually supreme for most Philosophers.  Indeed, for many Philosophers, it retains that supremacy even as the fruits of Modern Science, i. e. the Industrial Revolution, begin to dominate human society.  Regardless, the more recent triumph over terrestrial gravity, abetted by accurate calculations of the rate of the spin of the Earth, strongly suggests that Aristotelian Desire to Know-that is actually Will to Power, and that Theory is actually a phase of Techne.

Techne and Evolution

Traditionally, Reason is conceived to be possessed by humans and divine beings, but nothing else, notably animals.  Usually, it is a variety of Theoretical Reason, and also Kantian Pure Practical Reason.  But it is difficult to deny that other species possess Techne, e. g. the construction of shelter.  Granted that attribution, the relation between humans and other animals is a greater degree of diversity of Techne, to a large extent facilitated by the superior versatility of the thumbs.  So, it is in the context of Evolutionism that the value of Techne can be best recognized.  At the same time, the evolutionary value of other varieties of Reason, especially Theoretical ones, is less clear than their value in those traditional contexts.

Religion, Science, Experimentalism

In contemporary culture, 'Religion vs. Science' frequently signifies a debate about Theory, i. e. Creationism vs. Big Bang and/or Evolution.  Thus obscured is the long, and continuing, concept of Religion as fundamentally Causal.  For, whether it is the performance of a dance in hopes of the arrival of rain, or a prayer seeking salvation, Religion is Practical--a Means to an End.  Accordingly, Theoretical topics, i. e. Theology, are implicitly Practical, e. g. 'God exists' = 'Behaving according to the dictates of God will bring divine blessing'.  Now, in many cases the efficacy of Religion is indeterminable, e. g. when the desired effects are afterworldly.  But in others, they are verifiable, so the efficacy of 'Religion' can be contrasted with that of 'Science', e. g. prayer vs. medicine as a cure for an illness.  Now, such a contrast is governed by Experimentalist principles--the better cure is the one that has the higher incidence of a recovery.  So, where resolvable, Religion vs. Science is an experiment, not a debate.

Parallelism and Techne

Spinoza's Parallelism is sometimes conceived as a theory of Cognition--a correspondance between the Sensory and Intellectual aspects of Perception.  It is also sometimes conceived as a theory of Events--a correspondance between their Causal and Rational aspects.  But it is rarely conceived as a theory of Action.  So, rarely recognized is its plain exemplification in Techne, e. g. in the following of a set of instructions, constituted by a sequence of physical motions that correspond to a plan.  Accordingly, since human Action is a Mode of divine creativity in Spinoza's system, rarely even considered is that Techne is a Mode of the Thought-Extension parallel attributes of Spinoza's God, the dynamic natures of which are better rendered as Thinking and Extending.

Henosis, Contemplation, Techne

According to Plotinus, Knowledge is Henotic--a unity of Subject and Object.  So, applied to Aristotle's system, as Plotinus believes that it does, it follows from that concept that the human desire to know is a desire to unify with the deity of the system, i. e. with the Object of the highest Knowledge.  Thus, if that deity is Immaterial, as it is for Aristotle, the unification is achieved in Contemplation, the content of which is Forms.  But, if the deity is constituted by both Form and Matter, e. g. Spinoza's God, then so, too, is Henosis.  On that basis, Henotic Knowledge is Techne, constituted by a combination of Mental and Physical processes, e. g. Spinoza's Parallelism.  So, a significant factor in the traditional priority of Contemplation over Techne is the concept of divinity as incorporeal, a tradition that is so deeply entenched that it is rarely recognized that even though Spinoza explicitly diverges from it, his Henotic moment, Intuition, is usually interpreted as contemplative, rather than as creative.

Techne and Experimental Reason

Knowing-how is usually the product of learning-how.  And, learning-how is often the product of teaching-how, which entails knowing-how.  But, in the absence of the dubious possibility of an immediately given, fully developed, knowing-how, learning-how can begin only as discovering-how.  In other words, Techne is rooted in Experimental Reason.

Organicist Technocracy and Political Philosophy

In an Organicist Technocracy, a Technocrat functions as the brain of a Polity--the source of Techne--to which it is vitally connected.  Thus, a Technocrat in this context is not the detached dehumanizer it is sometimes stereotyped as.  It thus functions primarily as setting a course of action for the Polity, i. e. all its parts, the primary goal of which is vitalistic, e. g. surviving, growing, etc.  So, essential to that functioning is effective organization, beginning with clear afferential and efferential communication.  Thus contingent are specific modes of structuring--Monarchy vs. Democracy, Capitalism vs. Socialism, etc.  In other words, some of the staples of established Political Philosophy are derivative in an Organicist Technocracy.

Techne and Technocracy

'Technocracy' commonly signifies a Polity organized on the basis of some 'scientific' model.  Often that model is Physicist, e. g. Newtonian, on the basis of which 'technocracy' connotes to many a dehumanizing system manipulated by cold-hearted 'technocrats'.  However, a scientific model could also be Biological, i. e. an Organism, of which a 'technocrat' is the brain, and, therefore, is dependent on the vitality of the other parts of society.  So, Technocracy is not as inherently inhuman as some critics of 'technocracy' charge.  Furthermore, 'technocracy', literally, connotes 'knowing how to rule', which entails not only ruling on the basis of some model, but skill in the implementation of it.  But such a skill involves empowering the members of the polity.  On that basis, a cold manipulator of people is not a Technocrat in the proper sense of the term.  Thus, as is the case with the common usage of 'technology', that of 'technocracy' reflects an inadequate understanding of Techne.

Techne, Technology, Technicology

It is difficult to infer from common usage of the term 'technology' a consistent definition of it.  For example, an electric car is 'technological', but a wheel rarely is.  But the terminological problem is deeper than one of consistency.  For, strictly speaking, 'technology' means 'the logic of Techne', or 'the study of Techne'.  Thus, constituting the former would be the interaction of the mental and physical dimensions of Knowing-How, the extension of the interaction to inert implements, etc.  Hence, as applied to a vaguely delimited class of inventions, that term is a misnomer.  However, it is too deeply entrenched to return it to its proper usage, so, for that purpose, 'technicology' can be used.  Thus, "the abuse of technology", in common parlance might be a coherent phrase, but "the abuse of technicology" could not be, i. e. since 'abuse' contradicts 'knowing how'.

Techne and Moral Evaluation

Techne seems to be a Good, since it means Know-How and Skill, each of which is regarded as an asset.  However, that a hammer might be used to harm someone seems to suggest that Techne has no intrinsic value, with its Moral status contingent on that of an End to which it is a Means.  But, an End can be pursued either skillfully or not, i. e. knowing how to resolve a problem with someone better than by attacking them with hammer.  So, the contingency in such cases is that of one exercise of Techne with respect to another.  Likewise, in a criticism of 'technology', either in a specific use, or in general.  In other words, if, as Aristotle holds, the locus of Moral judgment is not what one does, but how one does it, then Techne can be the basis of Moral Evaluation, classified as Morality of Character.

Techne and Morality

As has been previously discussed, Aristotle's questionable concept of the relation between Doing and Making complicates that of the relation between Techne and Practical Virtue, and, hence, of the Moral status of Techne.  So, to begin, instead, with the concept of Production, which connotes the generation of any concrete actuality, Productive Reason is any Mental formulation that is productive.  In a diety, a mere thought or fiat might suffice for creativity.  But in humans, the formulation must be executed.  Now, the immediate Product of such execution is some Conduct, which, in many cases, also generates some non-human Product.  In other words, in humans, the immediate Product of Productive Reason is a Doing, of which Making is a special case, i. e. the Product of Making is a mediate Product of Productive Reason.  Thus, for example, in Aristotle's doctrine, two formulas of Productive Reason are: 'Act in accordance with a Mean', and 'Treat a friend as another Self'.  So, since the Conduct produced by the execution of those formulas includes the Virtues of Generosity and Friendship, Productive Reason is not antithetical to traditional Moral values.  Likewise, since Techne--Knowing-How--is human Productive Reason, any association of it with dehumanization can only be derived from either a misunderstanding of the concept, or extrinsic factors.

Techne and Praxis

Aristotle's classification of Techne as Theoretical, not Practical, is based on his distinguishing Making from Doing.  However, he does not explain why Making is not a kind of Doing, from which it would follow that Techne is a special case of Praxis.  Now, in some places, it seems that the grounds for the distinction is that Doing is an interpersonal relation, while Making is a relation between a person and something inert.  However, expressions like 'knowing how to treat others' suggest that Skill cannot be reduced to an inhuman process.  Indeed, insofar as the Nichomachean Ethics aims at the cultivation of Virtue, i. e. at character-building, Aristotle's distinguishing of Techne from Contemplation and Practical Virtue is itself a product of Know-How.  Nevertheless, the contemporary reputation of Techne as both intellectually and morally deficient reflects that Aristotle's classifications of Mental powers have survived better than has his Cosmology.

Teleology and Gravity

Aristotelian Cosmology is hierarchical--Up and Down are the value-laden High and Low.  Furthermore, the distinction between High and Low is one of kind, not of degree.  In Platonism, the kinds are Ideality vs. Reality, in Aristotelianism, they are Unmoved vs. Teleologically Moved.  So, half the repudiation of Aristotelian Cosmology is the consequence of Heliocentricism, which homogenizes High and Low as merely Up and Down from a terrestrial perspective.  The other half is the discovery of Universal Gravitation, which replaces Teleology as the Cosmological motor force, with infinitely multiple centers, rather than one.  Now, as has been demonstrated in the centuries since that discovery, terrestrial Gravity has become superable, which Aristotle considers impossible with respect to Teleology, thereby enabling travel from Low to High.

Deity, Teleology, Extraterrestriality

Aristotelianism has been repudiated in several respects.  But, two of them taken in combination reveal his prescience.  First, his closed Geocentrism has been supplanted by not only Heliocentrism, but a concept of an indefinitely open Universe.  Second, his concept of a deity that moves the rest of the Cosmos Teleologically has had little Theological traction over the centuries.  However, with respect to the location of that deity, he has anticipated the perhaps fundamental course of Modern Human history.  For, that location is the circumference of his Cosmos, which, in Modern Astronomy, is an extraterrestrial realm.  So, to the extent that the realm is now being conceived as the destiny of the Human race, Aristotelian Teleology has been accurate.

Productive Reason, Unproductive Reason, Re-inversion

There can be little doubt of the value of Productive Reason--the immediate product of which is intelligent action, with the fruits of intelligent action among its mediate products.  In contrast, Philosophers have struggled to not only justify Unproductive Reason, e. g. Contemplation, but to elevate it over Productive Reason, e. g. Techne.  Nevertheless, their preference for that variety of mental process is susceptible to Marx' charge of Classism, i. e. that it expresses the privilege of the leisure class, and to Nietzsche's diagnosis that it is a symptom of the Ressentiment of the Weak, e. g. the insularity of the concept of Necessity in Deductive Logic.  So, as is the case in Marx's concept of the relation of Materialism to Spiritualism, and in Nietzsche's concept of the relation of the Morality of Strength to the Morality of Weakness, the concept of the relation between Productive Reason and Unproductive Reason constitutes a re-inversion of a usurpation that has characterized much Philosophy over the centuries.

Productive Reason and Unproductive Reason

As has been previously discussed, an alternative to the traditional Theoretical Reason-Practical Reason contrast is that of Productive Reason vs. Unproductive Reason.  Thus, for example, both sides of the former contrast are subsumed under Unproductive Reason.  Now, Productive Reason can be either immediate or mediate, with the former variety, e. g. a thought that directly actualizes its content, seemingly no more than an abstract possibility, e. g. the capacity of a deity.  But, an example of mediate Productive Reason is familiar--Techne, the product of which can be both concrete action and a product of that action, e. g. knowing how to build a house.  So, whether or not Techne is inferior to Deduction, i. e. a contingent concrete result, to a necessary propositional conclusion, as it has usually been judged to be since Aristotle, depends on which between Productive Reason and Unproductive Reason is the superior process.

Deductive Logic and Productive Logic

In its usual usage, the term 'Practical Syllogism' is only nominally 'practical'--it is constituted by a sequence of Propositions as much as a Theoretical Syllogism is, defined also by Deductive Logic. That is why there is a profound lacuna in Kant's doctrine--between 'I ought to do X' and doing X, that the stern words "Categorical Imperative" cannot fill.  In contrast, Reason that is truly Practical, formulated by a Syllogism that is truly Practical, is one in which a mere thought suffices to actualize the content.  In this case, the Instantiation of a Universal is literal, or, equivalently, Reason is efficacious.  So, a better term for it might be Productive Reason, with the sequence of which, accordingly, the Productive Syllogism, defined by Productive Logic.  Thus, the Necessity that characterizes Productive Logic is more powerful than that of Deductive Logic.

Wonder and Experimental Reason

According to Aristotle, Philosophy begins with Wonder, e. g. at celestial phenomena, which eventually blossoms into Contemplation.  But, he does not consider that Wonder first arises at a very early age, when a child asks, 'What will happen if I do this?'  On that basis, Wonder blossoms into Experimental Reason, and it is the latter that is the defining characteristic of Philosophy.  Still, regardless of which concept of Wonder is prior, the alternative illustrates what is inadequate in Aristotle's--it is indeterminate as to what is being questioned about its object, as the absence of any corresponding clear articulation signifies.  In other words, he does not specify what question he is posing when he 'wonders', e. g. "What is the Moon?", "What causes the Moon to exist?", etc., nor is it likely that he is expressing the contemporary wondering about whether or not celestial bodies are inhabitable, can be travelled to, etc.  This uncertainty only reinforces the criticism that his concept of Wonder is derived from and contingently abstracted from one that is more fundamental.  In other words, Aristotle does not consider that underlying his contemplative wonder is a what if? impulse of Experimental Reason.  Absent such an impulse, closed Aristotelian Cosmology might still be accepted as an Eternal Truth.

Concrescence, Primary Causality, Sufficient Causality

The entire given Universe is ingredient in a Whiteheadian Concrescence, but to varying degrees of relevance.  So, to focus on the most relevant ingredient in such a Process, the term Primary Cause can be used.  Most usages of 'cause', in both common parlance and specialized contexts, signify a Primary Cause, and it can apply to any one of the four Aristotelian Causes, as well as to a Proximate Cause, though a Proximate Cause, e. g. the last stage of a mechanical, is not necessarily the Primary Cause of what ensues.  Now, a Primary Cause is not necessarily a Sufficient Cause, and, if Whitehead is correct about other factors always being involved, then it never completely suffices.  However, knowledge of what results from a Primary Cause in combination with other factors is possible.  Thus, Spinoza is mistaken when he seemingly equates Adequate Idea with Adequate Cause, i. e. the latter suffices to produce an Effect, but the former can consist in the knowledge of a variety of ingredients in the generation of an Effect, only part of which is the Primary Cause.

Morality, Physics, Chemistry

Whitehead's concept of Concrescence is better exemplified by an interaction in Chemistry than by the prototypical scenario studied in Physics, i. e.  by a reaction brought about by a combination of factors vs. one object in motion striking another one, thereby setting it in motion.  But regardless of the apparent simplicity of the latter, Whitehead's model is a reminder that the scenario abstracts from other factors, e. g. friction, the angle of the surface, atmospheric conditions, the internal compositions of the two objects, etc.  In any case, it is the Physics interaction that is incorporated into Psychology and Morality, beginning with the standard concept of Behavior as constituted by a Means-End pattern, which is nothing but the prototypical  Cause-Effect pattern of Physics.  Accordingly, Sentimentalist Moral programs tend to advise in terms of that pattern, e. g. deferring immediate gratification in favor of a later, greater Pleasure.  But even notable Rationalist responses, i. e. Aristotle's or Kant's, also conceive interpersonal interaction in terms of Means and Ends.  Thus, no consideration is given in these theories to the concept of human relations as chemical combinations, which would thereby extend the concept of Concrescence to Morality and Political Philosophy, well beyond Whitehead's vision of it.

Concrescence, Causality, Experimental Method

Whether or not he intends it, Whitehead's system helps explicate one of the essential features of Experimental Method.  For, he conceives all novelty to be a Concrescence of the entire given Universe, the parts of which varying in degrees of relevance to the final moment.  Accordingly, Cause and Effect are products of a two-fold retrospective analysis of a Concrescence--an Effect is the final phase, isolated from what precedes it, and its Cause is the most relevant of those earlier phases.  It is easy to confirm that this concept has greater fidelity to actual experience than do the abstractions that are typically presented in Philosophy or Physics, though less so in Chemistry.  Thus, the model defines part of the task of Experiment--the determination of a Cause by segregating a factor in a Concrescence, via controls of other variable factors.  So, if these controls, essential to the success of determining a Cause, e. g. of a disease, are what Whitehead characterizes as "cooking the facts", he underappreciates the grounding that his system provides for the Experimental Method.

Rationalism, Empiricism, Sentimentalism

In some circles, Rationalism vs. Empiricism is an Epistemological debate, but the conflict also applies to Psychological and Moral theories.  In those, the Rationalist holds that one can and/or should be motivated by Reason.  In contrast, the Empiricist, sometimes better known as a Sentimentalist, asserts that only Pleasure and Pain have motive power, with Reason functioning only as a means in pursuing the former and avoiding the latter.  That thesis is itself Psychological, usually classified as Hedonism, but since it recognizes an indeterminacy in the means to its ends, it recognizes the possibility of better or worse means, via the aid of Reason, the result of which are varieties of Moral Sentimentalism, e. g. some Eudaimonisms, Prudentialism, Utilitarianism, etc.  Now, while, in some cases, Empiricism entails Sentimentalism, e. g. Hume, most notably, in other cases it does not.  For example, Aristotle is an Empiricist insofar as he conceives that the seeking of Knowledge begins with immediate sense observation.  But, both Psychologically and Morally he is a Rationalist, since he asserts that human behavior can and ought to be controlled by Reason, i. e. by his concept of a Mean.

Empiricism and Objectivity

The foundations of Locke's Empiricism are the immediate objects of the five senses.  He then distinguishes in those objects Primary Qualities and Secondary Qualities, and Berkeley eliminates the former completely, as does Hume.  But, the resulting experiential data can no longer be characterized as 'sensory', since the sense organs are part of what has been eliminated.  Likewise eliminated are any grounds for a distinction between Subject and Object, e. g. Hume's Bundle of Perceptions constitutes any entity as much as the 'I'.  So, this tradition can no longer be classified as 'Empiricism', and it lacks any criterion of Objectivity.  In contrast, Bacon's Empiricism seeks objective Knowledge via impersonally repeatable operations on observed things and events.  In other words, by privatizing Empiricism, Locke et al. abstract it from its social relevance.

Unmoved Mover, Causality, Critique of Religion

Aristotle's Unmoved Mover 1. is self-moving; 2. is unmoved by anything else; 3. moves everything else.  Now, the Causality involved in #3 is Teleological, i. e. it is the obect of desire of everything else.  However, it is unclear if, or how, the Causality involved in #1 is Teleological, or is any of the other three, for that matter.  Regardless, there is no Causality involved in #2.  So, while this concept seems internally indeterminate, and perhaps incoherent, it is valuable in one respect.  It serves as a critique of any religion constituted by any Causality other than unilateral Teleological, e. g. by human prayer or ritual, on the one hand, and divine reward and punishment, on the other.  The critique thus applies not only to pagan religions, but also to those the Theology of which draw upon Aristotelianism.

Omniscience and Omnipotence

Because Aristotle's deity is perpetually active Mind, it might be better characterized as 'self-moving', rather than his "unmoved".  Regardless, its internal dynamic is distinct from the Causality by virtue of which it is the "mover" of everything else--the "desire" of the moved for it.  Now, such Teleological Causality is clearer in the case of the entity whose enjoyments of mental activity are sporadic and finite than it is in the case of any entity with no obvious mental experience, e. g. an orbiting celestial body.  Instead, that the equivalence of Knowledge and Power is entailed, as has been previously discussed, in Aristotle's concept of Active Mind, suggests a different concept of Deity.  For, it follows that Omniscience and Omnipotence are also equivalent, so, the Deity that possesses them can create an object merely by thinking it--capacity that is surely desired by the lesser entities who must toil, with no guarantee of success, to actualize its objects.  Plus, that Deity is still the creator of any entity, e. g. a planet, that might lack such desire.  So it is debatable that his deity is supreme in the terms of his system.

Contemplation and Power

Probably the most misleading term in Aristotle's oeuvre is 'contemplation'.  For, while the word commonly connotes 'passive observation', in Metaphysics XII, 7, he characterizes the condition as "active", and, more notably, in On the Soul, III, 5, as "productive" and as "an art".  In other words, it is constituted by a possession of Power, from which it follows that Bacon's identity of Knowledge and Power is a recovery of, not a departure from, true Aristotelianism.  Similarly, his concept of the "desire to know", formulated at the outset of the Metaphysics, is equivalent to a Will to Power.

Productive Imagination, Schematism, Techne

Kant does not merely systematize the cognitive operations from the two main traditions of the previous era, he discovers one that is hitherto unknown--Productive Imagination.  In contrast with Reproductive Imagination, which copies Sense-Experience, Productive Imagination is the source of Schematism, which, in accordance with Concepts, delineates objects in advance of actual experience, a process that he characterizes variously as a "method", a "procedure", and an "art".  Now, in the relevant passages, his concern is the contribution of Schematism to Cognition.  But, it is, thus, analogously ingredient in Action, i. e. in which what it delineates in advance is motions in accordance with Concepts.  Thus, it is an essential factor in mundane operations such as following a set of instructions, as well as, more generally, in Techne.  On the other hand, it seems to be not a factor at all in Contemplation, which Aristotle conceives as immediate and intuitive.  Thus, Techne cannot be derived from Contemplation, which leaves Aristotle's judgment that it is inferior to the latter problematic, i. e. he therefore cannot argue that Techne is an degenerated mode of Contemplation.

Techne and Contemplation

According to Aristotle, Techne and Contemplation is each a Knowledge of Universals, but that the products of Techne are variable constitutes its inferiority to the latter.  Thus, it is unclear if it is insofar as it is productive, or insofar as its products are variable, that it is inferior.  Now, the Metaphysics does not quite clarify his judgment.  For, his definition of Contemplation as Knowledge of "first causes" is that of what the First Cause is--the Unmoved Mover.  But that Knowledge is distinct from Knowledge of Causality itself, a Knowledge that seems difficult to conceive without entailing Productivity.  So, the superiority of Contemplation might consist instead in the non-variability of the products of the First Cause, or, in other words, that the object of Contemplation, unlike that of Techne, is Necessary Causality.  But, then, he is arguing that the thought of the Causality of some other entity is superior to first-hand acquaintace with his own.  So, to accommodate that strong objection, Aristotle would seem to need to shift focus to an example of first-hand Knowledge of Necessary productivity, which, in his system can be only Syllogistic reasonong, i. e. the production of Consequences from Premises, which he discusses in On the Soul. But, how that process, i. e. Logic, is not Techne, i. e. a Knowledge of how to generate one proposition from another, remains unclear.

Techne and Political Philosophy

According to Plato, what qualifies the Philosopher to rule is Knowledge of the Idea of the Good.  Now, such Knowledge is Contemplation, but though he suggests that via the influence of that Idea, a ruler can harmonize the Polis, he does not explain how they can accomplish that.  In other words, Plato does not examine the Techne of ruling, and nor does Aristotle.  And nor does Bacon, even as he elevates Techne over Contemplate.  Rather, perhaps the only major work of Political Philosophy in which ruling is treated as a skill is The Prince.  So, while the break of the latter from Ancient Political Philosophy is generally considered to be its promotion of less than noble conduct in a ruler, the more fundamental innovation may be, a century before Bacon, the implicit elevation of Techne over Contemplation as the Knowledge that is essential to successful ruling.