Physics and Sufficient Reason

While for Newton, the Principle of Sufficient Reason inheres in objects, as is expressed by his first Law of Motion, for Kant, it is a mental synthesizing process that constructs objects of knowledge, as is articulated in his Second Analogy.  So, since the latter is applicable to only phenomena, Kant argues that Newton's positing of the existence of an incorporeal first mover, i. e. of his deity, is an illegitimate extension of the PSR.  More generally, according to Kant, qua Theoretical, the Principle can only motivate the search for an unconditioned cause, and never ground the cognition of it.  But, upon the Kantian revolution, in which motion is located in the subject, Reason locates free causality in itself, i. e. in its Pure Principle of Practical Reason.  In other words, that revolution transforms the PSR from a Theoretical to a Practical proposition, with the latter the ground of the former.  However, Kant seems to leave unexplored the status of an Experimental PSR, which, on the one hand, entails a search for knowledge, but, on the hand, entails the positing of the free causality of events in a controlled context, e. g. Galileo rolling balls down an incline in order to demonstrate that they accelerate.

Experimental Reason

'Deduction' can be defined as a relation between a universal proposition and an instance, and 'induction' as that between a multiplicity of individual propositions and a general one.  An inference that is an alternative to both of these--from a single arbitrary individual proposition to a universal one--is recognized as 'universal generalization' in contemporary Predicate Logic. Such reasoning is involved in most mathematical and geometrical demonstrations, in which a proof pertaining to the properties of a single example suffices for all cases.  Kant's insight, developed in the B edition preface to the 1st Critique, is that the same inference is involved in experimental logic, i. e. in which the results of a single experiment, e. g. Galileo's experiment with balls rolling down a plane to show that they accelerate, suffices for all cases.  His explanation for the validity of such an inference is that it entails Reason recognizing its own contribution to phenomena, and, hence, as entailing a prior knowledge.

Revolution, Constructivism, Experimentalism

Kant's theory of Knowledge is often characterized as 'Constructivism', because its objects are the products of an organizing of raw sensory material by a priori mental structures.  Accordingly, Constructivist a priori knowledge includes the structural features of objects that are the mind's own contribution, in contrast with the status of such knowledge in the theories of Kant's Rationalist and Empiricist predecessors.  Now, it is the first appearance of Constructivist insight that Kant characterizes, in the Preface to the B edition of the 1st Critique, at B xi, as an intellectual "revolution", which he attributes to an anonymous ancient Egyptian thinker, and of which the Copernican innovation is a special case.  But, furthermore, that appearance is, more precisely, an "experiment", as Kant puts it, at B xi.  Hence, the fundamental 'revolution' that is the main theme of that preface, is the emergence of the experimental method, which is why the inscription that precedes that Preface is a quote from Bacon, the father of modern Experimentalism.

Physics, Time, Causality

As is well-known, Newtonian Physics departs from the Aristotelian in at least two respects--that it is mathematized, and that the only Causality that it recognizes is Efficient.  Kant's interpretation of Newton's theory demonstrates the common root of those two developments.  As a system of Appearances, according to Kant, one of its fundamental Forms is Time, i. e. Successiveness.  Now, Successiveness is the basic structure of enumeration, and, hence, of Mathematics.  Furthermore, Successiveness is Atomistic, i. e. the contents of distinct moments are discrete with respect to one another, which precludes their being related by any other than Efficient Causality.  On this interpretation, Kant relocates Teleological Causality to an extra-natural realm, though, by re-conceiving Temporality as concrescent, Whitehead shows how such Dualism can be avoided.  On the other hand, Whitehead seems to remain committed to his and Russell's pioneering Atomistic concept of Mathematics.

The God Particle

Given that in traditional Theology, Matter is often conceived as antithetical to divine Spirit, the dubbing of the recently discovered Higgs boson--a particle posited as the source of Matter in the universe--as the 'God particle', seems deliberately heretical.  However, many physicists reject that rubric, not out of piety, but because they want to distance Physics from any mystical connotations.  Still, that distancing from Theology does not immunize their equally grandiose ambitions from the same critical scrutiny.  For example, the assertion, 'The Higgs boson, an elementary particle of Matter, imparts Mass to other particles', requires definitions of 'Matter' and 'Mass', which could reveal their relation as merely an instance of the hardly exceptional one of Motion to quantified Motion, as Kant's definitions do.  More generally, in the absence of an adequate response to Kant, the Higgs boson is no more than an hypothesis about phenomena, and, hence, is inadequate to serve as a fundament of the universe-in-itself.  In other words, Kant's critique of the excesses of speculation applies just as much to Physics as it does to Theology.

Physics and Phenomena

Some interpret Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science as an attempt to certify Newtonian Physics, i. e. by demonstrating that the latter is grounded in the a priori structures of Experience--Space, Time, and the Categories of the Understanding.  However, such an interpretation confuses Kant's ambition with Husserl's, which is to defend Science from the "crisis" of a reduction to Empiricism, and, hence, to contingency.  However, as is plain from the Critique of Pure Reason, the primary purpose of the Foundations is to demonstrate that Newtonian Physics is a system merely of Phenomena, in order both to expose some of its groundless pretensions, as well as to immunize Morality, i. e. the realm of Freedom, from it.

Linearity and Dimensionality

Whitehead is among those who have argued that a zero-dimensional point is an abstraction.  But, a one-dimensional line, too, is an abstraction.  Thus, Newtonian Motion, which is given as either rectilinear or curvilinear, is likewise an abstraction.  Direction, too, is linear, and it is because expansion is a motion that cannot be reduced to one-dimensionality that attribution of direction to it seems problematic, as has been previously discussed.  Furthermore, insofar as the very notion of 'dimension' is correlated with linearity, then all dimensionality is abstract, including three-dimensionality, as well as 4- or any n-dimensionality  In other words, the characterization of lived experience as 'three-dimensional' is a geometrical abstraction.

Physics, Radiality, Direction

According to Kant's representation of Newtonian Physics, every motion consists of Velocity and Direction.  However, the direction of radial motion seems unclear.  For, if, as Kant describes one example of that motion, expansion, which is caused by repulsion from within, a body "endeavors to extend itself everywhere", "on all sides", then he implies that it moves in all directions at once.  However, a multiplicity of directions would seem to imply a multiplicity of motions, not one.  Rather, omnidirectionality is itself derived from a pre-directional radial encompassing of all directions.  In other words, Direction is abstracted from Radiality.  Now, oriented Space, e. g. experiential space, is self-evidently radial.  Thus, Kantian Space, which is oriented, is the a priori ground of Newtonian Directionality, as has been previously proposed here.

Physics, Space, Direction

The main ambition of Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science is to ground Newtonian Physics in the a priori structures of Experience--Space, Time, and the Categories of the Understanding.  For the most part, the correlation between e. g. Category and Newtonian Principle, is explicit, with one exception--Direction.  Kant comments that the "usual definition" of the latter is sufficient, with the qualification that, as he shows in the Prolegomena, any perceived asymmetry is derived from the forms of Intuition, and is neither a intellectual concept nor a property of things-in-themselves.  Lacking, therefore, is an explicit demonstration of the ground of Directionality that is as exhaustive as most of his other deductions.  One such available demonstration begins with the irreducible Here-There asymmetry of the oriented Space of the experiencing Subject, on the basis of which all others can be projected--not only Right-Left, but Above-Below, Clockwise-Counterclockwise, as well as any angular degree, for example.  The seeming impossibility otherwise of Directionality in non-oriented Newtonian Space demands this more thorough demonstration.

Matter--Dynamic and Inert

According to Kant's representation of Newtonian Physics, a body is both 1. 'dynamic', insofar as it is constituted by internal repulsive and attractive forces, and 2. 'inert', insofar as it can be moved only by an external force.  So, one challenge to Newton is to explain how his deus ex machina manages to function from within Matter, which the imparting to the latter of a repulsive force would seem to entail.  For, Kant, whether a fundamental particle is dynamic, or is inert, seems reducible to the question of whether there exists a further irreducible particle, i. e. to a dialectical antinomy.  However, to allow even the possibility of a particle moving itself would seem to disrupt the fundamental premise of his Freedom-Nature distinction.  An alternative resolution to the apparent dynamic-inertia conflict is to infer from the former that Matter is not essentially independent of Force, but is itself a product of it, e. g. of Repulsion and Attraction in equilibrium, with respect to which, Inertia is a derivative characteristic.  Subsequent developments in sub-atomic Physics have tended to confirm that alternative.

Copernican Revolution and Matter

The Geocentric model grounds a concept of Spirit-Matter, i. e. Heaven-Earth, contiguity, which is, thus, severed by the Copernican revolution.  One replacement has been pan-Animism, pioneered by the ill-fated Bruno, and anticipating the almost equally reviled Pantheism of Spinoza.  The more prevalent alternative has been Dualism, in which essentially inert Matter is linked to Spirit via a problematic tertium quid, e. g. Descartes' 'pineal gland'.  For Kant, who transposes the Dualism to Praxis, i. e. as Freedom vs. Nature, that arguably equally problematic tertium quid is a retributive deity, i. e. a rewarder of Virtue, a bridge which, still, fails to explain how Matter, i. e. the content of 'Nature', is classified in the system as both "inert" and "dynamic".  However, neither classification is fundamental, for, according to Kant, 'Nature' is only mere 'appearance', which Schopenhauer further reduces to the status of 'illusion'.  Thus, given that the advocacy of the latter thesis has sent no one to the stake, the elimination of Matter from Existence seems to be the less hazardous consequence of the Copernican revolution.  

Copernican Revolution and Democracy

To associate a 'Copernican revolution' with a transition primarily from Geocentrism to Heliocentrism distracts from a broader undermining to which it contributes.  As part of Medieval Theology, Geocentrism reinforces the hierarchical value systems of the era, e. g. Theocracies.  Hence, the repudiation of it helps destroy the authority of such political arrangements, leading, as history has demonstrated, to the predominance of Democracy.   Thus, the more accurate Astronomical analogue of these revolutionary political developments is a fundamental decentralization of the universe, advocated by Cusa and Bruno, notably, that provides the more general context for any Copernican re-centering.

Copernican Revolution and Utilitarianism

As part of Medieval Theology, Geocentrism is no mere Astronomical theory, but is an expression of a Spirit-Matter Moral hierarchy, with the Earth at not the center, but at the bottom of the cosmos.  Accordingly, a Moral system that inverts that order is Hedonism, for which Pleasure makes the world go round, and proximity to which is a criterion of the value of anything else in the universe.  In contrast, in Kantianism, Morality is independent of any physical ordering.  Thus, Utilitarianism is a more accurate reflection of a Moral 'Copernican revolution' than is Kant's doctrine.

Revolve and Revolt

Contributing to the confusion over Kant's allusion to Copernicus is the use of the term 'revolution' to characterize a metaphor about theories of revolving bodies.  Further complicating the confusion is the ambiguity of the term, which can mean either 'revolving' or 'revolting', which are clearly not equivalent.  For, while the former means 'turning 360 degrees', the latter means 'turning 180 degrees', i .e. means 'inverting'.  So, the spinning Earth and the orbiting Earth 'revolve', Copernicus and Kant 'revolt', while the French Revolution accomplishes both.

Theology, Practical Reason, Copernican Revolution

Kant is surely mindful that Geocentricism is as much an integral feature of Medieval Theology as are the proofs of the existence of God that he refutes.  Thus, he surely appreciates that both Copernicus' and his own innovations have general systematic implicates, i. e. that they constitute more than specifically Astronomical and Epistemological revolutions.  Now, the focal point of his theological inversion is the transition from Theoretical Reason to Practical Reason.  Likewise, the decisive moment of his interpretation of the Copernican inversion--that "the spectator is made to revolve", as he characterizes it--is that the "spectator" becomes a performer.  On that basis, the spinning Earth, but not the immobile Sun, is a plausible specifically astronomical analogue.

Motility and Copernican Revolution

As has been previously discussed, Kant's phrase, at B xvii of the 1st Critique, characterizing Copernicus' insight, in which "the spectator is made to revolve", can be interpreted either as 'the spectator is made to revolve around the Sun', as tradition has it, or as 'the spectator is made to rotate around the axis of the Earth, as urged here.  Still, there is a more literal alternative to both, namely, that the spectator, independent of the Earth at which it is located, and of any celestial phenomena, simply itself describes a circular motion.  Now, the thought "made to" connotes a deliberate, spontaneous process, which, ultimately, can be only that of one setting oneself into a revolving motion, e. g. a ballerina spinning on her toe.  In other words, Motility is presupposed by Kant's Copernican revolution, with the spinning of the Earth on its axis the more immediate analog of that self-contained motion.

Space, Relativity, Copernican Revolution

With respect to the perspective of a spectator on the Earth, the circumambient universe can be characterized as 'oriented'.  Likewise, the 'space' that, for Kant, is a form of Intuition, is self-evidently oriented with respect to the subject of Intuition.  That space is 'absolute' insofar as all outer experience occurs within it, not insofar as it is unoriented, as is the case with Newtonian 'absolute space'.  While for the latter, oriented space is 'relative' space, in the Kantian system, that latter is an intellectual concept, not a form of Intuition.  Thus, one by-product of Kant's Copernican revolution is an advocacy of what Physicists call 'relativistic space'.

Nuclear Physics and Copernican Revolution

In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant proposes that there are precisely two fundamental motions--Repulsion and Attraction.  In particular, circular motion combines the Attraction of the parts of a body to its center, with the mutual Repulsion of all its parts.  Now, while Kant's basic example for that analysis is the Earth rotating on its axis, other examples express his recognition of the applicability of the model to the orbiting of one body around a distinct second body.  However, he might not have anticipated its later application to sub-atomic motions, e. g. in the Rutherford-Bohr concept of an atom.  Thus, Kant's Copernican revolution, insofar as it locates fundamental circular motion in a single body, as has been argued here, facilitates the conceivability of a writ large-writ small relation between Astronomy and Nuclear Physics.

Rectilinearity, Time, Copernican Revolution

As has been previously discussed here, in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant posits, inverting the Aristotelian concept of the relation, that circular motion is derived from rectilinear motion.  Now, it seems likely that the priority of the latter motion is an expression of what Kant shows is the rectilinearity of Time, one of the forms of Experience.  Accordingly, given that circular motion is perpetual for Aristotle, Kant's circular-rectilinear inversion is an expression of an Eternity-Time inversion.  So, Kant's Copernican revolution, which relocates Ptolemaic, from Aristotle, celestial circulation in the spectator spinning on the axis of the Earth, is one consequence of his innovative theory of Time.

Rectilinear Motion and Copernican Revolution

In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant defines circular motion as a "continuous change of rectilinear motion", i. e. as derived from the latter.  In contrast, according to Aristotle, circular motion, as perfect, is more fundamental than rectilinear motion, which is imperfect.  Now, as has been previously discussed here, Ptolemaic Astronomy incorporates Aristotle's idealization of circular motion, i. e. in it, the revolving firmament is a divine realm.  Hence, pivotal to the Metaphysical and Theological implications of Kant's Copernican revolution, in which celestial circulation is relocated into the spectator, is his inversion of the established relation between circular motion and rectilinear motion.

Rational Revolution and Copernican Revolution

Perhaps encouraging the standard interpretation of 'Kant's Copernican revolution'--which proposes that object : subject = Earth : Sun--is Kant's characterization of Copernicus as theorizing "in a manner contradictory to the senses", in the footnote to B xxii.  For, Kant could be interpreted, with justification, on the one hand, as alluding to, in that passage, Plato's use of the Sun as an image of non-empirical Intellect, while on the other, as, more generally, locating the Intellect within the Subject.  However, such an interpretation founders on the characterization, also in the same footnote, that Copernicus located "observed movements", i. e. the apparent circular motions of celestial bodies, in the Subject.  In other words, while Kant may indeed have effected a Rational revolution, the latter is not to be confused with his Copernican revolution.

Circular Motion and Copernican Revolution

Celestial circular motion is more than a quaint astronomical feature of the Ptolemaic Geocentrism that Copernicus supplants.  For, based on Aristotle's idealization of it, circular motion is the defining characteristic of divinity.  Thus, the standard interpretation of Kant's 'Copernican revolution'--that it constitutes a mere change of perspective--abstracts from the substantive Metaphysical and Theological significance of Kant's relocation of fundamental circular motion.  Likewise, that interpretation misses the significance of the analysis of circular motion that Kant presents in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.  There, he shows that the spinning of the Earth, though perceivable independent of reference to any celestial phenomenon, is, nevertheless, relative motion, i. e. is hardly divine.  Thus, the Copernican transformation that has been emphasized here--from a revolving firmament to a spinning earth--better illustrates the Metaphysical and Theological inversions entailed in Kant's own innovations than does the standard version.

Mathematics and Copernican Revolution

As Kant shows, the Copernican re-orientation of perception from object to subject locates the principles of Geometry in the latter.  Similarly, the re-orientation of Motion from object to subject locates the principles of Arithmetic in the subject, i. e. Arithmetic is the science of Enumeration, and Enumerability is given with the Temporality of Experience.  Now, for Kant, Geometry is quantified, and, hence, is ultimately grounded in Arithmetical relations.  Furthermore, for Kant, Physics, in general, is based in Mathematics, and, hence, in Arithmetic.  Thus, the Copernican image that is significant to Kant is not the immobile Sun, but the spinning Earth, i. e. it is the latter, not the former, that is primarily instructive in Kant's 'Copernican revolution'.

Gravity and Copernican Revolution

Perhaps the best textual support for the standard interpretation of Kant's 'Copernican revolution'--that he effects a transition that is analogous to Copernicus' transition from Geocentrism to Heliocentrism--is in a footnote to B xxii of the 1st Critique.  There, Kant cites the influence of Copernicus' insights on Newton's theory of Gravitation, regarding the attraction that "holds the universe together", which would seem to directly apply to the orbiting of the Earth around the Sun, i. e. to Heliocentrism.  However, in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, written by Kant before the B edition of the 1st Critique, the fundamental type of circular motion is presented as that of a body spinning on its axis, with respect to which the orbiting of one body around another, including examples of the latter taken from Newton's works, are special cases.  Hence, the passage at B xxii does not effectively challenge the hypothesis previously proposed here--that the Copernican transition, from Geocentrism, that primarily inspires Kant is that to the Earth spinning on its own axis, not that to the Earth orbiting the Sun.

Relative Motion and Copernican Revolution

Also written by Kant between the two editions of the 1st Critique is the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, the main theme of which is the relativity of Motion.  One prominent example in this work is the motion of a body rotating on its axis, while, on the other hand, there seems to be no attention to heliocentric phenomena.  Thus, while there is no reference to Copernicus in these passages, they tend to confirm the hypothesis, previously presented here, that the allusion to him in the B edition of the 1st Critique concerns the rotation of the Earth on its axis, not the orbiting of the Earth around the Sun, as the traditional interpretation of Kant's 'Copernican revolution' has it.

Copernican Inversion

In the passages that allude to Copernicus, Kant's only use of 'revolution' is with respect to astronomical processes being studied, not to any paradigm shift effected by Copernicus.  Furthermore, Kant's own transformation that is the topic of those passages--from perception as conforming to its objects, to perceptual objects conforming to perceptual processes--can be more accurately characterized as an 'inversion'.  Now, the transition that has been usually connoted by the phrase 'Copernican revolution'--from Geocentrism to Heliocentrism--is not an 'inversion', i. e. the latter pertains, in conjunction with the tilt of the Earth's axis, to annual phenomena, while the former pertains to daily phenomena.  In contrast, the transition from the Sun rotating around the Earth, to the Earth spinning on its axis with respect to an immobile Sun, is inversive.  So, 'Copernican inversion' better characterizes the Kantian transformation than does 'Copernican revolution'.

Practical Reason and Copernican Revolution

As has been previously discussed, appearances, for Kant, are fundamentally events.  Now, in his system, a special case of Event is one entailing spontaneity, i. e. Action., the most intimate example of which is the appearing of a Mind to itself.  In other words, on this model, the appearing Mind is not a bare static 'I', but a performing one.  Hence, just as the transition to an Event ontology is one expression of Kant's 'Copernican revolution', the transition of atomic Subjectivity to Agency is another, which could explain why his allusion to Copernicus is not presented until after his development of the concept of Pure Practical Reason.

Perception, Event, Copernican Revolution

For Kant's modern predecessors, perception is at least partly mediated by subjective conditions.  So, his concept of perceptual object as mediated by subjective processes, is not a radical innovation.  Rather, his distinctive contribution to the tradition is the temporalization of those subjective conditions, yielding, via the Schematism, essentially temporal objects of perception.  In more contemporary jargon, perceptual objects are, on his model, fundamentally events, not substances, or qualities, as they generally are for both his modern and ancient predecessors.  For example, what is traditionally rendered as 'A perceives B', with 'B' either a substance or a quality, is, according to Kant, derived from a more fundamental 'A perceives that S is P', with 'S' some relatively enduring feature, 'P' some relatively ephemeral feature, and one or the other = 'B'.  So, one of the expressions of his 'Copernican revolution' is a transition to an event ontology, from the more traditional substance or quality ontology.

Mind, Appearance, Copernicus

Kant's allusion to Copernicus appears in the B edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, along with many other revisions, composed subsequent to his development of his theory of Practical Reason.  One significant departure from the A edition is his study of 'self-affection', a process in which Mind actively appears to itself, including examples in which he ascribes motion to appearing Mind.  Thus, it is not only his own earlier concept of Mind that the revision surpasses, but that of Hume's passive observer, as well.  In other words, the context for his allusion to a Copernican spectator is one in which Kant has already presented Mind as an active mobile frame of reference, and, so, as one better illustrated by the Earth rotating on its axis, than by either the immobile Earth of Geocentrism, or the immobile Sun of Heliocentrism.

Atomism, Temporality, Copernicus

According to Atomism, relations between fundamental elements are external to them.  Thus, for Hume, Temporality is an external relation, i. e. in 'A precedes B', neither A nor B are temporal, and 'precedes' is a special case of  'differs from', an intellectual construction extrinsically imposed on sensory data A and B.  Kant's response, which is supported by subsequent micro-analysis, is that A and B each is itself temporal, i. e. each is an event that, as brief as it may appear to be, takes time to occur.  In other words, for Kant, even basic perception is a mobile event.  That is a main reason why the Copernican example that is significant to Kant is neither the immobile Earth of Geocentrism, nor the immobile Sun of Heliocentrism, but the revolving spectator, i. e. around the axis of the Earth, as has been previously argued here, against the standard interpretation of his 'Copernican revolution'.

Mind, Concert Hall, Movie Theater

Bergson's theory of Experience suggests two variations on Hume's image of Mind as a theater--concert hall and movie theater--with the latter, of course, unknown to Hume in his lifetime.  These images illustrate the essential flue of Experience, which Hume's static 'bundle', his most prominent characterization of multiplicity in the theater, falsifies.  But, the pioneer of that concept of Experience is Kant, who first discerns that Temporality is a fundamental condition of whatever transpires in the mental theater.